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The complexity of the strategic decision making environments, in which busi-
nesses and governments live in, makes such decisions more and more difficult to
make. People and organizations with access to the best known decision support
modelling and analysis tools and methods cannot seem to benefit from such re-
sources. We argue that the reason behind the failure of most current decision and
game theoretic methods is that these methods are made to deal with operational and
tactical decisions, not strategic decisions. While operational and tactical decisions
are clear and concise with limited scope and short-term implications, allowing them
to be easily formalized and reasoned about, strategic decisions tend to be more gen-
eral, ill-structured, complex, with broader scope and long-term implications. This
research work starts with a review of the current dominant modelling and analysis
approaches, their strengths and shortcomings, and a look at how pioneers in the
field criticize these approaches as restrictive and unpractical. Then, the work goes
on to propose a new paradigm shift in how strategic decisions and conflicts should
be modelled and analyzed.
Constrained Rationality is a formal qualitative framework, with a robust method-
ological approach, to model and analyze ill-structured strategic single and multi-
agent decision making situations and conflicts. The framework brings back the
strategic decision making problem to its roots, from being an optimization/efficiency
problem about evaluating predetermined alternatives to satisfy predetermined pref-
erences or utility functions, as most current decision and game theoretic approaches
treats it, to being an effectiveness problem of: 1) identifying and modelling explic-
itly the strategic and conflicting goals of the involved agents (also called players
and decision makers in our work), and the decision making context (the external
and internal constraints including the agents priorities, emotions and attitudes); 2)
finding, uncovering and/or creating the right set of alternatives to consider; and
then 3) reasoning about the ability of each of these alternatives to satisfy the stated
strategic goals the agents have, given their constraints. Instead of assuming that
the agents’ alternatives and preferences are well-known, as most current decision
and game theoretic approaches do, the Constrained Rationality framework start
by capturing and modelling clearly the context of the strategic decision making
situation, and then use this contextual knowledge to guide the process of finding
the agents’ alternatives, analyzing them, and choosing the most effective one.
The Constrained Rationality framework, at its heart, provides a novel set of
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modelling facilities to capture the contextual knowledge of the decision making sit-
uations. These modelling facilities are based on the Viewpoint-based Value-Driven
- Enterprise Knowledge Management (ViVD-EKM) conceptual modelling frame-
work proposed by Al-Shawa (2006b), and include facilities: to capture and model
the goals and constraints of the different involved agents, in the decision making
situation, in complex graphs within viewpoint models; and to model the complex
cause-effect interrelationships among theses goals and constraints. The framework
provides a set of robust, extensible and formal Goal-to-Goal and Constraint-to Goal
relationships, through which qualitative linguistic value labels about the goals’ op-
erationalization, achievement and prevention propagate these relationships until
they are finalized to reflect the state of the goals’ achievement at any single point
of time during the situation.
The framework provides also sufficient, but extensible, representation facilities
to model the agents’ priorities, emotional valences and attitudes as value properties
with qualitative linguistic value labels. All of these goals and constraints, and the
value labels of their respective value properties (operationalization, achievement,
prevention, importance, emotional valence, etc.) are used to evaluate the different
alternatives (options, plans, products, product/design features, etc.) agents have,
and generate cardinal and ordinal preferences for the agents over their respective
alternatives. For analysts, and decision makers alike, these preferences can easily
be verified, validates and traced back to how much each of these alternatives con-
tribute to each agent’s strategic goals, given his constraints, priorities, emotions
and attitudes.
The Constrained Rationality framework offers a detailed process to model and
analyze decision making situations, with special paths and steps to satisfy the spe-
cific needs of: 1) single-agent decision making situations, or multi-agent situations
in which agents act in an individualistic manner with no regard to others’ current
or future options and decisions; 2) collaborative multi-agent decision making situ-
ations, where agents disclose their goals and constraints, and choose from a set of
shared alternatives one that best satisfy the collective goals of the group; and 3)
adversarial competitive multi-agent decision making situations (called Games, in
gamete theory literature, or Conflicts, in the broader management science litera-
ture).
The framework’s modelling and analysis process covers also three types of con-
flicts/games: a) non-cooperative games, where agents can take unilateral moves
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among the game’s states; b) cooperative games, with no coalitions allowed, where
agents still act individually (not as groups/coalitions) taking both unilateral moves
and cooperative single-step moves when it benefit them; and c) cooperative games,
with coalitions allowed, where the games include, in addition to individual agents,
agents who are grouped in formal alliances/coalitions, giving themselves the ability
to take multi-step group moves to advance their collective position in the game.
Special modelling and analysis concepts and methods are offered within the
framework to deal with the specific needs of multi-agent adversarial competitive
decision making situations (conflicts or games). The framework defines formally:
the conflict’s states from the agents’ alternatives; the conflict’s structure (itera-
tions, stages, or phases) from the conflict’s states; the calculation of the agents’
preferences over the conflict’s states; the calculation of the preferences’ strengths,
for each of the agents, for each of the states; the different types of moves agents have
within the three types of conflicts (noncooperative, cooperative without coalitions,
and cooperative with coalitions); the stability and equilibrium solution concepts
within these types of conflicts (and the interrelationship among these solution con-
cepts and their respective strength sets); and the qualitative strength measures
for stabilities/equilibriums, for each state, for each agent. In addition, the frame-
work offers algorithms: to decide on the existence of a stability/equilibrium, for
each state of the game, under each of the solution concepts; and to calculate the
strength of this stability/equilibrium.
The research work used illustrative and exploratory case studies, and application
examples, to demonstrate the effectiveness and benefits of using the Constrained
Rationality approach in comparison to what the current dominant approaches pro-
vide. The cases cover a wide range of real-life strategic decision making situations
and conflicts: the Cuban Missile Crisis (a non-cooperative historical political con-
flict); the Elmira Groundwater Contamination Conflict (a cooperative, without
coalitions, historical governmental and environmental policy conflict); the show-
down between RIM and NTP over intellectual property rights (a cooperative multi-
phase, with coalitions, historical strategic business conflict); a multi-stakeholder
requirements engineering collaborative decision making case (a hypothetical case
study, based on a real-life industrial case simplified to fit the scope of our research
context); a car manufacturer’s strategic business decision to accept governmental
bailout or file for bankruptcy (a hypothetical one-agent case study, based on real-life
case simplified to fit the scope of our research context); Howard’s personal dilemma
(a hypothetical case, with high degree of emotionality, from the literature); in addi-
v
tion to some of the classical paradoxes of rationality games (the prisoner’s dilemma,
the iterative prisoner’s dilemma, Tit for Tat, and the game of Chicken).
In all these case studies, and where there are models and analysis for them in
the literature using other frameworks, we showed how the Constrained Rational-
ity framework: performed better in addressing many of the limitations of current
frameworks; provided better modelling and analysis facilities; captured more con-
textual knowledge about the case and the decision maker’s motives and constraints;
and provided more and better insight, learning and predictions. And, where there
are no formal models and analysis exist in the decision and game theoretic literature
for a conflict, such as the case of RIM v. NTP –an important business conflict with
far reaching implications on patent laws and business practices–, we showed how
the Constrained Rationality framework not only provided models and analysis for
this multi-stage multi-game complex real-life strategic conflict, but also produced
accurate predictions of how the confict would evolve.
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Efficiency is doing things right; effectiveness is doing the right things.
Peter Drucker
Why do good, well managed, companies fail? Why did Digital Equipment Co.
go down? Why did Nortel struggle to survive, and in its way to disappear? Why did
IBM almost collapse? And how did it managed to recover? Why did Microsoft, with
its less than perfect products, manage to survive, while Apple almost disappeared?
Why did Sony fail to see the changes happening in its own market, while Apple,
a complete outsider, recognized them? And why did Research In Motion (RIM),
with its revolutionary product been heavily used and relied on by the important
security and political establishment of the post 9/11 US, almost fail to maintain its
presence in the US, its biggest market? All these companies, and many more, were
well managed companies with exceptional sales and marketing arms that listened
and measured customer needs and demands; all possessed exceptional funding,
outstanding R&D, impressive intellectual capital portfolios; and most importantly,
all had unparalleled access to all decision support techniques and tools.
The complexity of the strategic decision making environment in which busi-
nesses live in, especially these days, makes strategic decision making more and
more difficult. In fact, Christensen (1997) argued that it is precisely because these
firms, and the like, listened to their customers, invested aggressively in new tech-
nologies that provided their customers more and better products of the sort they
wanted, and because they carefully studied market trends and systematically allo-
cated investment capital to innovations that promised the best returns, they lost
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their positions of leadership, or worse failed to survive.
But, is this dilemma limited to the business domain? If so, how do we explain
the US, with all its might and resources, failed to foresee the failures they faced
in their war against Iraq? And how do we explain Britain’s failure in the 1956
Suez War, the Tripartite aggression against Egypt? Did the US envision that
Japan and Germany, two countries that lost the war, would become so powerful
economically? Did the US envision China to become the largest creditor to the
US government? And did the US envision the ousting of some of its most trusted
and heavily supported allies in the Middle East, such as the Mubarak regime of
Egypt and the Ben-Ali regime of Tunisia, by popular uprising? It is clear that
the problematic strategic-decision-making dilemma is not limited to the business
world, or even the political world. The problem lies in the nature of the decisions
to be made, not on who make them.
So, what makes such decisions so hard that people and organizations with access
to the best known decision support tools and methods cannot seem to benefit from
such resources? Let us break the question to two parts: 1) what makes strategic
decisions hard to make? and 2) why do the decision support tools and methods fail
to help in the strategic decision making cases listed above? The answer lies in the
characteristics of strategic decisions, and how they differ from other tactical and
operational decisions; and, therefore, whether the decision tools and methods, used
by decision makers, are designed to support strategic decision making.
1.1 Strategic vs. Operational Decisions
The USA Department of Defense (2008) defines three levels of military decisions:
strategic, operational and tactical. The strategic level is concerned with the nation
(or multi-nation) strategic security and military objectives and guidance, decid-
ing on long-term global action plans, defining limits and assessing risks for use of
military and other instruments of national power. The operational level is where
campaigns and operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strate-
gic objectives within theatres or other operational areas. The operational decisions
link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve
the strategic objectives. At the tactical level, battles and engagements are planned
and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.
Decisions at this level focus on the immediate ordered arrangement and maneuver
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Figure 1.1: Goals and Decisions at the Strategic Level of the Organization versus
at the Operational Level
of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat
objectives.
And while the strategic goals and decisions are dealt with at the highest level
of the US government and the military ranks, the operational and tactical ones are
dealt with at lower ranks. Similarly, any other organization, whether governmental,
business, or social, will have some form of these levels (strategic, operational and
tactical). The nature (content and context) of the decisions at all these levels will
differ from one organization to another, but the main characteristics of the decisions
at these levels will mostly stay the same.
Figure 1.1 shows the hierarchal breakdown of goals and decision making environ-
ments within the organization. Strategic Goals are at the top of the organizational
hierarchy, and are different from the Operational or Tactical ones at the middle
and bottom of the hierarchy. While operational and tactical goals are clear and
concise with limited scope and short-term implications, allowing them to be easily
formalized and reasoned about, strategic goals tend to be more general, less clear,
complex, with broader scope and long-term implications. As we go down the hierar-
chy shown in the figure, and as per the definitions provided by USA Department of
Defense (2008), we see the following:
• Goals become clearer;
• Goals become less survival and prosperity type goals;
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• Goals’ scopes decrease;
• Level of control/influence over the environment increases;
• Goals increasingly become inter-related forming a complex network of dy-
namic affect and get-affected relations;
• Constraints increasingly shift from being external to being internal;
• Problems increasingly shift to be optimization problems (how to best use and
allocate resources);
• Options/Alternatives increasingly become easier to identify and rationalize
about; and
• Making the wrong decisions increasingly become less costly.
Strategic Decisions to address the strategic goals are enterprise-wide decisions
that deal with the survival and prosperity of the origination, its directions, its part-
ners, products to have, technologies to invest in, markets it wants to be in, lobbying
it must do, etc. Conflicting goals, conflicting realities, internal constraints, outside
regulations, and so on, are the norm of a strategic decision making environment.
At the same time, departments and lower rank managers consider operational and
tactical decisions that are limited scope decisions with the environment mostly well
defined and under their control.
Even at the individual (human) agents level, strategic goals, such as balancing
life and career goals or deciding on a career/educational path, seem difficult to deal
with and very hard to mobilize or decided on. This is while mobilizing/deciding on
tactical matters such as “what movie to watch tonight”, or “which route to take to
reach work today” are all easy decisions.
Dealing with the complexity of strategic decisions, and how to bring about
the strategic goals the organization/individual have, is very challenging. In most
cases, it is still considered more an art than a science. Many high ranking offi-
cers/directors, and people in general when facing strategic decisions, still rely on
what they consider intuition, or gut feeling.
So, why not use sound mathematical quantitative and precise decision aids and
tools, such as Decision Theory or Game Theory. Why do such theories fail in
every day life to help decision makers, especially at the strategic level, to predict
failures or see creative outcomes. What makes the strategic decision right? Is it
maximization of expected utility? Is it finding the right Nash stable state? or
something else?
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1.2 Strategic Decision Support: Being Effective
vs. Being Efficient
Answering the questions about why current decision analysis theories, such as de-
cision theory and game theory, fail in modelling, and therefore aiding in analyzing,
strategic decision making situations/conflicts, we look at whether these theories are
designed to deal with decision making at the strategic level in the first place. We
look at four major problems which any methodological framework to model and
analyze strategic decision making situations must deal with.
1) The Incomplete-Knowledge Problem: Unknown or Incomplete Op-
tions, Utilities and Preferences
At the tactical level, options can be identified clearly, preferences can be elicited
with no vagueness, and strict assumptions can be accommodated. But at the
strategic decisions level, options are not complete/clear and preferences are harder
to establish. Therefore, decision and game theoretic approaches can be used effec-
tively at the tactical decision making situations (ignoring the criticism, the failures
and the lack of use or interest by practice, which has been reported in the liter-
ature as we will see in Chapter 2). But, these theories, which require complete
identification or determination of all possible options, as well as the utilities and/or
preferences over them, could not be applied to situations where options are not
complete, preferences are hard to establish, and utilities are very subjective and
difficult to define, as it is the case when strategic decisions are considered. The
strict assumptions imposed by these theories are unrealistic at best, as we will see
in Chapter 2.
2) The Effectiveness vs. Efficiency Problem: Quantitative Analysis of
the highly Qualitative Humanistic Systems
In his insightful early paper, Zadeh (1973) stated: “the conventional quantitative
techniques of system analysis are intrinsically unsuited for dealing with humanistic
systems or, for that matter, any system whose complexity is comparable to that
of humanistic systems. The basis for this contention rests on what might be called
the principle of incompatibility. Stated informally, the essence of this principal is
that as the complexity of a system increases, our ability to make precise and yet
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significant statements about its behaviour diminishes until a threshold is reached
beyond which precision and significance (or relevance) become almost mutually
exclusive characteristic. It is in this sense that the precise quantitative analyses of
the behaviour of humanistic systems are not likely to have much relevance to the
real world societal, political, economic, and other types of problems which involve
humans either as individuals or in groups”.
The majority of the decision and game theoretic approaches, proposed to address
the decision making problems, are limited in their use, not only because of their
restrictive assumptions and pre-requisites, but also and most importantly because
the majority of them deal with decision making, whether strategic or tactical, as
quantitative-tactical-effectiveness-optimization problems. Framing the strategic de-
cision making problem as such brings with it, to the problem definition, many trou-
bling assumptions and restrictions. For example, if the strategic decision making
problem is an optimization-effectiveness problem, then all the options/alternatives
are known, and the problem is all about searching the options space to find an
option that will maximize a benefit (or expected subjective utility). If this is true,
how do we explain, or deal with, a creative decision maker “creates” a completely
new set of options that were not part of the options space. The “out of the blue”
phrase used casually to describe this dilemma could not be explained/modelled by
using optimization decision or game theoretic approaches.
When the decision making problem is about increasing efficiency (or doing the
thing right, as Drucker defined it in the quote presented at the beginning of this
chapter), quantitative analysis methods and tools could be easily used. This hap-
pens usually at the operational/tactical decision making level, where the agents
have all the data (all the options, all the resources needed, etc.), have a clear
definition of the problem and how to solve it. For example, the decision making
problems of an assembly line manager are about scheduling materials and people
to achieve the optimal (maximized) production of the assembly line. All options
are known, preferences well established, and utilities can easily be defined or found.
This is similar to the case of a lower rank commander in the army. The objectives,
plans and resources are all given to him. His job is to efficiently finish the mission
utilizing the given resources and plan. The ultimate goal at this level looks more
like the fine tuning of a mechanical machine with the purpose of maximizing the
output.
In contrast to this, take the example of a CEO, or a General in the army, in one
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of the strategic decision making situations she might have. The theme of the strate-
gic decision making situation will not be to increase efficiency (this is usually left
to mid-to-lower rank managers/officers), but rather deciding on the best direction
in which to take the whole organization/army. The question is more about effec-
tiveness, rather than efficiency. Drucker, in the quote cited earlier, and discussed
in depth in his landmark business strategy book (Drucker, 1967), calls this prob-
lem an effectiveness-problem, or a problem about getting the right things done, and
considers it to be “the” type of problems/decisions that an executive level manager
should be concerned with. The rest (the increasing-efficiency problems/decisions)
should be delegated to lower rank managers.
The effectiveness-problems are strategic problems that could make or break the
organization. Decisions about such problems are ill-defined, with many factors
involved, players are not all fully known, options are not all known, preferences
are hard to decide on, and so on. In this type of decision scenarios, it is not about
maximizing profit or minimizing costs (such as in the case of efficiency/optimization
operational level decisions), but rather about leveraging and trade-offs, ensuring
that all goals are achieved to some satisfactory levels for the time being, and all
constraints are considered. Hardly anything could be quantitatively defined here.
Things look as if they are defined in ranges and very subjectively. This is the
qualitative nature of the strategic humanistic decision making systems (Zadeh,
1973). Compare this to the quantitative nature of the tactical/operational decision
making.
3) The Black-Box-Agents Problem: Before there are Options to Analyze,
there are Goals to Achieve and Satisfy
In reality, the lack-of-support exhibited by the current decision and game theoretic
approaches for the needs of strategic decision making at its heart is a problem-
framing problem. The decision making problem in general is not about choosing
among options for the sake of choosing an option, but rather choosing among op-
tions to satisfy the strategic goals the agents (decision makers or game players –as
these terms are used interchangeably in our research to mean the same thing–)
have. Both decision theory and game theory, and by extension almost all related
theories, deal with the agents’ goals and motivation by establishing numeric strict
proxies such as preference ordering and utility functions, instead of mapping how
the options will help, support or hinder the achievement of the agents’ multiple
strategic goals.
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(a) Decision Theory and Game Theory model the Decision Makers as
Black-Box Agents.
(b) In reality Agents have goals that motivates their decision making ex-
perience and how they identify their respective options and evaluate
them
Figure 1.2: Most of the current Rational Decision Making and Conflict Analysis
theories deal with Decision Makers (Agents) as Black-Boxes, reasoning only about
their pre-determined options and preferences. Goals and Constraints, that the in-
volved agents have, are completely ignored, or dealt with through numeric strict
proxies such as preference ordering and utility functions.
8
As shown in Figure 1.2, dealing with agents as black-boxes can be very dan-
gerous. It changes the decision making problem. At the beginning, as Figure 1.2b
shows, it was about: how the different options that the agent has, or could create,
will contribute to her inter-related and complex set of needs and wants (goals),
given all the internal and external realities/constraints of the environment and the
situation. Decision theory and game theory changes the problem definition from
one that is shown in Figure 1.2b to a new problem, same as the one shown in Figure
1.2a. The new problem is a about choosing one option/plan from a set of prede-
termined fully-known ones that each of the players (agents) has (no assumption of
agents’ creativity is allowed). These options are all ordered clearly and fully based
on predetermined preferences (cannot change over time or have a gap among them
at certain times).
In the black-box agents model, shown in Figure 1.2a, the purpose is to maximize
a strictly defined subjective utility function/s, or find an equilibria based on the
agents’ preferences order. What had happened to the satisfaction the options sup-
posed to bring to the inter-related and conflicting strategic goals the agents have?
What will happen now if the agents’ goals change over time and/or the agents’
constraints change over time? Are these all the options that agents could have?
How does an agent know if there is a need to become creative, or even ask for help
to find another option in order to satisfy his ultimate strategic goals? How will
the agent be able to tell which options have the best positive effect on his strategic
goals, or be able to tell what constraints actually affect his ability to achieve his
strategic goals? How will one be able to verify the correctness and completeness of
the preferences given? and so on.
In reality, the modeller, analyst or consultant, usually meets with the decision
maker/s to know his/their goals and constraints. Based on this acquired informa-
tion (goals, constraints, and other information about who the players are, what
are their options, and so on), he then defines the players’ options and preferences.
Then, suddenly all the original information disappear and only a set of options,
preferences and utilities stay as part of the decision/conflict model. The problem
now is not about goals to be achieved, but rather about these options and pref-
erences. Now, if any of this information changes over time, it does not exist any
longer as part of the decision/game model to validate/verify the changes against it,
and therefore update the model accordingly. Clearly, there is a need to explicitly
capture and include all the agents contextual information, namely the agents’ goals
and constraints, within the decision/conflict models the analyst builds.
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Keeney (1992) acknowledged the need to go back to the root of the decision
making problem: achieving the decision maker’s strategic goals (and not just the
mere choosing of one alternative among a pre-selected set of alternatives and using a
pre-set cardinal preferences over such alternatives). In fact, Keeney went on to say:
“”You do not control decision situations that you approach through alternative-
focused thinking [in a reference to how decision theory and game theory model
the decision making problems]. This standard mode of thinking is backward, be-
cause it puts the cart of identifying alternatives before the horse of articulating
values [referring to the decision makers’ goals and constraints]. It is values that
are fundamentally important in any decision situation. Alternatives are relevant
only because they are means to achieve your values. . . . Many methodologies and
techniques to aid decisionmaking have been developed over the past forty years.
So why bother with yet another approach? Invariably, existing methodologies are
applied to decision problems once they are structured, meaning after the alterna-
tives and objectives are specified. Such methodologies are not very helpful for the
ill-defined decision problems where one is in a major quandary about what to do
or even what can possibly be done. Certainly if the alternatives are not known,
one cannot characterize the decision problem by the alternatives. In addition, most
decision methodologies try to find the best alternatives from a prespecified list. But
where does this list come from?”
4) The Agent’s Irrational-Behaviour Problem: Creativity, Emotions,
Limitations and Biases
Furthermore, these current theories and approaches failed to explain what is been
referred to as “irrational” behaviour of decision makers. The term “irrational”
suggested by decision and game theory literature to describe some decisions made
by decision makers, not because those agents show crazy insane foolish decision
making behaviour, but rather because the decisions made by those agents do not
fit the rational behaviour as defined by the theories. One has to wonder then, if
Apple’s decision to create the iPod, and go after a market that is not Apple’s market,
a market which is “the” market for giants like Sony, Panasonic, and Samsung, was
an “irrational” decision, what good the “rational” decisions are or should be?
In business, the commonly used phrase “thinking outside the box”, which de-
scribes Apple’s decision and many others, is in direct conflict with what decision
and game theories suggest and propose. Not only because what Zadeh (1973) calls
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the principle of incompatibility, since these theories propose precise and quantita-
tive methods to describe a completely complex and mostly qualitative humanistic
world and systems, but also because these theories ignore the creative abilities of
humans, and humanistic systems, to come up with new alternatives that did not
exist before and never been thought of. Sometimes causing a complete shift in the
paradigm of thinking.
In addition, many studies, as presented later in Chapter 2, discuss the effect of
emotions, attitudes, cognitive limitations and biases on the decision making pro-
cesses. These factors fail to be explained or account for using the current theories.
Some of these factors are essential to analyze the agents’ behaviour in conflict sit-
uations. For example, in political conflicts, players such as the US mostly have
aggressive policies and actions, while others have soft reactions. Such attitudes
could not be considered part of the preferences, because it could change suddenly
in the middle of the game when circumstances and emotions change. There is a
need to capture these factors within the model, and use them to guide the reasoning
and analysis about the situation/conflict.
Constrained Rationality: Addressing the need for a Systematic and
Methodological Qualitative Formal Modelling and Reasoning Framework
for Strategic Decision Making
From above, it is clear that there is a need for a formal reasoning framework to ad-
dress the challenges of dealing with strategic goals and decisions about them. This
thesis document presents a new theory of rational strategic decision making. Con-
strained Rationality is a formal qualitative goals and constraints reasoning frame-
work for the modelling and analysis of single and multi agents strategic decision
and conflict. The theory suggests bringing back the strategic decision making prob-
lem to its roots: reasoning about options, and alternatives, to satisfy the strategic
and conflicting goals an agent (whether an individual, an organization, or a robot)
has, given the internal and external complex and conflicting realities the agent has.
No linear equations are assumed. No single or multi variable utility functions are
required. No probability distributions satisfying restrictive statistical assumptions
are demanded. No criterion setting or pre-determination of options/alternatives is
mandated. And, most importantly, no suppression of conflicts among goals and
other knowledge concepts, in favour of compromises and consistent well-behaved
agents/systems, is assumed.
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Constrained Rationality is concerned with the effectiveness problem, i.e. find-
ing the right strategy to adopt, or finding the right thing to do as Drucker put
it, more than being concerned with the tactical efficiency problem. Constrained
Rationality is a theory to explain how people, and humanistic systems/agents, can
reason, create (be creative), realize limitations as well as opportunities, and deal
with internal and external conflicts. And even though, it proposes a new way to
look at the strategic decision making problem, it also tries to make use of the
well established methods and techniques within decision and game theory. It will
help these methods to capture formally what they missed, as well as validate their
assumptions.
1.3 Research Objective
The objective of this research work: to propose a qualitative formal goals and
constraints/context conceptual modelling and reasoning framework, for decision-
making agent/s (also called players or decision makers) within single and multi-
agent systems and environments, to use in order to effectively help the agent(s)
systematically analyze his(their) strategic decisions and conflict situations.
The problem and application domains include: business strategic decision
making, such as decisions about product development, R&D, intellectual property,
market positioning; analysis of societal and political conflicts; and analysis of mul-
tiple stakeholders’ requirements for optimal system design and development. The
proposed framework should be able to handle the reasoning and analysis of decision
making and conflict situations whether current or historic, and whether the changes
happening to the conflict are tracked in real-time or as off-line simulated single or
series of what-ifs.
The central argument (proposition) of the research is that:
By structuring and conceptually modelling the strategic decision making problem
(within single or multi agent decision making environment and whether the
decision-maker/agent is an individual, an organization, a robot, or a coali-
tion) by bringing the problem back to its roots: reasoning about options, and
alternatives, to satisfy the strategic and conflicting goals each agent has, given
the internal and external complex and conflicting realities (limitations and op-
portunities) each has.
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Then more realistic modelling, insight and analysis of the strategic decision making
situations, or the real-life conflicts, could be reached, allowing for:
• better understanding of the full extent of the players’ options (current
and potential alternatives)
• better decision making, and sensitivity analysis
• better stability analysis and outcome prediction
• better dynamic modelling and simulation of evolving and changing decision-
making/conflicts
• better representation and testing of players’ different patterns of be-
haviour (based on priorities, needs, wants and emotional states)
Compared to what alternative-focused (as called by Keeney (1992)) decision the-
ory, and game theory, can provide. Not to mention that the proposed method-
ology, and the models it produces, can be used in fact to provide and/or verify
as well as explain the proxy cardinal and/or ordinal preferences these theories
use and need to order decision makers’ options.
Especially when applied to strategic decision making, conflicts and problems
where: options of players are not clear or unknown, preferences could not be
defined or unclear, utility functions are hard to establish, and so on.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis research work argues that there is a need for a new reasoning framework
for agent (and multi-agent) strategic decision making, that is based on agents’
goals and constraints. Therefore, the thesis document starts, in Chapter 2, with
a background and an analytical review of the current modelling and reasoning
strategic decision making frameworks.
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the main components of the Constrained Rationality
Modelling and Reasoning Framework. Chapter 3 introduces the basic Constrained
Rationality formal qualitative goals and constraints modelling and reasoning frame-
work for strategic decision making situations. The chapter shows how goals and
constraints of the different agents are modelled as viewpoint models, how the com-
plex relationships these goals and constraints are modelled, and how value proper-
ties of the agents’ goals, such as their achievement levels, propagate through these
relationships until they are finalized. Chapter 4 shows how the framework proposes
13
Constrained Rationality:
Formal Qualitative Goals-and-Constraints 
Modelling and Reasoning Framework for 
Strategic Decision Making Situations
Adding Qualitative Modelling and 
Reasoning of Agent's Priorities, Emotions 
and Preferences to the Framework
Modelling and Analysis of Multi-Agent 
Strategic Decision Making Situations 
(Collaborative Situations and Competitive 
Adversarial Conflicts/Games )
Analysis and Stability Solution Concepts for 
Non-Cooperative Strategic Conflicts
Analysis and Stability Solution Concepts for 
Cooperative Strategic Conflicts
Coalition Analysis and Stability Solution 
Concepts for  Cooperative Strategic 
Conflicts
Stability Solution Concepts for Strategic 









Main Components of the Constrained 
Rationality Modelling & Reasoning 
Framework
(with Focus on One-Agent Decision Making 
Situations and Multi-Agents Situations 
where Agents Act with No Regard to Others' 
Options and Decisions)
Adding the Constrained Rationality's 
Modelling and Reasoning Components for:
 Multi-Agent Collaborative Decision Making Situations 
and Multi-Agents Competitive Adversarial Decision 
Making Situations (also called Conflicts or Games)
Figure 1.3: Organization of the Thesis Document
to deal with and model the agents’ priorities, emotions and attitudes towards acting
rationally or emotionally. In addition, it will show how the agents preferences over
their respective alternatives are elicited from the model.
As Figure 1.3 shows, Chapter 3 and 4, and because they introduce the core con-
cepts and methods of the Constrained Rationality framework, present illustrative
examples that focus on single agent decision making situations, or multi-agent sit-
uations where the agents act in an individualistic manner with no regard to others’
current or future options and decisions. The real-life like multi-agent decision mak-
ing situations, and how the Constrained Rationality framework aids in modelling
and analyzing them, are discussed in the Chapters 5 - 9, as the figure shows.
Chapter 5 defines the two modes/types of multi-agent decision making situa-
tions: the collaborative situations and the adversarial competitive situations (these
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situations are also referred to as conflicts or games, as been called in the game
theory literature). Then, it discusses the process of modelling and analyzing these
two types of decision making situations, as it modifies and extends the Constrained
Rationality concepts and methods introduced in Chapter 3 and 4 for the simple
one-agent decision making situations. Chapter 5, also, provides an illustrative case
study of a collaborative multi-agent system requirements engineering decision mak-
ing situation. But, because of the complexity of multi-agent adversarial situations,
or conflicts, the topic of discussing how Constrained Rationality proposes to ana-
lyze conflicts is not covered by Chapter 5. It is covered through out the following
four chapters after that.
Chapter 6 defines the players’ moves and the stability solution concepts (and
their strengths) for non-cooperative strategic conflicts; and provides a thorough
modelling and analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study for such con-
flicts. Chapter 7 looks at the different characteristics the stability solution concepts
introduced in Chapter 6; the theoretical interrelationships these solution concepts
have among them; and how knowing about these characteristics and interrelation-
ships brings more insight into the results of the conflict analysis process.
Chapter 8 defines the players’ moves and the stability solution concepts (and
their strengths) for cooperative strategic conflicts, where coalitions are not al-
lowed/considered; and provides a thorough modelling and analysis of the Elmira
Groundwater Contamination Conflict, a 1989 environmental policy conflict between
the provincial government of Ontario and Uniroyal Chemical Ltd., as a case study
for such conflicts. Chapter 9 defines the players’ moves and the stability solution
concepts (and their strengths) for the broadest type of multi-agent strategic con-
flicts: the cooperative conflicts where coalitions are allowed and considered. Chap-
ter 9, then, provides a thorough modelling and analysis of the 2001-2006 showdown
between Research and Motion (RIM) and NTP, over intellectual property rights,
as a case study for cooperative conflicts where coalitions are involved.
Figure 1.4 provides a more detailed look at the Constrained Rationality frame-
work as a process that branches at one point to three paths based on the type of
decision making situation modelled and analyzed:
• single-agent decision making situations: covered mainly by the basic Con-
strained Rationality framework’s concepts and methods introduced in Chap-
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situations where the agents act in an individualist manner, with no regard to
others’ current and future decisions and options, use the same concepts and
methods the basic Constrained Rationality framework offer for modelling and
analyzing single-agent decision making situations.
• collaborative multi-agent decision making situations: covered mainly in Chap-
ter 5.
• adversarial competitive multi-agent decision making situations (also referred
to as conflicts or games): an overview is provided in Chapter 5, with details
given in Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 based on the type of the conflict (non-
cooperative, cooperative without coalitions, or cooperative with coalitions).
Finally, the thesis finishes with Chapter 10 providing a statement about the
contributions of the thesis work, and a list of suggested future work. The appendices
provided additional material for Chapter 3. Namely, Appendix A provides the
axiomatization of the Goal-Goal and Constraint-Goal Relationships introduced in
Chapter 3; and Appendix B provides proof of soundness and completeness of the







In this chapter, we present a review of how others addressed the research problem:
how an agent can reason about her own goals and reality (constraints and context),
and others’ goals and reality, and therefore be able to strategize her next moves. Of
course, we will be looking at models (representation) and methods for reasoning and
planning that are computable, i.e. formal or could be formalized, and that could be
integrated in a simulation tool and/or in a near-real-time Decision Support System
(DSS). The review presented will make clear the fact that the modelling method-
ology usually goes hand in hand with the reasoning methodology used, because of
the dependance and reliance of the reasoning method on how the agents, and their
domain, or problems/games are been presented. In fact, as we will see later in
this thesis, the goals and realities reasoning problem at its heart is a representation
problem. The actual reasoning mechanisms are completely constrained and limited
by the representation mechanisms offered.
Figure 2.1 shows a high level view of the research done regarding strategic deci-
sion making as led by different disciplines. We begin, in Section 2.1, by reviewing
the the strategic decision making process and its challenges. We will end the sec-
tion reporting on the gap between literature and practice regarding decision support
models/aids. Section 2.2 reviews the typical mathematical and economical decision
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models available. Section 2.3 reviews additional models offered by Artificial intel-
ligence (AI), especially within the Multi-Agents Systems (MAS) domain, to help
agents reason about their goals and options. While most of MAS domain’s research
in this area uses and focuses on the typical mathematical and economical models,
the domain shows increased interest to move beyond these limited models especially
in the direction of modelling and reasoning about goals and beliefs. In Figure 2.1,
we show how research flowed (shown as green arrows) to other areas in an effort to
address the challenges discovered (shown in red text). One area of research shown
in the figure, but we will not cover the Soft Informal Systems Models (proposed by
Checkland (1999)) because these models are highly informal and mainly used to
guide groups through problem solving/modelling sessions. In Section 2.4, we will
look at the question of rationality and biases, and end the chapter with a summary
and conclusion.
2.2 Strategic Decision Making Process
Before we start analyzing the strategic decision making process, let us clarify some
of the terms that will be used in this proposal. We will use here the definitions
used by Mintzberg et al. (1976).
First, we define a decision as a specific commitment to action or plan (usually
this plan involves some form of commitment to allocate or use resources - struc-
tured/physical or intellectual resources). Second, we define a strategic decision
process as a set of actions and dynamic factors that begins with the identification
of a stimulus for action and ends with the specific commitment to action. We will
assume that the decision processes we will refer to here are strategic decision pro-
cesses that have not been encountered in quite the same form and for which no
predetermined and explicit set of ordered responses exists in the organization. This
assumption is consistent with the fact that most strategic decisions are not momen-
tary, but take time and require some form of a process or stages/phases to come
about. And finally we define strategic to simply mean highly important, long-term
and enterprise-wide, in terms of the actions taken, the resources committed, or the
precedents set.
We can categorize the strategic decision making processes proposed in the liter-
ature to two categories: sequential and non-sequential. The sequential type is the
oldest and predominant , while the non-sequential is the most recent and realis-
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tic process. We will briefly look at each category and some of the process models
proposed in it. Then we will comment on them.
2.2.1 Sequential Strategic Decision Making Process Models
We can trace back the first general theory to define stages for the decision making
process to the French philosopher and mathematician Condorcet (1743-1794) in his
motivation for the French constitution of 1793. Condorcet identified three stages
for the decision making process. The first stage is concerned with “discuss(ing)
the principles that will serves as the basis for the decision in a general issue”,and
“examine(ing) the the various aspects of this issue and the consequences of different
ways to make the decision”. At this stage the opinions formed are personal, with
no attempts made to form a majority. The second stage is a discussion stage where
“the question is clarified, opinions approach and combine with each other to a
small number of more general opinions”. The second stage discussion produces
a manageable set of alternatives, which the third stage effort is concentrated on
choosing among them [Hansson (2007) reporting on Condorcet (1793)].
The insightful distinction that Condoncet has between two the first two stages
of the decision making process is virtually forgotten and not been referenced or
reflected on in modern decision theory (Hansson, 2007). Nevertheless, this distinc-
tion is important. Why? Because it separates between what Condoncet considers a
personal discussion of the issue at hand leading to the formation of one’s opinion/s
about it, as part of the first stage of the decision making process, and the analysis of
the issue in its full social context (or a game, as has been called in modern decision
making and game theories literature). This second stage, thinking about the issue
as a game, will lead to the formation of the set of options, or alternatives, that one
should consider to choose among them.
No account for serious discussion about the decision making process was con-
ducted, as far as we know, until Dewey (1910). According to Dewey, each reflective
thought, and problem solving, instance has five logically distinct steps: (1) a felt
difficulty; (2) defining the difficulty; (3) suggestion of possible solutions; (4) devel-
opment by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; and (5) further observation
and experiment leading to the acceptance or rejection of the suggestion.
Herbert Simon took Dewey’s five-steps problem-solving process and modified
it to fit the context of decision making within organizations. According to Simon
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Figure 2.2: Comparing the Decision Making Processes’ Stages as proposed by Con-
dorcet (1793), Simon (1960), Brim et al. (1962), and Mintzberg et al. (1976)
(1960), the decision making process has mainly three distinct phases: (1) the intel-
ligence phase: finding occasion for making a decision; (2) the design phase: finding
possible courses of action; and (3) the choice phase: choosing among courses of
action.
Later, Brim et al. (1962) proposed their decision process which included six
phases: (1) identification of the problem; (2) obtaining necessary information; (3)
production of possible solutions; (4) evaluation of possible solutions; (5) selection
of a strategy for performance; and finally (6) implementation of the decision.
The decision making process as been proposed by Condorcet (1793), Dewey
(1910), Simon (1960) and Brim et al. (1962) is a sequential process with the decision
maker going through the process one phase/stage at a time. Once the stage at hand
is completed, the decision maker then moves to the next stage in the process. The
process under all decision making contexts will always have the same stages, and
those stages come in the same order, as can be seen in Figure 2.2.
Many had disagreed with this notion of a sequential decision making process
and criticized it as unrealistic and unpractical. For example, Witte (1972) reports
on empirical studies done by him when he observed that these decision making
stages are done actually in parallel rather than in sequence; and that “we believe
that human beings cannot gather information without in some way simultaneously
developing alternatives. They cannot avoid evaluating these alternatives immedi-
ately, and in doing this they are forced to a decision. This is a package of operations
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and the succession of these packages over time constitutes the total decision making
process” (Witte, 1972).
A more realistic decision making process model in the view of Witte (1972) and
others is a model which does not define the order of the stages in a rigid predefined
fashion, but rather demonstrates flexibility by allowing different formations of these
stages as demanded by the decision making instance’s context and circumstances.
2.2.2 Non-Sequential Strategic Decision Making Process
Models
One of the most well known non-sequential model for strategic decision making is
the one proposed by Mintzberg et al. (1976). The model, which is shown in Figure
2.3, consists of three phases: (1) identification; (2) development; and (3) selection
phase. These three phases are equivalent to the ones proposed by Simon (1960),
shown in Figure 2.2 above, and could be easily mapped to Simon’s intelligence,
Design, and Choice phases. But the three phases that Mintzberg et al. (1976)
proposed in their model have no simple sequential relationships connecting them.
1. The identification phase consists of two routines:
(a) decision recognition routine: in which “opportunities, problems and
crisis” are recognized in “the streams of ambiguous, largely verbal data
that decision makers receive”
(b) diagnosis routine: in which the decision maker “seeks to comprehend
the evoking stimuli and determine cause-effect relationships for the deci-
sion situation”, this is usually done by “tapping of existing information
channels and the opening of new ones to clarify and define the issues”
2. The development phase is the heart of the decision making process and has
two routines:
(a) search routine: is evoked to find obvious alternatives and “ready-made
solutions”
(b) design routine: is evoked to find new alternatives, and to “develop
custom-made solutions or modify ready-made ones” usually using com-
plex iterative procedures
3. The selection phase consists of three routines:
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Figure 2.3: Comparing the Decision Making Processes’ Stages as proposed by
Mintzberg et al. (1976)
(a) screen routine: is evoked when the search routine above “generates
more ready-made alternatives than can be intensively evaluated”; it is a
“superficial routine more concerned with eliminating what is infeasible
than with determining what is appropriate”
(b) evaluation-choice routine: during which the actual choice between
alternatives happen, and may be considered to use one or more of three
modes: (1) judgment, in which choice is made “with procedures that
one cannot explain”, i.e. intuitively; (2) bargaining, in which choice is
made by “a group of decision makers with conflicting goal systems, each
experiencing judgement”; and (3) analysis, where “factual evaluation is
carried out, generally by technocrats, followed by managerial choice by
judgement or bargaining”
(c) authorization routine: in which the decision follow “a tiered route of
approval up the hierarchy and perhaps also out to parties in the envi-
ronment that have the power to block it”
In their final analysis of their model and empirically testing it across many
strategic decision making scenarios, Mintzberg et al. (1976) found that “the delin-
eation of steps in almost any strategic decision process shows that there is not a
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steady, undisturbed progression from one routine to another; rather, the process is
dynamic, operating in an open system where it is subjected to interferences, feed-
back loops, dead ends, and other factors. These dynamic factors are perhaps the
most characteristic and distinguishing features of decision processes that are strate-
gic. . . . We find in our study that dynamic factors influence the strategic decision
process in a number of ways. They delay it, stop it, and restart it. They cause it
to speed up, to branch to a new phase, to cycle within one or between two phases,
and to recycle back to an earlier point in the process”.
According to Mintzberg et al., the relation between their model’s phases and
routines is circular rather than sequential or linear, as been illustrated in Figure
2.3. The decision maker “may cycle within identification to recognize the issue
during design, he may cycle through a maze of nested design and search activities
to develop a solution during evaluation, he may cycle between development and
investigation to understand the problem he is solving . . . he may cycle between
selection and development to reconcile goals with alternatives, ends with means”.
2.2.3 Strategic Decision Making Process: in Practice vs. in
Literature
While the literature on strategic decision making has focused solely, for the largest
part of it, on the evaluation-choice routine of the process’s selection phase, the
reality of the mater is decision makers spend the majority of their time in activities
related to the first two phases of the process. First, Simon reported that executives
spend a large fraction of their time in intelligence activities, an even larger fraction
in design activities, and only a small fraction in choice related activities (Simon,
1960). Then, Mintzberg et al. (1976) confirmed this with the findings of their
empirical study.
According to Mintzberg et al., out of the 25 strategic decision making processes
they studied, 21 processes has the development phase activity appeared to dominate
the other two phases’ activity. This was “rather curious” to them, since “by far
the largest part of the literature on strategic decision process has focused on the
evaluation-choice routine” and that “this routine seems to be far less significant in
many of the decision processes we studied”. Mintzberg et al. also noted that:
“The normative literature emphasizes the analytic mode, clearly dis-
tinguishing fact and value in the selection phase. It postulates that
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alternatives are carefully and objectively evaluated, their factual conse-
quences explicitly determined along various goal, or value, dimensions
and then combined according to some predetermined utility function a
choice finally made to maximize utility. A more pragmatic rendition
of this view sees the analyst presenting his factual analysis of the con-
sequences of various alternatives to the manager who determines the
value trade-offs in his head and thereby makes a choice.
Our study reveals very little use of such an analytic approach, a sur-
prising finding given the importance of the decision processes studied...”
In fact they went on to cite other empirical studies which also provide little ev-
idence to support the prevailing normative views of decision making. For example,
they cite the work of Soelberg (1967) and Carter (1971a,b) who have addressed the
use of utility functions within the decision making process, and found no evidence
to support their existence. In addition to Soelberg and Carter, Cyert et al. (1956)
also “note rather that the criteria used in decision processes are multiple and non-
comparable. No study finds that even weightings on individual goal dimensions
are established in advance of making choices; rather the weights are determined
implicitly, in the context of making choices”. In fact, Soelberg (1967) goes a step
further describing a confirmation period, the decision maker has before announc-
ing his decision, during which he rationalizes to himself his implicit choices as well
as the goals it represents. This means that the determination of criteria in effect
follows the making of choice.
These observations lead us to the discussion of rationality within the context of
strategic decision making. But let us first, present a review for some of most im-
portant and relevant rationality models for strategic decisions making and conflict
analysis.
2.3 Mathematical and Economical Models of
Rational Strategic Decision Making and
Conflict Resolution
2.3.1 Decision Theory
Decision theory is a mathematical theory of rational decision making. Decision
theory defines a rational agent as one that maximizes expected utility. It is a
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prescriptive approach to help an individual make a choice among a set of pre-
specified alternatives/outcomes. The generation of alternatives is not generally
addressed within decision theory, except where particular analysis of options can
lead to the suggestion of new ones. The usual analysis has two components: an
uncertainty analysis and a utility (preferences) analysis (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
Decisions can be analyzed in the following way. The set of alternative plans/
actions is given and pre-specified {P1, . . . , Pm}. There is also a pre-specified set
of criteria of concern {C1, . . . , Cn}. Each of the actions then can be evaluated
for each criteria, yielding a vector of values for each action, and forming what is
usually referred to as a decision matrix. Comparison between two actions involves
the comparison of the two vectors, and weights can be used to give emphasis to
criteria (objectives). The most common way to represent the values in the action-
to-criteria vectors is to assign utilities to them. And, the most common way to
represent the criteria weights is to assign probabilities to them.
Mainstream decision theory is almost exclusively devoted to problems that
can be expressed in matrices of this type, utility matrices. With Expected Util-
ity, or probability-weighted utility, playing the dominating approach or the major
paradigm in decision making since the Second World War (Schoemaker, 1982). As
per this paradigm, each alternative is assigned a weighted average of its utility val-
ues under different criteria (or sometimes states-of-nature), and the probabilities of
these criteria/states are used as weights (Russell and Norvig, 2003). Mainstream
decision theory is almost exclusively devoted to problems that can be represented in
matrices of this type, expected utility matrices. As a result, most modern decision
theoretic methods require numerical information about these expected utilities.
There are, of course, a number of complications to this decision theoretic repre-
sentation of decision making models. First, the criteria items are most likely to be of
incommensurable units, making direct comparisons difficult. Intangibles, especially
psychological aspects, wile need to be taken into account, they are usually difficult
to measure and scale. Time also has an effect, as consequences will affect the
next decisions to be taken. Finally the uncertainties involved require consideration
of multi-variate probability distributions (Bell et al., 1977). The interdependence
among the criteria items is also usually ignored.
In addition, in many practical decision problems, especially the strategic deci-
sion problems, we have much less precise value information (perhaps best expressed
by an qualitative information rather than quantitative numerical ones). This is at
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the heart of what Zadeh (1973) refers to as the principle of incompatibility (“the
conventional quantitative techniques of system analysis are intrinsically unsuited
for dealing with humanistic systems or, for that matter, any system whose com-
plexity is comparable to that of humanistic systems”). However, the position that
most decision theoretic methods took, with few excepts which we will refer to be-
low, is that it is much more difficult to construct methods that can deal effectively
with non-numerical information. Hence, the domination of numerical information
in decision-theoretic methods’ representation of decision problems.
As characterized by decision theory, decisions involve individual agents. The
agent will be making a choice among a number of pre-determined pre-specified
options (not deduced) based on some evaluation of the options. The criteria of
evaluation used is also pre-specified, and not deduced. This may be contrasted
with a game/conflict, in which there is more than one agent, each with a different
perspective, a different set of strategic goals, and different set of constraints and
realities/context.
Decision theory has a set of very restrictive assumptions. So, if, in order to
deal with multiple agents conflicts, a new list of options is generated in which the
options of the individual agents are combined to represent different outcomes for
the decision, the usual assumptions of decision theory do not apply (Galbraith,
1977). While decision theory does allow for alternative evaluations to be taken into
account, this is to allow for uncertainty, and then probability theory to be used
to analyze the alternatives. If the differences arise not from uncertainty but from
different perspectives, no probabilistic analysis can be used. This does not mean
that decision theory has no role in conflict resolution. Agents can still use decision
theory individually, to decide whether to accept a particular option/plan, to justify
such decisions, to decide what action to take next in the process, and to persuade
the other agents that a solution is satisfactory.
Multi-agent decision making needs are ignored within the classical decision the-
ory. Although decision analysis attempts to prescribe approaches for each individual
agent, in which the actions of other agents can be regarded as uncertainties, there
is no means to handle multi-agent decision making. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) use
this observation to suggest uses of decision analysis for agent’s personal conviction,
advocacy and reconciliation. This is not to say that the theory is not useful, the
theory can still in conflict resolution situations provide, to each of the involved
agents, supporting evidence for the various options the agent has. This is assuming
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that the options are all completely known to the agent before the analysis starts.
The evolution of decision theoretic methods over the years focused into dealing
with the challenges and strict restrictions come to exist because of the the domi-
nant expected utility approach to model decision making problems. Some focused
on dealing the probabilistic knowledge about the decision making situation, to the
point that Luce and Raiffa (1957) categorized decision making based on how com-
plete/reliable this probabilistic knowledge to: decisions under certainty, under risk,
and under uncertainty. Alexander (1975) added the category of decisions under ig-
norance (Luce and Raiffa (1957) referees to this category as extreme uncertainty).
But the literature show many views on what complete, and what reliable, prob-
abilities means. For some only objective probabilities (actual frequencies of things
happening in real life) should be considered . Others allow for subjective estimates
of (objective) probabilities to be considered. Yet, others considered probabilities to
be a purely mental phenomenon represented by a degree of belief (Bayesian prob-
abilistic beliefs, or subjective (personalistic) probability). leading to what seems
a dominant acceptable. But, as we know objective probabilities are hard, or im-
possible, to establish in strategic decision making situations, where every decision
is different and does not repeat as often. Therefore, the most used probabilities
are the subjective estimates, which are often unreliable (Tversky and Kahneman,
1986; Lichtenstein et al., 1982), and the Bayesian probabilistic beliefs, which are
also criticized by many as being more popular among statisticians and philosophers
than among more practically oriented decision scientists. An important reason for
this detachment of Bayesianism from real practical use is that it is much less op-
erative than most other forms of expected utility/probabilities. Theories based on
objective (or subjective estimates of objective) utilities and/or probabilities more
often give rise to predictions that can be tested. It is much more difficult to ascer-
tain whether or not Bayesianism, with its strict assumptions, is violated (Weirich,
1986; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986).
The literature in decision theoretic methods show also a focus on dealing with
the concept of utilities as a proxy measure of the decision makers objectives, needs,
wants, and well being. Some offered variations to the expected utility approach. For
example, Loomes and Sugden (1982), Bell (1982) and Sugden (1985) offered the use
of a two-attribute utility function that incorporates two measures of satisfaction:
utility of outcomes, as in expected utilities; and a quantity of regret (defined as the
painful sensation of recognizing that “what is” compares unfavourably with “what
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might have been”). Sowden (1984) offered to add numerical values to represent
attitudes towards risk and certainty, forming what is referred to as process utilities
or a generalized expected utility (criticized by Weirich (1986); Luce and Raiffa
(1957) and others for including double counting of attitudes). Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), and Tversky and Kahneman (1981), offered what they refer to as
prospect theory, a descriptive theory with no normative claims that is developed to
explain the results of their experiments with decision problems that were stated in
terms of monetary outcomes and objective probabilities. One of the unique features
is that it distinguishes between two stages in the decision process: 1) editing phase
“to organize and reformulate the options so as to simplify subsequent evaluation and
choice”, identifying the gains and losses for the different options; and 2) evaluation
phase of these options using two scales, one replaces the monetary outcomes given
in the decision problem and the other replaces the objective probabilities given in
the decision problem.
The literature suggests many other forms of utility functions to deal with specific
decision making situations under deferent levels of completeness of the situations’
probabilistic knowledge and type of this knowledge. But, some went on to eliminate
the need for utility cardinal functions altogether replacing them with simple order-
ing/scoring methods, especially when the decision situation has many options to
be ordered/scored based on multiple criteria/attributes, and when utility functions
are hard to establish (as it is the case in most strategic decision making situations).
For example, Hwang and Yoon (1981) described a Technique for Order Preference
by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) method. The basic principle of it is
that the chosen alternative should have the shortest distance from the ideal solution
and the farthest distance from the negative-ideal solution; Roy and Vanderpooten
(1996) tacked about the ELECTRE method, proposed originally on 1966, that of-
fers an outranking relations to compare pairs of actions/options; and Saaty (1980)
proposed the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), one of the most known ranking
multi criteria decision making analysis tools.
But, unfortunately many of these methods, including TOPSIS, ELECTRE and
AHP, suffer from many weaknesses that made them the target for many criticism by
researchers and practitioners alike. One of these is the most severe criticism related
to what came to be known as the rank reversal problem in which these methods tend
to show contradictory results (ranking of options) for the same/similar problems. In
particular,when a new decision alternative is added to a decision problem, and while
the assessments concerning the original decision alternatives remain unchanged, the
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new alternative may cause rank reversals between the ranks or the utility estimates
of the original decision alternatives (Leskinen and Kangas, 2005). For example,
Belton and Gear (1983) and Triantaphyllou and Mann (1989) explain types of the
rank reversal problem for the AHP method.
Group Decision Making is an area that is related to decision theory. It is a nor-
mative study of how individual preferences can be combined into a group decision.
Arrow (1967) started much of the work in this area. Arrow defined the problem
of group decision making as that of finding a fair welfare function for combining
individual preference rankings into a social preference. Arrow proposed conditions
for what could be considered as a good welfare function. But, unfortunately Arrow
proved his conditions are inconsistent whenever there are three or more choices, so
that no welfare function can satisfy them all. He tried, in later work, to examine
relaxing his set of conditions, but with little success. Luce and Raiffa (1957) dis-
cussed the use of the majority rule as one of the most popular means of determining
social preference, but the biggest problems with majority rule is that it can lead to
intransitive social preferences.
Zeleny (1982) questions insistence on independence from irrelevant criteria at-
tributes, as suggested by Arrow and others, citing empirical studies which show
that the inclusion of unavailable options can reveal more about the strength of
individual agent’s preferences, as well as altering their perceptions of what is de-
sirable. Instead, Zeleny proposes his theory of the displaced ideal. In his theory,
each agent rates the options, and the infeasible combination of each agent’s highest
rated options, is used as a goal to guide the search for a feasible combination. The
option which comes closest to this ideal goal will be chosen.
Nevertheless, the work done on group decision making extending decision theory
to deal with multi-agent decision making situations, group decision making still
suffers from the strict assumptions used in game theory, which will be discussed
shortly. One of which is that all the options, for all the agents, must be known
before the modelling and analysis phase starts. No to mention, the disconnect
between the alternatives/option, and the proxy utilities/ranking and the agents’
goals, which the alternatives are supposed to help in achieving them.
2.3.2 Game Theory
Game Theory is a close relative of decision theory, and dates back to the seminal
work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). It studies the interactions among
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agents (called players or decision makers) where each agent is accorded a utility
function (Binmore, 1992). Rapoport (1974a) defines Game Theory to be a theory
of rational decision in conflict situations. Game theory examines the pre-specified
options used by the agents in the process of trying to achieve particular outcomes.
It is usually assumed that the set of outcomes is known, though not necessarily
finite; and the outcomes are states formed by combining the available pre-specified
options for the agents. A calculable payoff, for each agent, is associated with each
state. All agents are assumed to be rational in that each agent’s preference among
the game’s states is determined solely by the payoffs for that agent. In addition,
agents assume that all other agents are rational in the same way they are. Games
are classified according to whether they are two-player or n-player (n > 2); whether
the players’ choices of their strategies are independent (non-cooperative games) or
coordinated (cooperative games); and whether the sum of the payoffs for the players
is constant (zero-sum game such as chess) or not (non-zero sum games).
The payoffs for a game are usually shown a tabular form (a representation that
is usually referred to in the literature as the normal form). To illustrate, Table 2.1
gives the payoff table for the prisoner’s dilemma, a game which has received a lot
of attention in game theory literature (Rapoport, 1974b). Each agent (a prisoner)
must choose whether to confess, or not. The choices will affect the sentence given
to the agents: confession implicates the other prisoner. Whatever the other player
does, the payoff for confessing is a smaller sentence, and so a rational strategy is
always to confess. However, both players could improve their payoff by agreeing not
to confess (cooperate among them), but they need to be able to trust each other
not to break the agreement, as the payoffs tempt them to do so. The prisoner’s
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dilemma shows that a rational strategy might not always be the best one. The
prisoner’s dilemma has been studied in tournaments of repeated games (Axelrod,
1984). In this case agents need to persuade each other, through their play, that
they can be trusted. The repetitions allow agents to use moves as punishments and
rewards for previous actions.
Game theory has a number of important limitations, which make the results less
useful than they might otherwise seem. The biggest limitation is the restricted set of
actions available in a game. For example, in the prisoner’s dilemma, each player can
choose only a co-operative or a non-cooperative action each move. Sophisticated
games could introduce a larger set of actions, the rules still to specify a bounded set
of actions, and therefore states/outcomes. This is rarely the case in real-life conflicts
and situations, where agents usually get creative in finding new ways (options) to
achieve their goals. Also, game theory deals with payoffs which are usually assumed
to be known and defined, for each outcome for each agent, with certainty. It assumes
that all players have access to the same information about such payoffs. As it is
rarely the case that payoffs are known exactly in real-life conflicts and situations,
this restricts the applicability of the results of game theory. Agents usually have
different perceptions of the game and the payoffs for other agents involved in the
game.
Furthermore, game theory assumes that agents are rational, and selfishly moti-
vated. This means that the agents for example must be induced into co-operation
strategies. It also assumes that the preferences of the agents’ options are known
with certainty, let alone shared among the agents, which is rarely the case in real-
life conflicts and situations. Not to mention, that the players’ goals/motivations,
and behavioural historical patterns, are not explicitly included, alluded or referred
to in game theory approaches. If at all considered, then it will be part of the pre-
preparation of the preferences data, and will be assumed but not explicitly modelled
or referred to in preferences’ order.
In addition, many formal techniques that have been developed to analyze deci-
sion situations by game theory are founded upon various assumptions, which was
set by the pioneers who started Game theory (and its mathematical frameworks
and tools): von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) ; and Luce and Raiffa (1957).
New formal framework and tools, which are related to game theory, but differ in
some of the modelling assumptions or analysis principles, were proposed over the
years to deal with some of these limitations in modelling and analyzing interac-
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tive games and decision problems. Some of these frameworks include: Metagame
Theory (Howard, 1971), Conflict Analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), Hypergame
Analysis (Bennett, 1977, 1980; Wang et al., 1988), the Graph Model for Conflict
Resolution (Fang et al., 1993), and Drama Theory (Bennett and Howard, 1996;
Bryant, 2003; Howard, 1999; Howard et al., 1993).
Game theory rely almost completely on restrictive mathematical models and
tools, that encompass a structural reduction limitations. The games models pro-
duced do not account for the players’ goals, player’s realities and constraints, in-
terpersonal relations, environment’s dynamics. The limitations of game theory’s,
and game theory related mathematical models and tools, which are formal, sys-
tematic, and abstract, are acknowledged by Luce and Raiffa (1957): “Game theory
does not, and probably no mathematical theory could, encompass all the diverse
problems which are included in our brief characterization of conflict of interest”.
Lately, Raiffa et al. (2002) acknowledged the limitations of these frameworks and
their models: “for a long time I found the assumptions made in standard game
theory too restrictive for it to have wide applicability”.
2.3.3 Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) and
Stability Analysis
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), proposed by Kilgour et al.
(1987) and Fang et al. (1993), is a methodological approach for modelling an in-
teractive decision situation/conflict in a format to which stability analysis can be
applied. It serves as a prospective or retrospective strategic assessment tool for
disputes. The GMCR is also supported by an automated decision support sys-
tem, GMCR II (Hipel et al., 1997; Fang et al., 2003a,b). GMCR proposed a graph
form representation to games/conflicts, as a better alternative to the widely used
normal form (proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), and builds on
the binary-representation-based option form which was proposed by Howard (1971)
and later used by Fraser and Hipel (1984).
Figure 2.4 shows that GMCR is part of a movement within the research do-
main of game analysis taking a direction to relieve game analysis from of the strict
assumptions that classical game theory imposes. Namely, this new representa-
tion direction moves away from the utilities-based cardinal preferences required by
game theory, in favour of a more realistic ordinal/relative preferences that could
be elicited easily from the decision makers in a strategic decision making situation.
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Figure 2.4: Game Theory and Related Theories. A Diagram adopted from Hipel
and Obeidi (2005) (with modifications) showing how Conflict Analysis (Fraser and
Hipel, 1984) and Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (Fang et al., 1993) relates to
Game Theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953)
The movement started with (Howard, 1971) offering a new representation (option
form) and a set of analysis tools (meta-rationality analysis), taking on the challenge
of addressing the shortcomings of the representation proposed by (von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1953) and the Nash stability and equilibrium analysis proposed
by Nash (1950). Shortcomings which are responsible, as per Howard, for the in-
ability to deal with dilemmas such as the prisoner’s dilemma (collectively referred
to as Paradoxes of Rationality).
After the work of Howard (1971), Howard and others went on to propose Drama
Theory (Howard, 1999; Bryant, 2003), while (Fraser and Hipel, 1984) took a more
progressive systematic systems-engineering approach, building on Howard’s work,
offering a set of conflict analysis tools and methods. GMCR, which originated in
conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984) and in metagame theory (Howard, 1971)
as Figure 2.4 shows, is the latest major advancement in that branch of research,
employing definitions and terminology from graph theory, set theory, and logic to
model and analyze conflicts.
As per GMCR, players’ possible moves from state to state are depicted using a
directed graph in which nodes represent states and arcs indicate state transitions
controlled by the player. Each state represents an outcome, a player option or
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Figure 2.5: Applying the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
combination of players’ options (i.e. a scenario of how the game will progress). The
model is considered to always be at some state, and changes of states are controlled
by the players. The Graph Model specifies an initial state, or status quo.
Applying GMCR follows, as shown in Figure 2.5, two main stages: (1) Modelling
Stage, in which the game/conflict is structured by determining the key ingredients:
the players (or Decision Makers(DM), as called by GMCR), the states, the possible
state transitions controlled by each DM, and each DM’s relative preferences over
the states; and (2) Analysis Stage, in which stability of each state from each DM’s
viewpoint is determined. Stable States represents a resolution to the the conflict.
The stability of states, for players, is defined by various solution concepts, or
stability definitions. These are mathematical descriptions of patterns of players’
social behaviour, in decision making situations. Some of the most commonly used
solution concepts used for assessing stability of states and equilibria includes: Nash
Stability (Nash, 1950, 1951) reflects a player who thinks only one step ahead. In
General MetaRationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), and Sequential Stability (SEQ)
(Fraser and Hipel, 1984), a player considers two steps ahead. A player, in Symmet-
ric MetaRationality (SMR) (Howard, 1971), contemplates three steps by assessing
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available moves by which he can escape from any sanctions that may be imposed
by other players. On the other hand, in the Limited Move Stability (LhS) concept
(Fang et al., 1993) a player has a foresight of horizon h moves, and in Non-Myopic
Stability (Brams and Wittman, 1981a) the player’s foresight is unlimited moves
ahead. But, behavioural game theorists, such as Johnson et al. (2002), have chal-
lenged the notion of unlimited step-ahead strategizing.
Despite the fact that the GMCR framework is related to game theory, it is con-
sidered more advanced and feasible than other game theory approaches. Some of
the restrictions are removed or relaxed. For example, GMCR require relative pref-
erences for the states, for each of the players. No need for restrictive utility-based
preferences’ order. In addition, GMCR makes use of the very useful reliance on
the solid mathematical and practical Graph Theory. This allowed for some aspects
of the game/conflict dynamics to be captured and modelled formally. Namely, the
moves from state to state by players.
Over the years, many researchers proposed enhancements to the GMCR frame-
work, adding to it or dealing with some of its limitations. But these extensions to
GMCR, for the most part, offered limited enhancements to GMCR. For example,
Hamouda et al. (2004, 2006) proposed an extension to the preference relationship,
of the original GMCR of Fang et al. (1993), to represent a realistic but limited
weak-or-strong strength of preference; Obeidi et al. (2005) offered a method to deal
with include or not include decision makers’ options based on positive or nega-
tive emotions the have decision makers towers their options (the method did not
model emotions or emotions effect beyond the include or not-include options); Li
et al. (2004b,a) offered a systematic method to analyze the conflicts’ states starting
from the status quo of the conflict (the method employ strict move rules such as
a player cannot take two consecutive moves); Li et al. (2004, 2005) added deal-
ing with uncertainties in preferences (the method while mathematically sound, it
failed to ground the uncertainties to why they exist in the first place); Inohara et al.
(2007) added dealing with decision makers emotional feelings/attitudes toward each
other; and Xu (2009) as well as Xu et al. (2009) offered a matrix representation to
accompany/replace GMCR in addition to a very unrealistic and unverifiable repre-
sentation to preferences’ strength that assumes the decision makers will pre-specify
strengths of their preferences in a scale/rank, much like AHP (the preferences’
strength representation is not connected to the player’s goals or constraints, and
produce in what seems a break in the stability concept strengths structure). We
intend to show the weaknesses and disadvantages of some of these extensions in the
38
near future (as a future research work), in comparison to the our framework and
the advancement (and extensions) it provides to GMCR.
In addition, the GMCR framework, and many of these extensions, still suffer
from many of game theory limitations. For instance, GMCR demands a set of
pre-specified options for each player, with a pre-specified preferences order for the
states (defined from the player’s options). Not to mention, here too, that the
players goals/motivations, and behavioural historical patterns, are not explicitly
included, alluded or referred to. This means that most of the human-intensive pre-
preparation work which the framework user completes before he start building the
GMCR model and analysis, is all not modelled or captured explicitly in a formal
form.
In our thesis research, we build on the strengths of the conflict work of Fraser
and Hipel (1984) and the GMCR work of Fang et al. (1993) (and the extensions
offered to these works), and deal with their weaknesses. We show how we used,
redefined, and/or advanced-on concepts and methods of these works, especially
when we show how our proposed Constrained Rationality framework deals with
the analysis of multi-agents conflicts.
2.3.4 Value Focused Thinking, as a Response to the
Challenges Facing Decision & Game Theories
Keeney (1992) introduced an alternative thinking framework, for the problem of
decision making, to the dominant alternative-focused thinking frameworks (i.e. de-
cision theory and game theory, including multi-criteria decision making theories).
Keeney, in his book, talked about the importance of values (goals, ethics, charac-
teristics, and so on) on the decision making process:
“Focusing on alternatives is a limited way to think through decision
situations. It is reactive, not proactive. If you wish to be the master
of your decisionmaking, it makes sense to have more control over the
decision situations you face. You do not control decision situations
that you approach through alternative-focused thinking. This standard
mode of thinking is backward, because it puts the cart of identifying
alternatives before the horse of articulating values. It is values that
are fundamentally important in any decision situation. Alternatives
are relevant only because they are means to achieve your values. Thus
your thinking should focus first on values and later on alternatives that
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might achieve them. . . Such thinking, which I refer to as value-focused
thinking, can significantly improve decision making because the values
guide not only the creation of better alternatives but the identification
of better decision situations. These better decision situations, which
you create for yourself, should be thought of as decision opportunities
rather than as decision problems. . .
Many methodologies and techniques to aid decisionmaking have
been developed over the past forty years. So why bother with yet an-
other approach? Invariably, existing methodologies are applied to deci-
sion problems once they are structured, meaning after the alternatives
and objectives are specified. Such methodologies are not very helpful
for the ill-defined decision problems where one is in a major quandary
about what to do or even what can possibly be done. Certainly if the
alternatives are not known, one cannot characterize the decision prob-
lem by the alternatives. In addition, most decision methodologies try
to find the best alternatives from a prespecified list. But where does
this list come from?” (Keeney, 1992)
Keeney, also went on, in his book, advocating of spending the time and effort
to go through the process of modelling the decision maker values (which we call
goals and constraints). It is definitely obvious, that we share the same concern and
motivation with Keeney’s (beyond alternative-focused thinking and methodologies,
and the importance of what he calls values [which have in them what we call in
Constrained Rationality goals and constraints]). But beyond this shared concern
and motivation, we go about addressing the challenge in two different ways:
1. Keeney uses the goals (he calls them objectives) to generate a list of alterna-
tives. The objectives, to him, have identifiable attributes (criteria) to judge
their achievement through what he calls value functions, which are nothing
more that utility functions. The problem lies in these utility functions, which
he himself considers subjective, but still are at the heart of his analysis of the
alternatives.
2. Keeney splits the decision maker’s goals-reduction-tree to two layers. The top
layer starts with the strategic goals of the decision maker reduced “nicely”,
i.e. forming an objectives-hierarchy while ignoring any interrelations or inter-
dependencies among the goals (interrelations which we call in our Constrained
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Rationality framework lateral-relations). The second lower layer has objec-
tives network, forming a structure similar to influence diagrams. While this
objectives-network captures some interrelations among the objectives in it, it
does not consider any affect of them or through them on the achievement of
related/linked objectives. These interrelations are informal, and merely visual
links, that are not considered when establishing the utility functions. That’s
because the purpose of the second layer is to help in generating alternatives
only. There is no effect of these interrelations, or means-ends links, on strate-
gic goals achievement, not even to the level offered by influence diagrams.
We have to remember that Keeney is one of the established researchers within
the decision theory school of thinking. So, while he acknowledged the importance
to go beyond the classical views of the alternative-focused domain of thinking, and
therefore include some aspects of goals-oriented analysis and reasoning (mostly
done to acknowledge the importance of creativity in the decision making process
–hence, the name of his book), he showed extreme loyalty to the classical views of
the dominant alternative-focused-thinking school by using utility functions (he calls
them value functions in his book) and cardinal preferences as “the only means” to
achieve judgement about alternatives. In his book, Keeney shows many examples
where he went all the way to generate quantitative utility-based representation,
sometimes crossing the objectivity line. He appeared to acknowledge this himself,
after a lengthy chapter on Quantifying Objectives with a Value Model (i.e. setting
utility functions as means to measure objectives’, or the achievability of goals, as
we call them):
“Are Value Models Scientific or Objective? The final issue concerns
the charge that value models are not scientific or objective. With that,
I certainly agree in the narrow sense. Indeed, values are subjective, but
they undeniably are a part of decision situations. Not modelling them
does not make them go away. It is simply a question of whether these
values get included implicitly and perhaps unknowingly in a decision
process or whether there is an attempt to make them explicit and con-
sistent and logical. In a broader sense, the systematic development of
a model of values is definitely scientific and objective. It lays out the
assumptions on which the model is based, the logic supporting these
assumptions, and the basis for data (that is, specific value judgments).
This makes it possible to appraise the implications of different value
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judgments. All of this is very much in the spirit of scientific analysis.
It certainly seems more reasonable-even more scientific-to approach im-
portant decisions with the relevant values explicit and clarified rather
than implicit and vague.” (Keeney, 1992)
In summary, we see Keeney’s Value-Focused Thinking framework, and his ac-
knowledgement about the need to go back to the root of the decision making prob-
lem, achieving the decision maker’s strategic goals (and not just the mere choosing
of one alternative among a pre-selected set of alternatives and using a pre-set car-
dinal preferences over such alternatives) as an additional support to our research
motivation and also to its approach. After that, our research and Keeney’s ap-
proach go about representing the goals of the decision makers, and formally using
such goals and their inter-relations and inter-dependencies to reason about the
known (and generated) alternatives, in two different ways.
But, this should not, in any way, lessen the importance of the support Keeney
provides to our research’s motivation and approach, by his realization of the need to
bring back the strategic goals to the decision making models (in order to generate
alternatives and to establish better judgement about the worth of such alternatives).
Especially, when we know that these acknowledgements and realizations are coming
from a researcher of Keeney’s caliber and status within the communities of decision
theory research and practice. In fact, Keeney’s acknowledgements about the need to
adopt a goal-oriented thinking when addressing decision analysis, and his criticism
of the dominant alternative-focused theories, provided the motivation for our Al-
Shawa (2006b) work, and provides support to our Constrained Rationality research
direction and thinking.
2.4 AI Multi-Agents Rationality Models
2.4.1 Distributed Artificial Intelligence, and Multi-Agent
Systems
Agent and Multi-Agents started in AI as studies of Distributed Artificial Intelli-
gence (DAI). DAI studied how intelligence can be modelled in the cooperation of
a set of agents (Huhns, 1987), questioning the usual AI assumption that a single
self-consistent entity (such as a conventional knowledge base) can demonstrate in-
telligence. Problem solving activities can be divided up among agents, according
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to their specialist knowledge. As the system runs, the agents communicate partial
solutions, and possibly control information (e.g. re-allocation of tasks), amongst
themselves, until they converge on a final agreed solution. The premise is that
intelligence is an emergent feature of co-operative behaviour.
The DAI domain of studies evolved to be called Multi-Agent Systems (MAS),
in which the scope increased to cover cooperative and non-cooperative distributed
intelligent agents. The MAS paradigm has a natural ability to handle conflicting
knowledge without the usual logical contortions arising from inconsistent conclu-
sions. It allows agents to develop and maintain alternative hypotheses. Different
agents will contain different knowledge, which may compliment or conflict with
knowledge contained in other agents.
This is demonstrated in the blackboard system (Nii, 1986a,b), which is typ-
ically used for recognition problems. Separate knowledge sources communicate
partial hypotheses using a shared blackboard. The knowledge sources modify and
extend existing hypotheses on the blackboard, until one of them adequately explains
the phenomena being observed. In the blackboard model, the separate knowledge
sources have no knowledge of each other (Erman and Lesser, 1975). Removing
the global blackboard requires that agents communicate directly. In the BEINGS
system, agents simply broadcast messages, usually in the form of requests for help,
and hope that some other agent will reply (Lenat, 1975). Such systems still as-
sume problems can be partitioned into totally independent sub-problems, and so
the co-operation is reduced to that of trading tasks and sharing results. However,
this is an unrealistic assumption, and is essentially conflict avoidance. There is a
realization that most problems cannot be partitioned in this way (Ginsberg, 1987).
Various techniques have been proposed to allow belief-based epistemic reason-
ing, especially in multi-agent planning systems. Agents must be able to reason
about what other agents know and are capable of in order to make full use of their
existence, and to co-operate effectively (Konolige and Nilsson, 1980). Similarly, to
communicate properly, agents must be sure their communications contain enough
context information to be understood probably, and that they are useful to the
recipient agent (Appelt, 1980).
Also, most MAS systems assume benevolent agents working towards the same
goal. Rosenschein (1985) notes that in real world situations, perfect co-operation
never happens, as the goals of any two agents will never coincide exactly. Rosen-
schein examines payoffs from game theory as a way of comparing goals, and dis-
43
cusses various situations in which conflict of goals can occur, and how they can be
resolved (Rosenschein, 1985).
While MAS has contributed a variety of computational models of agent inter-
action, it has not progressed much beyond the game theoretical studies of conflict
resolution (Sycara, 1988; Parsons et al., 2002; Wooldridge, 2000). We have dis-
cussed the limitations of these models, and the reasons behind these limitations, in
Al-Shawa (2006b).
2.4.2 Goals Modelling and Reasoning, as a Response to the
Challenges Facing MAS
Because of the limitation of the decision theory and game theory approaches to
design and implement multi-agent systems (Wooldridge, 2000; Braubach et al.,
2004), a new direction started emerging and becoming of interest to researchers in
the area: Modelling Goals and Reasoning about them.
The popularity of the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) framework (Bratman, 1987;
Busetta and Ramamohanarao, 1998; Mora et al., 1998; Wooldridge and Parsons,
1998) within the MAS research community, and the the Knowledge Acquisition
in autOmated Specification (KAOS) framework (Dardenne et al., 1993; van Lam-
sweerde et al., 1995) within the agent-oriented software requirements analysis re-
search community, since the mid-1990’s, was instrumental in enriching the agent
modelling and development research and extended it to be well suited for describing
an agent’s mental state. Both frameworks used the desires (goals) concept of an
agent to represent its motivational stance and are the main source for the agent’s
actions.
Nevertheless, currently available BDI agent platforms mostly have abstract form
of goals and do not represent them explicitly. The same could be said about agent-
oriented requirements analysis and development frameworks other than BDI, in-
cluding KAOS and i* (Yu, 1995; Yu and Mylopoulos, 1994). So even though that
Goals are an integral part of a large body of theoretical work within these bodies of
research, there is only a limited amount of work that provides an explicit structure
for goals, and reasoning about goals, that can be directly implemented in a BDI-like
agent system. Some of the relevant existing work is described below.
The support for any form of goal related reasoning is limited and varied in
current agent development systems. PRS (Ingrand et al., 1992) and dMARS
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(D’Inverno et al., 2004) represent goals as events with no internal structure. Other
systems like JACK (Busetta et al., 1999) allow various information to be stored
within the goal structure, but the goals are transient in that if they cannot be
pursued as they occur they are ignored. On the other hand, Huber’s JAM (Huber,
1999) keeps track of goals that cannot be immediately pursued for a later attempt.
JAM also uses the goal structure to reason about when goals are satisfied. This is
while others, such as Thangarajah et al. (2003b,a) and Shaw and Bordini (2007),
uses hierarchical task networks embedding goals within plan trees to direct plan
commitment to be more in line with goals adopted.
Irrespective of how these frameworks and systems represent goals, none of
them support the management of interactions between concurrent goals. Most,
in fact, consider goals that are tactical or procedural, and/or goals that are em-
bedded within plan structures, i.e. none deals with strategic goals for agents. This
mainly due to the nature of the bodies leading such research direction: the agent
software development community. Agent implement-ability, and management of
agent/system resources, are at the top of those researchers’ research objectives.
Additionally, one reason for this shortcoming is that most of these frameworks,
old and new (such as JACK (Howden et al., 2001), JAM (Huber, 1999), or Jason
(Bordini et al., 2007)) are natural successors of the first generation BDI systems,
such as PRS (Ingrand et al., 1996) and (Georgeff and Lansky, 1987) , which had
to concentrate on performance issues and do without computationally expensive
deliberation processes due to scarce computational resources. Furthermore, these
frameworks are mostly based on formal agent languages like AgentSpeak(L) (Rao,
1996) which focus on the procedural aspects of goals and treat them in an event
based fashion.
In the theory of agents and MAS, there has been some work on the formal prop-
erties of goals (Doyle et al., 1991; van Linder et al., 1995; Bell and Huang, 1997;
Hindriks et al., 2000; van Riemsdijk et al., 2003) and an agent’s commitment to-
wards achieving its goals (Rao and Georgeff, 1992; Cohen and Levesque, 1990) . At
the same time, there has been a significant amount of work on conflict management
within MAS (Tessier et al., 2000) and interactions between agents (Cohen et al.,
1997) . However, most of this work is presented within a logical framework that
cannot be easily mapped into a practical agent, or agents, goal reasoning based
system suitable for large scale conflict analysis real-time/simulation applications.
The goal-directed requirement engineering community has, also, contributed to
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the use of goals modelling and goals reasoning within MAS. The leading work of
the KAOS team started a wave of interest in modelling goals formally and using
it to direct the implementation of software systems (Dardenne et al., 1993; van
Lamsweerde et al., 1995). i* (Yu, 1995; Yu and Mylopoulos, 1994), proposed infor-
mal reasoning about goals at early stage of software implementation, while Tropos
(Mylopoulos and Castro, 2000; Giunchiglia et al., 2002) proposed a goal reason-
ing framework that formally reason about system implementation goals including
non-functional goals (Mylopoulos and Castro, 2000). However, the frameworks
proposed by the requirements engineering community focused on software imple-
mentation. Goals reasoning in KAOS for example, will lead to an object-oriented
software model; and in i* will lead to a set of informal diagrams that help guide
the software designers take decisions. Tropos’s Goals reasoning, on the other hand,
are done for: one agent systems; in isolation of the effect of both the environment
and other agents; and no consideration is given to MAS conflict analysis or game
playing (Mylopoulos and Castro, 2000; Giorgini et al., 2004, 2005).
Nevertheless, the need for explicit goal representation is expressed in several
recent publications (Winikoff, Harland, and Padgham, 2002; Winikoff, Padgham,
Harland, and Thangarajah, 2002), and is additionally supported by the classic
BDI theory, which treats desires (possibly conflicting goals) as one core concept
(Bratman, 1987). The importance of explicit and declarative goal representation
in the modelling area is underlined by BDI agent methodologies like Prometheus
(Padgham and Winikoff, 2002), Tropos (Mylopoulos and Castro, 2000; Giunchiglia
et al., 2002) and requirements engineering techniques like KAOS (Dardenne et al.,
1993; van Lamsweerde et al., 1995; Letier and van Lamsweerde, 2002). If the the
declarative aspect of goals is omitted by the modelling framework, then the the
ability to reason about goals is lost (Winikoff et al., 2002). This means that the
representation of goals is a necessary precondition when one wants reasoning about
goals to become possible. But the current frameworks lacks the representation
mechanisms to support modelling goals, and therefore reason about it. Al-Shawa
(2006b) talked about the short comings of the current frameworks and the need to
extend them at different levels to be able to make the agent-oriented framework
well suited to build multi-agent knowledge-based systems.
Recently, we proposed in Al-Shawa (2006b) a new conceptual knowledge mod-
elling and management framework to address these short comings. especially with
regards to dealing with strategic knowledge management and decision making in
MAS. The Viewpoints-based Value Driven - Enterprise Knowledge Management
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(ViVD-EKM) framework offers a new and practical way to model agents and multi-
agents systems, the agents’ perspectives of the world, and reason about it. An
overview will be provided later on how an agent’s viewpoints, goals and constraints
are modelled within ViVD-EKM.
2.5 Rational Reasoning and Decision Making:
Limitations and Biases
Are strategic decision makers rational agents? This question was the focus of many
studies across many scientific disciplines and for a long time. The modern discussion
started with the Rational Action Theory that grew out from the principles set
forward by Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory which they
discussed in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). The expected utility theory
suggests that rational decisions focuses primarily on maximizing the individual’s
economic condition/wealth.
Simon (1990) had critically studied rational theory and subjective expected
utility theory. These theories depict the rational human decision maker as one
who “contemplates, in one comprehensive view, everything that lies before him
. . . understands the range of alternative choices open to him, not only at the moment
but over the whole panorama of the future . . . understands the consequences of each
of the available choice strategies, at least up to the point of being able to assign a
joint probability distribution to future states of the world. (And) . . . has reconciled
or balanced all his conflicting partial values and synthesized them into a single
utility function that orders, by his preference for them, all these future states of
the world” (Simon, 1995). Simon concluded, “when these assumptions are stated
explicitly, it becomes obvious that subjective expected utility theory has never been
applied, and never can be applied” (Simon, 1990).
Dawes (1988) considered the influences on decision-making that lead to irra-
tional outcomes and identified among many things: habit, tradition, religious be-
liefs, others’ choices, past choices, etc. The investigation of rational action theory
can lead to the conclusion that making a rational choice is beyond the capability
of an average individual. Habit, tradition, religious beliefs, social relationships, in-
terests, goals, experiences, perceptions, and biases, all influence human behaviour
resulting in a complex decision-making environment.
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Therefore, a more realistic view of rationality is needed. In response, Simon
(1990) introduced Bounded Rationality. The theory of bounded rationality recog-
nizes that human thought processes are bounded or limited. Although we live in a
world with “millions of variables that in principle could affect each other”, humans
will only detect or acknowledge a reasonable number of them when facing a problem,
which requires action (Simon, 1990). Although the theory of bounded rationality
loosens the demands of “rationality”, as described in game theory and decisions
theory, on agent’s decision-making, there still exists a gap between rationality and
the observed so called “irrationality”.
For an agent to exercise rational thinking, though bounded , the agent must be
capable of searching for and generating alternative solutions, though not necessarily
an exhaustive search. Once the alternatives have been identified, facts about the
environment must be gathered to allow the decision-maker to draw inferences from
these facts, relate them to each of the alternative solutions, reasonably project the
consequences that may result from each alternative. Lastly, the agent should be
able to compare each alternative to the desired goal and make a rational choice.
Bounded rationality considers the limitations of human computational ability and
the environmental constraints that exist in the real world. But, not all limitations
are due to computational abilities.
The Gap Between Goals and Actions:
Simon’s thesis is that “human behaviour is generally rational, and that it cannot
be understood without finding the connections between its actions and its goals”
(Simon, 1995). On the other hand, Mintzberg had stated that manager’s work
with “verbal information and intuitive (non explicit) processes” (Mintzberg, 1973).
This is not to say that intuition is necessarily irrational, but when comparing the
concept of intuition to the theory of rational action, it is inconclusive as to whether
agents are completely rational in their actions.
The complexity in this picture quickly emerges because a political or business
decision, for example, is not constructed in isolation between an agent and the eco-
nomic alternatives that lie before him. The complexity arises from many factors
such as the environment, culture, context, individual interests of the agents in-
volved, communication limitations, the expectations and biases that are extremely
influential on the agent’s decision-making abilities and therefore the agent’s deci-
sions. The value of information and its effective use in rational action is dependent
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not only on the environment and the social factors but also on the individual agent.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1981); Kahneman and Tversky (1973, 1979, 1984,
1996); Bazerman (1986, 1990); Rachlin (1980) investigated the biases that may
influence the decision-making behaviour of agents.
Abercrombie (1960) illustrates the intricate process behind the development of
judgment and the mental schemata, which is the scheme in the human mind that
allows information to be organized. The human mind scans all current information
in order to find matching schemata. The mind may distort the new information in
order to make it fit into current assumptions. Information that does not fit may
be rejected. Humans may not remember information as it was originally presented;
instead it may be remembered incorrectly, forming the individual perspective. This
individual perspective (or viewpoint) is one reason for the limits of rational action
or decision-making.
Cognitive heuristics (or biases) develop to perform this task. As a result, judg-
ments, which lead to decisions, are strongly influenced. These judgmental biases or
heuristics may be perceived as a negative influence, but in reality they allow agents
to make decisions on real-time, allowing the agents to live normal life. For example,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984); Tversky and Kahneman (1981) discovered
that the way a situation is presented to a decision maker can influence the resulting
decision. Their research revealed that different decisions are made simply based on
whether a problem/conflict outcome results in a gain or a loss (even when the sta-
tistical probability of the two problems were exactly the same). An individual agent
will avoid risk for a gain, yet, will seek risk to avoid a loss. In addition, Bazerman
(1986) found that decision makers have a tendency to seek alternatives that confirm
a prior decision. As a result they may ignore alternatives that may suggest a more
optimal solution. Not to mention that many had discussed the effect/influence
emotions have on decision making and how they shape and strengthen our beliefs
(Frijda and Manstead, 2000; Elster, 1999) and therefore rearrange our priorities
and revise our goal hierarchies (Simon, 1982).
These agents’ biases and realities affect their ability to take decisions, or more
accurately what decision making criteria to adopt, and therefore what decisions to
take. Unfortunately, the mathematical and economical models, typically used to
help decision makers analyze their options, ignores these factors. This is mainly
because of the limitations and restrictive assumptions of these models and tools.
The models do not even directly provide facilities to capture the agents’ goals and
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constraining realities/biases, and reason about them.
2.6 Decision Support Methods and Models:
Evaluation, Verification and Validation
The question of how best to evaluate and validate conceptual modelling methodolo-
gies and its products, is by itself a research topic. The issue is at the heart of what
constitutes a scientific research, and what a valid methodology is, with very polar-
ized conflicting views and camps dominate the scientific research landscape. Many
research, arguments and counter-arguments could be cited here on what is the best
way to evaluate and validate a methodology. Because this topic is not within the
scope of our research, we will answer the question based on how evaluation and
validation will be addressed in our thesis research.
2.6.1 Methodology Evaluation: the Essential Role of Case
Studies and Applications
Similar theses research work used case studies to demonstrate the usage of the pro-
posed methodologies in real-life examples, and to illustrate how more insight will
be gained by applying the proposed methodologies over the usage of other existing
methodologies. The more-insight, in each of these works, is explained and shown
by providing an interpretation of the studied conflict model/s generated by using
the newly proposed methodology. This more-insight is provided, in most cases, by
informally explaining the differences of the old compared to the new models, and
how the new models have better modelled the conflict studied. No controlled exper-
iments, experimental data, nor statistical or logical (in mathematical terms) infer-
ences are provided. Some examples of the very fine scholarly theses research work,
old and recent, which proposed decision-making modelling and analysis methodolo-
gies include: Fang (1989), Obeidi (2006), AL-Mutairi (2007), Kassab (2007), and
Sheikhmohammady (2009).
But this is not limited to theses works, or conflict modelling and analysis as
an area of research. Consider for example the published literature on proposed
methodologies on conceptual modelling, such as the work published on the bene-
fits of the famous Object-Oriented methodology (Jacobson and G., 1992; Booch,
1994), and its more elaborate and expanded version, the UML methodology and
conceptual framework (Jacobson and Rumbaugh, 1999); or take the research work
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in requirements engineering methodologies (for example Yu (1995)); or even work
of systems and decision modelling within Operational Research such as the work
of Checkland (1999) on Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) and Eden (1989) on
Strategic Options Development and Analysis (SODA); and so on.
None of these research work, which proposed conceptual modelling and analysis
methodologies and frameworks, used empirical experiments with numerical statis-
tical data analysis to show how their newly proposed methodology (at the time)
performs in comparison to the current existing methodologies (at the time), in order
to qualify any of these proposed methodologies as scientific and valid. The lack of
demands, by the receiving scientific community on the researchers and their newly
proposed methodologies, to provide “statistical” or “data-oriented” proofs could be
explained by the scholarly views cited and briefly discussed below.
In Checkland (1999) words: “Methodologies and their models are simply log-
ical machines for carrying out a purposeful transformation process expressed in a
root definition. Measuring the performance of a logical machine can be expressed
through an instrumental logic which focuses on three issues: checking that the out-
put is produced; checking whether minimum resources are used to obtain it; and
checking, at a higher level, that this transformation is worth doing because it makes
a contribution to some higher level or longer-term aim. This gives definition of the
‘3Es’ which will be relevant for every model: the criteria efficacy (E1), efficiency
(E2) and effectiveness (E3) (Forbes and Checkland, 1987; Checkland and Scholes,
1990).” Checkland, the well-known in Operation Research and Systems Engineer-
ing communities, also argues that a methodology should be taken as a process of
social and scientific inquiry which aims to bring about improvement in areas of
concern by articulating a learning cycle (based on systems concepts) which can
lead to action (Checkland, 1999).
In addition, Checkland and Holwell (1998a,b) and Checkland (1999) agreeing
with Kurt Lewin’s views, developed in the 1940s, that real social conflicts and events
could not be studied in a laboratory, argued for some mid ground between the strong
criterion of repeatability (of the happenings) insisted on by some in the scientific
research community and the weak criterion of plausibility suggested by others in
social sciences. They argue that: “action research, part of systems engineering,
should be conducted in such a way that the whole process is subsequently recoverable
by anyone interested in critically scrutinizing the research. This means declaring
explicitly, at the start of the research, the intellectual frameworks and the process
51
of using them which will be used to define what counts as knowledge in this piece
of research. By declaring the epistemology of their research process in this way, the
researchers make it possible for outsiders to follow the research and see whether
they agree or disagree with the findings. If they disagree, well-informed discussion
and debate can follow. Also, the learning gained in a piece of organization-based
action research may concern any or all of: the area focused on in the research; the
methodology used; or the framework of ideas embodied in the methodology.”
Eden (1995) describes the methodologies concerned with decision analysis and
support to be economically viable when used to support ill-structured, complex and
probably strategic decision making. Therefore, as he puts it while discussing de-
cision making in group settings: “Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety (Ashby, 1954)
suggests that a complex system will be needed to support a complex situation. The
criteria of success for such systems will inevitably be equally complex. . . . If the
system [methodology] is designed specifically to address real groups (with a history
and a future) working on complex issues then it is no use taking out those very
characteristics that: make it complex in order to control experiments. Research
with students using structured problems will say absolutely nothing about the per-
formance of a GDSS [Group Decision Support Systems] in relation to its designed
aims. As Checkland put it: “Methodology can be tested only in conjunction with a
problem to which it is applied” (Checkland, 1981, p. 242), and the problem will al-
ways be complex.”(text within square brackets is added to the original Eden text for
clarification purposes). Meaning that case studies on real-life problems, not control
experiments, should be considered the best way to test and evaluate methodologies,
especially the ones that aim to address complex issues and systems such as ours
(modelling and analysis of real-life strategic decision making and conflict).
It is also useful here to mention some research on what evaluation criteria
should be considered to best evaluate software engineering methodologies and tools.
For example, Kitchenham et al. (1997) identified the following evaluation criteria,
grouped them in three successive levels, and defined them as follows: 1) Basic: Is
the component description complete, understandable, usable, internally consistent
etc.? Would potential users have confidence that they could use it for real or carry
out a trial?; 2) Use: Is the component helpful? That is, when it was used, did
it achieve its objective, produce the specified results, produce usable and relevant
results, behave as expected, and not require expert assistance?; and 3) Gain: Is it
better than what was available previously (the control situation), i.e. lead to better
decision.
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This is just one example of research on evaluation criteria, but it clearly con-
firms with the views of researchers in systems design and operations research that
evaluation of methodologies best done within the context of case studies and the
criteria of evaluation are best described by Checkland’s “3Es” listed earlier (Check-
land, 1999; Eden, 1995). One also has to remember that case studies usually are
conducted to gain insight on whether the research arguments and propositions are
satisfied or not and why, and this should constitute the evaluation criterion (Yin,
2003) (and as best shown by the best-selling scholarly case study of Allison and
Zelikow (1999), again as per Yin (2003)).
Therefore, when it comes to evaluating our Constrained Rationality, with its
conceptual framework and methodology, we will use case studies and illustrative
application examples as a mechanism. At the time of using a case study or an illus-
trative application example, we will state: why the case or example was chosen; how
it is used; what is the process used in conducting the modelling and analysis parts
of it; and how the resultant models and analysis compare to what other method-
ologies provided (if any), i.e. what is the insight gained by using the Constrained
Rationality framework versus what others provided (if any).
2.6.2 Verification and Validation
Now, discussing how best to judge the validity of a methodology and its models is
an equally contentious research topic. While we were not able to find any discus-
sion on validation of the methodologies provided in comparable research in decision
making modelling and analysis (theses, or otherwise, such as the ones listed above),
we discuss the topic of methodologies and the validation of their models as defined
by the Requirements Engineering research and practice circles. Requirements En-
gineering research share many of the concerns that providers and users of decision
making models, or any models describing humanistic system (as called by Zadeh in
his principle of incompatibility - in Zadeh (1973)) or phenomenon, especially: how
to judge the validity of models built to describe the world?
In requirements engineering, validation is the process of establishing that the
requirements and models elicited from the stakeholders provide an accurate account
of their requirements. Explicitly describing the requirements is a necessary precon-
dition not only for validating requirements, but also for resolving conflicts between
stakeholders. But rarely, in the requirements engineering literature and standards,
validation is discussed separately. It is always accompanied by discussion on Veri-
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fication. Take for example how the IEEE Standards for Software Engineering set a
complete Verification and Validation standards document (IEEE, 1998), in which
a definition of Validation is given to be: the confirmation that the “particular re-
quirements for a specific intended use” are fulfilled; and Verification is defined to
be: the confirmation that “specified requirements” have been fulfilled.
Figure 2.6: Verification vs. Validation
Figure 2.6 shows the difference between verification and validation as discussed
in the system requirements engineering literature (Boman et al., 1997; Loucopoulos
and Karakostas, 1995; Lauesen, 2002; Blum, 1992). The figure also shows the equiv-
alent and similar steps that systems requirement engineering and decision/conflicts
modelling and analysis have. In both, the conceptual models describing the real-
world problem come as a product of a thorough knowledge acquisition process
conducted by an analyst/modeller eliciting the stakeholders/players’ view of the
problem.
Many consider validating the produced models, and the methodology used to
produce them, to be very difficult; and the same is not true when it comes to verifi-
cation. Nuseibeh and Easterbrook (2000) recalled that the question of verification
is easier to address, than validation, especially if techniques such as formal rep-
resentation and analysis is used by the methodology and the models it produces,
because such techniques tend to concentrate on the coherence of the models and
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descriptions of the world: are they consistent, and are they structurally complete?
These are the type of questions that verification tries to answer. In contrast, val-
idation is geared towards testing a correspondence with the real world problem.
Therefore, the techniques used usually softer and mostly concerned with checking
if all aspects of the problem that the stakeholders regard as important have been
covered. Some of the aids used in testing and ensuring validity include prototyping,
animation, and the use of scenarios. The use of models and replaying the elicited
clear description of the problem are considered very helpful aids to communicate to
the stakeholders/player what the analyst managed to capture from their knowledge,
and to confirm whether this captured view is accurate.
Nuseibeh and Easterbrook (2000) stated that “requirements validation is diffi-
cult for two reasons. The first reason is philosophical in nature, and concerns the
question of truth and what is knowable. The second reason is social, and concerns
the difficulty of reaching agreement among different stakeholders with conflicting
goals. . . We can compare the problem of validating requirements with the problem
of validating scientific knowledge. . . Requirements engineers (who) adopt a logical
positivist approach - essentially the belief that there is an objective world that
can be modelled by building a consistent body of knowledge grounded in empirical
observation. In RE, this view says that the requirements describe some objec-
tive problem that exists in the world, and that validation is the task of making
sufficient empirical observations to check that this problem has been captured cor-
rectly.” Then Nuseibeh and Easterbrook went on to cite the observations of Popper
(1963) on the limitations of empirical observation: scientific theories can never be
proved correct through observation, they can only be refuted , and this applies to
requirements modelling.
We also have to remember that logical positivism was severely criticized in the
latter part of the twentieth century (Blum, 1996). Kuhn (1962) observed that
science tends to move through paradigm shifts, where the dominant paradigm de-
termines the nature of current scientific theories. This leads to the realization that
observation is not value-free, rather it is theory-driven, and is biased by the cur-
rent paradigm, hinging on its view of the world. For requirements engineers, the
methods and tools they use dominate the way that they see and describe prob-
lems. Nuseibeh and Easterbrook (2000) described an extreme case of this, when
the problem of validating requirements models shifts to a problem of convincing
stakeholders that the chosen representation for requirements models is appropri-
ate. Jackson (1995) captures this perspective through his identification of problem
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frames. If stakeholders do not agree with the choice of problem frame, it is unlikely
that they will ever agree with any statement of the requirements. Can this be rea-
sonably accepted? At the other extreme, ethnomethodologists attempt to avoid the
problem altogether, by refusing to impose modelling constructs on the stakeholders
(Goguen and Linde, 1993). By discarding traditional problem modelling and anal-
ysis tools, ethnomethodologists seek to apply value-free observations of stakeholder
activities, and therefore circumvent the requirements validation issue altogether.
The decision making and conflict analysis case studies and literature show quite
striking resemblance and similarities. This could be confirmed by the case study
results of Allison and Zelikow (1999), the much celebrated case study about the
Cuban Missile Crisis. At the beginning, Allison and Zelikow stated the argument
of their study, formulated in three propositions:
1. Professional analysts of foreign affairs and policymakers (as well as ordinary
citizens) think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of
largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the
content of their thought;
2. Most analysts explain (and predict) behaviour of national governments in
terms of one basic conceptual model, here entitled Rational Actor Model
[This is the dominant conceptual modelling and reasoning framework, within
the research community in decision making and conflict analysis, and centres
around the views of decision theory and game theory];
3. Two alternative conceptual models, labeled an Organizational Behaviour Model,
and Governmental Politics Model, provide a base for improved explanations
and predictions.
Then they conclude the study with the following observations:
1. The source of differences is the conceptual models each employed;
2. Differences in Interpretations based on taking alternative conceptual angles,
looking at the conflict, presenting a number of significant differences in em-
phasis and interpretations;
3. Different Answers or Different Questions: Competing interpretations reflect
each model’s tendency to produce different answers to the same question.
Observing the models at work, what was equally striking are the differences
in the ways the analysts conceive of problems, shape puzzles, unpack summary
questions and dig into the evidence in search for an answer
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So, if different models captured different aspects of the world problem, who can
judge which model is valid, invalid, more valid, or less valid than the others. And
most importantly who can say that one methodology or conceptual framework is
not valid because it captured some aspect of the problem but not all.
The other essential difficulty in requirements, and models in general, centres on
how to validate the models of the world-problem if there is disagreement among
the stakeholders/players. In Constrained Rationality, we explicitly model players’
goal hierarchies and goal inter-dependencies making the problem clear: stakehold-
ers/players have goals that conflict with one another. Avoiding the problem of re-
solving such conflicts, as current decision and conflict methodologies suggest, does
not mean that the problem does not exist, nor means that it has been resolved.
You only need to see the effect of suppressing the stakeholders’ conflicting interests
and goals on system implementation projects causing many failures and challenges,
as many industry reports shows.
So, how should we address the issue of validity in our methodology and its
produced models, knowing that methodologies and models validity is a research
topic on its own right, as we know by now? Do we just concern ourselves with
the verification problem, which is easier to address in our case because we employ
a logical and formal representation/modelling and reasoning approach, and ignore
validation. We do believe that this will be impractical, especially because we hope
that the methodology will be used and employed by others to analyze their strategic
decision making and real-life conflicts.
We see the verification problem of any methodology to be the most essential
for the methodology to be a methodology in the first place. Why? Because it
is concerned with the coherence, consistency and correctness of the models and
methods employed within the framework structure of the methodology. This is
especially true if the methodology assumes formality (mathematical and logical
concepts and constructs). On the question of validity, we are with the view that
validation testing and enhancing is what makes the methodology usable and useful
for interested users. The methodology itself could not be invalidated except on
the grounds of failing to be logically grounded, sound and verifiable, and here
too we may have many of the scholars we cited their work above protest. On
the other hand, models built (by the methodologies) to describe a problem of the
world could be invalidated on the ground that it did not correspond to the real-
world problem and events. But, the problem here is what constitutes the “true”
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definition of the problem, or the “truth” about any of the world affairs, especially if
the stakeholders/players state the problem as they believe it, and the methodology
is just a tool to capture their belief and then analyze it.
If a decision maker made an incorrect statement about his options, preferences
and utilities, is it true then that the incorrect decision theory models (produced
by an analyst based on this stated description of the decision making problem)
will invalidate the decision theory and its applied methodology? Nobody can say
that it is Decision Theory’s fault, and therefore it is an “invalid” theory. Take
another example from requirements modelling: if the stakeholders, of a systems to
be built to solve a real-life problem, have agreed that the requirements’ conceptual
models for the system are absolutely correct, then, few months down the road, it is
been found that what the stakeholders stated and agreed on as “the” model of the
world and the system they want happened to be incorrect and incomplete (because
they did not know better at the time). Who is at fault here? The methodology
itself, and therefore it has to be declared invalid because it produced these incorrect
and incomplete models, or because it employed some specific methodological and
systematic-way to capture the world and model it, but then the process failed to
produce the right models? is it the analyst’s fault? or is it the stakeholders’ fault?
Suggesting an invalidation of methodologies because they provide models based on
errors in knowledge-elicitation or failures of players/stakeholders to recognize and
state the “truth” about their world and their problem is not logical at best.
The validation problem is not a methodology problem, except in one aspect:
failing to help and aid the stakeholders to specify clear and accurate definition of
their domain world or problem. In short, it is a knowledge elicitation problem. Yes,
it is an important problem to address, especially when there is investment in time,
money and resources at stake, such as the case when building a multi-million dollar
business system. And that’s why requirements engineering literature talks about
validation and how to test it and solve its dilemmas, but only when it comes to
models validation, not methodology validation.
In our research, we were and still concerned with model correctness, complete-
ness, quality and reliability and that’s why we discussed them in Al-Shawa (2006b),
and highlighted there aspects we considered important to address, even informally,
and aspects that we considered for future research. Within this thesis research,
our methodology calls for context setting of the problem definition, as well as helps
and challenges the analyst and the decision-makers/players to describe not only
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the decision making, or conflict, environment but also disclose their own interests,
goals, and realities; and then captures all of this in formal models and structure.
The opposite is practiced and encouraged by the current dominant frameworks and
methodologies, where many aspects of the decision-making, or conflict, are reduced
to a set of proxies such as preferences and/or utility functions (understood, and
therefore verifiable, by specialists only, not the end users).
Our research, beside guiding the decision makers through the process of elicita-
tion, it also allows for further validation of the models to be produced by providing
a systematic methodological decision support system, tools and methods, that aids
in the process of modelling, reasoning, simulation, stability analysis, sensitivity
analysis, and what-if testing of one and multi-agent decision making situations.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have looked at the strategic decision making process as presented
in the literature; and how the literature focused by far on one small part, the
evaluation of alternatives part, of the process. We then discussed the two main
theories dominated the strategic decision making research: decision theory and
game theory; and how these theories, and related theories, are inherently limited.
While the Multi-Agent Systems research community mostly used the dominant
decision and game theories to address the decision making problem, recent work
in the field (especially after the BDI framework appeared in the mid 1990s), as
we discussed, start looking at reasoning-about goals and beliefs as a better way to
frame the problem and therefore the solution. We concluded with some discussion
on decision making theories and the concept of “Rationality”, and how many of
these theories could not explain the deviation observed in real life case studies
from what these theories suggest as “the” rational behaviour; and with discussion
on evaluation, verification and validation of conceptual modelling frameworks and
how we define these concepts and intend to apply them in our research.
The following chapter will present the Constrained Rationality, a formal goal
and constraints reasoning framework for strategic decision making and conflict anal-
ysis for single and multi-agent systems and environments. The framework suggests,
as discussed in Chapter 1, bringing back the strategic decision making problem to
its roots: reasoning about options/alternatives, not to satisfy a set of preferences,
but rather to satisfy the explicitly stated strategic and conflicting goals an agent
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This chapter presents an important part of the Constrained Rationality framework.
At the heart of the framework is the modelling mechanisms the framework provides
to model the goals and realities/constraints that the agents (or the involved deci-
sion makers in the decision making situation) have; how these goals and constraints
interact and affect each other; how these goals, constraints and the relationships
among them are used to reason about the goals and the different alternatives (op-
tions to choose from) the agents have; and how this reasoning will guide the agents
to choose the best alternatives that provides the most achievement of their respec-
tive goals given their respective constraints.
The main purpose of the framework is to allow the agent to represent and
reason about the goals that she believes in and the plans she is about to adopt in
order to achieve these goals. By reasoning about goals, we mean: be able to judge
the degree of operationalization that the agent is committing to these goals, and
therefore the degree of achievement possible for such goals; as well as, be able to
judge what plans to commit to, and how to order such plans based on the degree
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 Generating DM's Preferences Over Alternatives
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 Build a Goals Tree for he DM by Reducing the Strategic Goals
 until a List of Intentions are Reached 
 Add All Constraints (Relevant Internal and External 
 Constraints for the DM within Context)
 Model All the Effects Goals have on Other Goals and 
 Constraints have on Goals using Lateral Relations (each 
 complete with its type and modifier)
Generate a List of All Possible Alternatives 
(List All Known Plans/Options, and 
Uncover the Hidden, or Create New, Ones 
using Creative Thinking Techniques)
Model the Effect of each of the Plans/
Options on the Goals  in GCM, and the 
Effect the GCM Constraints on each Plan/
Option using Lateral Relations (each 






Model each of the Plans/Options as an 
Aggregate Intention Node Placed at the 
Bottom of the GCM’s Goals Tree.  
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The Route for the One-Agent, or  
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Strategic Decision Making Model
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Plan/Option (or Group of Plans/
Options) on the DMs’ Strategic 
Goals’ Achievement, Prevention 
and Operationalization 
Levels.Done By Using:
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Importance, or Priorities, 
to the Strategic Goals in 
the DM’s GCM Model
Add Any Emotional 
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Prvn & Opr through all 
Relations (Rules & Algorithm)
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Generate the DM's 
Preferences, over the DM'S 
Alternatives, and 
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 Generate Different Scenario/What-if Strategic Decision  
 Making Models
 Separate Models Should be Built for Each Possible  Variation to Base Model 
of the Decision Making Situation. These Additional Models are called: 
Scenario Models if the new models varies drastically from the base model, or 
What-If Models if the new  models are slightly different from the base model. 






6  Strategic Decision  Making Analysis: 
Figure 3.1: The Process of Modelling and Analyzing Single (and Multi-Agent De-
cision Making & Conflicts, where agents act in an individualistic manner with no
consideration to others’ current or future choices and decisions). Modelling agents’
Viewpoints, Goals-and-Constraints-Models (GCMs), as well as modelling and final-
izing the reasoning Value Properties are shown in the Highlighted Boxes and will be
covered in this chapter.
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of operationalization and achievement those plans will provide to the agent’s goals,
if the agents decide to commit to them.
Al-Shawa (2006b,a) discussed how ViVD-EKM represent agent’s goals and con-
straints conceptually, and that goals and constraints are mainly captured as part
of the Goals & Constraints Model (GCM), a sub-model of an agent’s Viewpoint
model. Figure 3.2 shows a simple one goal tree GCM model. We need now to find
a satisfactory formal goals reasoning framework. The research objective is look-
ing for a formal qualitative reasoning framework which an agent can use formally
and systematically in order to rationalize about different aspects of its goals: its
operationalization level, its achievement level, any inconsistencies that exit, any
conflicting goals, and so on.
To tackle the problem of finding the right satisfactory formal reasoning frame-
work, a step by step approach is followed. We started by tackling the simplest, and
the limited in its scope, problem definition where the agent has only one simple
goals-reduction-tree and where there are no conflicting or hindering relations among
such goals. We, then, slowly increased the scope of the problem to include other
items or more details such as goals-goals relation and goals-constraints relations.
Once we reach a satisfactory and sufficiently formal reasoning techniques at each
level/step of the problem, we move to the next level/step where we introduce addi-
tional concepts and relations from the GCM model. The process continued until we
have a complete sufficient and effective formal reasoning framework that will satisfy
our research objective. Following the steps of the research’s plan of attack, we will
dedicate one section in this chapter, to each step of the plan. This means that
our formal reasoning framework, the Constrained Rationality framework, will be
presented, as it was built, gradually. At the end, we will conclude with a summary.
Figure 3.1 shows the Constrained Rationality framework’s process of modelling
the decision making situation. The figure covers the process of modelling single-
agent situations, or multi-agent decision making situations where agents act in an
individualistic manner with no consideration to others’ current or future choices
and decisions). The figure also highlights the parts of the process that will be
covered in this chapter. As the figure shows, this chapter will show how the goals
and constraints of the different agents in the situation are modelled as viewpoints
models and how the value properties, which the agents need for their reasoning
abilities, are modelled and finalized. The following chapter will cover the aspects
of the framework responsible for modelling the agents’ priorities and emotions; and
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generating the agents’ preferences over their alternatives. The chapter after that
will look at how the framework’s process and components presented in this chapter
and the following one are extended and modified in order to model and analyze
multi-agent decision making situations.
The chapter starts with Section 3.2 introducing the Goal and Constraints Model
(GCM) and its constructs, and Section 3.3 discussing the concept of qualitative la-
belling of goals’ value properties, such as the goals’ achievement, operationalization
and prevention. The following two sections, Sections 3.4 and 3.5, introduce a for-
malization of the relations that exist among goals and with constraints, and then
discuss how the goals’ value labels get propagated across these relations. All the
pieces will be put together in Section 3.6. Then, the section will introduce a formal
forward qualitative value propagation algorithm to analyze plans/options based on
expressed initial set of value properties of the agent’s goals and constraints.
Sections 3.7 and 3.8 discuss how the framework will deal with complexities
such as the existence of multiple strategic goals, therefore multiple goal trees, and
dynamic changes happen to the goals and constraints over time. Then, Section
3.9 will demonstrate the extensibility of the framework by showing some possible
extensions such as new types of relations among goals that could be added when
the applications/users need such. The chapter then ends with presenting some
preliminary experiment, and a summary.
3.2 Agent’s Goals & Constraints Model (GCM)
Al-Shawa (2006b,a) proposed the Viewpoints-based Value-Driven Enterprise Knowl-
edge Management (ViVD-EKM) framework, a conceptual modelling framework to
model Multi-Agent Systems in the context of knowledge management and analysis.
As per ViVD-EKM, the agent has Viewpoint models about the world he perceives.
These inter-related Viewpoints are structured in a way that each could represent
the agent’s own knowledge about a subject-matter, a decision making situation of
his, or ones of another specific agent/player in his world.
At the heart of each Viewpoint model is the Goals & Constraints Model (GCM),
a sub-model of the agent’s Viewpoint model. GCM captures the agent’s goals and
constraints with regard to the specific situation/conflict which his viewpoint model
is concerned with. The goals within GCM are operationalized by a set of plans (or
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Figure 3.2: Goals & Constraints Model (GCM), with simple one goal-tree
processes), a set of assets (physical or intellectual), products, features of products,
etc.
The detailed ontology of GCM, Viewpoint, and the full ViVD-EKM conceptual
modelling framework are given in Al-Shawa (2006b). In this thesis document, we
will use the GCM part of the viewpoint model because it has all the components
to reason about: the goals and constraints. It has all what the judgment about
the options (plans, processes, intellectual property or physical assets, products,
features, etc.) is based on. But, for simplification and space constraints, we assume
that the goals within GCM get operationalized by a set of options/plans through
intentional primitive goals to adopt such plans, i.e. there will be no discussion on
the details of the options/plans.
Figure 3.2 shows an illustration of a simple one goals-tree GCM model, with
goals within the tree affecting each other, and a set of constraints constraining these
goals. The lower refined goals at the bottom of goal-tree are operationalized by a
set of plans (each is modelled as aggregate plan concept, i.e. with no details about
the actions and rules within such plans).
The goal nodes in GCM represent the motivation the agent has within the topic,
situation, or conflict that the viewpoint model is concerned with; or they could be
represent all the agent’s goals, needs and wants, in life in general. Goal nodes are
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modelled by first inserting the ultimate strategic goals the agent has. Then, these
big goals, called Desires in ViVD-EKM, go through a refinement/reduction process,
using reduction relations, refining them to a set of smaller Desires, and so on until a
set of primitive very-refined goals, called Intentions in ViVD-EKM, are produced.
Intentions are goals that could be operationalized by means of Plans, whilst Desires
are goals that could be operationalized by other Desires or Intentions.
The end result of the goals reduction process is a goals tree, or a set of goals trees,
where ultimate strategic Desires form the roots of these trees, and with Intentions
present at the bottom of each goal tree. We will discuss the reduction relation that
connects the upper goals to the immediate lower ones within the trees later in this
thesis document.
Goals could have among them different type of relations, other than reduction
relations. We call these relations Goal-to-Goal (G-G) Lateral Relations, to differen-
tiate them from the top-down G-G reduction relations . These relations represent
the supporting, hindering or conflicting effect which some goals have on other goals.
For example, in the CM’s GCM shown in Figure 3.11, the achievement of “Out-
sourcing Customer Services” goal (G23) will have a negative impact (hinders or
prevents to some degree) the achievement of “Improve Customer Services” goal
(G13). We will discuss later the different types/effects of G-G Lateral Relations.
An important component of the GCM model, is the set of Constraint nodes it
has. As per the ViVD-EKM framework, these nodes could represent internal con-
straints within the agent, such as resources or capabilities constraints, or external
constraints, such as governmental regulation or industrial known constraints. A
detailed discussion about Constraints, within the ViVD-EKM framework, is given
by Al-Shawa (2006b).
In this thesis document, we treat all constraints similarly as Constraint nodes
without differentiating between internal and external (to the agent). An important
fact about constraints is that they represent not only limitations on goals’ achieve-
ment, i.e. affecting goals negatively, but also they could represent opportunities.
For example, In the CM example, the “Government Bailing out Auto Industry”
constraint (C6) will provide a positive opportunity for CM to achieve its “Get a
bailout/help from the Gov.” goal (G26). The effect Constraint nodes have over
goal nodes is represented through the use of Constraint-to-Goal (C-G) Lateral Re-
lations, a set of relations similar to the G-G Lateral relation but slightly different.
We will discuss them later in this chapter.
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Note that the constraint will not guarantee achievement to the goal, it only
provides an opportunity for the goal to be achieved to an extent set by the constraint
(decided by the bailout amount/percentage decided by the government). The actual
achievement of CM’s G26 intention (goal) will happen through some plan that CM
will commit itself to. An intention, which through this plan operationalizing it, will
most-likely have a negative impact on other goals CM has, such as the outsourcing
goal indicated earlier (because the government will not allow outsourcing as part
of the bailout conditions - for example).
Each modelling construct/concept, within the ViVD-EKM conceptual frame-
work, has multiple Attributes and Values (Value Properties). Attributes for con-
cept nodes in general stay not changed through out the life of the instances of
the concept node, or at least tend to not change frequently as it is the case of
Value Properties attached to the nodes. Values are more dynamic in nature and
tend to change with time as the agent realizes changes in the instance value of the
Value Property, as the environment around him changes, or his understanding of
the world evolves and therefore his interests change.
Attributes are narrowly defined by ViVD-EKM; and a suggested practice of
the framework is to use them to represent only conceptual modelling features of
the concept, such as: the formal definition of the goal, informal definition of it,
its name, its type (desire/intention, or strategic/operational,..), etc. On the other
hand, we can have as many Value Properties attached to the concept, based on
our needs and the purpose of the knowledge representation exercise. ViVD-EKM
recognizes that Value as a concept has many interpretations. This is because it
represents an opinion about any of the features or benefits of something.
Generally speaking, Value is a concept which describes a measure of the utility
of a world object (thing) from the perspective of the person/organization looking
at this object. Value is a relative concept that does not exist in the abstract and
must be addressed in the context of time, place, evaluator, potential owner, and
potential users.
For the purpose of introducing a formal reasoning framework, in this thesis
document, we will not use attributes (beyond Goal/Constraints’ formal names and
numbers) and we will only use Value Properties since they are used intensively in
the reasoning abilities of the agents Three important Value Properties are attached
to each goal, and two to each constraint:
Goal Achievement is a value property that provides a measure of the achieve-
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ment level of the goal. Goals’ achievement levels propagates up the goals
reduction tree from the intentions at the bottom (based on results from the
plans attached to these intentions) and up the goals tree until a value is
assigned to the achievement level of the goal, or through the G-G lateral
relations.
Goal Prevention is a property that describes the hindering (negative) effect that
another goal’s achievement has on the goal. For example, if an agent has a
goal to “increase Sale Price for Product A” and another goal to “increase Sales
Numbers for A by 50% this year”, then we know for sure, from experience,
that increasing the sale price of A will impact negatively the goal to increase
A sales, preventing it from happening at least in the short term. The question
is by how much? The Goal Prevention value aims to answer this question.
The Prevention property is especially important to track conflicting/hindering
effect that may be hidden otherwise (if we have only achievement level indi-
cators for goals).
Goal Operationalization is a value property that describes the operationaliza-
tion level of the goal node. This property will state whether the agent has
committed itself to a set of plans that will ensure a degree of operationaliza-
tion for the goal, or not. Higher goals in the trees have operationalization
levels that reflect the degree of operationalization that is provided to each by
the lower level goals, mainly the Intentions (who get their operationalization
levels through their direct connection to the operationalizing plans).
It is important to track Operationalization, separate from Achievement, be-
cause the maximum level of achievability possible for any goal depends on
the level of operationalization the agent commits to it. For examples, if a
strategic goal has been reduced to a set of goals but none is an intention
(committed-to by attaching it to a plan), then the operationalization level of
this strategic goal is zero, and therefore its achievement level will be zero (at
best), modelling a pure wishful thinking by the agent.
Constraint Achievement is a value property attached to constraints to reflect
the true reality/strength of the constraint as imposed by the enforcer, or as
believed to be enforced/exist.
Constraint Prevention is a value property attached to constraints, to reflect the
prevention the constraints suffer from, stopping them fully or partially from
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having their effect on the goals they are attached to.
In the following section, we will discuss the process of fuzzy-labelling these
value properties with meaningful linguistic qualitative labels, then we will discuss
how the value labels of these value properties get propagated through the relations
connecting goals and constraints.
3.3 Fuzzy Labeling of Goals’ and Constraints’ Value
Properties
As a matter of notation, the GCM model is a graph like structure 〈G, C,R〉 where
G is a set of goals, C is a set of constraints, and R is a set of relations over G and
C. Let the value properties of Operationalization, Achievement and Prevention
for each goal Gi∈G be represented as variables Opr(Gi), Achv(Gi), and Prvn(Gi)
respectively; and the Achievement and Prevention value properties for each con-
straint Cj∈C be represented as variables Achv(Cj), and Prvn(Cj) respectively. In
addition, let the set of variables, for each goal and constraint, tracks the different
level-of-satisfaction for the value property it represents for the goal/constraint. In
general, the level of satisfaction for each value property could be expressed numer-
ically as a percentage number (0-100%).
For the purpose of the Constraint Rationality’s qualitative reasoning framework,
let us consider a limited number of satisfaction levels (instead of considering all
the levels between 0-100%) for these value properties’ variables. And let these
limited set of levels be defined as fuzzy sets, each is given a name which represent a
meaningful linguistic label such as Full, Little, Some, Big, etc. Each of these fuzzy
sets is to be defined by a fuzzy membership function mapping the actual satisfaction
level of the property (within the fuzzy domain of the property satisfaction level:
0-100%) to a set membership degree [0, 1].
While the fuzzy domain of any value property’s satisfaction-levels can be divided
into any number of fuzzy sets, as deemed sufficient and beneficial to the framework
user, caution should be exercised to maintain usability (i.e. this should not be taken
as a restriction). For this thesis document, we introduce a simple but sufficient (and
extendable if needed) scheme to divide the fuzzy satisfaction level domain of each
value property to seven sets: Full, Big, Much, Moderate, Some, Little, and None.
These fuzzy sets will cover all the value properties (Operationalization, Achieve-
ment or Prevention) for goals/constraints, as shown in Figure 3.3. The figure shows
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Figure 3.3: Fuzzy Sets dividing the satisfaction levels domain of the different Goals’
Value Properties (operationalization, achievement, and prevention)
the membership functions for each set to be trapezoidal in shape, for simplicity only
(not as a restriction). In practice, the number of fuzzy sets and their membership
functions should be defined based on the user needs and requirements. Some users
will consider a goal Fully Achieved if it reached an achievement level of 80-100%,
whilst others will consider the goals to be Fully Achieved only if their satisfaction
levels are 95-100%.
Now, let us introduce L as a set of labels. The elements of L matches in
number and names the fuzzy sets chosen to divide the satisfaction levels domain of
the operationalization, achievement, and prevention value properties. In our case,
L={Full,Big,Much,Moderate, Some,Little,None} = {F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N}. And
let Full>Big>Much>Moderate>Some>Little>None, or F > B > M > Mo >
S > L > N , matching the order of the fuzzy sets coverage over the satisfaction
levels domain, with the meaning that the Full label represents a higher satisfaction
level than Big, and so on.
Let the Achievement value property of a goal Gi is represented as Achv(Gi)=
Lachv, where Lachv∈L, and Lachv is a label that matches the name of the fuzzy set
which the achievement level of Gi has the highest membership of. For example: if
xi represent the achievement level of the goal Gi and xi =94, and the achievement
level of Gi has memberships of µFull(xi)=0.9, µBig(xi)=0.1 and µMuch(xi)= · · · =
µNone(xi)=0. This makes Achv(Gi)=Full.
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Similarly, let the Operationalization value property of a goal Gi is represented
as Opr(Gi) =Lopr, where Lopr ∈ L, and where Lopr is a label that matches the
name of the fuzzy set which the operationalization level of Gi has the highest
membership of; and let the Prevention value property of a goal Gi is represented as
Prvn(Gi)=Lprvn, where Lprvn∈L, and where Lprvn is a label that matches the name
of the fuzzy set which the prevention level of Gi has the highest membership of.
Same to be said about constraints’ Achievement and Prevention value properties.
We also use the proposition Null to represent the Null trivially true statement
that the status of the satisfaction level of the value property for a goal/constraint
is unknown or negative. Meaning that if xi represents the achievement level of
the goal Gi and xi is unknown or a negative number, then the achievement level
of Gi has memberships of µFull(xi) = µBig(xi) = · · · = µNone(xi) = 0, and there-
fore Achv(Gi) = Null. We also add the Null label to the set of labels L, intro-
duced earlier, to make L={Full,Big,Much,Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null} =
{F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}, and Full>Big>Much>Moderate>Some>Little>None>
Null, or F > B > M > Mo > S > L > N >Null.
In the following sections we will introduce the relations that could exist among
goals and constraints within the GCM model, and how the value labels of the goal
and constraint nodes will propagate through these relations. It is important to
mention here, before we discuss the relations, that we are providing a complete set
of ground relation axioms for all the goal-to-goal and goal-to-constraint relations,
discussed later in this chapter, as an appendix. It should be understood that the
propagation rules presented are generated by aggregating/generalizing the extensive
ground axioms we started with. The rules and axioms are tested for soundness and
completeness. Proofs of such are included in the appendix.
3.4 Goal-to-Goal Relations
There are two types of relations that could exist among goal nodes within GCM:
Reduction Relations, and Goal-to-Goal (G-G) Lateral Relations.
3.4.1 Goal Reduction/Refinement Relations
The main objective of the goal reduction process is to produce eventually a set of
primitive goals whose operationalization, through known plans (processes, prod-
ucts, features, or otherwise) by the agent, are obvious. To be able to reduce strate-
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Figure 3.4: Goal Reduction/Refinement Relations
gic big goals (Desires) of the agent to a set of such smaller can-be-operationalized
goals (Intentions), we make use of what is called Goal Reduction/Refienment Rela-
tionships. These are relations that can model a strategic goal as a conjunction or
disjunction of a number smaller operational goals, decomposing the higher bigger
goal to a lower (level) more detailed ones.
Goal reduction relations, especially AND and OR ones, are the easiest type
of relations that could exist among goals, and the most widely used since the
early days of conceptual modelling and AI (e.g. Nilsson (1971)). The goal reduc-
tion/refinement process, as said earlier, is responsible for generating the tree like
structures found in goal-tree/s. Because of the popularity of this type of relations,
we will not expand on it except to add few clarifications.
In this thesis document, for simplicity, only binary AND and OR goal reduction
relations are considered (shown in Figure 3.4. This should not be taken as a restric-
tion, in fact any n-ary operator could be used. The operators we use and consider
in our framework, such as ∧, ∨, min, max, etc., are all associative, therefore can be
used as n-ary operators. And because strategic goals at the top of the goals-tree are
reduced using n-ary operators, we can use such decomposition to propagate mean-
ingful properties (or value properties’ labels) of these goals across such relations.
The Propagation Rules of Value Labels using Goal Reduction Relations:
(G1, G2)
and−→ G : Opr(G) = min{Opr(G1), Opr(G2)} (3.1)
Achv(G) = min{Achv(G1), Achv(G2)} (3.2)
Prvn(G) = max{Prvn(G1), P rvn(G2)} (3.3)
(G1, G2)
or−→ G : Opr(G) = max{Opr(G1), Opr(G2)} (3.4)
Achv(G) = max{Achv(G1), Achv(G2)} (3.5)
Prvn(G) = min{Prvn(G1), P rvn(G2)} (3.6)
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3.4.2 Goal-Goal Lateral Relations
Goal-to-Goal (G-G) Lateral Relationships are relations that represent the effect of
goals other than the immediate successor and follower goals, part of the goal own
reduction tree, on the goal itself. It is commonly known, in real life, that working
to achieve a specific goal will make achieving another goal a bit easier or harder,
in some cases even conflict completely with it. For example, if a person has a goal
of “becoming rich”, achieving this goal will make achieving another goal of hers,
not part of the becoming-rich goal’s reduction tree, such as “buying a new house”
to be more easier, while making the goal of “spending more time with family” to
be more harder to achieve than ever (since she had to spend more time now on
accumulating wealth).
In this section, we introduce a formalization of the G-G lateral relations in-
troduced informally in Al-Shawa (2006a), and briefly mentioned earlier: Supports,
Hinders and Conflicts-with. Figure 3.5 lists 12 possible combinations of cause-effect
relations which we could have, assuming that the cause comes in the form of reach-
ing either a full or a partial satisfaction level of one of the three value properties
(operationalization, achievement or prevention) of the start goal, or the goal G1
which is in left side of the lateral relation G1
lr−→ G, and the effect comes in the
form of reaching either a full or a partial satisfaction level of one the three properties
for the goal G on the right side of the relationship, the end goal.
These lateral relations are named based on whether the cause/effect is positive
(achievement or operationalization) or negative (prevention) on the goal at that
end of the relation. For example, if G1 is achieved fully and this will cause G to
be fully achieved as well, then we call the relation: a “++” relation; and if having
G1 fully achieved will cause G to be fully prevented, then the relation is called: a
“+−” relation. And, to differentiate between fullness and partiality of effect, we put
round brackets around the sign which represent the effect, when the effect is partial.
For example, if achieving G1 fully will cause G to be partially prevented, then the
lateral relation between them will be called: a “+(−)” relation, and we represent
this relation as: G1
+(−)
−→ G. The degrees of partiality of the “effect”, such as the
effect is small or moderate, will be addressed by adding what we call a Modifier
to the effect side of the relation’s definition. We will discuss later in this section
the Modifier concept, but for the time being let us assume that the partiality in
the effect is dealt with in the aggregate as “Some” and represented with the round
brackets around the effect’s positive or negative sign, as shown above.
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Figure 3.5: Goal-to-Goal (G-G) Lateral Relations
Figure 3.5 shows four lateral relations categorized as Strong/Strict Lateral Re-
lations. These relations have the strength level of the cause (operationalization,
achievement or prevention in the start goal) match the strength level of the effect
on the end goal of the relation. The Strong Lateral Relations include the following
relations: “++”, “−−”, “+−”, and “−+”. On the other hand, the Weak/Soft Lateral
Relations are relations which propagate a partial effect on the end goal of the re-
lation without consideration to the strength level of the cause. In this category of
relations, the names of the relations will always have the effect sign between round
brackets to show that these relation do not cause severe/full operationalization,
achievement or prevention to the goal on the end side of the lateral relation, hence
the name. Relations belong to this category are: “+(+)”, “−(−)”, “+(−)”, and “−(+)”. It
is worth mentioning that we did not find the need to add lateral relations that have
a partial level cause to produce a full level effect on the end goal of the relation, for
two reasons: 1) it is not a usual relation to happen in real life; and 2) it will not be
hard to add these relations when proved needed or beneficial, as we will show later
in Section 3.9.
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The above mentioned eight lateral relations could be categorized differently.
In Figure 3.5, the lateral relations are split horizontally into two distinct groups.
The top group includes relations in which the causes propagate consistently to the
relations’ effects. In other words, the sign of the cause matches the sign of the
effect. This groups has the “++”, “−−”, “+(+)”, and “−(−)” relations. The group at
the bottom includes relations in which the cause sign is always different from the
effect sign, or the opposite of it. Each of these relations represents a conflict among
its two goals. If the start goal is achieved, the end goal will be prevented, and vice
versa. Relations that are part of this group are: “+−”, “−+”, “+(−)”, and “−(+)”.
A fair question to ask here is: why we called the second group Conflict Relations
and not inconsistency relations? ViVD-EKM differentiate between an inconsistency
and a conflict. If there are two relations starting from the same start goal, say G1,
and pointing at the same end goal, say G, one described as “++” relation and
the other as “+−”, then this is a clear instance of an inconsistency, that hint at
a problem in the knowledge-base, or to be more specific a confusion about what
is the actual effect of the source goal on the target goal. A problem that must be
resolved. On the other hand, if we have the two relations connecting G1 to G to
be “+−” and “−+”, then this represent a conflict-with relation between G1 and G
(with the meaning that if G1 is been achieved, then G will be prevented; and if
G1 is been prevented, then G will be achieved). The “conflict-with” relationship
is allowed to exist, because it represents a clear and valid relation among goals in
real life; and does not represent a confusion, or a problem in the knowledge base.
Inconsistencies are not allowed in ViVD-EKM, but conflicts are permitted. Not
only conflicts are allowed to be captured/modelled as fully supported modelling
constructs, but also they are allowed within the reasoning process. This is quite
different from what other knowledge modelling frameworks do. We felt the need
to allow for representing conflicts because conflicts in the real world are the source
of opportunities as we explained and discussed thoroughly in Al-Shawa (2006b).
Therefore, Conflict Relations are supported in Constrained Rationality while in-
consistencies are highlighted to be brought to the modeller’s attention, in order to
be resolved. Conflict Relations such as the ones discussed above, namely conflicts
among goal nodes within the GCM model, represent one example of how conflicts
are represented within the ViVD-EKM framework.
It is worth mentioning here that the eight lateral relations discussed above
are all Asymmetric Lateral Relations. If an asymmetric relation states that an
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achievement in the start goal will result on an achievement of the end goal, then it
is not true that the statement also supports the argument that a prevention of the
start goal will result on a prevention of the end goal. Now, let us introduce four
Symmetric Lateral Relations : “=”, “(=)”, “×” and “(×)”. Each of these relations is
the equivalent of combining two of the Asymmetric Relations listed above: (“++”
∪ “−−”); (“+(+)” ∪ “−(−)”); (“+−” ∪ “−+”); and (“+(−)” ∪ “−(+)”) respectively. Out of the
four Symmetric Lateral Relations, both “=” and “(=)” relations produce consistent
cause-effect, whilst “×” and “(×)” relations represent conflict relations. At the same
time, “=” and “×” are strong lateral relations, while the “(=)” and “(×)” are weak
lateral relations.
The set of lateral relations introduced above will be able to represent sufficiently
any support, hinders or conflicts-with relations that could exist between any two
goals in the agent’s GCM model. But before listing the propagation rules for
the G-G lateral relations, let us first add the concept of a Modifier to the lateral
relation. So far, we used a lateral relation of “+(+)” to represent a relation in which
a full or partial achievement of the start node will make the achievement level
of the targeted end node be partial, or “Some”. In fact, it is like stating that
the relation is “+(Some+)”. The Some part of the relation’s definition is what we
call the relation’s Modifier. The relation’s Modifier M is a label that belongs
to the same set of labels L used for value properties, i.e. M ∈ L , where L =
{Full,Big,Much,Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null}. Modifier M defines the at-
most achievement/prevention (based on whether the end part of the lateral relation
is “+” or “−” respectively) level of the end-goal targeted by the relation. For example,
if a lateral relation is defined as G1
+(Little−)
−→ G, then this means a “Full” achievement
of G1 will cause at most a “Little” prevention to G. Also, it is worth noting here
that an assignment of Null as a label to a relation’s Modifier makes the relation
has no effect on the targeted end node, i.e. as if the relation does not exist.
The Propagation Rules of Value Labels using G-G Lateral Relations:
1) for the Symmetric Consistent G-G Lateral Relations:
G1
=−→ G : Opr(G) = Opr(G1) (3.7)
Achv(G) = Achv(G1) (3.8)
Prvn(G) = Prev(G1) (3.9)
G1
(M=)−→ G : Opr(G) = min{Opr(G1),M} (3.10)
Achv(G) = min{Achv(G1),M} (3.11)
Prvn(G) = min{Prvn(G1),M} (3.12)
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2) for the Symmetric Conflict G-G Lateral Relations:
G1
×−→ G : Achv(G) = Prev(G1) (3.13)
Prvn(G) = Achv(G1) (3.14)
G1
(M×)−→ G : Achv(G) = min{Prvn(G1),M} (3.15)
Prvn(G) = min{Achv(G1),M} (3.16)
3) for the Asymmetric Consistent G-G Lateral Relations:
G1
++−→ G : Opr(G) = Opr(G1) (3.17)
Achv(G) = Achv(G1) (3.18)
G1
+(M+)−→ G : Opr(G) = min{Opr(G1),M} (3.19)
Achv(G) = min{Achv(G1),M} (3.20)
G1
−−−→ G : Prvn(G) = Prev(G1) (3.21)
G1
−(M−)−→ G : Prvn(G) = min{Prvn(G1),M} (3.22)
4) for the Asymmetric Conflict G-G Lateral Relations:
G1
+−−→ G : Prvn(G) = Achv(G1) (3.23)
G1
+(M−)−→ G : Prvn(G) = min{Achv(G1),M} (3.24)
G1
−+−→ G : Achv(G) = Prev(G1) (3.25)
G1
−(M+)−→ G : Achv(G) = min{Prvn(G1),M} (3.26)
3.5 Constraint-Goal Relations
We have studied the effect of goals on goals through reduction and lateral goal-
to-goal relations, but the effect on goals could be caused by more than just goals.
Constraints also could affect goals, as discussed earlier. Constraints represent real-
ities about the internal affairs of the agent, limiting the agent’s ability to achieve
some of its goals. It could also represent external and/or industrial limiting realities
about the the domain.
Constraints are connected to goal nodes through Constraint-to-Goal (C-G) Lat-
eral Relations, which are similar to the G-G Lateral ones. Figure 3.6 shows the
effect a constraint will have on a goal through the C-G Lateral Relation. The con-
straint will not “add” achievability to the goal’s achievement value property, but
rather it will set an upper limit to the level of achievement the value property could
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Figure 3.6: The effect of a Constraint-to-Goal (C-G) Lateral Relation on the Achiev-
ability and Prevention Value Properties of the targeted Goal Node
have. With regards to the targeted goal’s prevention value property, the constraint
through the C-G Lateral Relation will set the minimum prevention level the value
property could have. This means that the constraint, and based on the type of the
C-G lateral relation which connects the constraint to the targeted end goal node,
will set the potential (the upper limit) of achievability which the end goal could
have, and/or will set the minimum level (the lower-starting-level) of prevention the
end goal must have.
The Constraint-to-Goal (C-G) Lateral Relations syntactically are similar to the
G-G Lateral ones, i.e. show the same possible propagation flows as the ones shown
in Figure 3.5 for the G-G lateral relations. Therefore, the propagation rules of
value properties’ labels using C-G Lateral Relations are similar to the G-G ones
introduced above, with one exception: constraints do not have Operationalization
values and do not affect the Operationalization values of their target end goal nodes
(connected to them using the C-G lateral relation).
One also has to remember that, as discussed above, the constraint’s effect on a
targeted end goal by a lateral relation is different from the one a goal has on an end
goal, even though the lateral relations’ type used look similar. For example, whilst
a “++” G-G lateral relation ensures that the targeted end goal gets an achievability
level similar to the one of the start goal (of the lateral relation), the similar-in-
type “++” C-G lateral relation will only set the upper limit of achievability that the
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targeted end goal node could have to a level similar to achievability level of the
start constraint.
Therefore, if the C-G lateral relation has a positive effect on the targeted end
goal, the propagation rules of the relation will set the upper-limit Achvup−lim(G),
rather than setting the goal’s achievability level itself, or Achv(G), which similar
(in type) G-G lateral relation’s propagation rules will do. Likewise, if the C-G
lateral relation describes that the start constraint (of the relation) has a negative
effect on the targeted end goal, then the propagation rules of the relation will set
the least possible prevention level that the targeted goal must have, or the lower-
limit Prvnlo−lim(G), rather than setting the prevention level of the end goal, or
Prvn(G), which similar (in type) G-G lateral relation’s propagation rules will do.
The Propagation Rules of Value Labels using C-G Lateral Relations:
1) for the Symmetric Consistent C-G Lateral Relations:
C
=−→ G : Achvup−lim(G) = Achv(C) (3.27)
Prvnlo−lim(G) = Prev(C) (3.28)
C
(M=)−→ G : Achvup−lim(G) = min{Achv(C),M} (3.29)
Prvnlo−lim(G) = min{Prvn(C),M} (3.30)
2) for the Symmetric Conflict C-G Lateral Relations:
C
×−→ G : Achvup−lim(G) = Prev(C) (3.31)
Prvnlo−lim(G) = Achv(C) (3.32)
C
(M×)−→ G : Achvup−lim(G) = min{Prvn(C),M} (3.33)
Prvnlo−lim(G) = min{Achv(C),M} (3.34)
3) for the Asymmetric Consistent C-G Lateral Relations:
C
++−→ G : Achvup−lim(G) = Achv(C) (3.35)
C
+(M+)−→ G : Achvup−lim(G) = min{Achv(C),M} (3.36)
C
−−−→ G : Prvnlo−lim(G) = Prev(C) (3.37)
C
−(M−)−→ G : Prvnlo−lim(G) = min{Prvn(C),M} (3.38)
79
4) for the Asymmetric Conflict C-G Lateral Relations:
C
+−−→ G : Prvnlo−lim(G) = Achv(C) (3.39)
C
+(M−)−→ G : Prvnlo−lim(G) = min{Achv(C),M} (3.40)
C
−+−→ G : Achvup−lim(G) = Prev(C) (3.41)
C
−(M+)−→ G : Achvup−lim(G) = min{Prvn(G1),M} (3.42)
3.6 Constrained Rationality’s Qualitative Forward
Reasoning Framework
We talked about how the value labels of goals propagate or get affected along
individual relations, whether these relations are G-G or C-G relations, but still we
did not discuss the overall effect that all these relations sinking into the goal node,
or fanning out from it, will have on its value properties’ labels. In this section, we
will present first how the final value labels of each of the goals’ value properties
will be calculated. Then, we will present a forward propagation algorithm that will
update all the value properties of all the goal nodes in the GCM model with their
final value labels.
Let RG−G ⊆ R, where RG−G is the set of relations in R which includes all goal
reduction and goal-to-goal lateral relations exist inR; andRC−G ⊆ R, whereRC−G
is the set of relations inR which includes all constraint-to-goal lateral relations inR.
And, let (RG−G∩RC−G)=∅ whilst (RG−G∪RC−G)=R. For each goal Gi ∈ G, let:
the set of G-G relations (reduction and lateral) that targets/ends-with Gi is the set
RG−Gi ⊆ RG−G; the set of C-G lateral relations that targets/ends-with Gi is the set
RC−Gi ⊆ RC−G; and Achvr(Gi), Oprr(Gi), and Prvnr(Gi) are the value properties
of the goal Gi as a result of the relation r. When the relation r ∈ RC−Gi , i.e. when
r is a constraint-to-goal lateral relation targeting goal Gi, then the Achvr(Gi) and
Prvnr(Gi) results from r are the Achvup−lim(Gi) and Prvnlo−lim(Gi), respectively,
that r produces by applying the propagation rules for C-G lateral relations listed
in the previous section (rules: 3.27- 3.42).
Then, the final value labels of Gi’s value properties, at any time t, are concluded
by the following propagation rules:
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Figure 3.7: Dealing with multiple Goal-to-Goal and Constraint-to-Goal Relations
coming-in to a Goal Node, or going-out from it, and the final effect of such relations






























Figure 3.7, and the propagation rules above, show that the effect on any goal’s
achievement (and operationalization), based on all G-G relations (whether reduc-
tion or lateral) targeting the goal is maximized, whilst the goal’s prevention is
minimized. This follows the same rules of the OR reduction relation introduced
earlier. In other words, each goal-to-goal relation, whether reduction or lateral, is
considered to represent a different mean to achieve, operationalize and/or prevent
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the targeted end goal, and therefore all these relations act as if connected to the end
goal by an OR relation. At the same time, the figure and the rules show that each
C-G lateral relation plays a role of limiting (minimizing) the end goal’s achieve-
ment to an upper limit set by the relation if it has positive effect on the goal, or
increasing the end goal’s prevention to a level match one set by the constraint if the
constraint has a negative effect on the goal. Otherwise stated, a constraint effect
on a goal follows the same rules of ANDing two goals’ values (the AND relation
rules are introduced earlier), but here with two values of the same goal: the first
is the original value before the constraint’s effect and the second is the value after
the constraint’s effect. Overall, the effect of all the C-G lateral relations on a spe-
cific targeted end goal are ANDed together and then ANDed with the goal’s value
properties after the effect of all the G-G relations targeting it had been applied.
Goals’ Value Labels Forward Propagation Algorithm:
Let there be four arrays: Initial C is an array that holds the value-labels of
〈Achv(Ci), P rvn(Ci)〉 for each Ci ∈ C part of the GCM model graph 〈G, C,R〉;
Initial G is an array that holds the value-labels of 〈Opr(Gj), Achv(Gj), P rvn(Gj)〉
for each Gj ∈ G part of the GCM model graph 〈G, C,R〉; Previous G holds the
previous value-labels for each Gi as per the last run of the propagation algorithm
loop; and Current G holds the current value-labels for each Gi as per the current
run of the algorithm. The number of elements in Initial C is |C|; and in each of
Initial G, Previous G and Current G is |G|. Now, the value-labels forward propa-
gation algorithm is given as Algorithm 3.1
Termination and Complexity: A note worth mentioning, before we present our
theorem about the algorithm termination and complexity, is that the formulas in
our framework are all propositional Horn Clauses (one is headless clause, and the
rest are all headed). This means that deciding if a ground assertion holds not only
decidable, but also decidable in polynomial time (Horn, 1951; Clocksin and Mellish,
1984). Nevertheless, the following theorem and its proof show the at-most number
of loops that the algorithm needs to go through for it to terminate.
Theorem 3.6.1: The Label GCM Goals algorithm will terminate after at most
(3|L||G|) + 1 loops.
Proof. From lines 15, 16 and 17 of the Label GCM Goals algorithm, each of
the value property variables, for each goal Gi, is either monotonically increasing
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Algorithm 3.1 Goals’ Value-Labels Forward Propagation Algorithm
1: value-label-array Label GCM Goals(GCM Graph〈G, C,R〉, c-value-label-array Ini-
tial C, value-label-array Initial G)
2: // Start with the Goals value-labels given in Initial G
3: Curren G=Initial G
4:
5: repeat
6: Previous G=Current G
7: // For every Goal, apply all Relations feeding into it
8: for all Gi ∈ G do
9: //OR all Goal-to-Goal Relations affecting Gi
10: for all Rj ∈ RG−G such that end goal(Rj) == Gi do
11: Opr = Apply G to G Opr Rules(Gi, Rj , Previous G)
12: Achv = Apply G to G Achv Rules(Gi, Rj , Previous G)
13: Prvn = Apply G to G Prvn Rules(Gi, Rj , Previous G)
14: //OR with the effect of all previous G-G Rel affected Gi so far
15: Current G[i].Opr = max(Opr, Previous G[i].Opr)
16: Current G[i].Achv = max(Achv, Previous G[i].Achv)
17: Current G[i].Prvn = min(Prvn, Previous G[i].Prvn)
18: end for
19:
20: //AND all Constraint-to-Goal Relations affecting Gi
21: for all Rk ∈ RC−G such that end goal(Rk) == Gi do
22: Achv = Apply C to G Achv Rules(Gi, Rk, Initial C )
23: Prvn = Apply C to G Prvn Rules(Gi, Rk, Initial C )
24: //AND with the effect of all previous G-G/C-G Rel affected Gi so far
25: Current G[i].Achv = min(Achv, Previous G[i].Achv)
26: Current G[i].Prvn = max(Prvn, Previous G[i].Prvn)
27: end for
28: end for
29: until (Current G==Previous G)
30:
31: return Current G
or monotonically decreasing, but not both. Whilst both Current G[i].Opr and
Current G[i].Achv value property variables, tracking Gi’s operationalization and
achievement levels respectively, monotonically increase over the life of the repeat-
until loop cycles, the Current G[i].Prvn value property variable, tracking the pre-
vention level of goal Gi, monotonically decreases during the algorithm’s repeat-until
loop life. The labels that could be assigned to each value property variable are el-
ement of L, in our case L= {Full,Big,Much,Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null},
where Full>Big>Much>Moderate>Some>Little>None>Null, and |L|=8.
In order for the algorithm’s repeat-until loop not to terminate, one of the mono-
tonically increasing value properties must change to a higher level (e.g. from Null
to None, None to Little, or Some to Full) and/or the monotonically decreasing
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value property to change to a lower level (e.g. from Full to Big, Much to Some, or
Little to None). And since we know that each of the 3|G| value property variables
(Opr(Gi), Achv(Gi) and Prvn(Gi)) takes one of |L| possible value labels, or eight
possible labels for our specific L, and that in each none final run (of the repeat-until
loop) at least one of these 3|G| value property variables will either increase (if the
variable is one of the monotonically increasing value property variables, i.e one of
Opr(Gi) and Achv(Gi)), or decrease (if the value property variable is Prvn(Gi)),
then we can conclude that all the 3|G| value properties will settle and reach to their
final values in at most |L| ∗ 3|G| runs of the repeat-until loop of the algorithm. But
the loop must continue for an additional one more run to satisfy the until-condition.
This makes the algorithm to terminate after at most 3|L||G|+ 1 (or 24|G|+ 1 using
our specific case of L) runs of its repeat-until loop structure.
One could ask whether lines 25 and 26 of the algorithm could make the val-
ues of the value property variables zigzagging up and down, contradicting what is
been indicated in the proof above that lines 16 and 17 ensure a monotonically in-
creasing Achv(Gi) value property variable and a monotonically decreasing Prvn(Gi)
value property variable. Answering this, we have to remember that ”ANDing all
constraint-to-goal relations affecting Gi” part of the algorithm (lines 20-27) has
only a limiting effect on the value properties, making Achv(Gi) to not exceed a
level of achievement set by the constraint and the lateral connection type, and/or
making the Prvn(Gi) to not go below a level of prevention set by the constraint
and the lateral connection type. This limiting effect, which the constraint-to-goal
lateral relations set to the achievement level or prevention level of any goal, is con-
sistent through all the repeat-until loop runs ensuring that the limit is satisfied for
the specific goal at hand, Gi in this case. This limit will not affect other goals, but
rather maintain Gi’s own achievement/prevention to the satisfactory levels (set in
the previous run) if it has been changed in the current run to a level that is not
confirming with the collective upper/lower limits (respectively) established by all
C-G relations affecting Gi . Thus, lines 25 and 26 of the algorithm will not change
the fact that Achv(Gi) monotonically increases, and that Prvn(Gi) monotonically
decreases, but rather will stop the increase, or decrease, at a level confirming with
all the constraints affecting the goal Gi.
It is worth noticing that the algorithm will terminate much much sooner than
the at-most (3|L||G|) + 1 loops ceiling indicated in the theorem because many
updates to the value properties variables will happen in parallel; and because many
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of the value updates will not follow a step-wise increase/decrease (e.g. from None
to Little, then to Small and finally to Moderate) but we most likely see jumps,
such as from None to Moderate in one iteration of the repeat-until loop. In fact,
we have noticed from the experiments which we have conducted that the algorithm
will not reach this pessimistic at-most running time, but rather usually terminates
after just few runs of its repeat-until loop.
Finally, it is clear that the framework and this algorithm will not try to con-
solidate the value properties of each goal node within the GCM model. Meaning
that the framework purposely keeps the achievement, operationalization and pre-
vention values of the goal node all separate from each other. The idea is to highlight
the achievement and operationalization which the goal node managed to gain, and
highlight the prevention value it managed to receive. Therefore, the model user will
be able to track what caused this achievement, operationalization, and/or preven-
tion for each goal node. Understandably, the final achievement that a goal receives
ideally is the result of subtracting its final prevention value from its final achieve-
ment one. But, if the real achievement value of a goal, tracked in real-time or
in-simulation, is different than the one suggested by the model, or if in reality the
goal managed to accumulate achievement value more than the operationalization
level that the model suggests it could have, then the modeller/user must resolve
this inconsistency between reality and the model by ensuring that all the relations
targeting the goal are accurately captured and represented.
Soundness and Completeness: In Appendix B, we also provide Theorem B.0.2
and its proof proving the correctness and completeness for the goals’ value-label
forward propagation algorithm, Label GCM Goals, provided above as Algorithm
3.1. Theorem B.0.2 shows that the value label assignments for all the goals’ value
properties (achievement, operationalization and prevention) which are returned by
the Label GCM Goals (GCM Graph 〈G, C,R〉, c-value-label-array Initial C, value-
label-array Initial G) algorithm, Algorithm 3.1, are the correct, complete and fi-
nal value label assignment statements that could be deduced from Initial G and
Initial C.
3.7 Multiple Strategic Goals, and Goal Trees
An agent who represents a human or an intelligent life/system will usually have
multiple strategic goals it aspires to achieve at any single point of time. This is
understandable, knowing that there are usually a number of basic needs, or survival
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goals, that the agent must achieve to stay alive and survive. For example, for an
organization to survive, it must be able to pay its employees’ salaries and pay the
office rent; and for a robot, some of it needs could be to ensure at minimum a
battery charge of 10%, and to be at no more than 100m away from the charging
station. These basic needs are survival goals that has nothing to do with why the
agent existed in the first place. On the other hand, any agent tends to have a set of
wants, or strategic value-creation goals, that the agent is aspiring to achieve whether
to add meaning to its life/operation or in order to exchange the value created by
operationalizing and achieving such goals with things that satisfy its survival needs
and continuous operation.
These multiple strategic goals the agent has, whether represent needs or wants,
the agent usually must reduce them to a set of more primitive goals in order to
be able to operationalize and achieve them, as we discussed before. This means
that the agent will have multiple goal trees represented within its ultimate aggre-
gate GCM model. Even if the agent decided to decompose these goals and model
them as part of separate GCM models, each model to represent goals on a spe-
cific area/time/priority/etc., still at an aggregate level the agent must integrate all
goals and see how these different goals will affect each other. This will lead to the
situation where the agent has multiple goal-trees in its GCM model, at least at an
aggregate level.
So far in this chapter, and for simplicity, we treated the GCM model as a
one-goals-tree model. The question that this section will answer is: if the agent
has multiple goal-trees, what will happen to our goals’ value-label axioms and
propagation rules that we have introduced earlier? Will they need to be changed or
adjusted in order to accommodate the multiple goal-trees case and its complexities?
We will examine whether the previously introduced value labels propagation rules
and algorithm need to be changed, or adjusted, in order to deal with multiple goal
trees within the GCM model, such as the one shown in Figure 3.8 instead of the
one goals tree we dealt with so far (shown in Figure 3.2).
In this section, and for simplicity, we will assume that the agent is completely
invariant about all its strategic goals Gstrategic (root nodes of the goal-trees). We
will discuss representing different priorities and orders for the agent’s goals in the
following chapter, but for now let us assume that all goals within Gstrategic are
equally important to the agent.
What we have here is an easy straight forward goals representation exercise.
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Figure 3.8: An agent’s GCM with multiple goal-trees, where the root goals represent
strategic goals for the agent and the goals in different goal-trees support, hinder or
conflict each other through G-G lateral relationships
Whether we have all the goals in Gstrategic (underneath each is its goal reduction
tree attached to it) connected to a new higher overall strategic goal (e.g. ‘success
in life” goal) allowing for all the goals in Gstrategic to form a one goal reduction tree
for the agent, or we have them as isolated root nodes, each with its own reduction
tree, this should not make a difference in terms of the reasoning mechanics of the
formal framework presented in this chapter. The propagation rules and algorithm
need not be changed.
For example, in the Car Manufacturer (CM) example, used later in this chapter,
Figure 3.11 shows the CM’s GCM with both of the company’s short-term (G2) and
long-term (G1) strategic goals connected to the ultimate overall goal “CM to Survive
& Prosper” (G0) using an AND redaction operator. Later in the chapter, we will
show the results of running the algorithm to produce a final set of value labels for
the value properties of all CM’s goals including the three strategic goals CM has
(G0, G1, and G2).
CM could choose not to connect the two strategic goal is has, G1 and G2, to a
higher overall goal( G0). This will produce a two strategic goals GCM model (i.e.
forming a multiple goal-trees case) with two goal-trees affecting each other through
lateral relations running across them. For this case too, we will show the results of
running the algorithm to produce a final set of value labels for all value properties
of all CM’s goals including the two strategic goals CM has (G1, and G2).
In addition, we will show an extreme case of a GCM with multi-goal-trees: the
case where the agent’s goals are all set as individual goal nodes with no reduction
relations among them. The Howard’s Dilemma example, shows goals connected
to each other using a complex network of lateral goal-to-goal relations, forming no
reduction trees. Again here, the algorithm managed to deduce the final value labels
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for all goals’ value properties.
Within each of the multiple goal trees, all the relations and rules that were
introduced earlier to explain and propagate value labels of goals’ value properties
(within a single reduction tree) will work. The only implication of having multiple
goal reduction trees, is that goal nodes, which belong to different trees, will affect
each other. This affect could come in the form of support, hinder or conflict-with
relations. This means that lateral goal-to-goal relations will run between goals that
belong to different reduction goal trees.
At the goal node level, the final value label of each value property still need to be
concluded by ORing the results of all the goal-goal (reduction or lateral) relations
the goal node is at the receiving end of, and ANDing the results of all the constraint-
goal relations the node is constrained by, same as shown in Figure 3.7, and in the
rules (3.43) - (3.45). Goal nodes across different goal trees, affecting each other, will
be treated exactly the same way goal nodes at far ends of a heavenly branched single
goal tree will be treated. Both have no direct goal reduction relations connecting
them, and only lateral goal-goal relation affecting them.
One could also ask about the effect of constraints on goals of different trees.
A constraint can be connected to many goals with different constraint-goal lateral
relations. This should not make a different on how the goals properties’ values are
calculated, it will be the same way it was calculated before. Recall that value-
labels are derived at the goal-node level by ORing and ANDing the results of all
the value-label propagation relations that the node receives. This holds whether
the goal node represents a strategic goal the agent has, or a very primitive goal
(intention) at one of the goal reduction trees the agent has.
The only implication having-multiple-strategic-goals have on any agent is not
how the goals value-labels propagate, but what goals to work on operationalizing
and achieving first. In other words, the agent should be concerned now with what
strategic goals are more important to work on achieving, and therefore what or-
der/priority the agent should give to the different plans he uses to operationalize
each of these goals. This will be the focus of the next chapter.
3.8 Reasoning as a Dynamic Process: Dealing
with Dynamic Changes
The framework so far offered formal rules and techniques to identify and calculate
the final value labels for GCM goals’ value properties based on the effect goals
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Figure 3.9: Dealing with the dynamic Changes happening to the GCM Model and
its nodes over time, and how the framework will determine the nodes’ final value
labels at each point of time
and constraints have on each other, but what about changes that happen to the
GCM model over time? In real life, agents tend to abandon goals or adopt new
one; and their goals’ achievement levels will increase over time, as plans feed to the
lower intention nodes new satisfaction levels. Not to mention the fact that realities,
internal and external constraints, of the agent change over time. This means new
nodes are added, some old nodes are removed, and value labels assigned to nodes’
value properties change. So, how the forward value labels propagation algorithm
(Algorithm 3.1) will be used to decide on the nodes’ values as changes happen to
them over time?
Figure 3.9 shows how these dynamic changes will be dealt with using the Con-
strained Rationality’s reasoning framework. No modification to the framework’s
rules and algorithms are needed. The agent needs only to do at each point of time
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the following steps:
1. Update the Initial G and Initial C arrays with the values that are coming
from the previous point of time (or the values fed initially to the arrays - if
this is the first time running the algorithm);
2. UpdateGCM Graph〈G, C,R〉 with any changes happened to the GCM model,
including any new goals, constraints or relations added (new knowledge added),
and/or any changes happened to the current goals, constraints or relations;
3. Update the Initial G and Initial C arrays with values for the new goals and
constraints added, and/or with changes in values happened to the old goals
and constraints just before this point of time; and then
4. Run the value-label forward propagation algorithm to have all previous values,
as well as the new value changes, take effect and propagate through out the
GCM’s graph. By the end of this step, all goal nodes’ value properties will
have the final value labels, for this point of time, assigned to them.
For the next point in time, the same steps should be followed, as shown in
Figure 3.9. In fact, the Constrained Rationality modelling and reasoning tool is
designed and implemented to use these steps in its simulation engine.
3.9 Extending the Constraint Rationality
Modelling and Reasoning Framework
The Constrained Rationality reasoning framework presented in this chapter is flex-
ible enough to allow for many extensions. We present here two possible extensions,
and leave many as future work.
3.9.1 Increasing the Number of Qualitative Fuzzy
Linguistic Value Labels
One possible extension is to increase the number of linguistic labels (L) that could
be assigned to the value properties of goals (and constraints) beyond the simple
scale adopted so far (L={Full,Big,Much,MOderate, Some,Little,None,Null}). We
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said that one could increase, or decrease, the number of these value labels, as per
his needs or his application’s need. For example, in Appendix A, we used a smaller
set of fuzzy sets and labels (shown in Figure A.1) in order to make the process of
presenting the axioms of the framework’s propagation rules simpler and the axioms
more manageable and presentable. The analyst can use such smaller set of L or
make it bigger as he sees fit.
3.9.2 Adding New Types of G-G and C-G Relationships
Another possible extension is to add new types of goal-to goal (or constraint-to-goal)
lateral relationships to satisfy special reasoning/application needs. For example,
Figure 3.10 shows a number of possible new lateral relationships, compared to
some of the ones we introduced earlier. In the figure, the previously introduced
strong G-G lateral relation Gi ++−→ Gj is shown in Figure 3.10.(1), and the weak
relation Gi
+(MOderate+)
−→ Gj is shown in Figure 3.10.(2). Both subfigures provide visual
representations of the relations’ value label propagation.
If an application of the framework requires a new weak relation such as the
one given in Figure 3.10.(2) but with different value label propagation rules, then
one could define a new relation such as the one given in Figure 3.10.(3) or the
one shown as Figure 3.10.(4). The only requirement for any lateral relation is to
maintain monotonicity of the value propagation.
One additional new type of G-G lateral relations shown in the figure is one where
there is now a Modifier label at the start goal side (the cause) of the relation,
not just at the end (targeted) goal of it, as in the previously introduced lateral
relations. For example, relations shown in Figure 3.10.(5) and Figure 3.10.(6) are
new relations with Modifier Labels present at both sides of the lateral relation: the
start (cause) and the end (effect) sides. Relations in Figure 3.10.(7) and Figure
3.10.(8) have Modifier Labels at only the cause side of the lateral relations, whilst
a lateral relation such as the one in Figure 3.10.(2) has the Modifier Label at only
the effect side of the relation.
Many other relations could be added to make the modelling, and therefore the
reasoning, of the GCM model more expressive and reflective. For example, new
reduction relations could be used, as we mentioned earlier when we introduced
goal reduction; and/or new value properties for both goals and constraints could
be added whenever needed by the framework’s application/user. We will show in
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Figure 3.10: Some new possible types of Lateral Relations, that could be used in
the framework in addition to the ones introduced earlier in Figure 3.5
the following chapter how we extended the framework to include modelling and
reasoning-with emotions and attitudes, as well as priorities and ordering. And
we will report on how we used these extensions to add more sensitivity analysis
capabilities to the framework when used to model and analyze real industrial and
political strategic decision making cases.
3.10 Examples and Experimental Results
3.10.1 A Car Manufacturer’s Bailout vs. Bankruptcy
Strategic Decision
Al-Shawa and Basir (2009) used the example of a leading Car Manufacturer (CM)
facing the the economical crisis of 2008-2009. We will use this example as a pre-
liminary experiment, and report on its results.
Figure 3.11 shows a business strategy decision making scenario in which CM
modelled its strategic goals to survive the hardships it is facing, and to achieve
prosperity in the future. The company used the Constrained Rationality frame-
work to prepare a complex model of its goals and constraints (a simplified smaller
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Figure 3.11: Goals & Constraints Model (GCM) for a Car Manufacturer (CM)
Bailout-vs-Bankruptcy Strategic Decision Making Case [simplified for this illustrative
example]
version of this model is used in this example and shown in the figure) with goals
affecting/conflicting with each other.
Using the reasoning framework, CM wants to test two plans, to see which one
satisfy its immediate short-term survival needs while keeping in mind the long-term
prosperity goals: 1) plan to accept a bailout from the government (represented in
Figure 3.11 as an intention node G26); and 2) reject the bailout and instead declare
bankruptcy, based on chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code (represented in Figure
3.11 as an intention node G25). CM’s GCM shows that accepting a government
bailout comes with conditions limiting it from, among other things, outsourcing to
cut operational cost on the long run.
By using the Constrained Rationality framework’s modelling and reasoning
methods, presented in this chapter, we found that CM is better off rejecting the gov-
ernment’s bailout and instead operationalize the bankruptcy intention by declaring
bankruptcy (under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code). This is
assuming bankruptcy will provide full achievement of goal G6 by allowing restruc-
turing of CM’s current debt. When fed with the initial values for the goal and
constraint nodes, and by selecting to activate one of the intentions representing
93
CM’s options (G25 or G26), Algorithm 3.1 will produce the final achievement and
prevention value labels for the three strategic goals CM has: the CM to Survive
and Prosper G0 goal; the Increase Revenue to Prosper in the Long Run G1 goal;
and the Survive the Short Term Problems G2 goal. Note that the strategic goal
G0 is an “AND” of both G1 and G2 (i.e. G1,G2 AND−→ G0). or as it could be put
differently: G1 and G2 are the result of an AND reduction relationship.
The algorithm’s repeat-until loop runs for both scenarios, using initial values
representing each scenario (and for simplicity assuming operationalizability equals
achievability for all goals), are shown in Figure 3.12. As shown, whilst both options,
accepting the bailout or declaring bankruptcy, provide moderate achievement to the
strategic goals CM has, accepting the bailout will have a prevention effect on the
long-term prosperity goal (G1), and therefore the ultimate survive and prosper goal
(G0). A negative effect that the bankruptcy will not have on these goals.
The experiment, even though simplified to fit this chapter’s need, demonstrates
the complexity of strategic decision making, knowing the interdependency and in-
terrelations goals and constraints have among them, and how the reasoning frame-
work we proposed can help identify the effect of adopting certain plans/goals on
the ultimate (conflicting) strategic goals the agent has. It is worth mentioning here
how the algorithm deduced the final value labels of all goals’ value properties in
just 5 runs of its loop, i.e. much less than the at-most ceiling of 3|L||G| + 1, or
3(8)(39) + 1, given by Theorem 3.6.1.
In addition, we could test the effect of CM having two separate strategic goals
G1 and G2, without “ANDing” them to produce the one joint ultimate strategic
goal G0. This could be done by removing the strategic goal G0 from CM’s GCM
model given in Figure 3.11, and removing the AND reduction relationship that
connects G1 and G2 to the late G0 node. In effect, this will make CM has two
goal-trees. One with the root strategic goal G1 on top, and another with the root
strategic goal G2 on top. Individual goals within each tree are still affecting goals
within the other tree, as shown in Figure 3.11.
Now, if we feed Algorithm 3.1 with the same initial values for the goal and
constraint nodes, and by selecting to activate one of the intentions representing
CM’s options (G25 or G26), The algorithm will produce the same final achievement
and prevention value labels for all CM’s goals, including its two strategic goals G1
and G2. The results will be the same as the ones shown in Figure 3.12, but with no
G0 node or final values for it .The fact that each of the two goals are separate and
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CM Mobilize a Plan to Accept Government Bailout (G26) CM Mobilize a Plan to Reject Bailout & Declare Bankruptcy (G25) 
Initial run 1 run 2 run 3 run 4 run 5 Initial run 1 run 2 run 3 run 4 run 5
Node Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Node Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn
G0 L O M O M G0 L O O
G1 L O O O G1 L O O O
G2 O O M O M O M G2 O O O O
G3 B B L B L B L B G3 B B L B L B L B
G4 O O O O G4 O O O O
G5 M M M M M M G5 M M M M M M
G6 F F F F F F G6 F F F F F
G7 O O M O M O M O M G7 O O O O O
G8 O O O O G8 O O O O
G9 L S L S L S L S L S G9 L S L S L S L S L S
G10 G10
G11 O O O O O G11 O O O O O
G12 G12
G13 O O O O O G13 O O O O O
G14 O O O O O G14 O O O O O
G15 O O O O O G15 O O O O O
G16-18 G16-18
G19 L L L L L L G19 L L L L L L
G20 O O O O O O G20 O O O O O O
G21 L L L L L G21 L L L L L
G22 F F F F F G22
G23 O O F O F O F O F O F G23 O O O O O O
G24 L M L M L M L M L M G24 L M L M L M L M L M
G25 G25 F F F F F F
G26 F F F F F F G26
G27 S S S S S S G27 S S S S S S
G28 O O O O O O G28 O O O O O O
G29 G29
G30 F F F F F G30 F F F F F
G31-35 G31-35
G36 L L F L F L F L F L F G36 L L L L L L
G37 G37
G38 L M L M L M L M L M L M G38 L M L M L M L M L M L M
C1-C6 F Constraints' Initial Values C1-C6 F Constraints' Initial Values  didn't change (Same Realities)
Labels:  Full    "F"  Big    "B"  Much "M"  Moderate  "O"  Some "S"  Little "L"  None  "N"  Null    "  "
Figure 3.12: Algorithm Runs for the CM Example. G25 and G26 Represent the
two intentions to adopt Accept Gov. Bailout and Declare Bankruptcy, respectively.
And, CM’s strategic goals: G0, G1 and G2.
has its own reduction goal-tree, with goals in both trees affecting each other, did
not change how Algorithm 3.1 finalizes the value labels for the goals. Not only this,
if we add loops and multiple interacting loops, the algorithm will still terminate and
finalize the value labels for all its nodes, as we indicated earlier when we discussed
the algorithm’s termination and complexity.
3.10.2 Howard’s Personal Dilemma
An interesting real-life “personal dilemma” was presented by Thagard and Mill-
gram (1995). As per the dilemma, Howard, a professor in a good university, re-
ceives an offer to move to Harvard. Howard has many personal goals that range
from research-related to family-related goals. The goals conflict with each other.
Satisfaction of some will lead to dissatisfaction of others. Typically, a situation
such as the Howard Dilemma will be modelled using decision theory models; more
accurately using multiple-criteria decision models. But these models usually hide
all the details about how and why such criteria came to be “the criteria” in the first
place. These models also tend to hide all the conflicting relations among the chosen
criteria. This is mostly done to show independence of events (an assumption that is
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Figure 3.13: Goal & Constraints Model of the Howard’s Dilemma example
not realistic in most cases) in order to satisfy the use of probability and statistical
analysis, which is heavily relied on within decision theory.
Figure 3.13 shows Howard Dilemma modelled using the Constrained Rationality
framework. We used the goals stated by Thagard and Millgram (1995), but added
some additional relations and conflicts among the goals to increase the complexity
of the model. It is worth mentioning that the model presented by Thagard and
Millgram (1995) does not show any goals’ reduction.The goals presented as islands
(separate nodes) with no reduction, but with links which are numerically weighted
(done by the authors mainly to model the situation as a neural-like-network). We
believe that the example is better served if the dilemma’s model used goals’ reduc-
tion as well as inter-relations, but we decided to use the same structure suggested
by the authors (mainly to show the usefulness of our model in an extreme multi
strategic goals situation). Therefore, in our model of the dilemma, we use the
goals as suggested, but the links among them are all labeled G-G lateral relations.
The value labels are assigned to the goals’ value properties through fuzzy mem-
bership functions, and the label propagation is done by following the Constrained
Rationality framework’s rules and algorithm.
Algorithm 3.1 repeat-until loop runs for this GCM model are shown in Figure
3.14, for the two scenarios: 1) Howard continues to work at his current school
(G11) with no job offer received from Harvard (C1); and 2) Howard decides to
activate the “move to Harvard” intention goal (G10) after the “Offer from Harvard”
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Howard at his Current School, and has no offer from Harvard Howard, if he accepts Harvard's offer          
Initial run 1 run 2 run 3 run 4 run 5 Initial run 1 run 2 run 3 run 4
Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn Achv Prvn
G1 M M M M G1 B B B
G2 F F F F G2 O B O B O B
G3 O O M M G3 F F B F B
G4 F F F F F G4 S S S S
G5 F F F F F G5 B B B B
G6 O O L M L M L M L G6 F F L F L F L
G7 M M S M S M S M S G7 F F S F S F S
G8 S O M M M G8 F F F F
G9 M M M M M G9 F F F F
G10 F F F F F G10 F F F F F
G11 F F F F F F G11 F F F F
C1 F C1 F
C2 F C2 F
Labels:  Full    "F"  Big    "B"  Much "M"  Moderate  "O"  Some "S"  Little "L"  None  "N"  Null    "  "
Figure 3.14: Algorithm Runs for the Howard Dilemma Example.
constraint (C2) changed from full prevention (no offer) to full achievement (offer
received). For the first scenario, the figure shows that while Howard’s goal of
keeping his family happy (G2) is fully achieved, Howard’s goals of “increase scientific
understanding”(G1) and “keep self happy” (G3) are moderately achieved.
For the second scenario, the figure shows the effect of Howard’s decision to move
to Harvard on all his goals. Here, while he managed to satisfy fully G1, his and his
family’s happiness goals received prevention. Simple tweaking to the Constrained
Rationality model, by changing some of the lateral relation types, or their modifier
labels, could provide more insight on how Howard thinks, and what will happen
to his goals as his thinking changes. For example, the relation between G2 and
G3 reflects how Howard believes that his own happiness is really connected to his
family’s. Is it true that this relation is only from G2 to G3, and not the other way
around as well? And, is it true that this relation is of “−(Big−)” type (propagate
prevention of G2 to G3) or is it more of a “=” type (propagate both achievement
as well as prevention) that goes both ways? What about the relation between G5
and G2 which reflects how Howard believes that his family’s happiness is really
achieved? The current “=” relation between them shows that he believes that their
happiness is achieved “only” by making them comfortable. Is this true? Any change
in the model to “better” capture Howard’s actual state-of-mind, or to test what-if
scenarios by him, will show the effect on all his goals.
3.11 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a formal qualitative goals and constraints modelling
reasoning framework for strategic decision making. We defined formally many types
of relationships that could exist among goal and constraint nodes; multiple value
properties that a goal node has to track the achievement, operationalization, and
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prevention effect it receives from other nodes; how the values assigned to these
value properties are fuzzified and converted to meaningful linguistic qualitative
value labels; and how value labels of the goals’ value properties propagate through
the different goal-to-goal and constraint-to-goal relations among the GCM model
nodes.
The chapter then proposed a value label forward propagation algorithm which
can conclude the final value labels for each value property of each goal node within
the GCM model. The value labels propagation rules which form the basis for the
algorithm were given, and shown to be a translation of a complete set of ground
axioms (provided in Appendix A and the proof of sound and completion is provided
in Appendix B). The chapter also provided proof that the algorithm terminates
and produces a correct and complete set of final value label assignment statements
deduced from a set of initial assignment statements. At the end, two illustrative
strategic decision making examples, one for an enterprise business and another for
an individual agent, were modelled and analyzed to illustrate the framework, its
modelling and reasoning abilities.
This chapter showed how the goals and constraints of the different agents in the
one agents decision making situation (and multi-agent decision making situations
where agents act in an individualistic manner with no consideration to others’ cur-
rent or future choices and decisions) are modelled as viewpoints models and how
the value properties, which the agents need for their reasoning abilities, are mod-
elled and finalized. The following chapter will cover the aspects of the framework
responsible for modelling the agents’ priorities and emotions; and generating the
agents’ preferences over their alternatives. The chapter after that will look at how
the framework’s process and components presented in this chapter and the following






Preferences in Strategic Decision
Making Situations
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, when discussed multiple goal-trees, we said that an agent, especially
if the agent represents a human or an intelligent life/system, will usually have
multiple goals which it aspires to achieve at any single point of time. Some of these
goals represent basic needs, or survival goals, that the agent must achieve to stay
a live and survive. Others could represent wants, or strategic value-creation goals,
that the agent is aspiring to achieve whether to add meaning to its life/operation
or to exchange the value created by operationalizing and achieving such goals with
things that satisfy its survival needs and continuous operation.
For this reason, goals which any agent has should not be treated equally. It
is clear that achieving needs has priority over achieving wants. Prioritization of
goals is a natural process embedded within an agent firmware, or purpose of cre-
ation.Therefore, we will look, in this chapter, into the process of how an agent will
be able to assign different priorities/orders to strategic goal nodes within its GCM
model.
We assumed, in Chapter 3, that the agent is indifferent about all its strategic
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 Generating DM's Preferences Over Alternatives
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6  Strategic Decision  Making Analysis: 
Figure 4.1: The Process of Modelling and Analyzing Single (and Multi-Agent De-
cision Making & Conflicts, where agents act in an individualistic manner with no
consideration to others’ current or future choices and decisions). Modelling agents’
Priorities and Emotions, and generating agents’ Preferences are shown in the High-
lighted Boxes and will be covered in this chapter.
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goals. This was to focus the discussion, then, on having multiple goal-trees and the
implication such multiple trees has on our Constrained Rationality formal frame-
work of goals’ value labels axioms, rules and algorithm. In this chapter, we will
remove the strictness of the indifference condition, and allow the agent, as it is
usually the case, to have different priorities, order, or emotional feelings over the
different strategic goals it has. Figure 4.1 shows the Constrained Rationality mod-
elling and analysis process. Some of the process parts were discussed in the previous
chapter. In this chapter, we will discuss the highlighted boxes in the process shown
in the figure.
The first section of this chapter will discuss how the different strategic goals
and alternatives the agent has are identified and modelled. The second section
will present how the final achievement levels of agents’ strategic goals are elicited
for each of the alternatives the agents’ have; how the strategic importance and the
emotional valences for each of the agents over their own strategic goals are captured
and modelled; as well as how the personality wide attitudes of the agents’ toward
acting rational and/or emotional are modelled.
The two sections to follow will show: how all these values will be used to deter-
mine the cardinal and ordinal preferences of the agents over their own alternatives;
and how the strength of the agents’ preferences are determined and represented.
The chapter will close with an illustrative example, showing how the concepts and
methods presented in the chapters are applied in a close-to-real-life one-agent de-
cision making situation.
This chapter presents the foundational concepts and methods to model the im-
portance and feelings of agents’ over their strategic goals, and how to use these
values (in addition to the achievement, prevention and operationalization values
captured and modelled for the genets’ goals in the previous chapter) to determine
the agents’ preferences over their alternatives. But, because this chapter is con-
cerned more about presenting these foundational concepts and methods, it focuses
on the simplest form of decision making situations: single-agent situations.
The methods will also apply to multi-agent decision making situations, but
only to the ones where the agents act and decide in an individualistic manner
with no regard to others’ choices and decisions, or how these choices might affect
their own objectives and choices. The following chapter will take the concepts
and methods of this chapter further. It will discuss how to model collaborative
and competitive multi-agent decision making situations; and how the concepts and
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methods presented here will be applied to determine the preferences of all agents
in these situations.
4.2 Agent’s Strategic Goals and Alternatives
In this section, we will first show how some of the agent’s goals are singled out to
be the “strategic goals” of the agent in the decision making situation at hand. And,
how alternatives/options an agent have are modelled as intention nodes (each to
represent an intention to adopt the alternative) within the agent’s GCM model. In
addition, we will set the stage for some of the notation to be used from now on.
4.2.1 Identifying Agent’s Strategic Goals
Let, each decision maker DMi ∈ DM, at time t of the decision making situation,
has a set of strategic goals SGDMi,t , and SGDMi,t ⊆ GDMi,t, where GDMi,t is the set
of all goals part of DMi’s GCM model GCM GraphDMi,t 〈GDMi,t , CDMi,t ,RDMi,t〉.
What differentiate the goals in SGDMi,t from the rest of goals in GDMi,t is that the
strategic goals are the aims, or the ends, DMi is ultimately looking to achieve while
the rest of the goals form the means.
Also, the strategic goals in SGDMi,t are usually the top goals or root goals of the
goal-trees part of the GCM Graph
DMi,t
〈GDMi,t , CDMi,t ,RDMi,t〉. But, this could not
be the case all the time. While strategic goals within SGDMi,t which represent Needs
are, or should be, considered part of DMi’s SGDMi,t, strategic goals that represent
Wants to DMi could be part of SGDMi,t or not, depending on DMi’s state of mind
at that moment of time or the current situation/conflict that DMi is involved in.
In reality, both strategic Needs and Wants are part of DMi’s set of strategic goals
SGDMi,t, but the strategic importance of these goals change from time to time. This
is why we must consider the strategic importance, of the strategic goals within each
agent’s SGDMi,t set, and how DMi feels about working for and achieving each of
these strategic goals, as value properties attached to these goals as we will see in
the next section.
4.2.2 Identifying Agent’s Alternatives
The current alternatives for an agent are the current plans, moves, products, mar-
kets, or options which the agent is considering to take/adopt in the decision making
situation, game or conflict. These alternatives could either be modelled as intention
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nodes at the bottom of the GCM’s goal trees, or as Plans/Processes, Products, Fea-
tures, etc. part of one of the many focused-sub-viewpoint models that the agent’s
viewpoint model could have (such as Business Processes Model, Business Offering
Model, and so on (Al-Shawa, 2006b)). If the latter way is adopted to model the
alternatives (as it is recommended by the ViVD-EKM framework), then these al-
ternatives will be connected to intentions and goals in the GCM model by means
of lateral relations.
In this research work, we will simplify the representation by modelling the alter-
natives/options that agent has in a decision making situation as individual intention
nodes at the bottom of his GCM’s goal-trees. With the meaning that each intention
node represent an intention by the agent to adopt the specific alternative it repre-
sents without considering how the agent will actually do adopt the alternative. For
example, a company’s alternative to “Accept a Government Control Order As-Is”,
as we will see in a case study in a later chapter, is represented as an intention node
in the company’s GCM model, with the understanding that the company has many
ways to operationalize this intention: send a letter to government indicating this,
do this in public, drop the appeal process they started, and so on. These ways are
considered detail plans to operationalize the intention. None is shown in the case
study’s GCM models, and none are considered in the analysis either, because these
are considered not important compared to the actual real alternative “Accept a
Government Control Order As-Is” adopted by the company.
Let ADMi,t be the set of alternatives (plans, options, moves) that the decision
maker DMi ∈ DM is considering at time t in his decision making situation. Each
alternative A ∈ ADMi,t produce certain level of operationalization, achievement,
prevention to each strategic goal SG ∈ SGDMi,t, by propagating value labels for
such value properties through the goal-trees and up to the strategic goals.
In addition, and as a matter of notation, let DM represent the set of all de-
cision makers considered by the agent in his perceived decision making situation,
and modelled in the situatuation’s overall Viewpoint model; the the set of all alter-
natives considered by all agents involved in the decision making situation is A; and










4.3 Modelling Agents Strategic Priorities,
Emotional States and Attitudes
In this section we will present the different mechanisms by which an agent will be
able to prioritize/order the strategic goals he has. We will show how strategic im-
portance of deferent goals will be modelled, and how emotional valences the agent
holds about these goals will be captured in the decision maiming model. In ad-
dition, we will present a robust and flexible modelling mechanisms to capture the
personality-wide attitudes the agent has toward acting rationally and/or emotion-
ally. But before we do so, we will show how the achievement values for strategic
goals are consolidated in order to be used as the basis for judging the effectiveness of
each of the alternatives which the agent has. The modelling mechanisms which will
be presented in this section will be used in the following section to generate/validate
the preferences each agent has over his own alternatives
4.3.1 Modelling the Final Achievement Levels of the Agent’s
Strategic Goals
We have stated in Chapter 3 that the Constrained Rationality framework’s rea-
soning algorithm (Algorithm 3.1) purposely keeps track of the achievement, op-
erationalization and prevention values of the goal nodes, within the agent’s GCM
model, all separate from each other. The value-propagation reasoning algorithm will
not try to consolidate the value properties for each goal node to a single achieve-
ment value for the node. In fact, the decision support system we built for the
framework displays graphically each of the value properties’ values for each goal
and constraint node in the GCM model.
The idea is to highlight the achievement and operationalization which each indi-
vidual goal node manages to gain, and highlight the prevention value it manages to
receive. Therefore, the DM, or the analyst modelling the decision making situation
on his behalf, will be able to track what caused this achievement, operationaliza-
tion, and/or prevention for each goal node in the model. And as a result, she will
be able to reflect on the current state of affairs, her goals, constraints and her cur-
rent alternatives to operationalize her goals; and help focus her critical as well as
creative thinking efforts in changing the current available alternatives or generating
new ones.
104
But for the purpose of evaluating each alternative (move, option or plan) the
agent has in the strategic decision making situation at hand, a consolidated achieve-
ment level value property is as a logical choice to adopt. This new value property
will track how much achievement that an alternative manages to give to a goal,
especially a strategic important goal. This value property could be adopted as a
measure of how good the alternative is in helping the agent getting closer to his
ultimate goals. In this section, we propose a method and a set of mechanisms to
evaluate alternatives based on their effect on the agent’s strategic goals.
We introduce here a consolidated value property called Final Achievement.
For a strategic goal SG, its Final Achievement value property will be denoted
as FAchv(SG). Understandably, FAchv(SG) should receive a value that repre-
sent the result of subtracting its final prevention value (Prvn(SG)) from its final
achievement one (Achv(SG)), taking in consideration the achievement upper limit
that is set by both the constraints targeting SG and the level of operationalization
SG managed to gain from the alternative the agent adopts. If in fact the real
achievement value of SG, tracked in real-time or in-simulation, is different from
the value suggested by the model, or if in reality SG managed to accumulate an
achievement value more than the operationalization level that the model suggests
it could have, then the analyst must resolve this inconsistency between reality and
the model by ensuring that all the relations targeting SG are accurately captured,
accounted for and represented.
At time t of the decision making situation and for a strategic goal SG ∈
SGDMi, t , let the three final value labels that Algorithm 3.1 produces for SG’s op-
erationalization, achievement and prevention are denoted as Opr(SG), Achv(SG)
and Prvn(SG), respectively. The Final Achievement value of SG, denoted as
FAchv(SG), is defined as follows:
FAchv(SG)=
Achv(SG)	 Prvn(SG) if Achv(SG)≤Opr(SG)Opr(SG)	 Prvn(SG) if Achv(SG)>Opr(SG). (4.2)
Let the fuzzy linguistic value label given to FAchv(SG) based on the defini-
tion above is denoted as LFAchv and is assigned by applying the “	” operator’s
table shown in Figure 4.2b (implemented as reasoning rules). In other words,
FAchv(SG) =LFAchv, where LFAchv ∈ L= {Full,Big,Much,Moderate, Some,Little,
None, -Little, -Some, -Moderate, -Much, -Big, -Full,Null}={F,B,M,Mo,S,L,N,−L,−S,
−Mo,−M,−B,−F,Null}. And, with the complete order of F>B>M>Mo>L>N>
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N L S Mo M B F Null
N N -L -S -Mo -M -B -F Null
L L N -L -S -S -M -B Null
S S L N -L -L -S -M Null
Mo Mo S L N -L -S -Mo Null
M M S L L N -L -S Null
B B M S S L N -L Null
F F B M Mo S L N Null
Null Null Null Null Null Null Null Null Null
(a)
(b)
Figure 4.2: (a) the membership functions of the extended Fuzzy Sets di-
viding the satisfaction levels domain of the Final Achievement value prop-
erty FAchv(G); and (b) the definition of the “	” operator given as a ta-
ble showing the resultant linguistic value label produced from the operation
V1 	 V2, where V1 and V2 are value linguistic labels belong to the set L =
{F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,−L,−S,−Mo,−M,−B,−F,Null}
−L>−S>−Mo>−M>−B>−F>Null, where the labels range from representing
Full goal achievement to Full goal prevention, covering the Final Achievement sat-
isfaction level of 100% to -100% or -1 to 1, and that the Null label represents an
unknown achievement/prevention of the goal.
The fuzzy membership functions defining these linguistic value labels are given
in Figure 4.2a. The figure shows the membership functions for each label’s fuzzy
set to be trapezoidal in shape, for simplicity only (not as a restriction) as indicated
in Chapter 3. In practice, the number of fuzzy sets and their membership functions
should be defined based on the user needs and requirements. Some users will
consider a goal Fully achieved if it reached an achievement level of 80-100%, whilst
others will consider the goals to be Fully achieved only if their satisfaction levels
are 95-100%.
4.3.2 Modelling the Strategic Importance of Agent’s Goals
To model the priorities a DM might give to his strategic goals, we introduce here
the Strategic Importance value property. A value property that will be attached to
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each strategic goal node the DM has, and given a fuzzy linguistic value label that
will represent qualitatively the importance/priority the DM gives to this strategic
goal.
For a decision maker DMi ∈ DM, and at time t of the decision making situa-
tion, let the Strategic Importance value property for a strategic goal SG ∈ SGDMi, t
be denoted as SImprt(SG). And, let SImprt(SG) = LSImprt, where LSImprt is a
fuzzy linguistic value label that represents the name of the fuzzy set which the
strategic importance of SG, as assigned to it by DMi, has the highest membership
of. And, LSImprt ∈ L = {Full,Big,Much,Moderate, Some,Little,None,NULL} =
{F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}, with the complete order of F>B>M>Mo>L>N>
Null. L, here, is the same value labels set used before (for the goal’s achievement,
prevention and operationalization value properties) with the same fuzzy member-
ship functions. But now, it is defined over the strategic importance levels ranging
from 0% to 100%, or from 0 to 1, where 0 is represented by the importance label
None and 1 is represented by the importance label Full, and where the label Null
represents negative or unknown importance level.
The suggested membership functions for the fuzzy linguistic value labels in L are
given in Figure 4.3a. The figure shows the membership functions to be trapezoidal
in shape, for simplicity only (not as a restriction). In practice, the number of fuzzy
sets and their membership functions should be defined based on the user needs
and requirements, as we indicated in Chapter 3 for the basic value properties we
introduced there.
This representation of the strategic importance of goals allows the agent the
freedom to set his strategic goals to be all with Full importance, or set some goals
to be of Full importance, set some to be of Moderate importance and others to be
of Little importance. In other words, the total of all the strategic importance values
given to the agent’s strategic goals do not have to add up to be 1, or 100%, as many
other game/decision-analysis representation frameworks demand (for example, the
priorities in the famous Analytic Hierarchy Process must add up to 1 (Saaty, 1980),
same as all probability-based or Bayesian-belief- network-based frameworks). In our
representation, the agent has the freedom to choose the importance value label that
reflect his own belief about the importance of each of his strategic goals considered
individually, i.e. without consideration or comparison to the importance of the other



























Figure 4.3: (a) the membership functions of the Fuzzy Sets dividing the importance
levels domain of the Strategic Importance value property SImprt(G); and (b) the
membership functions of the Fuzzy Sets dividing the emotionally likeness and dislike
levels domain of the Emotional Valence value property EV lnc(G)
4.3.3 Modelling Agent’s Emotional Likes and Dislikes
Following the steps of many researchers who have proposed to introduce emotions
into cognitive models by adding valences or affective tags (such as Thagard (2000);
Bower (1981, 1991); Fiske and Pavelchak (1986); Lodge and Stroh (1993); Ortony
et al. (1988); Sears et al. (1986)), we propose here to represent the effect of emotions
on concepts in our models by adding emotional valence values. For example, Tha-
gard (2000, 2006) proposed for his emotional coherence theory to include an emo-
tional valence that can take positive or negative numbers for elements/concepts.
These numerical valences can indicate likability, desirability, or other positive or
negative attitudes towards the concept by the agent. Thagard (2006) cites the work
by Kahneman (1999) in which Kahneman reviewed experimental evidence that eval-
uation on the good/bad (positive/negative) dimension is a ubiquitous component
of human thinking.
There are many ways we can model emotional valences for the different con-
cepts within the Constrained Rationality models (goals, constraints, and plans):
(1) model valences as Internal Constraints ; or (2) model valences as Value Prop-
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erties. Modelling Valences as Internal Constraints, while easier since it could be
added to the framework with no additional concepts, modelling mechanisms or rea-
soning mechanisms, it is limiting. Not to mention that every thing we added as
a constraint in our framework, we demanded at minimum that the agent “knows”
it, i.e. believes that it is true with justification (based on ViVD-EKM definition of
knowledge given in Al-Shawa (2006b)). The problem with emotions and its effect is
that it is tied to feelings and attitudes, where justification for truth of beliefs is not
clear or possible. We use Constraints as a mechanisms to model some aspects of
emotions, only when emotions play the role of constraining a goal(s), or a plan(s),
and when there is true a justification for believing this constraining effect.
On the other hand, modelling emotional valence as a value property of concepts,
such as goals, plans, constraints and relations, will provide a more powerful and
flexible way to deal with emotions. In this thesis work, we propose to attach an
Emotional Valence value property to each strategic goal the agent has. This value
property will capture a different, but real –as suggested by many researchers such
as the ones cited above–, importance level than the importance level given by the
Strategic-Importance value property discussed above. Surely, a highly desired/liked
strategic goal to achieve should not be treated in a similar manner as a strategic
goal that the agent must/forced-to accomplish but does not like.
The Emotional Valence value property can hold non-fuzzy numeric value that
is within the range [-1,1] or from -100% to +100%. But, in reality assigning precise
numeric value for emotional valence is not practical, or even real. Therefore, we
use the same mechanism to capture values for this property as we did for all value
properties we used in our qualitative reasoning part of the Constrained Rationality
framework. We suggest here that the emotional valence value properties be assigned
a qualitative linguistic value label based on fuzzy membership functions.
For a decision maker DMi ∈ DM, and at time t of the decision making situa-
tion, let the Emotional Valence value property for a strategic goal SG ∈ SGDMi, t
be denoted as EV lnc(SG). And, let EV lnc(SG)=LEV lnc, where LEV lnc is a fuzzy
linguistic value label that represents the name of the fuzzy set which the degree
of like or dislike, that DMi feels toward working and achieving SG, has the high-
est membership of. And, let LEV lnc ∈ LEV = {ExtremelyLiked,Liked, SlightlyLiked,
EmotionallyIndifferent, SlightlyDisliked,Disliked,ExtremelyDisliked,NULL}= {EL,
L, SL,EI, SD,D,ED,Null}, with the complete order of EL>L>SL>EI>SD>
D>ED>Null.
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The suggested membership functions for the fuzzy linguistic value labels in LEV
are given in Figure 4.3b. Again here, the figure shows the membership functions to
be trapezoidal in shape, for simplicity only (not as a restriction). In practice, the
number of fuzzy sets and their membership functions should be defined, shortened
or extended based on the user needs and requirements, as we indicated earlier.
This representation of the emotional valence gives the agent the freedom to set
his strategic goals to be all ExtremelyLiked , or some goals to be ExtremelyLiked,
some to be just Liked and others to be Disliked. In other words, the total of all
the emotional valence values given to the agent’s strategic goals do not have to add
up to be 1, or 100%. The agent has the freedom to choose the emotional valence
value labels that reflects his own belief about each of his strategic goals considered
individually.
4.3.4 Dealing with Agent’s Overall Rationality and
Emotionality Attitudes
To account for situations in which a decision maker decides to act completely ratio-
nal even when having strong emotional likes/dislikes (i.e. act emotionless or in an
extremely disciplined manner) or act completely emotional (i.e. give no regard to
the strategic importance of goals), we offer two weighting factors: the Rationality
Factor and Emotionality Factor. The two factors are intended to show the over-
all agent’s attitude toward acting rationally and/or emotionally in general, and at
times when there are conflicts among the strategic order versus the emotional order
of goals.
For a decision maker DMi ∈ DM, and at time t of the decision making situ-
ation, let the Rationality Factor of DMi be denoted as RFDMi , and let his Emo-
tionality Factor be denoted as EFDMi . And, let RFDMi =LRF and EFDMi =LEF ,
where LRF and LEF are fuzzy linguistic value labels that represent the name of the
fuzzy sets which the rationality weighting factor and the emotionality weighting
factor, respectively (that DMi holds or expected to hold at time t of the decision
making situation) have the highest memberships of. These two factors are intended
to describe the overall attitude DMi exhibits, or expected to exhibit, toward acting
rationally or acting emotionally at that point of time.
Let LRF ∈ L and LEF ∈ L, where L = {Full,Big,Much,Moderate, Some,Little,
None,NULL} = {F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}, with the complete order of F >
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B>M>Mo>L>N >Null. L, here too, is the same value labels set used be-
fore (for the goal’s achievement, prevention and operationalization value proper-
ties) with the same fuzzy membership functions. But now, it is defined over the
rationality/emotionality levels ranging from 0% to 100%, or from 0 to 1, where 1 is
represented by the label Full to indicate Fully Rational/Emotional (depending on
whether the label Full is assigned to LRF or to LEF , respectively) and where 0 is
represented by the label None to indicate Not Rational/Emotional (depending on
whether the label Full is assigned to LRF or to LEF , respectively).
The suggested membership functions for each of the fuzzy linguistic value labels
in L are the same as the ones given for the strategic importance’s L in Figure
4.3a. The figure shows the membership functions to be trapezoidal in shape, for
simplicity only (not as a restriction). In practice, the number of fuzzy sets and their
membership functions should be defined based on the user needs and requirements,
as we indicated in Chapter 3 for the basic value properties we introduced there.
We will show in the next subsection, how these factors will be used. We will
also show the flexibility this representation scheme provide to the modelling of
decision makers’ preferences. The last section of this chapter, will show the usage
of these factors in modelling a single-agent decision making situation. Chapter
8 will show an example of using these factors to test different what-if models of
players’ preferences in a real-life multi-agent decision making conflict.
4.4 Eliciting Agents’ Preferences over
Alternatives
Now, for the purpose of calculating the effectiveness of adopting an alternative
over another, for DMi, we need to calculate how much each alternative contributes
to the final achievement of the strategic goals in SGDMi . The Final Achievement
value property, FAchv(SG) ∀SG ∈ SGDMi , which was introduced above and rep-
resents the final achievement value that a goal SG managed to accumulate. But,
FAchv(SG) does not take into consideration how important is SG to DMi and
how DMi emotionally feels about working to achieve SG. It is clear that the Final
Achievement value property is not enough. We need to be able to differentiate
between alternatives that provide means to achieve extremely important strategic
goals from the ones that provide means to achieve less important strategic goals.
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To provide such differentiation, we introduce the concept of a Weighted Final
Achievement value property. A property that will be attached to each of strategic
goals in SGDMi , and provide a weight-adjusted Final Achievement value. The ad-
justment weight is based on the importance that DMi gives to the strategic goal, the
emotional valence given to the goal by DMi, in addition to DMi’s overall attitudes
towards rationality and emotionality. This new value property will be represented
as a numerical value, not a qualitative fuzzy linguistic value label such as the ones
we give to the Final Achievement value property, FAchv(SG).
This means that the new Weighted Final Achievement value property will have
a numerical value capturing a relationship between number of value properties
(FAchv(SG), SImprt(SG), EV lnc(SG), RFDMi and EFDMi), all of which are rep-
resented by fuzzy linguistic value labels (indicating a fuzzy membership functions).
Therefore, we need to adopt a defuzzification scheme to reduce the fuzzy value
labels to single scalars representing numerical values. While many defuzzification
methods available in the literature, we will use here the simple but effective Cen-
troid method (also known as Centre of Area or Centre of Gravity). Despite of its
simplicity, this method is the most prevalent, physically appealing computationally
efficient of all the defuzzification methods (Sugeno, 1985; Lee, 1990).
The centroid defuzzification method is appealing specially for calculating weighted
averages when the memberships functions are symmetrical, something that we have
here in our application. As per the method, the numerical representative value
for the symmetrical fuzzy membership function (or its name: the fuzzy linguistic
value label) is the centroid, or the mean, for its respective shape. For example,
let the defuzzified value of FArch(SG) be denoted as FArch∗(SG), and as per
the fuzzy memberships given in Figure 4.2a: if “Big” is assigned to FArch(SG),
then FArch(SG) will have a representative centroid value of 0.8 , and therefore
FArch∗(SG) = 0.8; “None” will be represented by FArch∗(SG) = 0.0; “-Some”
will be represented by FArch∗(SG) = −0.4; and “Full” will be represented by
FArch∗(SG) = 1.0 (rounded). We will use the same method for the defuzzification
of the Strategic Importance SImprt(GS), the Emotional Valence EV lnc(SG), the
Rationality Factor RFDMi and the Emotionality Factor EFDMi value properties. Let
the defuzzified values for them be denoted as SImprt∗(SG), EV lnc∗(SG), RF ∗DMi
and EF ∗DMi , respectively.
For a decision maker DMi, at time t , let the Weighted Final Achievement of a
strategic goal SG ∈ SGDMi , as a result of having alternative A ∈ A been adopted,
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to be denoted as WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t), and calculated algebraically as follows:
WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t)=
W(SG,DMi, t) · FAchv(SG,A, t) if W(SG,DMi, t)≥00 if W(SG,DMi, t)<0. (4.3)
where:
W(SG,DMi, t) = (RF
∗
DMi · SImprt∗(SG)) + (EF ∗DMi · EV lnc∗(SG)) (4.4)
where SImprt∗(SG), EV lnc∗(SG), RF ∗DMi and EF
∗
DMi
represent the defuzzified values of
their respective fuzzy values, and where none of the original fuzzy values is Null, and all
reflect the state of mind and beliefs of DMi at time t
FAchv(SG,A, t) = [FAchv∗(SG)] if A was fully applied to the GCM model at time t−1 (4.5)
where FAchv∗(SG) represents the defuzzified values of FAchv(SG), and FAchv(SG) 6= Null;
and where “A was fully applied at time t−1” means that the intention to apply A was fully
achieved, i.e. Achv(A)=F , at t−1
As per Equation 4.3, the Weighted Final Achievement of SG for DMi at time
t after alternative A is been adopted is given as the algebraic product of two values:
the defuzzified value of SG’s Final Achievement after A is applied (FAchv(SG,A, t))
and the weighting factor W(SG,DMi, t). W(SG,DMi, t) is calculated in Equation
4.4 as the sum of: 1) the defuzzified value of the strategic importance that DMi as-
signs to SG (SImprt∗(SG)) weighted by the defuzzified value of the overall attitude
DMi has over acting rationality with no regards to emotions (RF
∗
DMi
); and 2) the
defuzzified value of the emotional valence that DMi assigns to SG (EV lnc
∗(SG))
weighted by the defuzzified value of the overall attitude DMi has over acting emo-
tionally with no regards to rationality (EF ∗DMi).
The way the weighting factor W(SG,DMi, t) is calculated suggests that if DMi
has a RFDMi = F and EFDMi = N (i.e. DMi will act completely rational with no
regard to his emotions), then what matters as a weighting factor is the strategic
importance that DMi assigns to the strategic goal SG. On the other hand, if DMi
has a RFDMi = N and EFDMi = F (i.e. DMi will act completely emotional with no
regard to the strategic importance of his goals), then what matters as a weighting
factor is the emotional valence that DMi assigns to the strategic goal SG. But,
if DMi has none of the two factors (the rationality one and the emotionality one)
set to None, then the strategic importance of SG as well as its emotional valence
both come to play as a weighting factor but after each get adjusted by how much
rationality/emotionality DMi is exhibiting at the time. Some special cases could
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follow from this. For example, DMi could be fully rational and fully emotional (i.e.
RFDMi = EFDMi = F , and as a result his very important goals which are extremely
liked too will get an additional weight in comparison to other very important goals
but are disliked. As another extreme special case, DMi could be completely careless
and emotionless, or completely indifferent (i.e. RFDMi = EFDMi = N , and as a
result none of his goals will matter to him whether achieved or not achieved. This
shows the powerfulness and the flexibility of this weighting mechanism.
From Equation 4.4, the weighting factor W(SG,DMi, t) will have a final value
that is in the range of [−1, 2]. This is because the defuzzified value ranges for
RFDMi , SImprt(SG), EFDMi , and EV lnc(SG) are [0, 1], [0, 1], [0, 1] and [−1, 1],
respectively. Note that Equation 4.4 requires that none of the original fuzzy value
labels for these value properties to be Null, i.e. all these value properties must
have known values (recall that Null label means that the value is unknown or out
of range). This requirement/assumption is very reasonable, considering that the
weighting factor is used in calculating the effect of applying an alternative A on
achieving one of DMi’s strategic goals, or WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t). If there is no
known value for how important the strategic goal to DMi, how DMi feels about the
goal, or how rational and/or emotional DMi is expected to act, then it will not be
logical to assume that WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) could give a valid assessment of the
effect/contribution of A on DMi’s strategic goal SG.
In addition, note that Equation 4.5, which shows how to calculate FAchv(SG,A,
t), requires that the final achievement of the goal SG after A is been applied, or
FAchv(SG), to have a known value label. In other words, FAchv(SG) should not
have a fuzzy value label of Null assigned to it. This requirement/assumption is a
logical one, for the same reasons explained above.
Knowing that the weighting factor W(SG,DMi, t) will have a final value in the
range of [−1, 2], and the defuzzified value of FAchv(SG,A, t) is in the range [−1, 1],
then from Equation 4.3, we can be assured that the final value of WFAchv(SG,DMi,
A, t) will be in the range of [−2, 2]. It is worth noting here, that WFAchv(SG,DMi,
A, t) will be in the range of [−2, 2], if and only if the modeller considered emo-
tionality in calculating the weighting factor W(SG,DMi, t), i.e. when (EFDMi 6=
N) ∨ (EV lnc(SG) 6= EI). On the other hand, if the modeller did not include
emotionality in W(SG,DMi, t), whether by setting (EFDMi = N) ∨ (EV lnc(SG) =
EI), then the value of W(SG,DMi, t) will be in the range [0, 1], and therefore
WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) will be in the range [−1, 1].
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Furthermore, because an alternative that is been taken by a decision maker
can affect the the achievability of the strategic goals of another agent, we not only
need to track the effect of the alternative on the decision maker who adopted the
alternative but also the effect of it on all other decision makers. For this reason,
we defined WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) in Equation 4.3 with the alternative A ∈ A.
A could be any alternative that is part of the total alternatives available for all
decision makers in the decision making situation, and we did not limit A to be
A ∈ ADMi .
But, the weighted final achievement value, WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) calculated
in Equation 4.3, shows only the affect of adopting an alternative A to one specific
strategic goal SG that DMi has. We need a measure that reflects the total effect
of A, once adopted, on all DMi’s strategic goals in SGDMi . This measure is what
the Total Weighted Final Achievement value property tracks.
For a decision maker DMi, at time t , let the effect of the full application of
alternative A ∈ A into DMi’s strategic goals in the none-empty SGDMi collectively
be represented by a Total Weighted Final Achievement value property; and let this







WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) (4.6)
For the Total Weighted Final Achievement TWFAchv(DMi, A, t) value to reflect
the effect of alternative A, and A only, on DMi, then the GCM with all its constructs
and value properties’ value must stay the same and only A is applied fully, i.e. the
achievement value of the intention representing the intention to implement/apply
alternative A changes from Achv(A) =N to Achv(A) =F . All other alternatives’
intentions’ achievement values must stay the same unchanged, preferably unselected
and stay at the None level, i.e. (∀Ak ∈ A : Ak 6= A) Achv(Ak) = N . Then
after the values forward propagation algorithm, Algorithm 3.1, finalized the value
labels for all goals for time t, we calculate TWFAchv(DMi, A, t). The value of
TWFAchv(DMi, A, t), now, reflect the effect of applying alternative A, and only A,
on DMi’s strategic goals.
All the requirements/assumptions given for calculating W(SG,DMi, t) and
FAchv(SG,A, t) applies to calculating TWFAchv(DMi, A, t) too. The values of
the overall rationality and emotionality factors, RFDMi and EFDMi , must not have
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a fuzzy vale label of Null assigned to them . As well, none of the fuzzy value la-
bels assigned to SImprt(SG), EV lnc(SG) and FAchv(SG) for each SG ∈ SGDMi ,
should be Null. These assumptions are logical for the same reasons we indicated
earlier. In addition, Equation 4.6 requires that the set of strategic goals that deci-
sion maker DMi have must not be empty, i.e. it requires that |SGDMi| 6= 0. This is
also a logical assumption. If DMi has no strategic goals that he cares about, then
there is no basis to judge how effective an alternative versus another. Recall that we
use the contribution that the different alternatives have on the achievement of the
decision maker’s strategic goals as a measure of effectiveness for these alternatives.
We said above that WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) will be in the range of [−2, 2], if
emotionality is captured within the model (i.e. ∃DMi ∈DM : ((EFDMi 6= N) ∧
(∃SG ∈ SGDMi EV lnc(SG) 6= N)) ). This makes the value of TWFAchv(DMi, A, t)
to be in the same range of [−2, 2], under the same condition of having emotionality
been captured as part of the model. On the other hand, if the modeller did not
consider modelling emotionality as part of modelling the decision making situation
(i.e. ∀DMi ∈DM : ((EFDMi = N) ∨ (∀SG ∈ SGDMi EV lnc(SG) = N)) ), then
WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) will be in the range of [−1, 1], and therefore the value of
TWFAchv(DMi, A, t) will be in the range of [−1, 1].
In the case where the modeller included emotionality in the model, for at
least one of the decision makers in the decision making situation modelled, then
we need to normalize the value of TWFAchv(DMi, A, t) calculated for every and
each decision maker involved in the decision making situation (and included in
the model) to ensure consistency across the model. The new normalized value of









WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) (4.7)
But, how TWFAchv(DMi, A, t) maps to the concepts of cardinal preference and
ordinal preference used extensively in the literature of both game theory and de-
cision theory? We should first differentiate between preferences over a set of al-
ternatives a decision maker have and preferences over a set of states a multi-agent
decision making situation has. Preferences over a set of alternatives, that a deci-
sion maker have in a single-agent decision making situation, is what we will discuss
in this section, and what this chapter is concerned with. In the next chapter, we
will modify our method of calculating preferences over alternatives (given in Equa-
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tions 4.3 - 4.6) to account for preferences over states and shared-alternatives of
multi-agent decision making situations.
For a single decision maker DMi, in a single-agent decision making situation,
at time t, let the Cardinal Preference that DMi has over alternative A ∈ ADMi be
represented as a Weighted Payoff value property attached to A, and be denoted as
WP (A,DMi, t). Let WP (A,DMi, t) have a numerical value in the range of [−1, 1]
and calculated as follows:









WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) (4.9)
Recall that TWFAchv(DMi, A, t) does not need any normalization, if the mod-
eller did not consider modelling emotionality as part of modelling the decision mak-
ing situation (i.e. ∀DMi∈DM : ((EFDMi = N) ∨ (∀SG ∈ SGDMi EV lnc(SG) =
N)) ). Because in such case, WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) will be in the range of [−1, 1],
and therefore the value of TWFAchv(DMi, A, t) will be in the range of [−1, 1]. But,
if emotionality is captured within the model (i.e. ∃DMi∈DM : ((EFDMi 6= N) ∧
(∃SG ∈ SGDMi EV lnc(SG) 6= N)) ), then the value of WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t)
will be in the range of [−2, 2], and therefore the value of TWFAchv(DMi, A, t) will
be in the range of [−2, 2]. In this case, normalization is needed to maintain the
values of TWFAchv(DMi, A, t) and WP (A,DMi, t) in the range of [−1, 1]. Hence,
the devision by 2 shown in 4.9.
Based on the cardinal preferences, or weighted payoffs, calculated for DMi over
each of his alternatives A ∈ ADMi , there will be a Preference Vector, denoted as
Pref(DMi,ADMi), showing the order of the alternatives in ADMi from the most
preferred to the least preferred. It is assumed here that Pref(DMi,ADMi) repre-
sents only ordinal ranking of the alternatives in ADMi based on how much each of
these alternatives contributes to the achievement of DMi’s strategic goals, given the
importance weight and emotional valence that DMi assigned to each of his strategic
goals, and given a specific rationality factor RFDMi and emotionality factor EFDMi
describing the attitudes DMi is exhibiting towards acting rationally or emotionally
at that point of time.
The preference order of a specific alternative A ∈ ADMi , to DMi at time t,
is given as an Ordinal Preference value property attached to A, and is denoted
by OP (A,DMi, t). Let OP (A,DMi, t) be given an integer number that reflects
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A’s position in DMi’s preference vector Pref(DMi,ADMi) at that point of time.
The smaller the integer number assigned to OP (A,DMi, t) the more preferred the
alternative A is, to DMi at time t. The alternative that has OP (A,DMi, t) = 1 is
the most preferred alternative and the one with OP (A,DMi, t) = |ADMi| − 1 is the
least preferred alternative. This is because the alternatives in the Pref(DMi,ADMi)
vector are ordered from the alternative that has the highest weighted payoff value
to the the one that has the lowest weighted payoff.
OP (A,DMi, t) = n + 1 where 0 ≤ n ≤ |ADMi| − 1 (4.10)
and n reflects A’s position in Pref(DMi,ADMi)
In the next chapter, we will modify our method of calculating the cardinal
and ordinal preferences over alternatives (given in Equations 4.3 - 4.10) to account
for preferences over states and shared-alternatives of multi-agent decision making
situations. In the following section, we will present how we will elicit and model
the strength of preferences over alternatives that we have calculated above.
4.5 Modelling Preferences’ Strength
To capture the strength of alternative A’s preference over other alternatives, for
a specific decision maker DMi, we use a distance measure between the cardinal
preference of A and the cardinal preference of each other alternative DMi has in
his set of alternatives ADMi for the decision making situation at hand. Based on
this distance measure a binary relation among each pair of these alternatives is
assigned.
For decision maker DMi, and at time t, let the distance measure among the two
preferences which DMi has over the two alternatives Aa and Ab , both in ADMi , be
denoted as d(Aa , Ab , DMi, t). And, let its value be given as a real number calculated
as follows:
d(Aa , Ab , DMi, t) = [WP (Aa, DMi, t)−WP (Ab, DMi, t)] (4.11)
Because each of WP (Aa, DMi, t) and WP (Ab, DMi, t) is in the range of [−1, 1],
whether normalized as per Equation 4.9 or not normalized because the modeller
did not consider modelling emotionality as part of the decision making situation’s
model (as discussed earlier), then the distance value will be in the range of [−2, 2].
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Figure 4.4: The membership functions of the Fuzzy Sets dividing
the satisfaction levels domain of the Preference Strength value property
PrefStrngth(Aa , Ab , DMi, t): (a) shows the fuzzy sets covering the defuzzified real
values > 0; and (b) shows the fuzzy sets covering the defuzzified real values < 0
The sign of d(Aa , Ab , DMi, t) shows which alternative, of the two, that deci-
sion maker DMi prefers. If d(Aa , Ab , DMi, t) > 0, then state Aa is preferred
by DMi over Ab ; if d(Aa , Ab , DMi, t) = 0, then DMi is indifferent; otherwise, if
d(Aa , Ab , DMi, t) < 0, then DMi prefers Ab over Aa . The actual value of d(Aa , Ab ,




Let Preference Strength be a value property, denoted as PrefStrngth(Aa , Ab ,
DMi, t), and be given the fuzzified value of the distance value property. In other
words, let PrefStrngth(Aa , Ab , DMi, t) = ˜d(Aa , Ab , DMi, t). PrefStrngth(Aa , Ab ,
DMi, t) will be assigned a fuzzy linguistic value label LPS based on the fuzzy mem-
berships functions given in Figure 4.4. The strength expressed by PrefStrngth(Aa ,
A
b
, DMi, t) = LPS is meant to represent the distance between the weighted prefer-
ence values for the two alternatives considered here, Aa and Ab . And, where LPS
is a fuzzy linguistic value label that represents the name of the fuzzy set which
the preference strength value has the highest membership of. And, LPS ∈LPS =
{Extreme, Significant, Strong,Full,Big,Much,Moderate, Some, Little, None, -Little ,
-Some, -Moderate, -Much, -Big, -Full, -Strong, -Significant, -Extreme,Null} = {Ex,
Si,St,F,B,M,Mo,S,L,N,−L,−S,−Mo,−M,−B,−F,−St,−Si,−Ex,Null}. And, with the
complete order of Ex>Si>St>F>B>M>Mo>L>N>−L>−S>−Mo>−M>−B>
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−F>−St>−Si>−Ex>Null, where the labels range from representing Extreme




The LPS fuzzy label assigned to PrefStrngth(Aa , Ab , DMi, t) will cover the
preference’s strength levels in the range [−2, 2], with the understanding that the
Null label represents an unknown preference strength. The fuzzy membership func-
tions defining these preference strength’s linguistic value labels are given in Figure
4.4. The figure shows the membership functions for each label’s fuzzy set to be
trapezoidal in shape, for simplicity only (not as a restriction) as indicated in Chap-
ter 3. In practice, the number of fuzzy sets and their membership functions should
be defined based on the user needs and requirements.
Now, let the preference strength of alternative Aa over alternative Ab , for de-
cision maker DMi at time t, given in PrefStrngth(Aa , Ab , DMi, t) = LPS, be rep-
resented by a binary relationship between the two alternatives. Let this binary





. The notation of this relation is shown in Figure
4.4 for each possible preference strength fuzzy linguistic label LPS (shown in the
figure above each label’s membership function).
In the next chapter, we will extend this method of calculating and representing
the strength of the decision maker’s preferences over alternatives he has, to cover the
strength of preferences over states and shared-alternatives in multi-agent decision
making situations. But, for now, we will show an example of calculating preferences
and preferences’ strengths for a single-agent decision making situation.
4.6 Example: Howard’s Personal Dilemma
In Chapter 3, we presented as an example the Constrained Rationality GCM model
for an interesting “personal dilemma” that represents a real-life conflict: Howard’s
Personal Dilemma (based on the personal conflict originally presented in Thagard
and Millgram (1995)). As per the example, Howard, a professor in a good university,
receives an offer to move to Harvard. Howard has many personal goals that range
from research-related to family-related goals. The goals conflict with each other.
Satisfaction of some will lead to dissatisfaction of others. We showed there, in Figure
3.13, the Howard Dilemma modelled using the Constrained Rationality framework;
and we showed how Howard’s two alternatives (stay at his current school or move
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to Harvard) contribute differently to Howard goals’ achievement and prevention
value properties.
We ran the framework’s forward labels propagation algorithm (Algorithm 3.1)
to generate the final reasoning about the two scenarios: 1) Howard continues to
work at his current school (G11) with no job offer received from Harvard (C1);
and 2) Howard decides to activate the “move to Harvard” goal (G10) after the
“Offer from Harvard” constraint (C2) changed from full prevention (no offer) to
full achievement (offer received). The analysis presented in Section 3.10 showed
that for the first scenario: Howard’s goal of keeping his family happy (G2) will be
fully achieved, but Howard’s goals of “increase scientific understanding”(G1) and
“keep self happy” (G3) will be moderately achieved. For the second scenario, the
analysis showed the effect of Howard’s decision to move to Harvard on all his goals:
He will manage to satisfy fully G1, but his and his family’s happiness goals will
receive prevention. We also showed that with simple tweaking to the dilemma’s
Constrained Rationality model (by changing some of the lateral relation types or
their modifier labels, for example), we will able to provide more insight on how
Howard thinks, and what will happen to his goals as his thinking changes. In
addition, we said there that any change in the GCM model to “better” capture
Howard’s actual state-of-mind, or to test what-if scenarios by him, will show the
effect on all his goals.
In this section, we will use the same dilemma, with Howard having the same
two alternatives:
AH0 : stay at current school; and
AH1 : move to Harvard.
But, let the GCM model, presented in Figure 3.13 be modified to generate for each
of these two alternatives a set of different final achievement and prevention value
labels for Howard’s ultimate three strategic goals:
SGH1 : increase scientific understanding;
SGH2 : keep family happy; and
SGH3 : keep self happy.
And, let the final achievement and prevention labels of these three strategic goals
be the ones given in the table shown in Figure 4.5a. This table shows also the
Final Achievement value for each of these goals, given in both its forms: as fuzzy
linguistic value label, and as a defuzzified real number.
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Howard
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGHoward
SGH 1 SGH 2 SGH 3
Alternative AH 0 Achv(SGk) S M Mo (a)Status Quo  (Howard Prvn(SGk) N N N
Stays at Current School) FAchv(SGk) S M Mo
{ Achv(AH 0)=F } FAchv*(SGk) 0.40 0.60 0.50
Alternative AH 1 Achv(SGk) B M F
Howard Moves Prvn(SGk) N L B
to Harvard FAchv(SGk) B S L
{ Achv(AH 1)=F } FAchv*(SGk) 0.80 0.40 0.20
decision making situation # 1 decision making situation # 2
  (b) Howard HowardStrategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGHoward SGHoward
SGH 1 SGH 2 SGH 3 SGH 1 SGH 2 SGH 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) F B Mo F B Mo
Emotional Valence EVlnc(SGk) L EL SL EI EL SL
Alternative AH 0
FAchv(SGk, AH 0 ,t) 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.60 0.50
W(SGk,H,t) 1.00 0.80 0.50 1.00 0.80 0.50
Status Quo  (Howard WFAchv(SGk,H,AH 0,t) 0.40 0.48 0.25 0.40 0.48 0.25
Stays at Current School) WP(AH 0, H, t) 0.38 0.38
{ Achv(AH 0)=F } OP(AH 0, H, t) 2 (Worst) 2 (Worst)
Alternative AH 1
FAchv(SGk, AH 1 ,t) 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.80 0.40 0.20
W(SGk,H,t) 1.00 0.80 0.50 1.00 0.80 0.50
Howard Moves WFAchv(SGk,H,AH 1,t) 0.80 0.32 0.10 0.80 0.32 0.10
to Harvard WP(AH 1, H, t) 0.41 0.41
{ Achv(AH 1)=F } OP(AH 1, H, t) 1 (Best) 1 (Best)
Alternative AH 0
FAchv(SGk, AH 0 ,t) 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.60 0.50
W(SGk,H,t) 0.60 1.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.20
Status Quo  (Howard WFAchv(SGk,H,AH 0,t) 0.24 0.60 0.10 0.00 0.60 0.10
Stays at Current School) WP(AH 0, H, t) 0.31 0.23
{ Achv(AH 0)=F } OP(AH 0, H, t) Same 1 (Best)
Alternative AH 1
FAchv(SGk, AH 1 ,t) 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.80 0.40 0.20
W(SGk,H,t) 0.60 1.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.20
Howard Moves WFAchv(SGk,H,AH 1,t) 0.48 0.40 0.04 0.00 0.40 0.04
to Harvard WP(AH 1, H, t) 0.31 0.15
{ Achv(AH 1)=F } OP(AH 1, H, t) Same 2 (Worst)
Alternative AH 0
FAchv(SGk, AH 0 ,t) 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.60 0.50
W(SGk,H,t) 1.60 1.80 0.70 1.00 1.80 0.70
Status Quo  (Howard WFAchv(SGk,H,AH 0,t) 0.64 1.08 0.35 0.40 1.08 0.35
Stays at Current School) WP(AH 0, H, t) 0.69 0.61
{ Achv(AH 0)=F } OP(AH 0, H, t) 2 (Worst) 1 (Best)
Alternative AH 1
FAchv(SGk, AH 1 ,t) 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.80 0.40 0.20
W(SGk,H,t) 1.60 1.80 0.70 1.00 1.80 0.70
Howard Moves WFAchv(SGk,H,AH 1,t) 1.28 0.72 0.14 0.80 0.72 0.14
to Harvard WP(AH 1, H, t) 0.71 0.55
{ Achv(AH 1)=F } OP(AH 1, H, t) 1 (Best) 2 (Worst)
Alternative AH 0
FAchv(SGk, AH 0 ,t) 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.60 0.50
W(SGk,H,t) 0.92 0.84 0.44 0.80 0.84 0.44
Status Quo  (Howard WFAchv(SGk,H,AH 0,t) 0.37 0.50 0.22 0.32 0.50 0.22
Stays at Current School) WP(AH 0, H, t) 0.36 0.35
{ Achv(AH 0)=F } OP(AH 0, H, t) 2 (Worst) Same
Alternative AH 1
FAchv(SGk, AH 1 ,t) 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.80 0.40 0.20
W(SGk,H,t) 0.92 0.84 0.44 0.80 0.84 0.44
Howard Moves WFAchv(SGk,H,AH 1,t) 0.74 0.34 0.09 0.64 0.34 0.09
to Harvard WP(AH 1, H, t) 0.39 0.35

















































































































































































































































Figure 4.5: Howard’s Weighted and Ordinal Preferences over his Alternatives: (a)
Howard’s Strategic Goals and their individual Achievement, Prevention and Final
Achievement value labels (in addition to the Final Achievement defuzzified value) for
each of his alternatives; and (b) Calculating Howard’s Preferences using different Ra-
tionality and Emotionality Factors, and with different Emotional Valences attached
to the strategic goals.
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We analyze Howard’s dilemma to generate Howard’s cardinal and ordinal pref-
erences over his two alternatives. But, we assume different scenarios where different
strategic importance, emotional valences, rationality factor and emotionality factor
values are employed. This is done mainly to test how the preferences change as
these values change. The results of the analysis are presented in a set of tables,
shown in Figure 4.5b.
First, all the decision making situations which we analyzed for the Howard’s
Dilemma will have the following two sets for Howard: Howard’s strategic goals set
SGH = {SGH1, SGH2, SGH3}; and Howard’s alternatives set AH = {AH0, AH1}.
Second, the two main situations which we analyzed with different Rationality and
Emotionality factors are:
decision making situation # 1
Howard’s three strategic goals SGH1, SGH2 and SGH3 have the following
strategic importance values: SImprt(SGH1) = F , SImprt(SGH2) = B and
SImprt(SGH3) = Mo , respectively, with the meaning that Howard gives
his “increase scientific knowledge” full importance while giving his “keep
family happy” and “keep self happy” goals less importance levels (big and
moderate importance, respectively). The three goals, also, have the fol-
lowing emotional valences: EV lanc(SGH1) = L, EV lanc(SGH2) = L and
EV lanc(SGH3)=L, respectively, with the meaning that: Howard gives “keep
family happy” the extremely-liked emotional valence (understandably) while
keeping the achievement of his “increase scientific knowledge” and “keep self
happy” goals emotionally in the second and third places by giving them the
liked and slightly-liked emotional valence labels, respectively.
decision making situation # 2
In this situation, Howard keeps the strategic importance of his three goals
SGH1, SGH2 and SGH3 the same (as in decision making situation # 1).
He, also, keeps the same emotional valences attached to the goals, with
the exception of his “increase scientific knowledge” (SGH1). In this situa-
tion, he elevated this goal from being just liked to extremely-liked, i.e. from
EV lanc(SGH1) = L, as in the first situation, to EV lanc(SGH1) =EL here.
This makes SGH1 extremely-liked as it is the case for his “keep family happy”
SGH2 goal. But, both goals still differ in their strategic importance levels with
SImprt(SGH1)=F and SImprt(SGH2)=B. The idea behind this situation
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is to test if a slight change in the emotional “likeness” of SGH1 will make a
difference in the preferences of Howard over his two alternatives.
Figure 4.5b presents these two decision making situation and their respective
calculated values in two separate columns. The figure shows the calculations of both
the cardinal weighted preference and ordinal preference, for each of Howard’a two
alternatives, for the two situations, but analyzed under four different Rationality
and Emotionality Factors for Howard:
Howard is Extremely Rational
In this case, Howard is fully rational (RFH = F ) and considers no emotion-
ality at all (EFH = N). As this case’s table in Figure 4.5b shows, both
alternatives AH0 and AH1 maintained the same weighted and ordinal prefer-
ence values, in both decision making situations #1 and #2: AH1 is slightly
preferred to AH0. This means that, for Howard, and if he is completely ra-
tional, “moving to Harvard” is slightly better than “staying at his current
school”. This stays the same whether he likes his “increase scientific knowl-
edge” as much as he likes to “keep family happy”, or less than ‘keep(ing)
family happy” (situation #1 and #2, respectively).
The strength of the preference of AH1 over AH0 is given as PrefStrngth(AH1,
AH0, H, t) = N , and represented as AH1 N
H,t
A
H0. Recall that the None fuzzy
value label given here to describe the strength of the preference does not mean
that there is no preference, but rather there is a very minimal preference.
Under the fuzzy sets/labels scheme we adopted to describe the preferences’
strengths, discussed above and shown in Figure 4.4, the label None is assigned
to the preference’s strength here because the real number (defuzzified) value
of it (0.03) falls in the range covered by the None fuzzy-set/value-label.
Howard is Extremely Emotional
In this case, Howard is fully emotional (EFH = F ) and considers no rational-
ity at all (RFH = N). This case’s table in Figure 4.5b shows that the weighted
and ordinal preference values for AH0 and AH1 depends on how much Howard
likes his SGH1 compared to SGH2. For this case and under decision making
situation #1, where EV lanc(SGH1)<EV lanc(SGH2), both alternatives have
the same preference levels (with strength level of 0.0 and therefore assigned
the None strength value label). But, under decision making situation #2,
where EV lanc(SGH1) = EV lanc(SGH2), alternative AH0 is more preferred
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to AH1. In other words, for Howard, the preference of staying at his school
is slightly more than moving to Harvard. The preference strength of AH0 to
AH1 for this scenario is still minimal, though slightly better, at the numeric




Howard is Fully Rational, but also Considers his Emotions Fully
In this case, Howard is fully rational (RFH = F ), but he also considers his
emotions fully (EFH = f). Therefore, the strategic importances will be added
to the emotional valences to form the weighting factor for each of the goals’
final achievement harnessed by each alternative. This case’s table in Figure
4.5b shows that the weighted and ordinal preference values for AH0 and AH1,
here too, depends on how much Howard likes his SGH1 compared to SGH2.
For this case, and under decision making situation #1, where EV lanc(SGH1)<
EV lanc(SGH2), AH1 is shown to be slightly more preferred to AH0. The
strength level is minimal at 0.02. Therefore, AH1 N
H,t
A
H0. But, under de-
cision making situation #2, where EV lanc(SGH1) = EV lanc(SGH2), the
reverse is now true. AH0 is shown to be slightly more preferred to AH1. The




Howard is Mostly Rational and Slightly Emotional
In this case, Howard is more rational (with rationality at about the 80% level,
i.e. RFH = B) and slightly emotional (with emotionality at about the 20%
level, i.e. EFH = L). In other words, the weighting factor for each of the
goals’ final achievement, harnessed by each alternative, will be made for the
most part(80%) from the strategic importance given to the individual goals.
And, with the emotional valence forms a little part (20%) of the weighting
factor. This case’s table in Figure 4.5b shows that the weighted and ordinal
preference values for AH0 and AH1, here too, depends on how much Howard
likes his SGH1 compared to SGH2.
For this case, and under decision making situation #1, where EV lanc(SGH1)<
EV lanc(SGH2), AH1 is shown to be slightly more preferred to AH0. The
strength level is minimal at 0.03. Therefore, AH1 N
H,t
A
H0. But, under de-
cision making situation #2, where EV lanc(SGH1) = EV lanc(SGH2), both
alternatives have the same preference levels (with strength level of 0.0 and
therefore assigned the None strength value label).
In this example, we illustrated how the different importance and emotional-
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likeness of specific strategic goals, as well as the personality wide attitudes towards
acting rationally or emotionally, can affect the preferences (and their strengths)
over alternatives for a specific agent. The Weighted Preference WP and the Ordinal
Preference OP for Howard’s alternatives are calculated for each of the four cases,
and for each of the two decision making situations, #1 and #2 (where the emotional
valences attached to the goals slightly changes to reflect two possible state-of-mind
that Howard could be in). Figure 4.5 shows these preferences change as Howard’s
personality wide attitude mode change, i.e. as Howard Rationality Factor RFH and
Emotionality Factors EFH change.
But in this example, we also experienced the importance of adopting the right
fuzzy sets to describe a value property such as the strength of a preference. If the
sets, and their respective fuzzy linguistic value labels cover wider satisfaction real-
number/defuzzified values, then the labels will be less expressive, or descriptive. In
our case, because the preference strength/distance is minimal, the fuzzy value label
assigned to the value property is None. This could be satisfactory in this example,
because Howard should know that the preference an alternative have over the other
is minimal, and this is important for him to take in consideration when deciding
on the matter of moving to Harvard or not. This scale is better than adopting a
more detailed/expressive scale that will in effect inflate the strength level of the
preference, or call it with a value label that is more than what it deserves to be
described with.
4.7 Summary
We started this chapter by discussing how the different strategic goals and alterna-
tives, the agent has, are identified and modelled. Then the chapter presented how
the final achievement levels of agents’ strategic goals are elicited for each of the alter-
natives the agents’ have; how the strategic importance and the emotional valences
for each of the agents over their own strategic goals are captured and modelled;
as well as how the personality wide attitudes of the agents’ toward acting rational
and/or emotional are modelled.
The chapter, then, showed: how all these values are used to determine the
cardinal and ordinal preferences of the agents over their own alternatives; and how
the strength of the agents’ preferences are determined and represented. At the
end, the chapter presented an illustrative example that shows how the concepts
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and methods presented in the chapters are applied in a close-to-real-life one-agent
decision making situation.
The following chapter will take the concepts and methods of this chapter further.
It will discuss how to model collaborative and competitive multi-agent decision
making situations; and how the concepts and methods presented here will be applied








In the previous two chapters, we introduced the foundational concepts and meth-
ods of the Constrained Rationality framework. We showed how the agents’ goals
and realities are modelled; how they affect each other through reduction and lat-
eral relationships; how qualitative linguistic value-labels of the agents’ goals and
constraints propagate through these relationships; and how value properties of the
goals, such as their operationalization, achievement and prevention levels, are final-
ized and updated to reflect the changes happening over time to the agents and their
decision making situation. In addition, we showed how the priorities and feelings
of the agents’ over their strategic goals are modelled, and how these values are used
to determine the agents’ preferences over their alternatives.
But, the previous two chapters focused more on single-agent decision making
situations, and multi-agent decision making situations where the agents act and
decide in an individualistic manner with no regard to others’ choices and decisions,
and to how these choices might affect their own objectives and choices. This chapter
discusses how to model collaborative and competitive multi-agent decision making
situations; and takes further the concepts and methods, introduced in the last two
chapters, showing how they will be applied to determine the preferences of agents
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in these collaborative and competitive multi-agent decision making situations.
This chapter starts with discussing the two main modes/types of multi-agent
decision making situations, the collaborative decision making situations and the
competitive conflicts modes. The chapter, then, introduces the process to model
and analyze both types. First, the process of modelling is discussed, including im-
portant topics such as: how the framework suggests the different agents’ viewpoint
models be modelled and integrated ; how the agents’ alternatives will be modelled,
in both collaborative and competitive decision making situations; how the situa-
tion’s structure and states are defined, for the competitive conflicts; and how the
base-model of the decision making situation is to be validated and finalized.
Then, the topic of modelling priorities, capturing emotions, and eliciting agents’
preferences is discussed thoroughly for both types of multi-agent decision making
situations. The chapter, then closes the modelling-process section with a discussion
on how the framework models the dynamics of multi-agent situations, specifically
the different moves that agents who are engaged in competitive conflicts make or
can make; and how the different types of moves, agents have in conflicts, are used to
identify three main types of multi-agent competitive decision making conflicts: non-
cooperative, cooperative with no coalitions/alliances (i.e. agents cooperate but still
act individually and do not sacrifice their individual positions for the good of the
group), and finally cooperative conflicts where agents are allowed to form coalitions,
act as groups and take multi-step moves including intermediate temporarily scarifies
along the way for the good of all members of the group they belong to.
We will use these three types of multi-agent conflicts to structure and organize
our discussion about modelling and analyzing multi-agent conflicts (or games, as
they are also referred to in games theory literature), and what concepts and tools
the Constrained Rationality framework offers to deal with the specific needs of
modelling and analyzing these conflicts. We will provide a separate and dedicated
chapter, after this one, to discuss each conflict type, including the concepts and
methods to be used to model and analyze that type. But, in this chapter, we provide
a section to give an overview on the topic of analyzing multi-agent decision making
situation, covering not only the competitive conflict ones but also the collaborative
ones. This section will discuss: the process of analyzing multi-agent decision making
situations; how the agents’ preferences over alternatives and states are calculated;
how the stability of the different states in these conflicts is determined (for each
agent) and how equilibriums are identified; how sensitivity and what-if analysis is
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conducted; and finally, why the analyst should compare the produced analysis and
predictions to what actually happen/happened in real-life.
The chapter closes by providing an illustrative example. The example shows
how the process, concepts and methods introduced in this chapter are used to
model and analyze a collaborative multi-agent decision making situation: a system
requirements engineering situation. The chapter does not provide any example for
competitive conflict situations, because the next few chapters will provide detailed
case studies that cover all the three types of conflicts: non-cooperative conflicts,
cooperative conflicts without coalitions, and cooperative conflicts with coalitions.
5.2 Modes of Multi-Agents Decision Making
The domain of multi-agent decision making situations can be divided into two
groups. The first group is the one that includes the Collaborative Decision Making
Situations, where all agents collaboratively and jointly try to choose among many
alternatives they have. The alternatives are known to all agents, and form a shared
alternatives space. The goals and constraints are also shared, for the most part.
Examples of such situations include Product Selection, Product Development, Sys-
tems Development, Requirements Engineering, Scientific Research, Policy Making,
and so on.
The agents who are involved in collaborative decision making situations could all
be internal agents, part of a whole entity, such as internal sub-organizations of the
enterprise (as in Product Development initiatives). They also could be completely
separate agents who only come together to solve a problem, build a system, or
decide on the best policy. The fact that agents could be part of a whole entity does
not mean that these agents have the same goals, or even aligned goals. Agents,
even internal ones, tend to have conflicting goals, which could hinder or negatively
affect each others’ goals, and their constraints also could challenge each other. But
in collaborative decision making situations, they all come together, and disclose
their goals (needs and wants) for the purpose of choosing the option that “best fit”
their goals collectively.
The second group of multi-agent decision making situations is the one that
includes the Adversarial/Competitive Decision Making Situations. In these situa-
tions, all involved agents are competing with each other in some form or another,
and to some degree or another. These situations are commonly referred to in game
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theory literature as Games, and in the wider management and behavioural science
literature as Conflicts. In our research work, we use the two terms, game and
conflict, interchangeably to mean the same thing: multi-agent adversarial decision
making situation, where the agents involved have different conflicting gaols, and
each has a separate set of alternatives/options/moves to choose from.
The agents involved in multi-agent conflicts also could be internal agents that
belong to one whole bigger agent or completely separate independent agents. But
what differentiates agents involved in games/conflicts than the ones involved in
collaborative multi-agent decision making situations is the fact that the former have
their own alternatives while the later have a shared set of alternatives to choose
from. Therefore, collaborative situations are less dynamic, as the agents move
together from one collective decision to another. There is no relying on individual
agents choices/moves as the case in multi-agent conflicts.
Conflicts, on the other hand, are dynamic and could be represented as state
machines where the choices/moves agents take at any pint of time (future state)
depend on the choices they took at the previous point of time (current state). And,
while collaborative situations’ collective decisions could be represented as states,
each of these sates is in fact defined by one shared alternative/option selected by
all the agents. On the other hand, each of the states in a game/conflict situation is
defined by a set of alternatives/options that the agents select, from their own set
of alternatives, at the time they enter the state.
Splitting the domain of multi-agent decision making situations to the two groups,
the collaborative decision making situations and the adversarial competitive ones,
is a generalization that could help us categorize the situations in order to study and
analyze them. This splitting is not theoretical. It is rooted in organizational be-
havioural studies, such as the work of Thomas (1976). But in reality, the two groups
if defined to exclude competing collaborators or cooperating competitors form two
extreme points of the domain space, as shown by Figure 5.1, an illustrative digram
put together by Thomas (1976).
In reality, collaborating agents tend also to have competitiveness among them
(such as scientific researchers in the same filed collaborating to solve key problems
and at the same time competing for funding sources), and competing agents tend to
co-operate with each other (for example, industrial corporations forming standards
alliances even though they compete with each other in the same market space).
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Figure 5.1: Behavioural Modes of tackling a Conflict (an illustration originally
put by Thomas (1976)), with an overlay showing the two general groups, we are
considering in our research, divide the multi-agent decision making situations domain.
opposite points of the domain, but rather they have within each of them decision
making situations that embody degrees of shades of the characteristics defines the
other group. Figure 5.1 shows how those two general groups maps to the extreme
points of behaviour exhibited by decision makers in multi-agent decision making
situations; and shows how the two groups generally divide the domain space of
multi-agent decision making situations space with all its shades of behaviour modes.
A multi-agent decision making situation could have all the major characteristics
of the collaborative-multi-agent-decision-making group, but have some agents who
do not disclose all their relevant goals, because of reasons such as hidden competi-
tion. The situation should still be modelled and analyzed as a collaborative decision
making situation, despite this competing-agents problem. The problem should be
addressed (for example, by building separate what-if models to analyze the effect
such hidden goals have on the ultimate decision the group as a whole will take),
but should not affect how the situation be modelled (at least, in its base-model).
Similarly, in a situation where the agents are locked-in a competing adver-
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alliance, concerned agents/analyst should build what-if models of the conflict to
test/validate the motives behind such suggested or expected cooperation. But, the
situation itself should still be modelled as a conflict because it embodies all the
major characteristics of an adversarial multi-agent decision making situation.
These shades/degrees of competition in collaborative decision making situations,
or degrees of collaboration in conflict situations, comes from the perceptions and/or
deceptions that the situations’ agents have or participate in. It is a knowledge
problem: How much we know? Does what we know truly reflect the real world as
it is? How much of what we know, believe and perceive is truly justified?
The ViVD-EKM framework’s answer to this problem is to compartmentalize
knowledge and model perceived or hypothesized knowledge, as well as aggregated
or specialized knowledge, as Viewpoint Models. The framework offers knowledge
modelling mechanisms to support operations such as aggregation, decomposition,
generalization and specialization. We will not dive deep into how these mechanisms
work within the ViVD-EKM framework since this is an out of scope topic (Al-Shawa
(2006b,a) offers details). But, we will show how viewpoint models can help model
collaborative multi-agent decision making situations as well as multi-agent games.
5.3 Modelling Multi-Agent Decision Making
Situations
In this section, we will introduce the process to follow when modelling a multi-
agent decision making situation, whether it is a collaborative integrated situation
or a game/conflict situation. Figure 5.2 provides an illustration of the process. The
modelling and analysis process as a whole, and as shown in the figure, has two parts
to it: the modelling process part, and the analysis process part.
The section we start by listing first the modelling process a step wise fashion.
Then, it will discuss some important modelling concepts and methods used in
these steps: the agents’ perceived viewpoints and GCM models, and how these
models will be integrated to fit the specific needs of the decision making situation
and its type (collaborative or competitive); how the agents’ alternatives and the
conflict’s states are defined and modelled; and how the base-model of the situation
is validated and finalized. Modelling agents’ priorities, emotions and preferences,
for both collaborative situations and conflicts, will be discussed separately in the
following section.
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5.3.1 The Process of Modelling Multi-Agent Decision
Making Situations
The process of modelling a multi-agent decision making situation is part of the
total process shown in Figure 5.2, and includes the following steps:
1. Specify the context of the decision making situation. This context will serve as
guidelines on: what to include and not include in the decision making model;
what to consider as relevant and what should be declared as irrelevant; who
to include as decision makers; and so on.
2. Identify all the “real” decision makers involved in this decision making exer-
cise.
3. Build a Viewpoint Model for each decision maker. If this decision making
situation is a one-agent one, then one viewpoint model should be built with
the agent’s CGM. And, if this is a multi-agent decision making situation, a
collaborative or a conflict one, then multiple viewpoints should be built. One
viewpoint model for each of the agents. Each agent’s viewpoint must include
the agent’s GCM, and the agent’s alternatives (modelled as intention nodes
at the bottom of the agent GCM’s goals-tree/s).
4. Validating and finalizing the Base Model. At this step, different decision
making situational modes take different routes:
(a) For a Single-Agent Decision Making Situation, finalizing the base-model
means verifying that all the agent’s relevant goals and constraints are
captured, the alternatives are all elicited, and the reduction and lateral
relations are all accurately represented. Any uncertainties or variations
that need to be tested should all be dealt with at the sensitivity and
what-if analysis stage.
(b) For a Collaborative Multi-Agent Decision Making Situation, finalizing
the base-model means completing the following steps: 1) verifying that
all the agents relevant goals and constraints are captured within their re-
spective viewpoints’ GCMs, and that all reduction and lateral relations
are accurately represented; 2) integrating all agents’ viewpoint models
and capture the effect of each others’ goals and constraints on the rest
using lateral relations; 3) ensuring that all relevant known alternatives
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(products, architectures, designs, specifications, etc.) are captured, and
add any new ones the collaborating decision makers (find through cre-
ative thinking, brain storming or any other thorough knowledge acqui-
sition process); then 4) connecting the effect of the agents’ constraints
on the alternatives and the effect of choosing each of the alternatives on
the agents’ goals using lateral relations. Any uncertainties or variations
that need to be tested should all be dealt with at the sensitivity and
what-if analysis stage.
(c) For a Competitive Multi-Agent Decision Making Conflict, there are mul-
tiple steps to be taken: 1) verify that all the agents’ relevant goals and
constraints are captured within their respective viewpoints’ GCMs, and
that all reduction and lateral relations are accurately represented; 2) in-
tegrate all agents’ viewpoint models and capture the effect of each others’
goals and constraints on the rest using lateral relations; 3) capture all the
relevant known alternatives/options/moves that the involved agents have
in their respective viewpoint models, and find any other ones (through a
creative thinking process or otherwise) that should be added to the base-
model of the conflict; 4) add the effect of each of the agent’s alternatives,
when and if it is get selected by the agent, on the agent’s goals, and add
the effect of the agents’ alternatives on other agents’ goals; 5) define
the conflict states (by identifying the realistically possible combinations
of the agents alternatives happening at the same point of time during
the conflict or happening at all), then identify any phases/iterations the
conflict has and finalize the structure of the conflict with the states that
exist in each phase/iteration; and 6) define all unilateral and cooperative
moves the agents could make between the conflict’s states.
There are two more steps that could be part of the modelling steps as well as
the analysis steps. Both steps are shown in Figure 5.2, and are as follows: adding
the prioritizes, emotional valences, personality wide attitudes toward rationality
and emotionality (these values will be used later to generate the agents’ preferences
over the alternatives, for single-agent or multi-agent collaborative decision making
situations, or over the conflict’s states, for the multi-agent adversarial conflicts); and
modelling the dynamics of conflicts, namely the agents moves and countermoves.
We will discuss some aspects of each of these steps below. These steps are shown
in Figure 5.2 as part of the boxes numbered (5) and (6), respectively.
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5.3.2 Agents’ Perceived Viewpoints and GCM Models
We said above that one of the best benefits of the ViVD-EKM conceptual modelling
framework is the ability not only to aggregate and generalize knowledge but also
to segregate/divide the agent’s body of knowledge by subject areas, by involved
players, type of knowledge (who, how, what, etc.), and so on. A feature we will
use to model how an agent will build a model of a multi-agent decision making
environment. Whether this environment is a collaborative environment, where all
agents are selecting the best option for all, or an adversarial competitive environ-
ment, where each agent has his own options and plans his own moves. We said that
the later environment is also referred to as a Game, mainly in the Games Theory
literature, or as a Conflict in the broader management science literature. In our re-
search, we will use the terms Game and Conflict interchangeably to mean the same
thing: multi-agent decision making in an adversarial competitive environment.
Let us consider a situation where agent A is currently involved in a political
conflict C. Agent A wants to analyze all his options, in light of all what he knows
about his ultimate strategic goals and options, as well as what he knows about
the other players’ strategic goals and options. Agent A will use the Constrained
Rationality framework to model conflict C, and analyze all his options in order to
come up with the best option to take.
Following the process set in Chapter 3, agent A sat down and modelled his own
GCM model. A’s GCM model included all his strategic goals, as well as the internal
and external constraints which are relevant to conflict C, and what he is hoping to
achieve from it. In addition, agent A did a great job reducing the strategic goals,
and capture the lateral effect of goals on goals and constraints on goals. He even
managed to model the Intentions and Options that he can have, or take. For A,
it was not an easy job, but because he “knows” himself really well, he managed
to end up with a true complete GCM model (a viewpoint model of himself that
contains his Goals and Constraints Model only).
The next step for A, is to identify all the other players (agents or decision
makers –recall that both terms are used interchangeably in our research) involved
in conflict C. Agent A “knows” that agents B, C and D are the only other players
involved in the C (as far as he “knows”). He started to capture what he believes
about each of these players: their goals, constraints and options. In other words,
agent A built a separate viewpoint model for each of B, C and D, as he believes
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Figure 5.3: An Agent forming an Integrated View of a Game (Decision Making or
Conflict Resolution) Environment, by integrating believed Viewpoints Models about
all players involved, including itself
have a GCM model for the respective agent and his options. Figure 5.3 shows an
illustration of A’s work so far. To Agent A, the model he built to represent conflict
C is an integrated viewpoint model that describes C as he perceives it. Conflict C,
to A, has four players (including himself), and each of the four players has his own
goals, constraints and options captured in a separate GCM model.
A question may be asked whether Agent B, for example –if she builds a model
for conflict C–, will have the same model that Agent A have for C. The answer
is: maybe. In reality, it all depends on what agent B believes about conflict C
and its players. If B is not aware, for example, that agent D is a player within C,
then B will have a model of C that does not have a GCM model for D. In her
mind, B will have only three GCM models in the conflict C as she sees it: one
for herself, one for A and another for C, as shown in Figure 5.4. The figure shows
A has a full picture of C with all the four players been modelled, while B has a
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Figure 5.4: A Game as been by Two Different Agents, A and B, where Agent A
sees more Game Players than Agent B, and therefore Agent A forms/perceives more
Viewpoints about more Players, their Goals and Options than Agent B
less-than-complete model of C. It is also possible that agent B’s model for conflict
C is the accurate model, whilst A’s model is including a player who is not really
part of the conflict. But the fact is still: A believes truly, with justification, that
his C’s model is accurate. At the same time, B believes that her model of C is
an accurate model as she “knows” it (i.e. believes truly, with justification). A will
play the game as he perceives it, and models it; and B will play the game as she
perceives it, and models it.
The number of players involved in conflict C may not be the only difference
between how A models C, and how B models it. B could also have a different
“knowledge” about A, and models A’s goals and options differently, completely or
partially. She may, or may not, know this fact. Similarly, A may, or may not, know
this fact. A may have deceived B, leading her to have wrong beliefs about his goals
and/or options. Alternatively, it could be that B held these wrong beliefs based
on misreading of A’s actions, without any deception from A. What matters at the
end is that players play the game as they see it, perceive it, know it and model it
in their minds.
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Agent A  
Viewpoint of Own
Goals and Plans/Options
The Collaborative Multi-Agent Decision Making Situation
As seen by all the players
    (all see all players involved, and their “shared” goals and options)
Agent C Agent B Agent A
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Figure 5.5: A Collaborative Multi-Agent Decision Making Situation, where all
agents share their goals and constraints in an effort to reach the best compromise by
selecting the most fit option/plan/product/.. to all involved
The literature refers to games, in which one or more of the players are not
fully aware of the nature of the conflict situation and therefore players model the
same game differently, as Hypergames (Bennett, 1977; Wang et al., 1988). In this
research work, while we will not discuss hypergames specifically –we are leaving
them as a future research topic–, we show how to model hypergames as different
game models (each from the perception of one of the participating agents as shown
in Figure 5.4) and analyze these models separately. We will also provide illustrative
case studies, in the next few chapters, to show how the framework model and
analyze these different models and scenarios. Beyond the simple modelling and
analysis of hypergames provided in this thesis document, we intend to provide
more mathematical comparative analysis models of hypergames in the future.
At the other end of the multi-agent decision making situations is the situation
where all the agents collaborate with each other to choose one option (a product, a
business process, a set of requirements specifications, etc.) out of many presented
to them. They will choose the option that fit the most of what they collectively
value and aim for (their goals). In other words, they try to reach a compromise. In
this decision making situation, all involved agents will disclose and share their goals
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and their constraints. A GCM model for each agent is built to capture the agent’s
goals and constrains. All agents’ GCMs are shared among the agents. Figure 5.5
illustrates how the GCMs for the involved agents are shared across. This is unlike
a conflict/game multi-agent situation, where the agents are not likely to share their
motives and constraints, and therefore build the conflict model with what they each
believe to be theirs and others GCMs.
5.3.3 Agents’ Alternatives and Conflict’s States
After the agents are identified, a viewpoint model for each is built, and the agents’
goals and constraints are added to their respective viewpoint models, comes the step
of capturing the agents’ alternatives. If there is one agent in the decision making
situation, then her alternatives will be captured as part of her viewpoint model.
The alternatives, which they will be modelled as intention nodes as we said earlier,
could be reduced from the refined desire-type goals at the agent’s goals-tree/s, or
elicited directly from the agent herself.
The alternatives are then connected to the goals and constraints in the agent’s
GCM. Constraints are connected to any of the alternatives that they affect using
C-G lateral relations, and alternatives will be connected to the upper goals that
they affect positively or negatively through reduction relations (if the alternatives
are reduced from the upper goals) or G-G lateral relations (if the alternatives are
added to the viewpoint model by the agent and did not come through reduction
from upper goals). This is the same process we used in the previous chapters, for
one-agent decision making situations.
In the case of a multi-agent decision making situation, a collaborative or a
competitive one, a different modelling process is used. After the real agents involved
in the decision making situation are identified, a viewpoint model for each is built,
and the GCMs models are added to the respective agents’ viewpoint models, then
comes the step to integrate all the agents’ viewpoint models. This is done by
capturing the the positive and negative effects that the different agents’ goals has
on each other’s goals. The integration process is the same for collaborative as well
as competitive multi-agent decision making situations, and intended mainly to test
and highlight the effect of each agent’s GCM on the others’ GCMs. Figure 5.6
provides an illustration of how an end product of this integration process looks
like.
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Figure 5.6: Goals (Desires and Intentions) of the different Players’ GCM models
Interact and affect each other using G-G Lateral Relations
Figure 5.6 shows agent A’s model of the decision making situation, after he
integrated the different viewpoints of all involved agents in the decision making
situation. Agent A modelled the effect of each of the player’s intentions on the the
other agents’ desires and intentions. He modelled such effects using the goal-to-
goal (G-G) lateral relations. In the figure, the intentions were modelled to represent
the plans/options the agents have, i.e. the model uses the earlier recommendation
to further divide/decompose the intentions to form a one-to-one intention-to-plan,
making the model cleaner and easier.
In this model, the analyst (or the focal agent, agent A) does not need to worry
about the plans. All what he needs to test is how the satisfaction of different
intentions (each represent a goal to implement a plan or adopt an option) will
affect the satisfaction levels of the ultimate strategic goals of the agents. At the
end of this chapter, we will show an example of a collaborative decision making
case study, and in the next few chapters we will show the viewpoint integration in
a number of competitive decision making situations/conflicts case studies.
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Agent A  
Viewpoint of Own
Goals and Plans/Options
Agent C Agent B Agent A
Agent B  
Viewpoint of Own
Goals and Plans/Options
Agent C  
Viewpoint of Own
Goals and Plans/Options
The Collaborative Multi-Agent Decision Making Situation
As seen by all the players
    (all see all players involved, and their “shared” goals and options)
Plans/Options for the Agents to Choose From
PPP PP P
Figure 5.7: Common Alternatives, Options or Plans for all the involved agents, in a
Multi-Agent Collaborative Decision Making Situation, to choose from. Alternatives
contribute positively or negatively to the agents’ goals.
5.3.3.1 Agents’ Shared Alternatives in Collaborative Situations
As shown in Figure 5.2, the modelling process divert after the viewpoints integration
step based on whether the multi-agent decision making situation is a collaborative
one or a conflict (competitive) one. In collaborative situations, the agents, or the
analyst helping them, should capture all the “shared” alternatives. Recall that the
agents in these situations are supposed to choose from one of many alternatives
that they all collectively have. The agents here do not have to decide separately
on some alternatives that they need to choose from, away from the other agents
(if this is the case, then they each have to consider their decision making situation
as a single-agent situation, or alternatively they can model this as a collaborative
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multi-agent situation but must package the alternatives as sets as we will discuss
below). Again here, and as before, alternatives could come: through reduction from
lower goals in the agents’ goals-trees; by directly eliciting these alternatives from
the agents; and/or by discovering/uncovering them through the use of a creative
thinking process.
After capturing the shared set of alternatives, as collective intention nodes
shared among all the agents’ viewpoints (part of the decision making aggregate
base viewpoint model), the alternatives are connected to the agents’ GCM mod-
els. The effect of each alternative on the agents’ goal nodes is modelled using G-G
lateral relations, and the effect of agents’ constraints on the different alternative
nodes is modelled using C-G lateral relations. Figure 5.7 provides an illustration of
a model of a collaborative decision making situation, where the involved agents have
a shared set of alternatives. Alternatives are connected to the goals of the different
involved agents showing the effect on these gaols if the alternative get selected by
the group (in the figure we show only one alternative connected to the agents’ goals
for clarity and presentation purposes only, we also eliminated the inter-viewpoint
effects for the same reasons).
The shared alternatives modelling concept works perfectly in situations where
the agents are required to decide on one of many options. Examples of such situa-
tions include: new product screening initiatives, where agents are required to decide
on one of the products to invest in (design, produce, market, ..); product/system
selection initiatives, where decision makers are required to choose the best fit for
their organization from many offered by different vendors; and so on. In such sit-
uations, each of the products or the systems is represented as a shared alternative
node (a shared intention node in the integrated viewpoint model for the decision
making situations).
The shared alternatives modelling concept, also, works perfectly for situations
where the collaborative agents are required to choose one of many alternatives, but
these alternatives are more complicated in their structure than a simple product
or a system. Consider, for example, a requirements engineering or a product de-
velopment initiative. The decision makers here are required to chose one of many
designs/specifications proposed. Each of these designs is a collection of features or
specification statements. Will such alternatives need to be modelled differently?
The answer is: No. Each of these “collective” designs, architectures, or specifica-
tions are represented as an alternative node (modelled as an intuition to select this
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option –as discussed before–). In other words, for each design, we package all its
features, sub-systems, etc., and model it as an alternative. Then, we connect the
alternative to the agents’ goals using G-G lateral relations, showing the effect of
choosing this alternative on the agents’ wants and needs.
What if the alternatives are a set of different plans of actions, that the agents
individually must commit to, will that make any difference? Again, not at all. Each
of the alternatives, in such collaborative multi-agent situations (such as collabora-
tive scientific research or industrial R&D initiatives), is modelled as one node. The
node represents a complete coherent plan of actions. The items within coherent plan
represent actionable items that individual agents have agreed to be responsible for.
Variations of such plans will be modelled as completely separate new alternatives.
The effect of choosing each of these alternative/plans is modelled using G-G lateral
relationships, where the type of each relationship and its fuzzy label define the type
of the effect (positive or negative) and the degree of the effect which choosing the
plan has on the agents’ wants and needs.
5.3.3.2 Defining the States of Conflicts
Now, back to the point of divergence which the modelling process has just after
the viewpoints integration step. If the the multi-agent decision making situation
is a competitive adversarial one (a conflict/game), then the analyst should capture
the alternatives that each of the agents has. The alternatives in such situations
are individual choices, options, stands or moves. Again here, for each agent, these
alternatives could be the product of a reduction process (reduced from the lower
goals in the agent GCMs’ goals-tree/s), or elicited directly from the agent through
a standard or creative knowledge acquisition process.
We said earlier that games, or conflicts as we also call them, are more dynamic
than the collaborative multi-agent decision making situations. In the collaborative
situations, the agents move together. They all choose one alternative at the same
time. If they need to choose some other alternative later, then they will all move to
choose another alternative after analyzing all their options. And, if their previous
choices affect what they can choose later, then the agents need to consider mod-
elling their alternatives as plans of actions as indicated earlier, or a series of point
collaborative multi-decision making (as we will discuss later in Section 5.5 when the
topic of modelling the dynamics in conflicts is discussed). Collaborative situations’
dynamics can be simply dealt with, as they do not come close to the complexity
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Agent A    Plans/Options Agent B    Plans/Options Agent D    Plans/Options Agent C    Plans/Options
Set of all Game’s States.   Each State is formed by combining a set of one or more of the agents’ options
Figure 5.8: Players’ Plans/Options, as extracted from how the different Players
will be able to operationalize their Goals/Intentions
of completive conflicts’ dynamics. This is because the agents’ decisions on what
their next moves should be depend completely on: their current positions in the
conflict is; the current positions of their opponents; and the moves their opponents
can make.
We said earlier that dynamics of conflicts could be best served if modelled as
state machine, where each state represents a set of alternatives that the agents are
expected to already have selected/applied, before the conflict can be declared to
be in this state. The transitions/arcs represents moves or decisions by one or more
agents to select/apply other alternatives (i.e. moving to another states).
In game theory literature, the players in a game/conflict are considered to be
individual decision makers, or agents, who have various available actions (we call
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them alternatives) which jointly determine the outcomes (or as we call them here
states) of the conflict. These possible actions/alternatives, and their relationship to
the outcomes/states, are modelled differently by different game forms: the normal
form (the most commonly used representation since von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953) proposed it), the option/binary form (proposed by Howard (1971)) and the
graph form (first proposed by Fang (1989); Fang et al. (1993)).
The most advanced representation form for multi-agent conflicts is the graph
form, as it captures the dynamics of conflict and how players move from one state
to another in it. But despite their differences, these represenation forms share two
important concepts, and consider them essential to any game representation: the
individual actions (alternatives, options,..) of the decision makers involved in the
game; and the outcomes/states of the game (each is represented as a set of the
individual and joint actions that could be taken by the decision makers at a single
time in the game during its evolution or when it ends).
We have seen how the different actions (planes, options or alternatives) are
represented and integrated in the GCM models of agents. In Chapter 4, we showed
how to: formally represent alternatives as intention goal nodes; connect them to
the different goals and constraints in the agent’s GCM model; and calculate the
agent’s cardinal and ordinal preferences over them based on how much each of these
alternatives contribute to the strategic goals of the agent (given how important each
goal to the agent and how does the agent feel about each goal). But, we did not yet
formally define the concept of a state for a game/conflict. We will define it here.
For a set of decision makersDM, where eachDMi ∈ DM is an involved player in
a competitive decision making situation (such situation is also called in this research
as a game or a conflict), the state s of the game is a vector that captures information
about what alternatives/options have been adopted by the game players at a certain
time t in the game, and what alternatives have not been adopted by them at time
t. Let s be represented as a vector of Achv(A) values for all the alternatives
available in the game, and where the different Achv(A) values show the degree of
adoption/activation/implementation of each alternative at the time the sate is been
reached in the game.
In other words, for a game with n alternatives, a state in the game is defined
as: [Achv(A1), Achv(A2), . . . , Achv(An)] where Achv(Ai) represents the level of
implementation/achievement the alternative Ai gets at the time the state is reached
in the game. For example, s1 = [F,N,N,N ] represents a state of the game where
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there is a Full adoption of alternative A1 (by the decision maker/s who can adopt
A1) only out of all the four alternatives available for all players in the game; and
s2 = [F,N, F,N ] represents a state of a game where two alternatives A1 and A3
are Fully adopted by the game’s players who are responsible for (can adopt) these
alternatives, while the other two alternatives A2 and A4 are not selected/adopted
by the players who are responsible for (can adopt) them.
This representation, while modified to fit the concepts and needs of the Con-
strained Rationality framework and its modelling and reasoning tools, it is equiva-
lent to the binary number/form representation suggested for game’s states by many
authors in the game theory and conflict analysis literature (such as Howard (1971),
Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al. (1993)). But, whilst the binary representa-
tion of each of the game’s states is mathematically attractive and sound, it provides
a less-effective and more-costly representation to the game’s states, especially for a
game that have many alternatives. In addition, it suggests a very large set of states
for the game, with states covering all possible combinations of the alternatives in
the game. So, if a game has 10 alternatives, then the game could possibly have
210 states (if we only consider two values of None and Full, or 0 and 1, for each
alternative’s achievement/adoption value Achv(A)). Definitely, there will be much
more possible states if each of these states is represented as a vector of 10 fuzzy
labels, or defuzzified numbers.
In our research, we adopt an equivalent representation, which is not only sim-
pler to present and understand, but also more powerful and more computationally
efficient to use. For a game with a total set of alternatives A that includes all the
alternatives available to all agents involved in the game., we represent each state s
as a set of Achv(Ai) = Lachv statements for each Ai ∈ A : Achv(Ai) > N at the
time state s is reached in the game. For example, state s1 above will be represented
as {Achv(A1) = F}, and state s2 as {Achv(A1) = F,Achv(A3) = F}. And, while
this representation for game’s states allows for an alternative A to be included in
the state’s set definition with Achv(A) = Lachv and N < Lachv ≤ F , we will use, in
this thesis document and the examples presented in it, only states with alternatives
that has their Lachv = F , i.e. fully implemented. We plan in the future to present
examples that make use of the full spectrum of implementation/achievement levels
that alternatives can have in a state’s definition (such as allow states defined with
alternatives half implemented). This state representation provides a flexible and
expandable form to represent conflict’s states.
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Figure 5.8 provides an illustration of how the individual agents’ alternatives
are the basis of defining the total absolute set of states that the conflict can have.
But in most conflicts, only a handful of these states are logical or possible to have.
The rest are theoretical, but not logical or possible. We will show, in the next few
chapters, how real-life conflicts we used in our case studies, despite the fact that
they could have hundreds of states theoretically, only few states are possible and/or
logical to have in the conflicts.
It is the analyst responsibility to remove all illogical and/or impossible states, or
states that are not likely to occur within the context of the conflict (maybe add those
as part of what-if models during the sensitivity analysis). The remaining states from
the all-possible-combinations-of-alternatives set of states form the actual set of the
conflict’s states. In most case, very small number of states is relevant, possible or
logical to include in the set of states a conflict has. The rest should be ignored by
the analyst. In fact, our experience, and the case studies we studied and presented
in the next chapters, show that only few states realistically make it to the set of
states for for each real-life conflict studied.
5.3.4 Validation and Finalization of the Base Model
So far, we have the agents’ viewpoints modelled then integrated. In addition, if the
decision making situation is a collaborative one, the shared alternatives and their
individual effects on the agents’ goals are captured. And, if it is a competitive situa-
tion, a conflict, we have the conflict’s states identified. At this time, it is important
to validate what has been modelled so far, ensuring that it is as accurate as possi-
ble. Recall that in the ViVD-EKM framework, which the Constrained Rationality
framework builds on, knowledge is defined as justified true beliefs. This means that
the analyst not only need to capture the beliefs acquired from the decision makers,
or the agent whom the conflict model is built based on his perceived reality, but
also need to capture the justification for such beliefs. This will ensure that the
agent, and the analyst, can at any time refer to who provided this information and
what was the justification for believing its truthfulness at the time it was captured
(added to the knowledge base).
In the validation step, the analyst should go through all the elements captured
so far and ensure its accuracy. By the end of this step, the analyst is expected
to finalize a base-model for the decision making situation, and generate a list of
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uncertainties and/or what-ifs to test and analyze. This list will be the basis for the
sensitivity analysis stage of the process, and any what-if models the analyst should
analyze at it.
5.4 Priorities, Emotions and Agents’ Preferences
over Alternatives or Conflict’s States
In Chapter 4, we showed how an agent’s priorities are captured as strategic im-
portances fuzzy labels attached to the strategic goals the agent’s has. We also
showed how emotions, more specifically the degrees of like or dislike, the agent
have towards working at and achieving the various strategic goals he has, are also
attached to such goals as emotional valences fuzzy labels. In addition, we showed
how the analyst can capture the overall attitudes the agent shows, specifically his
general overall rationality and emotionality levels. We showed how the ordinal and
weighted preferences are calculated for each of the agents over their respective indi-
vidual alternatives. Preferences over alternatives are sufficient if the modelled and
analyzed decision making situation is a single-agent decision making situation, or a
multi-agent situation but the agents in it act individually with no regard to others’
moves and decisions.
Preferences over individuals’ alternatives could be used in multi-agent decision
making situations, only to test the effectiveness of the individual alternatives on
the agent himself, but not to guide the agent for the best plan of action in what is
usually a dynamic situation. In this subsection, we will introduce how the collective
preferences of decision makers, in a collaborative multi-agent decision making situ-
ation, over their shared alternatives are calculated. In addition, we will discuss how
decision makers’ preferences over the states of a multi-agent competitive decision
making situations (games or conflicts, as we also call them) will be calculated.
But, before we show how the decision makers’ preferences will determines in
multi-agent decision making situations, we would like to point out here the im-
portance of the care that the analyst must exhibit at this step of the modelling
process. It is usually the case that justifications of beliefs about naturally fuzzy
values (such as rationality, emotionality, importance, emotional valence) are very
difficult to validate. Even if these values are elicited from the involved agents them-
selves, through a direct knowledge acquisition process, the analyst should ensure
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adequate sensitivity analysis been done. In addition, the analyst should check for
any variations to these values based on what phase/iteration the game is in, if the
game has multiple phases/iterations. Such variations, if exist, will surely affect
the players’ preferences, the stability of the conflict’s states to the players, and
ultimately affect which state forms an equilibrium to the conflict.
The analyst should test different variations of these values, and/or build com-
plete what-if models (variations to the base-model) in order to highlight any impli-
cation on the agents’ preferences and the stabilities of the conflict’s states as a result
of such variations. The extra care in conducting sensitivity analysis, especially for
studying the implications of such variations, will serve two purposes: 1) keep the
analyst on the alert, looking for any signs of changes in these variables, when and if
such changes occur; and 2) point to the involved agents the importance to disclose
the real beliefs and justifications for any of these values, and report any changes
should some occur. The final analysis, stabilities, equilibriums and results, could
depend on these values. They are important factors that impact how the agents’
preferences are formed and calculated.
5.4.1 Agents’ Preferences in Multi-Agent Collaborative
Decision Making Situations
As indicated earlier, the decision makers involved in a multi-agent collaborative
decision making tend to take decisions collectively, choosing the best one alternative
that meets most of the decision makers goals. This one alternative will be chosen
from a set of shared alternatives that the decision makers collectively have. So,
how do the decision makers are supposed to rank their alternatives, or generate
preferences over these shared alternatives? Answering this question, we will follow
here the same steps we followed in Chapter 4, when we discussed generating the
preferences one agent has over his own alternatives.
5.4.1.1 Identifying the Agents’ Strategic Goals and Shared Alternatives
For each decision maker DMi ∈ DM, where DM is the set of all decision makers
who are involved in the collaborative decision making situation, at time t , let their
be a set of strategic goals SGDMi (chosen by DMi). Let, the set of all strategic
goals by all decision makers in DM is called the strategic goals of the collaborative
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decision making situation, and is denoted as SG, where SG = ⋃DMi∈DM SGDMi .
And, let the decision makers in DM collectively decided on a set of shared alter-
natives A to choose one from, based on how much each alternative contributes to
the achievement of all strategic goals in SG.
For each collaborative decision making situation, there are two important sets
to be set up-front: 1) SG: the set of all strategic goals, of all involved DMs in the
situation; and 2) A: the set of all shared alternatives that the DMs will choose
one from. It is important for the DMs to disclose their strategic goals, if they
want their goals be accounted for in the evaluation of the different alternatives.
Similarly, all alternatives that the DMs believe collectively, or individually, to be
serious alternatives to choose from must be included in A.
5.4.1.2 Calculating the Final Achievement Values of Strategic Goals
The contribution of the alternatives in the shared-alternatives set A to the strategic
goals’ achievement will be measured for the each of these goals when each of the
alternatives is applied/implemented. In other words, for each alternative Ak ∈
A, we set the Achv(Ak) = F then we run the value labels forward propagation
algorithm (Algorithm 3.1 ), and then calculate the Final Achievement value for
each strategic goal SG ∈ SG:
FAchv(SG)=
Achv(SG)	 Prvn(SG) if Achv(SG)≤Opr(SG)Opr(SG)	 Prvn(SG) if Achv(SG)>Opr(SG). (5.1)
Two notes about this equation. First, the “	” operation used here is the same
one defined in Section 4.3.1 in the previous chapter, and the fuzzy linguistic value
labels assigned to FAchv(SG) are the same value labels assigned in that section to
the FAchv(SG) calculated there (for one agent situations) with the same fuzzy sets
defining these labels. Second, this final achievement value calculation is similar to
the one we used in Chapter 4 for one-agent decision making situations. But here,
the strategic goals do not belong to a single DM. They belong to one of many DMs
involved in a multi-agent decision making situation. Also, the calculation of the
final achievement values is done not after a DM chooses one of his own alternatives,
but rather after all the DMs collectively choose one of the shared-alternatives they
have.
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5.4.1.3 Modelling the Strategic Importance, Emotional Valences,
Rationality and Emotionality Factors
In collaborative decision making situations, DMs are not only allowed to set the
strategic importance of their strategic goals, but are encouraged to do so. This is
to ensure that important strategic goals of the different DMs are not treated as
the less-important or the not-important-at-the-moment strategic goals. And, while
most multi-agent decision making situations, especially the collaborative ones, tend
to have the DMs act rationally with no consideration to emotions, or at least try
hard not to consider emotions, research show that emotions in group decisions are
part of the environment and their levels are as high or higher than their levels in
single agent decision making situations –because of the interactions and the egos–
(Barsade and Gibson, 1998; Bartel and Saavedra, 2000; Totterdell et al., 1998; Kelly
and Barsade, 2001; Goleman, 1995; Mayer et al., 1999; De Bono, 1985, 1992).
Therefor, the Constrained Rationality framework allows for the individual DMs
to attach emotional valences to their respective strategic goals; and allows for their
personality wide attitudes (towards acting rationally and/or emotionally) to be
captured as well. To do so, we follow the same steps and use the same value
properties used in Sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 to add the strategic importance
SImprt(SG) ∀SG ∈ SG, add the emotional valence EV lnc(SG) ∀SG ∈ SG,
and add both factors, the Rationality Factor RFDMi and the Emotionality Factor
EFDMi , for each DMi ∈ DM. These values will have the same fuzzification scheme,
sets and linguistic value labels used before for the same value properties in single-
agent decision making situations.
When these values are used in the models, they must be used consistently.
The same fuzzification scheme and value labels scheme, for each value property,
must be used across all the agents. No two agents should be allowed to have
different schemes to label their respective strategic goals. And, when one agent
sets emotional valences and the others do not, for example, the modeller must
encourage the agents who did not add their emotional valences to their goals to
either: add their emotional valences; or, at least, apply the Emotionally Indifferent
(EI) value label for their strategic goals.
In some of the industrial cases we have worked on, we have experienced a de-
cision making situation in which the situation’s model integrated two viewpoints:
one viewpoint model for the targeted market segment (the product’s potential cus-
tomers), and the other viewpoint model is a collective/aggregate one for the com-
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pany’s different departments. While the company decided to ignore emotions and
emotionality in their viewpoint, they decided to model them for the prospective
customers. In such case, the modeller must set the company’s Rationality Factor
to be Full, and each of their strategic goals to have an emotional valence of Emo-
tionally Indifferent. Consistency across the model must be maintained at all times
in order to ensure reliable results. This is should not be seen as a strict requirement,
but rather as a common sense requirement to ensure validity of the models and the
results.
5.4.1.4 Eliciting Agents’ Collective Preferences over Shared
Alternatives
Each of the individual decision makers involved in the collaborative decision making
situation can still use the same method and equations used in Section 4.4, in the
previous chapter, to determine his own preferences over the shared alternatives,
considering only how much each of these shared alternatives contribute to his, and
only his, strategic goals. But here, we will modify that method and equations
to determine the agents’ collective preferences over the shared alternatives they
have, considering how much each of these shared alternatives contributes to all the
strategic goals that all DMs have in the situation.
For each decision maker DMi ∈ DM, at time t , let the Weighted Final Achieve-
ment of a strategic goal SG ∈ SGDMi , where SGDMi ⊆ SG, as a result of having
alternative A ∈ A been adopted collectively byDM, to be denoted as WFAchv(SG,
DMi, A, t), and calculated algebraically as follows:
WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t)=
W(SG,DMi, t) · FAchv(SG,A, t) if W(SG,DMi, t)≥00 if W(SG,DMi, t)<0. (5.2)
where:
W(SG,DMi, t) = (RF
∗
DMi · SImprt∗(SG)) + (EF ∗DMi · EV lnc∗(SG)) (5.3)
where SImprt∗(SG), EV lnc∗(SG), RF ∗DMi and EF
∗
DMi
represent the defuzzified values of
their respective fuzzy values, and where none of the original fuzzy values is Null, and all
reflect the state of mind and beliefs of DMi at time t
FAchv(SG,A, t) = [FAchv∗(SG)] if A was fully applied to the GCM model at time t−1 (5.4)
where FAchv∗(SG) represents the defuzzified values of FAchv(SG), and FAchv(SG) 6= Null;
and where “A was fully applied at time t−1” means that the intention to apply A was fully
achieved, i.e. Achv(A)=F , at t−1
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For all the decision maker in DM collectively, at time t of the situation, let the
effect of the full joint application of alternative A ∈ A on all strategic goals in the
none-empty SG is represented by a Total Weighted Final Achievement value prop-
erty; and let this property value be denoted as TWFAchv(DM, A, t), and calculated
algebraically as follows:




WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) (5.5)
For the Total Weighted Final Achievement TWFAchv(DM, A, t) value to re-
flect the effect of alternative A, and only A, on all DMs in DM, then the situation’s
integrated viewpoint with all its constructs and value properties’ values must stay
the same, and only A is applied fully. The achievement value of the intention
node representing the intention to implement/apply alternative A changes from
Achv(A) =N to Achv(A) = F . All other alternatives have their respective inten-
tions’ achievement values stay the same unchanged, preferably unselected and stay
at the None level, i.e. (∀Ak ∈A : Ak 6=A) Achv(Ak) =N . Then, after the values
forward propagation algorithm, Algorithm 3.1, finalized the value labels for all goals
for time t, we calculate TWFAchv(DM, A, t). The value of TWFAchv(DM, A, t),
now, reflects the effect of applying alternative A, and only A, on all collaborating
decision makers in DM.
We said in Section 4.4 that WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t), for a single agent, will
be in the range of [−2, 2], if emotionality is captured within the model. Here
too in collaboration multi-agent decision making situations, if (∃DMi ∈ DM :
EFDMi 6= N) ∨ (∃SG ∈ SG : EV lnc(SG) 6= EI), then the value of TWFAchv
(DM, A, t) will be in the same range of [−2, 2]. On the other hand, if the modeller
did not consider modelling emotionality as part of modelling the decision making
situation (i.e. (∀DMi ∈ DMEFDMi = N) ∧ (∀SG ∈ SGEV lnc(SG) = EI)), then
WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) will be in the range of [−1, 1], and therefore the value of
TWFAchv(DM, A, t) will be in the range of [−1, 1].
In the case where the modeller includes emotionality in the model, for at least
one of the DMs in the modelled decision making situation, then we need to nor-
malize the value of TWFAchv(DM, A, t) calculated. The new normalized value of










WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) (5.6)
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Now, for all DMs in DM, collectively, in a multi-agent collaborative decision
making situation, at time t, let the Cardinal Preference that DM has over alter-
native A ∈ A be represented as a Weighted Payoff value property attached to A,
and be denoted as WP (A,DM, t). Let WP (A,DM, t) have a numerical value in
the range of [−1, 1] and calculated as follows:










WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) (5.8)
Recall that TWFAchv(DM, A, t) does not need any normalization, if the mod-
eller did not consider emotionality as part of modelling the decision making situ-
ation (i.e. (∀DMi ∈ DMEFDMi = N) ∧ (∀SG ∈ SGEV lnc(SG) = EI)). This is
because WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) will be in the range of [−1, 1], and therefore the
value of TWFAchv(DM, A, t) will be in the range of [−1, 1]. But, if emotional-
ity is captured within the model (i.e. (∃DMi ∈ DM : EFDMi 6= N) ∨ (∃SG ∈
SG : EV lnc(SG) 6= EI)), then the value of WFAchv(SG,DMi, A, t) will be in the
range of [−2, 2], and therefore the value of TWFAchv(DM, A, t) will be also in
the range of [−2, 2]. In this case, normalization is needed to maintain the values
of TWFAchv(DM, A, t) and WP (A,DM, t) within the range [−1, 1]. Hence, the
devision by 2 shown in 5.8.
Based on the cardinal preferences, or weighted payoffs calculated for DM
over each of their shared alternatives in A, DM will have a Preference Vector
Pref(DM,A) showing the order of the alternatives in A from the most preferred
to the least preferred. It is assumed here that Pref(DM,A) represents only ordi-
nal ranking of the alternatives in A based on how much each of these alternatives
contributes to the achievement of all DM’s strategic goals, given the importance
weight and emotional valence that each DMi assigned to each of his strategic goals,
and given a specific rationality factor RFDMi and emotionality factor EFDMi de-
scribing the attitudes each DMi exhibits towards acting rationally or emotionally
at that point of time.
The preference order of a specific shared alternative A ∈ A, collectively, to
DM at time t, is given as an Ordinal Preference value property attached to A,
and is denoted by OP (A,DM, t). Let OP (A,DM, t) be given an integer number
that reflects A’s position in DM’s Preference Vector Pref(DM,A) at that point
of time. The smaller the integer number assigned to OP (A,DM, t), the more
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preferred the shared alternative A is, to DM at time t. The alternative that
has OP (A,DM, t) = 1 is considered the most preferred shared alternative, and
the one with OP (A,DM, t) = |A| − 1 is the least preferred shared alternative.
This is because the alternatives in the Pref(DM,A) vector are ordered from the
alternative with the highest weighted payoff value for DM, to the one with the
lowest weighted payoff.
OP (A,DM, t) = n + 1 where 0 ≤ n ≤ |A| − 1 (5.9)
and n reflects A’s position in Pref(DM,A)
5.4.1.5 Modelling the Strength of DMs’ Collective Preferences over
their Shared Alternatives
To capture the strength of alternative A’s collective preference over all other shared
alternatives, for all DMs in DM, we use the same distance measure we used in Sec-
tion 4.5 for the strength of an individual DM’s preferences. This distance measure
captures the difference between the cardinal preference of A and the cardinal pref-
erence of another alternative in the set of shared alternatives A for the collaborative
decision making situation at hand. Based on this distance measure a binary relation
among each pair of alternatives in A is assigned.
For the set of all DMs in DM, and at time t of the collaborative situation, let
the distance measure among the two preferences which DM collectively has over
the two alternatives Aa and Ab, both in A, be denoted as d(Aa, Ab,DM, t). And,
let its value be given as a real number calculated as follows:
d(Aa, Ab,DM, t) = [WP (Aa,DM, t)−WP (Ab,DM, t)] (5.10)
Because each of WP (Aa,DM, t) and WP (Ab,DM, t) has a value in the range
[−1, 1], whether normalized as per Equation 5.8 or not normalized (because the
modeller did not consider modelling emotionality as part of the decision making
situation’s model), the distance value will be in the range of [−2, 2]. The sign of
d(Aa , Ab ,DM, t) shows which shared alternative of the two, that all DMs in DM
collectively prefer.
Let Preference Strength be a value property, denoted as PrefStrngth(Aa , Ab ,
DM, t), and be given the fuzzified value of the distance value property. In other
words, let PrefStrngth(Aa , Ab ,DM, t) = ˜d(Aa , Ab ,DM, t). PrefStrngth(Aa , Ab ,
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DM, t) will be assigned a fuzzy linguistic value label LPS based on the fuzzy mem-
berships functions given in Figure 4.4, the same fuzzy sets and labels that are used
for the preferences strength of an individual DM over his own alternatives in Sec-
tion 4.5. The strength expressed by the LPS fuzzy label is meant to represent the
distance between the weighted preference values for the two shared alternatives
considered here, Aa and Ab .
Also here, as it was the case in Section 4.5 for individual’s preferences, let the
strength of the collective preference of alternative Aa over alternative Ab , for all
DMs in DM at time t, given in PrefStrngth(Aa , Ab ,DM, t) = LPS, be represented
by a binary relationship between the two alternatives. Let this binary relation be





. The notation of this relation is the same as the ones shown
in Figure 4.4 in Section 4.5, for each possible preference’s strength fuzzy linguistic
label LPS (shown in Figure 4.4 above each label’s membership function).
5.4.2 Agents’ Preferences in Multi-Agent Conflicts
The decision makers involved in a competitive multi-agent collaborative decision
making situation, a conflict, tend to take their decisions individually. Each DM
will choose the best alternative/move that gives the most achievement levels to his
strategic goals, given the state of the conflict at the time and what other already
chose as their alternatives/moves. An involved DM, in such situation, can define
his preferences over his own alternatives/moves, without consideration to others’
choices and moves. He can do so by following the steps and equations given in the
previous chapter (Chapter 4 for single-agent decision making situations.
But, if the DM does so, he will in effect treat a conflict, a competitive decision
making situation, as a situation where the alternatives/moves that other DMs adopt
as if they do not matter to him. This is not true, and defies the concept of a
“competitive” multi-agent decision making situation (a game or conflict as mostly
called in the literature). That’s why we said earlier that what matters in conflict
situations is not alternatives but rather states. Recall we defined a state as a
collection of alternatives that have been adopted/implemented/taken by a number
of agents at a single point of time in the conflict. Therefore, what matters for each
DM in a conflict is not his preferences over his own alternatives, but rather his
preferences over the conflicts states. We will show in this subsection how a DM can
generate his own preferences over the conflict’s states.
159
5.4.2.1 Identifying the Agents’ Strategic Goals and Conflict’s States
In conflicts, as in multi-agent collaborative decision making situations, individual
agents have their own strategic goals, though their goals in games are more con-
flicting and competing. But, their alternatives will not be shared, for the agents to
collectively choose one. Each agent will have his own alternatives to choose from.
In conflicts,the agents, or the analysts modelling and analyzing them, will individ-
ually decide on their strategic goals and their alternatives and model them as part
of their own GCM model as explained earlier.
For each decision maker DMi ∈ DM,, at time t , let there be a set of strate-
gic goals SGDMi , and a set of alternatives ADMi to chose from. Let the set of all
alternatives in the conflict be denoted as A, where A = ⋃DMi∈DMADMi . And,
let DMi decision to choose/implement alternative A ∈ A at time t of the conflict
depends on how much the state, that includes the implementation of this alterna-
tive, contributes the most to the final achievement levels for DMi’s strategic goals,
given that others choose to implement their respective alternatives as per the state’s
definition.
In addition, let the set of all the conflict’s states be given as S = {s1 , s2 , . . . , sm},
where each state s ∈ S is defined as discussed above, as a set of Achv(Aj) = Lachv
value statements (where N < Lachv ≤ F ) for each Aj ∈ A : Achv(Aj) > N
at the time state s is reached in the conflict (i.e. the list of all alternatives men-
tioned in the definition of a state are implemented/taken at the time of s by the
agents who are responsible/can-take these alternatives). We said that what mat-
ters is the preferences that each decision maker has over the conflict’s states, not
just his own alternatives. This is because states will also account for the selec-
tion/implementation of other DMs in the conflict, at the same time the state is
reached, and how much their selected alternatives affect the achievement of DMi’s
strategic goals. Furthermore, using preferences over states, rather than individuals’
alternatives, allow us to account for the ability of DMs to move between the con-
flict’s states. This gives us the ability to analyze such dynamics, as we will show in
the next few chapters.
5.4.2.2 Calculating the Final Achievement Values of Strategic Goals
The contribution of state s ∈ S (or more accurately stated: the contribution of all
the alternatives that are part of s’s definition) to the achievement of each of the
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strategic goals, for a specific DM in the conflict, will be measured for each of these
goals when: all the alternatives part of state s’s definition are implemented to the
degree set by s’s definition (recall that s’s definition shows alternative’s Aj imple-
mentation as: Achv(Ai) = Lachv, where N < Lachv ≤ F ; and all other alternatives,
which are not part of s’s definition, not implemented (such alternatives will have
their achievement values set to None, or Achv(Ak) = N . After giving the alter-
natives that are part of s’s definition their respective implementation/achievement
levels, and the rest None implementation levels, we run the value labels forward
propagation algorithm (Algorithm 3.1). We, then, calculate the Final Achievement
value for each strategic goal SG ∈ SGDMi , for each DMi ∈ DM:
FAchv(SG)=
Achv(SG)	 Prvn(SG) if Achv(SG)≤Opr(SG)Opr(SG)	 Prvn(SG) if Achv(SG)>Opr(SG). (5.11)
Here too, the “	” operation used is the same one defined in Section 4.3.1 in the
previous chapter; and the fuzzy linguistic value labels assigned to FAchv(SG) are
the same value labels assigned in that section to the FAchv(SG) calculated there
(for one agent situations) with the same fuzzy sets defining these labels. Second,
this final achievement value calculation is similar to the one we used in Chapter
4 for one-agent decision making situations. But here, the calculation of the final
achievement value is done not after a DM chooses one of his own alternatives, but
rather after all the alternatives that make up a state s are implemented.
5.4.2.3 Modelling the Strategic Importance, Emotional Valences,
Rationality and Emotionality Factors
As in the different decision making situations we discussed before, in competitive
decision making situations (conflicts/games) too, DMs (or the analysts modelling
and analyzing them) are not only allowed to set the strategic importance of their
respective strategic goals, but are encouraged to do so. This is to ensure that
important strategic goals of the different DMs are not treated as the less-important
or not-important-at-the-moment strategic goals for them.
And, while most competitive multi-agent decision making situations, especially
the ones within the business or professional domains, tend to have the DMs act
rationally with no consideration to emotions, or at least try hard not to consider
emotions, many research show that emotions in group decisions are part of the
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environment and their levels are as high or higher than their levels in single agent
decision making situations –because of the interactions and the egos– (Barsade
and Gibson, 1998; Bartel and Saavedra, 2000; Totterdell et al., 1998; Kelly and
Barsade, 2001; Goleman, 1995; Mayer et al., 1999; De Bono, 1985, 1992). The
interaction and competition characterizing conflict situations, with the highly con-
flicting strategic goals the agents have, make emotions high and hard to ignore even
in business/professional environments.
Therefor, the Constrained Rationality framework allows in conflict decision
making situations too the individual DMs to attach emotional valences to their
respective strategic goals; and allows for the personality wide attitudes towards
acting rationally and emotionally to be captured as well. To do so, we follow the
same steps and use the same value properties used in Sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and 4.3.4
to add the strategic importance SImprt(SG) ∀SG ∈ SG, add the emotional va-
lence EV lnc(SG) ∀SG ∈ SG, and add both factors, the Rationality Factor RFDMi
and the Emotionality Factor EFDMi , for each DMi ∈ DM. These values will have
the same fuzzification scheme, sets and linguistic value labels used before for the
same value properties in single-agent decision making situations.
Here too, and as in the previously discussed decision making situations, when
these values are used in the models, they must be used consistently. The same
fuzzification scheme and value labels scheme, for each value property, must be used
across all the agents. No two agents should be allowed to have different schemes to
label their respective strategic goals. And, when one agent sets emotional valences
for his goals while the others do not, for example, the modeller must encourage the
agents who did not add their emotional valences to their goals to either: add their
emotional valences; or, at least, apply the Emotionally Indifferent (EI) value label
for their strategic goals.
5.4.2.4 Eliciting Agents’ Preferences over Conflict’s States
We will modify here the method and equations used in Section 4.4, and the ones
used in Ssection 5.4.1.4, to determine the agents preferences over their alternatives
in single-agent decision making situations, and shared alternatives in collaborative
multi-agent ones, respectively. The method and equations to follow will allow us to
determine the DMs’ preferences over the conflict’s states, in a competitive decision
making situation, rather than their own alternatives.
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For each decision maker DMi ∈ DM, at state s of the conflict and at time t of it,
let the Weighted Final Achievement of a strategic goal SG ∈ SGDMi as a result of be-
ing at s (and having all the alternatives in s’s definition been adopted/implemented
at the levels indicated by their respective Achv value label given in s’s definition),
to be denoted as WFAchv(SG, DMi, s, t), and calculated algebraically as follows:
WFAchv(SG,DMi, s, t)=
W(SG,DMi, t) · FAchv(SG, s, t) if W(SG,DMi, t)≥00 if W(SG,DMi, t)<0. (5.12)
where:
W(SG,DMi, t) = (RF
∗
DMi · SImprt∗(SG)) + (EF ∗DMi · EV lnc∗(SG)) (5.13)
where SImprt∗(SG), EV lnc∗(SG), RF ∗DMi and EF
∗
DMi
represent the defuzzified values of
their respective fuzzy values, and where none of the original fuzzy values is Null, and all
reflect the state of mind and beliefs of DMi at time t
and
FAchv(SG, s, t) = [FAchv∗(SG)] if s was fully applied to the GCM model at time t−1 (5.14)
where FAchv∗(SG) represents the defuzzified values of FAchv(SG), and FAchv(SG) 6= Null;
and where “s was fully applied at time t−1” means that the intentions to apply all the alter-
natives in s’s definition was achieved at the levels indicated by their respective Achv values in
s’s definition, at t−1
For each DMi ∈ DM, at state s of the conflict and at time t of it, let
the effect of the full application/implementation of s’s alternatives (to the lev-
els indicated by their respective Achv value labels given in s’s definition) into all
DMi’s strategic goals (part of his none-empty SGDMi) is represented by a Total
Weighted Final Achievement value property; and let this property value be de-






WFAchv(SG,DMi, s, t) (5.15)
For the Total Weighted Final Achievement TWFAchv(DMi, A, t) value to re-
flect the effect of state s, and only s, on decision maker DMi, then the conflict’s
integrated viewpoint with all its constructs and value properties’ values must stay
the same and only the alternatives in s’s definition are applied to the levels indicated
by their respective Achv value labels given in s’s definition. In other words, the
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achievement value of the intentions representing the intentions to implement/apply
the alternatives included in s’s definition must change from the None labels they
used to have before s is reached to value labels that represent the achievement
levels they are given in s’s definition. All other intentions, representing alternatives
that are not included in s’s definition, must have their achievement values stay the
same unchanged, preferably unselected and stay at the None level. Then, after
the values forward propagation algorithm, Algorithm 3.1, finalize the value labels
for all strategic goals for time t, we calculate TWFAchv(DMi, s, t). The value of
TWFAchv(DMi, s, t), now, reflects the effect of being at state s of the conflict, and
only s, on all DMi’s strategic goals.
As indicated in other decision making situations, the value ofWFAchv(SG,DMi,
s, t) will be in the range of [−2, 2], if emotionality is captured within the model.
So, if ∃DMi ∈ DM : ((EFDMi 6= N) ∨ (∃SG ∈ SGDMi : EV lnc(SG) 6= EI)), then
the value of TWFAchv (DMi, s, t), for each DMi, be in the same range of [−2, 2].
On the other hand, if the modeller did not consider modelling emotionality as part
of modelling the conflict situation (i.e. ∀DMi ∈ DM((EFDMi = N) ∧ (∀SG ∈
SGDMi EV lnc(SG) = EI))), then WFAchv(SG,DMi, s, t) will be in the range
of [−1, 1], and therefore the value of TWFAchv(DMi, s, t) will be in the range of
[−1, 1].
In the case where the modeller includes emotionality in the model, for at
least one of the DMs involved in the modelled conflict, then we need to nor-
malize the value of TWFAchv(DM, s, t) calculated. The new normalized value









WFAchv(SG,DMi, s, t) (5.16)
Now, for each state s ∈ S of the conflict, at time t of it, each player DMi ∈ DM
in the conflict has a Cardinal Preference of s over other states in S. Let this
cardinal preference which DMi has over s be represented as a Weighted Payoff
value property attached to s, and be denoted as WP (s,DMi, t). Let WP (s,DMi, t)
have a numerical value in the range of [−1, 1] and calculated as follows:









WFAchv(SG,DMi, s, t) (5.18)
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Recall that TWFAchv(DMi, s, t) does not need any normalization, if the mod-
eller did not consider emotionality as part of modelling the decision making situa-
tion (i.e. ∀DMi ∈ DM((EFDMi = N) ∧ (∀SG ∈ SGDMi EV lnc(SG) = EI))). In
such case, WFAchv(SG,DMi, s, t) will be in the range of [−1, 1], and therefore the
value of TWFAchv(DMi, s, t) will be in the range of [−1, 1] too. But, if emotion-
ality is captured within the model (i.e. ∃DMi ∈ DM : ((EFDMi 6= N) ∨ (∃SG ∈
SGDMi : EV lnc(SG) 6= EI))), then the value of WFAchv(SG,DMi, s, t) will be
in the range of [−2, 2], and therefore the value of TWFAchv(DMi, s, t) will be in
the range of [−2, 2]. In this case, normalization is needed to maintain the values
of TWFAchv(DMi, s, t) and WP (s,DMi, t) within the range [−1, 1]. Hence, the
devision by 2 shown in 5.18.
Based on the cardinal preferences, or weighted payoffs calculated for DMi over
each of the conflict’s states in S, DMi will have a Preference Vector Pref(DMi,S)
showing the order of the states in S from the most preferred for DMi to the least pre-
ferred. It is assumed here that Pref(DMi,S) represents only ordinal ranking of the
states in S based on how much each of these states contributes to the achievement
of all DMi’s strategic goals (in SGDMi) given the importance weight and emotional
valence that DMi assigned to each of his strategic goals, and given the specific
rationality factor RFDMi and emotionality factor EFDMi describing the attitudes
DMi exhibits towards acting rationally or emotionally at that point of time.
The preference order of a specific state s ∈ S, for a specific DMi ∈ DM at
time t of the conflict, is given as an Ordinal Preference value property attached to
s, and is denoted by OP (s,DMi, t). Let OP (s,DMi, t) be given an integer number
that reflects s’s position in DMi’s Preference Vector Pref(DMi,S) at that point of
time. The smaller the integer number assigned to OP (s,DMi, t), the more preferred
s is, to DMi at time t. The state that has OP (s,DMi, t) = 1 is considered the most
preferred state for DMi, and the one with OP (s,DMi, t) = |S| − 1 is the least
preferred state for him. This is because the states in the Pref(DMi,S) vector are
ordered from the state with the highest weighted payoff value for DMi to the one
with the lowest weighted payoff.
OP (s,DMi, t) = n + 1 where 0 ≤ n ≤ |S| − 1 (5.19)
and n reflects s’s position in Pref(DMi,S)
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5.4.2.5 Modelling the Strength of DMs’ Preferences over Conflict’s
States
To capture the strength of DMi’s preference over a specific state s ∈ S, at time
t of the conflict, we use the same distance measure we used in Section 4.5 for
the strength of an individual DM’s preferences over their alternatives, but here
we will have the distance between preferences over states instead. This distance
measure captures the difference between the cardinal preference of a state s and
the cardinal preference of another state in S, for the specific decision maker DMi.
The preferences are take from his perspective and based how much he will gain
from each state. Based on this distance measure a binary relation among each pair
of states in S is assigned.
For DMi ∈ DM, and at time t of the conflict, let the distance measure between
two preferences which DMi has over the two state sa and sb , both in S, be denoted






, DMi, t) = [WP (sa , DMi, t)−WP (sb , DMi, t)] (5.20)
Because each of WP (sa, DMi, t) and WP (sb, DMi, t) has a value in the range
[−1, 1], whether normalized as per Equation 5.18 or not normalized (because the
modeller did not consider modelling emotionality as part of the conflict’s model),
then the distance value will be in the range of [−2, 2]. The sign of d(sa , sb , DMi, t)
shows which state of the two DMi prefers.
Let Preference Strength be a value property, denoted as PrefStrngth(sa , sb ,
DMi, t), and be given the fuzzified value of the distance value property. In other
words, let PrefStrngth(sa , sb , DMi, t) = ˜d(sa , sb , DMi, t). PrefStrngth(sa , sb , DMi,
t) will be assigned a fuzzy linguistic value label LPS based on the fuzzy memberships
functions given in Figure 4.4, the same fuzzy sets and labels that are used for the
preferences strength of an individual DM over his own alternatives in Section 4.5.
The strength expressed by the LPS fuzzy label is meant to represent the distance
between the weighted preference values for the two states considered here, sa and
s
b
, from DMi’s perspective.
Also here, as it was the case in Section 4.5 for individual’s preferences over their
own alternatives, let the strength of DMi’s preference of state sa over state sb , at
time t of the conflict, given in PrefStrngth(sa , sb , DMi, t) = LPS, be represented
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. The notation of this relation is the same as the ones shown in Figure
4.4 in Section 4.5, for each possible preference’s strength fuzzy linguistic label LPS
(shown in Figure 4.4 above each label’s membership function).
5.5 Modelling The Dynamics of Conflicts
The Constrained Rationality framework takes care of the dynamics in multi-agent
decision making situations that result from changes over time (happens to the
agents’ goals as well as the agents’ internal and external realities/constraints –
as we showed earlier in Section 3.8). The framework also provides a platform to
analyze the dynamics produced by the nature of moves and countermoves agents
have in conflicts model specifically. In addition, the framework allows the agents to
have different moves for each phase/iteration of the game, based on the structure
of the game and the players’ preferences in each of these phases/iterations.
In the following chapters, we will study in details the different three conflict
types: non-cooperative games, cooperative games where coalitions are not allowed,
and cooperative games where coalitions exist and/or allowed. We will also present
case studies in which we model and analyze real-life conflicts based on the concepts
and tools that the Constrained Rationality framework offers. But in this section, we
will provide an overview of the move types which agents can have, and an overview
of the resultant different conflict types. In addition, we will provide an overview of
the different patterns or structures conflicts in real-life take.
5.5.1 Agents’ Unilateral, Cooperative and Coalition Moves
We said that multi-agent competitive decision making situations, or conflicts, are
highly dynamic. The agents move between the conflict’s states, and these moves
depend on many factors. One factor is the ability for an agent to actually move from
one specific state to another. The agent could in fact be able to move unilaterally
between two specific states, both ways or in one direction only. But the agent could
also be not able to move at all between those two states, or could only move between
them if he cooperates with other agents (such as the case if the agent is moving
from no-agreement state to a signed-agreement state). There is also the possibility
of sanction moves that other agents could take to block any improvements the agent
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might have hoped when he took his original move. And, what about countermoves
the agent might have to regain some of the lost improvement. In fact, the agents’
moves and countermoves, in addition to their preferences over the conflict’s states,
are the basis of the stability and equilibrium analysis methods discussed in the
game theory and conflict analysis literature.
We will not divert from the solid definitions and established methods that the
game theory and conflict analysis literature provides. But, we will take steps to
unify what seems fragmented definitions and analysis tools, and define (or more
accurately re-define) them to offer a full comprehensive, consistent and coherent
set of definitions and tools that not only be able to help model and analyze many
types/variations of multi-agents conflicts, but also anchor these definitions and tools
to verifiable and validate-able agents’ preferences. Preferences which in turn are
based on the captured and modelled agents’ goals, constraints, priorities, emotions,
and so on.
We will define, in the following chapters, a number of move types, agents in
conflicts can have and take. Following the steps of Fraser and Hipel (1984) and
Fang et al. (1993), we will define two types of unilateral moves for individual agents,
for each state of the conflict: the set of Unilateral Moves (UMs) that an agent can
take on his own from one state to another; and the set of Unilateral Improvement
moves (UIs), a subset of the UMs the agent has from the state, but by the end
of these moves, the agent will be at a better state (more preferred than the orig-
inal state he started from). We also add additional moves to the ones originally
offered by Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al. (1993). All these move types
will be redefined or defined in the following chapters, within the context of using
Constrained Rationality’s conceptual modelling and analysis framework in different
conflict types.
The UM and UI move types form the foundation of non-cooperative games,
which we will study in the next chapter, where involved agents are not allowed or
cannot make cooperative moves. We define Cooperative Moves (CMs) as moves
that the individual agents cannot make on their own, and must cooperate together
to jointly make the move (an example of such moves is a move from a state where
two agents are engaged in a legal battle over intellectual property rights to a state
where the agents both reach a full settlement agreement). These moves are not
allowed within the context of non-cooperative conflicts, but are allowed in cooper-
ative games. A subset of the CMs, agents have, are CMs in which engaged agents
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make the move from a less preferred state to a more preferred state, i.e. all engaged
agents benefit from these moves. These moves are called Cooperative Improvement
moves (CIs).
The concept of cooperative games is well known in the game theory literature,
the literature for the most part insist on making the cooperative moves binding to
all parties involved. Luce and Raiffa (1957) defined a cooperative game as a game
in which the players have complete freedom of pre-play communication to make
joint binding agreements. And, Hipel and Meister (1994) defined a different type
of cooperation that lasts throughout the duration of the conflict.
While we followed the steps of Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al. (1993)
in their definitions of non-cooperative UMs and UIs (but redefined them within the
context, terminology and notation of the Constrained Rationality framework), we
defined cooperative moves by the conflict’s players differently. Fang et al. (1993)
defined the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) techniques to fall under
the category of non-cooperative game theory. But later modifications to GMCR,
namely by Kilgour et al. (2001) and then by Inohara and Hipel (2008b,a), added
cooperative moves by a coalition of players in the conflict. In this thesis work,
specifically in Chapter 8 and 9, we define different types of cooperative moves.
In the Constrained Rationality’s cooperative games, the agents can make a
single-step joint cooperative move (CM), that none can make on their own, and
later defect. This is to ensure realistic representation of real-life scenarios, where
agents reach agreements, sign them, but later act as if the agreement does not
exist. This deceiving behaviour should be modelled within the conflict models to
ensure that the stability analysis uncover any potential benefits agents will have
in going back on their commitments, or even backing down from the negotiating
process at an earlier stage of it. In other words, our definition of cooperative games,
and cooperative moves, is broader than the ones found generally in game theory
literature.
In addition, we differentiate between two classes of cooperative moves: one-step
cooperative moves (CMs) and group’s cooperative moves (G-CMs). One-step CMs
are committed by two or more agents, all moving jointly from one state of the
game to another in one step. The agents make this joint move because none of
them can make the move on his own. They all must cooperate to make the move.
But they are all still concerned only about their individual gains and losses, and
do not share the same goals or values that the other agents have. They all act as
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Cooperative Games,  
with Coalitions Allowed




Figure 5.9: Venn Diagram showing the relationship between the three classes of
multi-agent conflicts
separate entities, and their cooperation to make the CM move is merely because
they all can benefit from this one-time one-step cooperative move.
On the other hand, we find in real-life conflicts, that agents form coalitions
or alliances and move together. The differences between the individualistic CMs
and the coalition group moves (C-GMs) is that G-CMs can be multi-step moves (a
combination of UMs and CMs), where the coalition harness the power of grouping
their abilities. And, while individual agents, for the most part, make a CM because
it is in fact a CI move for all involved agents, the coalition can afford have some
scarifies in the process, as long as the end result for the combined multi-step move is
a better more-preferred state for all members of the coalition, most of the coalition
members, or the big/strong members in the coalition (based on how the coalition is
structured and organized). These moves are called in the Constrained Rationality
framework: C-GIs or Coalition Group Improvement moves. We will study in later
chapters the two classes of cooperative games: the cooperative games, with no
coalitions; and the cooperative games, with coalitions.
The relationship between the three classes of conflicts is best described by the
Venn diagram shown in Figure 5.9. As the figure shows, the broadest class of multi-
agent competitive adversarial decision making situations (conflicts) is the class of
cooperative conflicts with coalitions. These games not only allow coalitions and
their moves to exist, but also allow agents to unilaterally or cooperatively move.
Cooperative games without coalitions allow agents to have UMs and UIs, and al-
low them to come together and move jointly to states that they will not be able
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to reach individually. But cooperative games without coalitions allow only single-
step cooperative moves by individual agents. Cooperative games with coalitions
have both types of agents: individuals who can move unilaterally or cooperatively
in one step UMs, UIs, CMs and/or CIs; and coalitions who can take multi-step
moves (which surely include one-step UM/UI/CM/CI moves and more-than-one-
step moves consisting of consecutive one-step UM/UI/CM/CI moves by the coali-
tion members). On the other hand, non-cooperative games can have individual
agents only, each with his own UM and UI moves. Therefore, and as Figure 5.9
shows, non-cooperative games are a subset of cooperative games without coalitions,
which in turn is a subset of cooperative games where coalitions are allowed to exist
and participate as whole entities.
5.5.2 Game Structures, Phases and Iterations
The analyst should also check if the conflict’s state have different contribution levels
to the agents’ goals based on what phase or iteration the conflict is in, or if there are
different states available to the individual agents at different phases in the conflict.
For example, in a legal conflict going through the courts, the players could have
different options based on the court level (low, high/appeals, or supreme court) the
conflict’s case is at, and/or what the court’s decision is (for or against a specific
agent). In Chapter 9, we will study a legal intellectual property conflict that has
multiple phases based on the level of the court and based on the nature of the
courts’ decisions.
The structure, or the grouping of a conflict’s states, could be one of many
patterns. Figure 5.10 shows three general patterns of conflicts’ structures. Sub-
Figure 5.10a shows a conflict with one stage/phase, i.e. a one time game. The
states of the game are all part of this one phase. Once the game ends, the players
have no other options or moves. An example of such games is the classical Prisoner’s
Dilemma, which will be studied extensively in Chapter 7.
Sub-Figure 5.10b shows a game with the game’s one-phase repeats infinitely, or
for a finite number of time. The states in each iteration stay the same, as well as
the players’ preferences and moves. An example of such game is the Tit for Tat
Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma, which also will be studied extensively in Chapter 7.
The third general structure is similar to the iterative game structure, but the
iterations, or better called phases/stages, could have different states, different play-
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431 2
One Full Game (with 2 Players and 4 States)
(a) A Conflict that has one itera-
tion/phase.
431 2
A new iteration of the game will 
start from state (1)
One Full Game (with 2 Players and 4 States)
(b) An Iterative Conflict, with each itera-
tion has identical states, players pref-
erences and moves. Each iteration
starts with state no. 1.
431 2
Phase 1 (or Iteration 1) of the Game 
(with 2 Players and 4 States)
431 2
Phase 2 (or Iteration 2) of the Game 
(with 2 Players and 4 States)
(c) A Conflict that has two phases/stages. The two phases has the same states, but the
“red” player’s preferences change in the second phase and therefore his UI moves
changes as a result.
Figure 5.10: Three different structures of a conflict between two players. Each
of the structures shows the conflict’s phases/iterations, if any, the states within the
phase/iteration, the two players UI moves between the states (shown in red for the
“red” player and in blue for the “blue” player).
ers’ preferences and/or players’ moves. Sub-Figure 5.10c shows a simple two phases
game. The two phases have similar states, but in the second phase one of the
players has a change in his preferences leading to a change in the UIs (Unilateral
Improvements moves –will be defined formally in the next few chapters for the
three different conflicts’ types) available to him at this phase. The legal intellectual
property conflict referred to above, and will be studied extensively in Chapter 9, is
an example of a complicated multi-phase conflict.
The analyst, most likely, will try a number of configurations of how the conflict
states are grouped and structured, before he will settle on a structure that best
represent the base-model of the conflict to study and analyze. He, also, could have
some of these possible structures for the conflict as additional what-if models to
analyze during the sensitivity analysis stage of the conflict analysis process.
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Care should also be given to validate how the states are grouped in the conflict’s
phases, if the conflict has multiple phases, and whether these states and the players’
alternatives that define them show different contributions (achievement, prevention
and operationalization levels) to the different players’ goals or not. Because such
changes could result on changes in the players’ preferences over these states, and
by extension to the players’ move, the stabilities of the different conflict’ states to
the different players, and finally to the conflict’s equilibrium states.
5.6 Analyzing Multi-Agent Decision Making and
Conflicts
We showed above how to model formally, systematically and methodologically
multi-agent decision making situations, both collaborative and adversarial. In this
section, we will discuss how these situations will be analyzed. Ultimately, the
analysis steps are intended to provide the involved decision makers with enough in-
formation to guide them to make better decisions in these situations. The analysis
steps differ for collaborative situations from the ones for games. This is due mainly
to the highly dynamic competitive nature of games in comparison to the joint col-
laborative decision making situations. The additional complexity of game/conflict
situations, is the reason behind the additional analysis steps that are required for
these situations, as we will see, in comparison to the steps needed for the collabo-
rative ones.
The analysis steps are shown in Figure 5.2 to be part of the overall modelling
and analysis process presented. They include the following steps (numbered as
shown in the figure):
5. Generating the agents’ preferences over the alternatives (for single-agent or
multi-agent collaborative decision making situations) or over the conflict’s
states (for the multi-agent adversarial conflicts).
6. Decision Making and Conflict Analysis:
(a) Conducting a stability analysis study of all conflict’s states, and identi-
fying the states that form equilibriums, or possible resolution points for
the conflict.
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(b) Conducting a thorough search for all variations to the base-model that
need to go through sensitivity and what-if analysis.
(c) Considering the changes that will happen over time to values and con-
structs of the base modes, as well as the sensitivity what-if models.
7. Generate the different sensitivity/what-if/scenario models for the conflict,
and re-start the modelling and analysis steps for each of them.
For multi-agent adversarial conflicts, specifically, the three chapters to follow will
provide more details and discussion on each of these steps for the three different
conflict classes (non-cooperative games, cooperative games without coalitions, and
cooperative game with coalitions); and will provide examples to illustrate how the
analyst should go through each step. But, we will give in this section a general idea
about them, and discuss some aspects of each of these steps.
5.6.1 Calculating Agents’ Preferences over Alternatives or
Conflict’s States
In Chapter 4, we showed how the ordinal and weighted preferences are calculated for
individual agents over their respective alternatives, in single-agent decision making
situations or multi-agent situations where agents act in an individualistic manner
with no regard to other agents past, current or future choices and moves. For
collaborative multi-agent situations, the preferences generated for the agents over
the stated “shared” alternatives represent the evaluation results for each of these
alternatives ( products, product designs, hardware specifications, software require-
ments, . . . ). Section 5.4.1 showed how the agents preferences are calculated over
shared alternatives in collaborative decision making situations. And, Section 5.4.2
showed how the agents preferences are calculated over games’ states in competitive
conflict situations, respectively.
Recall that these preferences map directly to the agents’ goals and realities/const-
raints. Not to mention that they are calculated with the agents’ priorities, emotions
and personality-wide attitudes toward rationality and emotionality are in mind.
Making the preferences generated, or the evaluations generated, more contextu-
ally rich than any evaluation results provided by the traditional methods used in
decision theory, specifically the multi-criteria decision analysis.
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The evaluation of the options, which decision makers have, represents the main
decision making analysis step for the collaborative type multi-agent decision making
situations. It provides the involved agents a clear preference ordinal ordering of their
alternatives, as well as a strength of each of these preferences (weighted cardinal
preferences) that maps directly to their objectives and constraints. Fo collaborative
situations, this step usually followed by identifying all variations (deviations from
the base-model) that should be studied. For the adversarial multi-agent conflicts,
the evaluation step of the agents’ individual options is just a step in the analysis
process followed by establishing which of the agents’ moves constitute improvement
moves (UIs, CIs, or C-GIs) based on the agents’ preferences. Both steps must be
completed before the stability analysis is conducted for each of the conflict’s states.
5.6.2 Conflict’s Stability Analysis and Equilibriums
The stability analysis of a multi-agent adversarial game/conflict is a process by
which the analyst will determine the stability of each conflict’s feasible states (out-
comes) for every agent involved in the conflict. If a state is stable for a given agent,
it will not benefit this agent to move away from this state to any other state. A
state that is stable for all agents involved in the game forms an equilibrium for the
conflict, and constitutes a possible resolution to the conflict. Because the stability
analysis step, part of the overall conflict analysis process, is used to predict the
possible equilibriums for the conflict, it is commonly referred to as the prediction
or forecasting step.
Clearly, the stability of a state to an individual agent depends on: what moves
the agents have out from this state (i.e. the UM or CM moves he has out of this
state); whether any of these UMs and/or CMs is in fact a move that constitute a
UI or a CI move by which the agent will be able to enhance his position from the
current state to a more preferred state; the strength of the gained preference, if
any; the ability of other agents to sanction such UI or CI moves; and the ability of
the agent to regain some of the lost preference by such sanction (i.e. the ability for
the agent to have a countermove to the sanction allowing it to regain all or some
of the advances made by his initial UI/CI).
This makes the conflict’s stability analysis process and concepts requires sepa-
rate and thorough discussion, more than what this chapter can provide. The four
chapters to follow will focus on providing formal definitions to agents moves types,
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stability and equilibrium types, for each of the three different classes of multi-agent
conflict, with one chapter dedicated to study the relationships among the different
stability types (referred to as stability solution definitions) which we will use in our
conflict stability analysis. The four chapters will also provide full illustrative case
studies that cover different types of real-life conflicts including a non-cooperative
cold-war political conflict, a cooperative-without-coalitions environmental/policy
conflict, a cooperative-with-coalitions industrial intellectual property conflict, in
addition to classical conflicts such as the prisoners dilemma and the game of chicken.
5.6.3 Sensitivity Analysis, What-if Analysis, and Analysis
of Changes Over Time
The purpose of conducting sensitivity analysis for a multi-agent decision making
situation, whether a collaborative one or an adversarial conflict one, is to be able
to assess the validity of the results produced so far by the analysis steps. The idea
is to model any variations, the analyst deems important, as what-if models and
test them in order to identify any changes in the preferences structure and any
implications that the DMs should be aware of. When doing so, few questions are
important to keep in mind: what could change the preferences, and how bad/good
the effect of each of these changes on the decision, or in comparison to the decision,
if it is been taken based on the base-model analysis. One also need to include
changes that could happen over time, not as a variation to the base-model, but
happen to the base-model’s context (goals and constraints, as well as the number
and identity of the agents involved in the decision making situation).
Most of the variations that the analyst will identify as candidates for sensitivity
testing will be –most likely– small variations that relate to the fuzzy values the
base-model include (such as rationality, emotionality, importance, and emotional
valence attached to the different agents’ goals). This is because of the fuzzy nature
of these values. Certainty and justification for the beliefs about these naturally
fuzzy values are very difficult to elicit and validate. Even if these values are elicited
from the involved agents themselves, through direct knowledge acquisition process,
the analyst should ensure adequate sensitivity analysis has been conducted. The
analyst should test different variations of these values, build complete what-if mod-
els (variations to the base-model), if needed, and highlight any implications on the
agents’ preferences and the stabilities of the conflict’s states that could happen as
a result.
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But, the analyst should look at other variations too, especially the ones related
to whether the agents., or some of them, have different goals, hidden goals or
additional goals than the ones captured in the base-model of the decision making
situation. In addition, he should verify that all the alternatives are captured within
the base-model, including alternatives that the agents do not have now but will/may
have in the future. Testing all these variations and possibilities is an important
task, in order to ensure that the analysis produced and the recommendation of
action/decision given to the focal decision makers are extensive and thoroughly
considered all possible scenarios.
Some of the most important variations that could exist, but mostly ignored
by analysts, are variations based on changes that could happen to the decision
making situation over time. Assuming the base-model of a situation, including all
its values and constructs, is accurate, there is always a possibility for changes to
happen over time. These Changes could impact the situation and drastically affect
its model, and therefore the analysis and predictions produced for it. For example,
consider changes such as: new agents joined the conflict; one agent acquire another
agent, consolidating some of the players or ending the conflict; some agents, due to
certain market conditions, legal ruling, or new governmental regulations/policies,
have drastic changes to their goals and/or constraints affecting their preferences
over their alternatives or the conflict states; new phases/iterations are added to the
conflict, and the analyst was not aware of them; and so on.
These variations should be tested as conflicts with different phases/stages, where
the conflict moves from one phase at a certain point of time to another phase at a
later stage. The way we deal with modelling such changes is similar to the way we
discussed modelling the dynamics of single-agent decision making situations over
time in Chapter 3 but here the new model is a new phase/stage of the conflict.
This results of a new what-if model which has multiple phases, each with different
agents, goals, alternatives, or states (similar to the model shown in Sub-Figure
5.10c.
The extra care the analyst puts in conducting sensitivity analysis, especially for
the implications of any variations or deviation from the base-model, will serve two
purposes: 1) keep the analyst on the alert, looking for signs of changes in these
variables, when and if such changes occur; and 2) point to the involved agents
the importance of disclosing the real beliefs and justifications for these values, and
any changes happen to them should some occur. The final analysis, stabilities,
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equilibriums and results, could depend on such values. They form an important
factor on how the agents’ preferences are formed and calculated.
5.6.4 Comparing Analysis to Reality
If the modelled and analyzed multi-agent decision making situation, whether it
is a collaborative one or a conflict one, is a historical situation happened in the
past, then the analyst must compare the models as well as the analysis produced
to what actually happened in reality. This is also true, if the modelled situation
is unfolding before the analyst and the involved agents. The analyst must monitor
how the situation unfolds in reality, compare it with the base-model analysis and
prediction, understand the reasons behind any deviation from the base-model, re-
adjust the base-model and conduct a thorough analysis for the new model (and for
sure inform the focal decision makers).
Comparing the base-model analysis and predictions with how the situation
evolved, or evolves, over time will benefit the analyst in many ways. First, this
comparison serves as a mechanism to test if the base-model is/was accurate and
valid. Second, it will help the analyst understand the reasons behind any devia-
tion from the base-model, and take measures to re-tune the base-model, analyze
it, conduct sensitivity testing on it, and provide better predictions and decision
support on the next actions to be taken (especially if the conflict is unfolding in
real-time before the analyst). Third, it will serve as a mechanism to learn about the
reliability of: the knowledge used in building the base-model; the sources which the
knowledge is elicited from; and finally, the elicitation and modelling process used.
Forth, it will uncover any deception or misinformation, the focal agent and/or the
analyst was a target of (i.e. it will uncover the existence of a hyper-game).
In addition, comparing the results of the analysis with the reality in the ground
could serve as a mechanism to uncover certain aspects about the conflict that could
not be discovered otherwise. In Chapter 6, for example, we modelled and ana-
lyzed the Cuban Missiles Crises. Certain questions about this important hysterical
conflict were the focus of many studies, and still (Allison and Zelikow, 1999). For
example, why the USSR did not escalate the conflict instead of withdrawing the
missiles? Why the USSR did not insist on the US to withdraw the missiles it has in
Turkey, before it removes the missiles from Cuba? Why the US chose the blockade
on Cuba as a strategy to deal with the conflict, and did not employ a strategy that
involved a show of force such as an air strike? and so on. By modelling the conflict
and analyze it using our framework, we managed to get answers to these questions,
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and show that the hysterical outcome of the conflict, as well as the hysterical flow
of events, are similar to what the analysis predicts. The Constrained Rationality’s
model for the conflict and its analysis provided answers to these questions that
confirm with the information uncovered after the cold war had ended.
Therefore, the analysis vs. reality comparison step is an important step not
only to ensure valid and reliable support for the focal decision makers as they
consider taking their next moves, but also as tracking and learning tool. It helps
the analyst uncovers any deviation from the base mode, and take the right measures
to understand why the deviation happened, modify the base-model and produce
new analysis and predictions based on the new model. It will also help the analyst
track knowledge reliability problems, uncover them and take the proper measures
to correct them for the conflict at hand, and all other future conflicts to be modelled
and analyzed.
5.7 Example: System Requirements Engineering,
Collaborative Multi-Agent Decision Making
The next few chapters will include many case studies showing how the Constrained
Rationality framework is used to model and analyze multi-agent adversarial decision
making situations (conflicts or games as also called in our research, and as they are
called in game theory literature). We will cover conflicts that vary in their types
(non-cooperative, cooperative without coalitions, and cooperative with coalitions),
in their structure (single phase, iterative and multiple-different-phases) and in the
nature of the conflict (whether they represent real industrial, environmental, policy,
or intellectual property conflicts, or represent hypothetical classical paradoxes or
rationality).
In this section, we will cover an example of a collaborative decision making
situation (the other type of multi-agent decision making situations –other than
conflicts–). We said above that collaborative situations are easier to model and
analyze than conflicts, mainly due to the less dynamic nature of these situations in
comparison to conflicts. Collaborative situations have shared alternatives that all
the agents choose from. In conflicts, agents have their own set of alternatives to
chose from. In conflicts, agents have moves, and have states been defined as stable
or unstable for them. In collaborative situations, all agents move together. There
is no competition. The agents still have conflicting goals, but they are not trying to
win over each other such as the case in conflicts. In essence, collaborative decision
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making situations is aiming for a cooperative and collaborative win-win decision on
a choice that will best satisfy the goals and constraints of all agents.
We used real-life hysterical conflicts or classical paradoxes of rationality games
in our case studies to illustrate how the Constrained Rationality framework will be
used to model and analyze different multi-agent conflict types. This also served our
illustrative case studies well. Because these conflicts either happened in the past,
or suggested and studied extensively in the game theory literature. This made
the process of comparing our analysis and analysis’s predictions to the hysterical
events, and/or to others’ analyses, much easier. Unfortunately, it proved to be
harder to find hysterical collaborative multi-agent decision making cases suitable
to be used as illustrative case studies. Cases that could be used to study and
compare its historical outcomes to our models and analysis’s predictions. At the
heart of the difficulty in finding such cases is to have access to the case’s players and
their contextual knowledge for the situations (goals, constraints, etc.), or previous
studies that report on such knowledge.
In an effort to validate the Constrained Rationality framework and its suitability
for the collaborative type of multi-agent decision making situations, we have used
the framework to study, model and analyze two complex industrial collaborative
multi-agent decision making situations: a strategic product development initiative
and a strategic software requirements engineering initiative. The two initiatives
were very successful, but contractually confidential (because of the sensitivity of
the information each covered) to be able to use them here. And, although the two
initiatives were easier in modelling and analyzing than the hysterical and classical
conflicts, we used in our conflicts case studies, in some aspects (namely because
of the apparent alignment in the agents goals and their motivation to reach agree-
ment), we faced some very challenging aspects in modelling them. Most of the
challenges seems to stem from the size of the models, making model management
and documentation a challenging task even with the help of some tools that we de-
veloped specifically to automate some parts of the task. Nevertheless, we intend to
report on the two initiatives, and the learning from them, after removing/altering
the confidential details with the help of the involved industrial partners, in separate
research studies.
In this section, we will use a simpler and heavily scaled-downed version of a
software requirements engineering example to show how the Constrained Rational-
ity framework can be used to model and analyze a collaborative type multi-agent
180
decision making situations. This simple example will be sufficient to illustrate the
use of the framework at the level required for this thesis document and this chap-
ter. To model this collaborative system requirements decision making situation, we
follow the same modelling steps shown in Figure 5.2:
1. Define the Context: The purpose of this collaborative decision making ini-
tiative is to decide on the best architecture for a software system. There are
three architectures to be reviewed for best fit. Best fit is defined as the most
accommodating to the needs of all the stakeholders involved.
2. Relevant Decision Makers: The software architecture for such small system
will be decided on by four agents. The involved agents include: two agents
represent the business users of the system; one system architect/designer (also
represents the rest of the technical team, namely the developers and testers);
and one project manager (responsible for the contractual obligations, delivery
timing and reporting requirements).
3. Build a Viewpoint Model for each Decision Maker: The analyst will acquire
the knowledge needed to build a viewpoint model for each of the stakeholders,
meeting individually with them and/or meeting with them as a group (there
are benefits for doing both). For each of the decision makers, she needs to
build a GCM model to capture all the goals (needs and wants) and all the
constraints that the decision maker has for the to-be-built system. For this
type of decision making situations, the collaborative ones, the agents’ individ-
ual viewpoint models will include mainly the GCM models of the respective
agents. Recall that the alternatives are “shared” for the group to choose from,
and are not individuals’ alternatives. Deciding on the alternatives, the differ-
ent architectures to use for the system, can be done in many ways: collect all
different alternative architectures that the agents suggest, evaluate them all
against the agents’ goals, or choose a subset of all alternatives and evaluate
those. But, before the evaluation step, the following step must be completed.
4. Integrate All Viewpoint Models and Finalize the Base Mode: The analyst will
take all the individual agents’ viewpoints (GCM models) and integrate them,
adding cause-effect qualified fuzzy-labeled lateral relationships between the
different goal and constraint nodes reside in different GCM models.The result
will be similar to Figure 5.11. Please note that the figure shows an integration
of very simple GCM models, for a very simple system requirements example.
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Note that each of the agents has a GCM model with a two-layers goal-tree,
and that the goals in both GCMs conflict with each other. In real-life require-
ments engineering initiatives, there are usually many more stakeholders, each
with a complex GCM model that has multiple goal-trees with many goals
conflict with each other and conflict with other goals across the individual
GCM boundaries. Also, Figure 5.11 shows the three alternative architectures
the agents should choose from at the bottom of the integrated viewpoints
model, with each alternative been connected to the agents’ goals through
lateral relations to show the positive or negative achievement/contribution
that implementation of these alternative has if implemented on the goals. In
real-life requirements engineering initiatives though, there are many more al-
ternatives (and each alternative has many shades/variations/configurations).
Please remember that the example we use here is intended to show a simple
case for illustration of use purposes only.
5. Add Priorities, Emotional Valences and Rationality Factors, then Generate
Agents’ Preferences over Alternatives: In this step, the analyst will follow
the same process we used in Section 5.4.1 in modelling the strategic impor-
tance and emotional valences the agents attach to their respective strategic
goals. Recall that the rationality and emotionality factors are as important
in collaborative multi-agent decision making situations as they are in one-
agent situations and the multi-agent conflicts. But, before adding these value
properties, the analyst should first calculate the Final Achievement levels
that each of the alternative architectures, once adopted to be implemented
for the system, will contribute to the agents’ strategic goals. This is done
by calculating the achievement and prevention levels these goals will receive
by activating each of these alternatives individually in the integrated model
of the decision making situation (and followed by running the same forward
label propagation discussed in Chapter 3). Figures 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 show
the effect (the achievement and prevention values) of implementing Architec-
ture 1, 2 and 3, respectively, on the agents’ goals (needs and wants). After
calculating the final achievement values for each strategic goal, for each of the
alternative architectures, then the analyst can add the importance values and
emotional valences for each of the agents’ strategic goals, and generate the
group’s preferences over these alternatives (both the ordinal and the cardinal
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6. Sensitivity and What-If Analysis: The analyst at this step will test varia-
tions to the value properties or constructs of the decision makers’ individual
GCMs, or the integrated decision making situation as a whole. In this sim-
ple example, one cannotice that the three alternatives that the base-model
have all show some serious weakness. For example, Alternative 3, the best
overall performing alternative out of the three ones the base-model includes,
is shown in Figure 5.13 to satisfy most of the goals of the system users and
the technical architect of the project, but fail to meet any of the goals that
the project manager value (most likely goals such as “meeting delivery time-
line”, “keep implementation cost within the approved budget”, or “have all
development skills/resources needed to implement and deliver the system”).
In such case, which is not far from what real-life requirements projects face,
the group has to rethink their alternatives, come up with other creative al-
ternatives, break the system/project to smaller systems/projects, ask for a
bigger budget and/or more resources, etc. The group, with the help of the
analyst, generate a what-if variation model, for each of the other alternatives
and/or creative solutions they come up with. They should, then, test each
what-if scenario model looking for the one that offer the best fit architecture
they all agree on.
This collaborative decision making situation shows that even in these situations
the collaborative agents, such as the stakeholders in the example have (users, ar-
chitect, and project manager), have different and conflicting goals. Despite the
fact that we intentionally simplified the example and its model for clear illustration
purposes, the example and its model (presented in Figures 5.11, 5.11 and 5.11 )
show the impact that different architectures/products have on satisfying each of
the stakeholders’ goals (requirements), in addition to the affect that different goals,
different stakeholders have, have on each others’ achievement or prevention.
But, in our experience, the best benefit these models provide is that they show
in a consolidated visual form the effect of the different needs the agents have on each
other. These models, then, serve as tools to guide the collaborating decision makers
to negotiate and/or rethink their alternatives. They serve as tools to highlight the
challenges some areas in the situation have, and where creative thinking must be
applied to overcome such challenges. In the many experiments we had, using the
Constrained Rationality framework to model and analyze collaborative decision
making cases, we have seen that the sensitivity and what-if analysis step, and the
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following remodelling or retuning needed after that, become the area where most
of the involved agents realized the strength and fruits of the framework and its
methods and tools.
5.8 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed how to model collaborative and competitive multi-
agent decision making situations; and took further the concepts and methods, intro-
duced in the previous two chapters, showing how they are applied to determine the
preferences of agents in collaborative and competitive multi-agent decision making
situations. The chapter started with discussing the two main modes/types of multi-
agent decision making situations, the collaborative decision making situations and
the competitive conflicts modes. Then, it introduced the process to model and
analyze both types.
It showed how the different agents’ viewpoint models be modelled and inte-
grated ; how the agents’ alternatives will be modelled, in both collaborative and
competitive situations; how the situation’s states are defined, for the competitive
conflicts; and how the base-model of the decision making situation is to be validated
and finalized. The chapter then moved to discuss modelling priorities, capturing
emotions, and eliciting agents’ preferences within both types of multi-agent deci-
sion making situations; and how the framework models the dynamics of multi-agent
situations, specifically the different moves that agents have in competitive conflicts.
The chapter discussed how these different types of moves are used to identify
three main types of multi-agent competitive decision making conflicts: 1) non-
cooperative; 2) cooperative with no coalitions/alliances (i.e. agents cooperate but
still act individually and do not sacrifice their individual positions for the good of
the group); and 3) cooperative conflicts where agents are allowed to form coalitions,
act as groups and take multi-step moves including intermediate temporarily scarifies
along the way for the good of all members of the group they belong to. We said that
these three types of conflicts will be used to structure and organize our discussion
about modelling and analyzing multi-agent conflicts, and what concepts and tools
the Constrained Rationality framework offers to deal with the specific needs of
modelling and analyzing these conflicts.Each of the following four chapters form a
separate and dedicated chapter to discuss one of these conflict type, including the
concepts and methods to be used to model and analyze that type.
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Next, the chapter discussed the process of analyzing multi-agent decision making
situations; how the agents’ preferences over alternatives and states are calculated;
how the stabilities of the different states in these conflicts are determined (for each
agent) and how equilibriums are identified; how sensitivity and what-if analysis
is conducted; and finally, why the analyst should compare the produced analysis
and predictions to what actually happen/happened in real-life. At the end, the
chapter provided an illustrative example that showed how the process, concepts and
methods introduced in this chapter are used to model and analyze a collaborative
multi-agent decision making situation: a system requirements engineering situation.
The chapter did not provide any example for competitive conflict situations, because
the next few chapters will provide detailed case studies that cover all three types
of conflicts: non-cooperative conflicts, cooperative conflicts without coalitions, and




Conflicts: Analysis and Stability
Solution Concepts
6.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the analysis of non-cooperative games, as per the Con-
strained rationality framework. The decision makers of this type of games are able
to make move types that are unilateral non-cooperative moves. In other words,
there will be no consideration of any type of cooperative moves. Such moves will
be covered in cooperative games, with and without coalitions, in the following
chapters.
We will start by looking at the type of moves the players of these games are
allowed to make, and are important to the stability analysis concepts. Then, we
will define four different stability and equilibrium solution concepts. These concepts
will guide the stability analysis of each of the games’ states, for each of the games’
players. Next, we will define the strength of the stability under such solution
concepts, and propose a set of algorithms to help identify the strength level of each
of these stabilities.
We will finish the chapter with a case study in which we apply the concepts
proposed in this chapter. In this case study, we analyze thoroughly the Cuban
Missile Crises. We start by giving a brief background on this important political
conflict. We then model the players goals, constraints and alternatives; analyze
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their GCMs; identify the conflict’s states; elicit the players’ cardinal and ordinal
preferences over these states; and then identify the players unilateral moves among
these states. The stabilities of the conflict’s states will be analyzed under the four
stability solution concepts, and the strength of these stabilities will be identified.
Then, we will look at the over all equilibrium states for the conflict; and how the
conflict could have progressed from the time the US discovered the missile bases in
Cuba. We conclude the case study by showing how our analysis results compares
to what historically happened in the conflict, and to what others offered as models
and analysis to the conflict, after the fact.
A reminder on the notation which will be used in this chapter. Let the set
of all the game states be given as S = {s1 , s2 , . . . , sm}, where |S| = m the total
number of states in the game, and states are defined as discussed earlier. And
let S a,b,...
D, t
⊆ S where S a,b,...
D, t
represents a subset of S’s states which has common
characteristics described in the subset’s notation as a, b, . . . as been perceived by
decision maker D and at time t. The set of decision makers in the game is given
as DM = {DM1, DM2, . . . , DMn}, where |DM| = n the total number of decision
makers, the involved agents/players, in the game.
As an additional reminder, and in relation to the notation used in this chap-
ter and the following ones, we use the terms game and conflict interchangeably to
mean the same thing: a multi-agent strategic conflict. Also, the terms agent, player
and decision maker will be used interchangeably to mean the same thing: an au-
tonomous independent agent, in the strategic conflict, who is capable of perceiving
the world around, holding beliefs, justifying beliefs, holding knowledge, represent-
ing knowledge, extracting new knowledge, reasoning about held knowledge, and
acting independently.
6.2 Types of Decision Makers’ Moves
Decision makers in non-cooperative games are only allowed to have individual uni-
lateral moves. First, we will define these unilateral moves. Then, we will define
the type of sanction moves that players can do to block certain other players from
benefiting from any unilateral improvement moves they have. Understanding these
types of players’ moves is essential to define the stability solution concepts which
will be used to analyze the stability of the games’ states for the games’ players.
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6.2.1 Types of Non-Cooperative Moves by Individual DMs
There are two types of movements that an individual decision maker, alone and
non-cooperatively, can make in a non-cooperative game: Unilateral Moves (UMs)
and Unilateral Improvements (UIs). We said in the previous chapter, in Section
5.5.1, that we follow the steps of Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al. (1993)
in their definition of both UI and UM moves for individual agents. But, we define
here both type of moves to be within the context, terminology and notation of the
Constrained Rationality framework. We also provide a game knowledge structure
and an algorithm to generate the UIs of all agents in the conflict from a given list
of all their UMs and calculated preferences over the conflict’s states.
Definition 6.2.1 (Unilateral Move (UM)): For Decision Maker DMi∈DM at
time t and state s∈S of the game: a move to state sum∈S is considered a Unilateral
Move (UM) for DMi at time t from state s, denoted as sum∈S
UM
DMi, t
(s), iff DMi can
move unilaterally from state s to state sum in one move, reaching sum at time t+1.
Definition 6.2.2 (Unilateral Improvement (UI)): For Decision Maker DMi∈
DM at time t and state s ∈ S of the game: a move to state sui ∈ S is consid-
























Now, let each game has a Game Configuration Structure, referred hereafter to
it as Game-Structure. This data structure provides essential initial information
about the game and its players, all organized and in a computerized DSS system
is written in a file structure. The Game-Structure for an Non-Cooperative Game
must have the following information:
• S: the set of all states in the game (as perceived, known -believed true with
justification- and elicited from the known players’ alternatives by the focal
Decision Maker whom the modeller is capturing/representing his knowledge
about the game);




(s) for every DMi ∈ DM and for every s ∈ S: given as a set of graphs
describing the UMs that DMs have from each state the game has (one graph
per DM in the game, with the game’s states represented as the graph’s nodes
and the UMs are represented as its arcs); and
• WP (s,DMi, t) for every DMi ∈ DM and for every s ∈ S: the weighted
(cardinal) preference of each DM over each of game’s states, as calculated
using the Constrained Rationality Framework’s agents preferences elicitation
and modelling method discussed in Chapter 5.
A Game-Structure will describe the game at a specific point of time t, as per-
ceived and known by the focal decision maker whom the game is modelled based on
his knowledge of it. Any updates or changes to what is known about the game by
the focal decision maker should initiate a generation of a new Game-Structure to
reflect the changes; and a new analysis of the updated game, treating the structure
as a new game.
One important step of analyzing a game is to generate the the UIs that DMs
will have from each state of the game. Given the Game-Structure for an Non-
Cooperative Game, Algorithm 6.1 is proposed to generate the UM and UI sets for
all DMs in the game.
6.2.2 Types of Sanction Moves
Sanction moves are moves that are made to block certain decision maker from
benefiting from a UI move that he made. Other players in the game could decide
to sanction this UI, by moving the game to a state which is less or equally proffered
than the original state the decision maker made his UI from. In effect, the sanction
move by the other player renders the UI made useless, or in the worst case scenario
harmful because it could make the game at a state that is worse than the original
state that the decision maker took a UI move from. The concept of a sanction move
was initially proposed by Howard (1971), and is essential to some of the stability
solution concepts games could have, as we will discuss later. Again here, we follow
the steps of Howard (1971), Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al. (1993) in their
definition of sanction moves for individual agents. But, we define them here to
be within the context, terminology and notation of the Constrained Rationality
framework.
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Algorithm 6.1 Generating the UM and UI Sets for all DMs in a Game
1: void Generate DMs UM and UI Sets (Game-Structure)
2:
3: // Game-Structure file starts with empty UM and UI sets for DMs.
4: // Only, S, DM, and the UM graph for each DM are given.
5: // A UM graph for a DM, has S’s states as vertices/nodes of the graph,
6: // while the directed arcs of the graph represent DM’s UMs in the game.
7: //
8:
9: for all DMi ∈ DM do
10: // Generate DMi’s UM Sets (one for each of the game’s states), and
11: // for each state find the DMi’s UI Set. All these UM and UI sets
12: // will be initially empty. If not, empty them [not included here].
13: // And, by the end, some of these UM/UI sets will be empty sets.
14:
15: for all s ∈ S do






18: // moving to sum from s is also considered a UI for DMi



















26: Add all generated UM and UI sets for each DM, for each state, to the Game- Structure file.
27: return
Definition 6.2.3 (Sanction Move (SM)): For Decision Maker DMi∈ DM at




said to have against it a Sanction Move (SM) at time t+1 to state ssm∈ S iff









As per the definition, a move to s
ui
by DMi is said to be sanctioned/able by
DMj’s move to ssm ; and DMj’s move to ssm is called a Sanction Move (SM) against
DMi’s UI to sui. In addition, it is important to notice that the definition of an SM
does not assume that the SM by DMj ∈{DM−DMi} to state ssm from state sui
be a UI move by DMj. In other words, DMj’s move to ssm will be considered a





). The definition assumes that DMj’s motive
for the SM is to hurt DMi and sanction DMi’s UI move to sui , even if this SM will
put DMj himself at a less preferred state.
To differentiate between an SM by DMj which is not a UI for DMj, as per the
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SM definition above, and an SM by DMj which is also a UI move for DMj, we will
call the second SM type: SMI move (read as Sanction Move and Improvement) by
DMj. As we will see later in the chapter, this stricter type of SMs, or SMI as we
decided to call it, is required for some stability solution concepts, such as Sequential
Stability (SEQ).
Definition 6.2.4 (Inescapable Sanction Move (ISM)): For Decision Maker
DMi∈ DM at time t and at state s ∈ S of the game, a UI by DMi to state sui∈
SUI
DMi,t
(s) is said to have against it an Inescapable Sanction Move (ISM) at time
t+1 to state s
ism



















As per the definition, DMi’s UI move to sui , from s, is said to have against it
an inescapable sanction move (ISM) by DMj’s move to sism , because DMi has no
move away from s
ism
by which he will be able to mitigate, or lessen, the negative
effect which DMj’s sanction to sism left DMi in.
6.3 Stability Solution Concepts and Equilibriums
for Non-Cooperative Conflicts
Two classes of solution concepts will be discussed in this chapter: 1) solution con-
cepts that are extremely individualistic and shortsighted in their definitions, in a
way that they do not consider other players countermoves; and 2) solution con-
cepts that tries to include other players’ countermoves, therefore these concepts
show more foresight.
6.3.1 Solution Concepts with No Consideration to Others’
Moves
One solution concept that falls under the class of solution concepts with no con-
sideration to other players’ countermoves will be covered in this subsection. This
solution concept is Nash Stability, and is defined as follows:
Definition 6.3.1 (Nash Stability (NASH)): For Decision Maker DMi∈DM at







As per the definition, state s is considered NASH stable for a decision maker
DMi at time t if and only if s is the best that DMi can achieve at time t, given the
total states of the game S. Therefore, states that are not NASH stable are unstable
states since DMi can unilaterally improve his position from any one of them.
Despite the considerable appeal in the notion that a state is a NASH state for
a certain decision maker, it is widely accepted that Nash stability represents a very
shortsighted understanding of game playing in real-life conflicts. This is because it
does not take into account the possible responses of other decision makers to the
unilateral improvement made by the player. Howard (1971) argued that not only
such reactions would be important to decision makers, but that they would take
such considerations into account in advance of choosing their moves/alternatives
in the game. His metagame analysis formalized these considerations into two addi-
tional stability solution concepts: General MetaRationality (GMR) and Symmetric
MetaRationality (SMR). Both solution concepts imply that a decision maker can
find certain states not to be NASH and yet find them to be stable nonetheless.
Howard in his new two stability concepts used the idea of a Sanction Move (Howard
(1971)), which we defined in the previous section.
6.3.2 Solution Concepts with Consideration to Others’ Moves
We will discuss here three stability solution concepts consider in their definitions
other players’ moves and countermoves. These solution concepts are: General
MetaRationality, Symmetric MetaRationality and Sequentially Stability. We follow
the steps of Howard (1971), Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al. (1993) in their
definition of these stability solution concepts, but we redefine them here to be within
the context, terminology and notation of the Constrained Rationality framework,
as well as using the definition of the agents’ unilateral moves and sanction moves
provided earlier.
Definition 6.3.2 (General MetaRational (GMR) Stability): For Decision
Maker DMi∈ DM at time t, a state s∈ S is considered a General MetaRational
(GMR) Stable state, denoted as s∈SGMR
DMi,t
, iff ∀s1 ∈S
UI
DMi,t








As per the definition, a state s is called GMR Stable for DMi at time t if and
only if there exists an SM against every UI that DMi has out of s. In other words,
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DMi cannot in any way reach a more preferred position/state, to the current state
s he is in, by using any of his UIs out of s, because other players will sanction
his UIs. The GMR stability solution concept assumes that decision maker DMi
believes that other players surely would apply a sanction against any of his UIs out
of s. Therefore, he will not move away from s, and s is a GMR stable state for him.
Definition 6.3.3 (Symmetric MetaRational (SMR) Stability): For Decision
Maker DMi∈DM at time t, a state s∈S is considered a Symmetric MetaRational
(SMR) Stable state, denoted as s∈SSMR
DMi,t
, iff ∀s1 ∈S
UI
DMi,t














As per the definition, a state s is called SMR Stable for DMi at time t if and
only if there exists an inescapable sanction ISM against every UI that DMi has out
of s. In other words, DMi cannot in any way reach a more preferred position/state,
to the current state s he is in, by using any of his UIs out of s; and DMi will not
be able to mitigate the sanction moves. DMi will not be able to reach a preferred
state (to s) by moving away unilaterally from the less-preferred states result from
the sanctions that other players can impose on his original UI move away from s.
SMR stability solution concept assumes that decision maker DMi believes that
other players surely would apply a sanction against any of his UIs out of s, and this
sanction is an inescapable one: DMi will not be able to benefit from any move away
from the state produced by the sanction move. Therefore, DMi will not move away
from s, and s is SMR stable for him. SMR takes into consideration one further
move in the game (the possible countermove -but not helpful one- by DMi after the
sanction) than what GMR considers. GMR does not consider whether DMi have
countermoves after the sanction to mitigate the sanction’s effect.
The metarationality GMR and SMR solution concepts, as proposed by Howard
(1971) and defined here, do not require the sanction moves imposed on the decision
maker’s UI away from the “GMR/SMR stable” state s be a UI for any of the
players committing a sanction (or inescapable sanction) move. This is interesting,
because Howard’s proposed definitions for the metarationality concepts assume a
completely rational DMi who only moves if and only if he has a UI and surely
will end up in a better position/state, but DMi’s opponents could be “irrational”
players who might move to less-proffered states, for them, just to hurt DMi and
sanction his UIs. Fraser and Hipel (1984) proposed a stability concept that assumes
all decision makers act consistently in a rational way even when sanctioning each
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other moves. In other words, sanctions must be UI moves by the imposing parties.
The following is the definition of this stability solution concept.
Definition 6.3.4 (Sequentially Stability (SEQ)): For Decision Maker DMi∈













As per the definition, a state s is SEQ stable for DMi at time t if and only if
there exists a UI by another decision maker sanctions every UI that DMi makes out
of s, i.e. render DMi’s UIs to be not beneficial for DMi. DMi cannot in any way
reach a position/state more preferred to the current state s he is in, by using any
of his UIs out of s, because other players will be able to sanction his UIs with SMI
sanction moves, putting DMi at the end into a state which is either less preferred,
or equally preferred, to the original state s he started from.
SEQ is similar to GMR, but has one important difference. SEQ requires the
sanction moves by other players to be SMI moves, not just merely SMs (as the
GMR definition requires). SEQ stability solution concept assumes that decision
maker DMi believes that other players surely would apply a UI move they have to
sanction against any of his UI moves out of s. Therefore, he will not move away
from s, and s is a SEQ stable state for him.
6.3.3 Equilibrium States in Non-Cooperative Games
The concept of an Equilibrium states is an important concept in game theory and
conflict analysis. Equilibrium is tied to the concept of Stability Solution Concepts,
and explains ultimate stability states in the game. We use here the commonly used
definition for an Equilibrium state, but we will add to it in the next section strength
levels to describe the level of strength the overall stability the Equilibrium has. For
now, here is the basic definition of an Equilibrium.
Definition 6.3.5 (Equilibrium (EQ.)): A state s∈ S is considered an Equilib-
rium for a non-cooperative game, at time t, under a specific Solution Concept SC
definition, denoted as s∈SSC EQ.
DM,t
, if and only if ∀DMi∈DM s∈SSCDMi,t.
As per the definition, a state s is stable for the game as a whole, i.e. an equilib-
rium, under a specific solution concept, such as NASH or GMR, if and only if the
state s is stable under this solution concept for each and every decision maker in
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the game.
In any specific game/conflict, there may be a number of equilibrium states under
one or more stability solution concepts. Equilibrium states represent the most likely
outcomes for the game, and constitutes possible resolutions to the game. Once one
of these states arise, this state is likely persist. But, the strength of this persistence
depends on which solution concept the equilibrium state is under, and what is the
strength of the state’s stability under this solution concept for each of the DMs in
the game.
6.4 Stability Strength of Solution Concepts and
Equilibriums for Non-Cooperative Conflicts
In the first subsection, we will define the concept of a measure of “strength” for
solution concepts. Then, we will discuss the mechanisms by which one can identify
the strength of the stability for any given state for any given DM under specific
solution concept. In the second subsection, we will discuss the strength of an equi-
librium under a specific solution concept for a state in a non-cooperative conflict.
6.4.1 Stability Strength of Solution Concepts
Let the Stability Concept Strength a value property, denoted as StabilityStrength(St-
abilityConcept , s,DMi, t), be given a fuzzy linguistic value label LSS based on the
fuzzy memberships functions given in Figure 6.1. The strength expressed by the
LSS fuzzy label is meant to represent the strength of the stability concept type
StabilityConcept (where StabilityConcept ∈{NASH,GMR,SMR,SEQ}) for state s,
for decision maker DMi at time t.
As we will see from the definitions for the stability strength of the different
solution concepts, the StabilityStrength value property, for a specific state for a
specific DM, is tied to the strength of the preference of the state the player ends
with in comparison to the state the state he started from. And as we discussed in
Section 5.4.2 of the previous chapter, preferences’ strengths when not normalized
before fuzzification have numeric values in the range [−2, 2], and the fuzzy label
equivalent will be between Extremely Preferred and Extremely Less-Preferred. If the
preferences’ strength are normalized before fuzzification, then its numeric value will
be in the range [−1, 1], and the fuzzy label equivalent will be between Fully Preferred
and Fully Less-Preferred. The stability strength, as we will see later in this section
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covers only the positive numeric value scale [0, 2], before fuzzification and without
normalization; and the scale [0, 1] before fuzzification and with normalization.
When the StabilityStrength value property before fuzzification is not normal-
ized, i.e. its numeric value is in [0, 2], then its fuzzy label LSS∈{Extreme, Significant,
Strong,Full,Big,Much,Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null} = {Ex, Si, St, F,B,M,
Mo, S, L,N,Null}. And, with the complete order of Ex>Si>St>F >B>M>
!Mo>L>N >Null, where the labels range from representing Extremely strong
stability of s (based on the definition of the solution concept given in StabilityCon-
cept) to None strength level for s (meaning very weak stability strength and close
to non-existing strength or close to indifferent). When StabilityStrength, before
fuzzification, is normalized, i.e. its numeric value is in [0, 1] , then its fuzzy labels
will include the same labels as above with the exception of the three higher labels
covering the range from [1, 2] and those are: Extreme,Significant and Strong.
The LSS fuzzy label assigned to StabilityStrength(StabilityConcept , s,DMi, t)
will cover the stability strength satisfaction levels, with the understanding that the
Null label represents an unknown stability strength or totaly-non-existing-stability.
The fuzzy membership functions defining these stability strength’s linguistic value
labels are given in Figure 6.1. The figure shows the membership functions for each
label’s fuzzy set to be trapezoidal in shape, for simplicity only (not as a restriction)
as indicated in Al-Shawa and Basir (2010). In practice, the number of fuzzy sets
and their membership functions should be defined based on the user needs and
requirements, as we indicated in Al-Shawa and Basir (2009, 2010).
It is worth mentioning here that the following set of definitions for strength of
stability, under each of the four stability solution concepts defined above, are differ-
ent from what others provide. For example, traditional stability solution concepts
definitions provided for GMCR by Fang et al. (1993) decide only whether a con-
flict’s state is stable or not-stable under a certain stability concept, i.e. no strength
of stability is provided. These GMCR definitions were later extended by Hamouda
et al. (2004), adding two strength levels for a state’s stability under a certain solu-
tion concept, and by Xu et al. (2009), subsequently generalizing it to two or more
levels. But all these GMCR stability-strength extended-definitions are based on
given pre-determined agents’ preferences that are set upfront, i.e. unlike the Con-
strained Rationality preferences, these preferences are not calculated as done here,
and could not be verified nor validated. On the other hand, the stabilities’ strengths
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Stability Strength Fuzzy Membership Functions (when the satisfaction domain is not normalized)
(b) Stability Strength Fuzzy Membership Functions (when the satisfaction domain is normalized)
Figure 6.1: The membership functions of the Fuzzy Sets dividing the satisfaction
levels domain of the StabilityStrength value property: (a) when the value property is
not normalized; and (b) when it is normalized
idated, and tied to the players’ motives and constraints. Changes in any of the
contextual information about the conflict and its players, will be reflected on the
stability strength of the conflict’s states for the agents.
Now, we define the stability strength, for non-cooperative games, for each of the
solution concepts we introduced in the previous section.
Definition 6.4.1 (Strength of NASH Stability): For decision maker DMi at
time t, and for a NASH stable state s∈SNASH
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s NASH stability,













, s,DMi, t),−Extreme} |)
As per the definition, the strength of s’s NASH stability strength is the positive
strength equivalent of the negative preference of the state that the worst UI move
executed/could-be-executed by DMi at time < t in order to move to s. Let the
NASH’s stability strength of a state s for DMi at time t be denoted as NASH (LSS),
where StabilityStrength(NASH , s,DMi, t)=LSS . Algorithm 6.2 uses Definition 6.4.1
to calculate the NASH’s stability strength and assign the strength’s fuzzy linguistic
label.
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Algorithm 6.2 Calculating a State’s NASH Stability Strength for a DM in a Non-
Cooperative Game
1: strength-value-label Strength of NASH Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is Not NASH stable
3: NASH Strength = Null
4: // check if DMi has any UIs from s at time t
5: if SUI
DMi,t
(s) = ∅ then
6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t. Now, find the NASH stability’s strength
7: NASH Strength = Strength of Nash(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
8: end if
9: return NASH Strength
10:
11: strength-value-label Strength of Nash(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
12: // this routine will return the strength of the weakest UI, by DMi, that yields to reaching s
13: // set Nash strength initially to “Extremely Strong” (this will be the case if s has no UIs
14: // that leads to it).
15: Strength = −Extreme
16: // find s’s NASH strength
17: for all s
bfr









20: // return the equivalent positive strength label, if Strength<N
21: if Strength < None then
22: Strength = |Strength|
23: end if
24: return Strength
Definition 6.4.2 (Strength of GMR Stability): For DMi at time t, and for a
GMR stable state s∈SGMR
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s GMR stability, to DMi at time t, ,
i.e. StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t), is calculated as follows:
(SUI
DMi,t



























(s) = ∅) → StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) = None
As per the definition, the strength of the GMR stability of s is the positive
strength equivalent of the negative strength of the worst sanction, imposed by
other decision makers {DM−DMi}, against DMi’s UIs from s, given the fact that
DMi will choose the UI that will yield the best less-preferred end state.
Let GMR’s stability strength of a state s for DMi at time t be denoted as
GMR(L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t)=LSS . Algorithm 6.3 uses Def-
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inition 6.4.2 to calculate the GMR’s stability strength and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
Algorithm 6.3 Calculating a State’s GMR Stability Strength for a DM in a Non-
Cooperative Game
1: strength-value-label Strength of GMR Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not GMR stable
3: GMR Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMi has any UIs from s at time t
5: if SUI
DMi,t
(s) = ∅ then
6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t
7: GMR Strength = None




(s)) [∃ an SM sanction ] then
9: // sanction exists against each of DMi’s UIs ⇒ s is GMR stable; find GMR’s strength.
10: GMR Strength = Strength of Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return GMR Strength
13:
14: strength-value-label Strength of Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
15: // this routine will return the strength of the sanction that yields the worst result for DMi,
16: // given the fact that DMi will choose the UI that will minimize his loss.
17: // set sanction’s end state strength initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
18: Strength = −Extreme
19: // find s’s GMR strength




21: SancStrength = None
22: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMi} do











24: SancStrength = min{SancStrength, PrefStrength(ssm , s,DMi, t)}
25: end for
26: end for
27: Strength = max{Strength, SancStrength}
28: end for
29: // return the equivalent positive strength label, if Strength<N
30: if Strength < None then




Definition 6.4.3 (Strength of SMR Stability): For DMi at time t, and for a
SMR stable state s∈SSMR
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s SMR stability, to DMi at time t, ,
i.e. StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t), is calculated as follows:
(SUI
DMi,t
































(s) = ∅) → StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t) = None
As per the definition above, the strength of the SMR stability of s is the positive
strength equivalent of the negative strength of the worst sanction, imposed by other
decision makers {DM−DMi}, against DMi’s UIs from s, given the fact that DMi
will choose the UI that will yield the best less-preferred end state after the counter
move that he has to mitigate the sanctions.
Let SMR’s stability strength of a state s for DMi at time t be denoted as
SMR(L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t)=LSS . Algorithm 6.4 uses Def-
inition 6.4.3 to calculate the SMR’s stability strength and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
Definition 6.4.4 (Strength of SEQ Stability): For DMi at time t, and for a
SEQ stable state s∈SSEQ
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s SEQ stability, to DMi at time t, i.e.
StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t), is calculated as follows:
(SUI
DMi,t


























(s) = ∅) → StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t) = None
As per the definition above, the strength of the SEQ stability of s is the positive
strength equivalent of the negative strength of the worst sanction, imposed by other
decision makers {DM−DMi}, against DMi’s UIs from s, given the fact that DMi
will choose the UI that will yield the best less-preferred end state. But recall
here that as per Definition 6.3.4, for SEQ stability to be established the sanctions
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Algorithm 6.4 Calculating a State’s SMR Stability Strength for a DM in a Non-
Cooperative Game
1: strength-value-label Strength of SMR Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not SMR stable
3: SMR Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMi has any UIs from s at time t
5: if SUI
DMi,t
(s) = ∅ then
6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t
7: SMR Strength = None
8: else if (∀sui ∈ S
UI
DMi,t
(s)) [∃ an inescapable sanction ISM ] then
9: // inescapable sanction exists against each of DMi’s UIs ⇒ s is SMR stable; strength?
10: SMR Strength = Strength of Inescapable Sanctions(s, DMi,Game-Structure)
11: end if
12:
13: return SMR Strength
14: strength-value-label Strength of Inescapable Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
15: // this routine will return the strength of the ISM that yields the worst result for DMi,
16: // given the fact that DMi will choose a UI and a counter move that will minimize his loss.
17: // Set sanction’s strength (after DMi’s counter move) initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
18: Strength = −Extreme




20: ISancStrength = None
21: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMi} do





















23: ISancStrength = min{ISancStrength, PrefStrength(ssm , s,DMi, t)}
24: CntrStrength = −Extreme











28: if ISancStrength < CntrStrength then




33: Strength = max{Strength, ISancStrength}
34: end for
35: if Strength < None then
36: Strength = |Strength|
37: end if
38: return Strength
imposed by other players on DMi’s UIs out of s must be UI moves by those other-
players. In other word, they must act “rationally”. They will not hurt themselves
in order to sanction DMi’s UIs. And this is at the heart of the difference between
GMR stability and SEQ stability.
Let SEQ’s stability strength of a state s for DMi at time t be denoted as
SEQ(L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMi, t)=LSS . Algorithm 6.5 uses Defi-
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nition 6.4.4 to calculate the SEQ’s stability strength and assign the strength’s fuzzy
linguistic label.
Algorithm 6.5 Calculating a State’s SEQ Stability Strength for a DM in a Non-
Cooperative Game
1: strength-value-label Strength of SEQ Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not SEQ stable
3: SEQ Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMi has any UIs from s at time t
5: if SUI
DMi,t
(s) = ∅ then
6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t
7: SEQ Strength = None




(s)) [∃ an SMI sanction ] then
9: // SMI sanction exists against each of DMi’s UIs ⇒ s is SEQ stable; find SEQ’s strength
10: SEQ Strength = Strength of UISanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return SEQ Strength
13:
14: strength-value-label Strength of UISanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
15: // this routine will return the strength of the sanction that yields the worst result for DMi,
16: // given the facts that: 1) the sanction move must be a UI (for the provider); and
17: // 2) DMi will choose the UI that will minimize his loss.
18: // set sanction’s end state strength initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
19: Strength = −Extreme
20: // find s’s SEQ strength





22: UISancStrength = None
23: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMi} do
24: for all ssm ∈ S
UI
DMj,t+1









28: Strength = max{Strength, UISancStrength}
29: end for
30: // return the equivalent positive strength label, if Strength<N
31: if Strength < None then




Let the Equilibrium Strength under a Solution Concept StabilityConcept is a value
property attached to a state s of the game at time t, denoted as Equilibrium-
Strength(StabilityConcept , s, t), be given a fuzzy linguistic value label LSS based on
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the same fuzzy memberships functions setup for the StabilityStrength value property
discussed in the previous subsection. The strength expressed by the LSS fuzzy label
is meant to represent the strength of the equilibrium under the specific stability con-
cept type StabilityConcept (where StabilityConcept∈{NASH,GMR,SMR,SEQ}) for
state s of the game at time t.
As indicated in the equilibrium definition given earlier (Definition 6.3.5), the
equilibrium concept must be defined under a specific stability solution concept. An
equilibrium state under a specific stability solution concept is a state that is stable
for all the decision makers in the game under the same stability solution concept.
For example, if a state is an equilibrium under GMR, then this means that the
state is GMR stable from every player in the game. As a result, the strength of
the equilibrium for a specific state s under a specific solution concept SC is tightly
coupled with the strength of the SC stabilities of s for each player in the game.
We said at the beginning of the previous subsection that the StabilityStrengthvalue
property, for any state, before fuzzification and without normalization has a nu-
meric value in the range [0, 2] , therefore it could have a fuzzy label LSS∈{Extreme,
Significant, Strong,Full,Big,Much, Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null}={Ex, Si, St,
F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}. With the understanding that the complete order of
these labels is Ex>Si>St>F>B>M>Mo>L>N>Null. We also said that the
StabilityStrength before fuzzification and with normalization has a numeric value
that is in the range [0, 1], therefore it could have the same fuzzy labels listed above
with the exception of the three higher labels covering the range from [1, 2] and those
are: Extreme,Significant and Strong.
As for the StabilityStrength value property, and because of the dependancy, the
Equilibrium Strength fuzzy label LSS∈{Extreme, Significant, Strong,Full,Big,Much,
Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null}={Ex, Si, St, F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}. And,
with the complete order of Ex>Si>St>F>B>M>Mo>L>N>Null, where the
labels range from representing Extremely strong equilibrium stability (based on the
definition of the solution concept given in StabilityConcept) of s to None strength
level (meaning very weak equilibrium strength and close to non-existing strength)
for s.
The LSS fuzzy label assigned to EquilibriumStrength(StabilityConcept , s, t) will
cover the equilibrium stability strength satisfaction levels, with the understand-
ing that the Null label represents an unknown equilibrium stability strength or
totaly-non-existing-equilibrium. The fuzzy membership functions defining these
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stability/equilibrium strength’s linguistic value labels are given in Figure 6.1. The
figure shows the membership functions for each label’s fuzzy set to be trapezoidal
in shape, for simplicity only (not as a restriction) as indicated in Al-Shawa and
Basir (2010). In practice, the number of fuzzy sets and their membership functions
should be defined based on the user needs and requirements, as we indicated in
Al-Shawa and Basir (2009, 2010).
Now, we define the equilibrium strength under any specific solution concepts,
for non-cooperative games.
Definition 6.4.5 (Strength of an Equilibrium ): For DM, all decision makers
in a specific non-cooperative game, at time t, and for state s which is an Equilibrium
for the game under a specific Solution Concept SC, i.e. s∈SSC EQ.
DM,t
, the strength of









) → EquilibriumStrength(SC,s,t) = min
DMi
{StabilityStrength(SC,s,DMi,t)}
As per the definition, the strength of the Equilibrium at s under the Solution
Concept SC is the minimum of the strength of s’s stability under SC for each
decision maker in the game. This means that s must be stable under SC for each
player in order for it to be an equilibrium for the game under SC (Definition 6.3.5),
then the minimum of all DMs SC stabilities’ strengths is considered to be the
strength level of this equilibrium at s.
Algorithm 6.6 Calculating a State’s Equilibrium Strength, under a specific Solu-
tion Concept SC, in a Non-Cooperative Game
1: strength-value-label Strength of Equilibrium (s, SC, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not an Equilibrium under SC
3: SC EQ Strength = NULL
4: // check if s is stable for all DMs in the game under Solution Concept SC




6: // s is an Equilibrium for the game under Solution Concept SC; find EQ’s strength
7: // set equilibrium’s strength initially to “Extremely Strong”
8: SC EQ Strength = Extreme
9: // find s’s equilibrium strength
10: for all DMi∈DM do
11: SC EQ Strength = min{SC EQ Strength, StabilityStrength(SC,s,DMi,t)}
12: end for
13: end if
14: return SC EQ Strength
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Let the Equilibrium’s stability strength of state s of the game at time t be
denoted as SC EQ(L
SS
), where EquilibriumStrength(SC, s, t)=L
SS
. Algorithm 6.6
uses Definition 6.4.5 to calculate the equilibrium’s strength and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
6.5 Case Study: The Cuban Missile Crisis
6.5.1 Background
The Cuban Missile Crisis stands as an one of the most important events in the
history of mankind. History offers no parallel to the thirteen days (16-28) of October
1962, when the two rivalry post-second-world-war superpowers, the United States
(US) and the Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - USSR), were at the
verge of starting the first nuclear war in history, and the most destructive war ever.
Had war come, previous wars and natural disasters of history would have faded into
insignificance. Given the high probability, which President Kennedy estimated as
“between one out of three and even”, of starting the disastrous nuclear war, the
fact that humanity escaped such fate seems a historic awesome event. This made
the Cuban Missile Crisis symbolizes what it meant to live in the nuclear age; and
made it to be one of the the most studied events in modem history (Allison and
Zelikow (1999)).
For our research, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 gives us an interesting multi-
agent strategic decision making conflict that is worth analyzing using our frame-
work, because of: 1) its significance as one of a kind strategic political conflict; and
2) the many studies that analyzed and modelled the conflict using other commonly
used rationality frameworks. The crisis has been studied and analyzed by many
(Abel, 1969; Allison, 1971; Fraser and Hipel, 1984). This makes the Cuban Missile
Crisis form a good example to show case the use of the framework, and its stability
analysis tools, which we discussed in this chapter, in modelling and analyzing a po-
litical policy making strategic conflict; and to compare the new model and analysis
to the existing ones available in the literature.
6.5.2 Players’ Strategic Goals
Now, we will follow the steps given in the previous chapter (for modelling multi-
agent conflicts) to model the Cuban Missile Crisis. In modelling the crisis, we
assume that the crisis is modelled from the perspective of the US executive branch
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based on what the US “knows” about itself and the USSR. The porches, model and
analysis we will convey in this section, is the same which a Constrained Rationality
modeller will use to help the US executive branch understand the conflict in order
to guide the US decision makers in the decision they will take.
We start by identifying the strategic goals of the players, using the iterative two
step process discussed in the previous chapter. First, we define the immediate goals,
the most related goals to the conflict context and why the conflict is considered a
conflict in the first place. In this case, the two obvious goals that the players have
were: the US wants the USSR to withdraw the missile bases it had setup in Cuba
(Goal G
US 4
in Table 6.1), and the USSR wants the US to remove the missile bases
it had established in Turkey (Goal G
USSR 5
in Table 6.1).
Second, we identify the higher strategic goals of the players by asking the “why”
question: Why the US wants to achieve G
US 4
of having the missiles withdrawn from
Cuba? Why the US had put missile bases In Turkey? why the USSR had shipped
the missiles to Cuba to be installed there? Why the USSR wants to achieve G
USSR 5
of having the US remove the missile bases In Turkey? Answering these question
will lead to uncovering the ultimate strategic goals (or higher goals in the players’
goal tree/s) behind why the players considered the obvious goals, elicited in the
first step, to be “the” goals for them in the conflict in the first place. This process
will identify a number of strategic goals for both players, the US and the USSR.
Table 6.1 provides a list of the most notable and relevant ones. During this steps
the modeller will link these goals by lateral and reduction goal-to-goal relationships,
and qualitatively labelling them as per the Constrained Rationality GCM modelling
discussed in Chapter 3.
Ideally, after going through the first two steps few times, building and refining
the goal tree/s for each of the players in the conflict, one should have a fully de-
veloped multi-level goal tree structures that form the bases for the players’ GCM
models. But because our focus in this case is to illustrate the use of the conflict
analysis concepts presented in this chapter, the goals listed in Table 6.1 are suffi-
ciently complete. These goals are the same goals/whys, for the US and USSR in
this conflict, that are indicated by the literature (Abel, 1969; Allison, 1971; Allison
and Zelikow, 1999; Fraser and Hipel, 1984); and in total explains sufficiently: why
the the missiles in Cuba and Turkey are important; why the the USSR put the
missiles in Cuba; and why the US wants them removed.
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Bring All South American Countries Under US Influence (a long standing strategic
goal of the US)
G
US 2
Do not enter a war with the USSR (any war will eventually be a nuclear war)
G
US 3
Contain the USSR’s power (hard and soft powers)
G
US 4
Control Cuba and/or Contain it
G
US 5
Remove the USSR missiles from Cuba
G
US 6




Attract new third world nations opposing to the US power/influnece to joint the
Eastern Bloc and offer protection to them (a long standing strategic goal of the USSR)
G
USSR 2
Do not enter a war with the US (any war will eventually be a nuclear war)
G
USSR 3
Protect and defend the USSR from any potential threat close to its Border
G
USSR 4
Protect the Communist Government in Cuba and Support it militarily and politically
G
USSR 5
Remove the US missiles installed in Turkey
6.5.3 Players’ Alternative Actions
In this step, the alternative course of actions for both players are identified. Because
of the nature of the conflict as a strategic military about keep/remove missile bases,
the players’ alternatives are obvious. They range from peaceful means (such as do-
nothing, apply diplomatic pressure, or negotiate) to full scale war, all in between.
A list of the US and the USSR alternatives in this conflict is given in Table 6.2.
These alternatives are, for the most part, similar to the ones both the US and
the USSR considered at the time of the conflict (Abel, 1969; Allison, 1971; Allison
and Zelikow, 1999). Some alternatives, such as do-nothing and negotiation were
not part of the list of actions considered by the Executive Committee formed by
President Kennedy, even though the USSR was hoping the US would include them
as alternatives. Instead for the US opted for a show of force approach, for many
reasons that range from pure-attitudinal reason (naturally aggressive, trying to save
face after being embarrassed publicly by the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, ..)
to more rational reasons (behavioural political maneuvering, the missiles form an at
most risk to the US national security and well-being, ..). Nevertheless, the decision
to include these alternatives in our model is made for two reasons: 1) the USSR
considered them as options for the US; and 2) a full scale analysis of the conflict
should include these options to show wether the US was better off using one of
them.
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Table 6.2: Cuban Missile Crisis: US and USSR Alternatives/Options





Threaten Cuba and USSR asking them to remove the missiles. This option includes
diplomatic pressure through the United Nations or other non-aggressive measures.
A
US 1
Impose a Blockade. The US will enforce an embargo on military shipments to Cuba.
A
US 2
Carry out a surgical Air Strike, destroying the missile bases in Cuba using
conventional but limited air attach.
A
US 3
Conduct a Full Attack against Cuba. This option is most likely be as a follow-up
invasion of Cuba if other less dramatic measures fail to remove the missile bases.
A
US 4
Negotiate a Deal with USSR, with the most likely outcome of this deal is the US
removes the missile bases in Turkey wile the USSR removes the Cuban missile bases.
A
US 5
War. Ultimate escalation of the conflict, this could come as a response to the USSR
escalating the conflict to a point where the US security, well being and reputation
are at stake such as when the USSR launches a ballistic missile attack on the US.





Do Not Withdraw the missiles from Cuba.
A
USSR 1
Withdraw the missiles from Cuba, without this being part of a negotiated deal
with the US. This option also represents Missiles Destroyed & USSR Does Nothing
option (the US destroys the missiles, and the USSR decides to “do nothing”).
A
USSR 2
Escalate the conflict, by carrying on actions that tops the aggressive action the US
took against Cuba. This escalation could be done by assaulting US Naval ships,
bombing southeastern American targets from
Cuba, invading West Berlin, etc.
A
USSR 3
Negotiate a Deal with US, in which the US removes the missile bases in Turkey, as
a condition to have the USSR removes the Cuban missile bases.
A
USSR 4
War. Ultimate escalation of the conflict, this could come by commencing ballistic
missile attack on the US.
6.5.4 Analysis of the Players’ GCMs and Alternatives
In the previous steps, we built a rough GCM model for both players in this in
conflict, the US and the USSR. At this stage, we should complete the GCM models
(goal-trees, constraints, alternatives, and interrelationships among them) adding
any missing component/relationship. The main purpose of this stage is to validate
the players’ alternatives, uncover any additional ones, then complete and validate
the effect of these alternatives on both players’ goals. The alternatives’ effect is
modelled by using lateral goal-to-goal relationships. At the end, this stage will
provide the necessarily information for the next two stages in the modelling and
analysis process: identifying the conflicts’ states, and modelling the players’ pref-
erences over them.
Figure 6.2 shows the players’ GCMs. The models could be enhanced and ex-
tended, but we believe the shown ones are sufficient for the analysis of this conflict,
and the purpose of the case study (illustrate the conflict analysis concepts dis-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































completing the GCM models and identify all known and potential alternatives for
the players. This test checks the validity of the players’ alternatives, knowing the
players’ relaities/constraints.
The conflict’s model is presented in Figure 6.2 as it stands after setting the
value labels for the conflict’s constraints and running the Constrained Rationality
forward propagation reasoning algorithm (Algorithm 3.1 discussed in Chapter 3).
The figure shows the known constraints affects negatively the ability of the players
to choose many of the alternatives they have. For example, the fact that, at the
time the US spy U2 plans uncovered the Cuban missile base and the conflict started,
the the missile base in Cuba was not operational, or could be made operational yet
(Constraint C0 in the model) prevents partially the ability for the USSR to use
the Cuban missiles as a bargaining chip in order to induce the US to remove its
missile bases in Turkey. This therefore affects negatively the ability for the USSR
to choose the Negotiation Alternative. For the US, the failure of the Bay of Pigs
Invasion (Constraint C1 in the model) affects negatively the chances of succeeding
in making another full scale attack or invasion on Cuba.
The first test, as we can see from the figure, reveals clearly that none of the US
and USSR’s alternatives will be eliminated as an option by just applying the effect
of the conflict’s constraints on them. Therefore, we should keep all the alternatives
in the model, despite the fact that some are “less-likely” to be chosen by the players
as the test demonstrates, and proceed to the next test. But it is important here to
note that this first test model provides us insight on how much influence the players
have on the game based on the known constraints/realities. For example, if the US’s
U2 spy plane discovered the Cuban missiles at a later stage of their installation,
and when they are operational, then the conflict will be different. Constraint C0
will propagate positive weight to negotiation between the US and USSR, and will
affect negatively any aggressive alternative the US have.
The second test is about the relevance of the players’ goals to the analysis of
the game. As Figure 6.2 shows, some of the higher goals, in the players’ GCM goal
trees, are not affected directly by the actions selected by the players, but indirectly





the model to remind us why the US wants to “control Cuba” and “maintain the
existence of its missile bases in Turkey”, respectively, these goals can be sufficiently
dealt with by the lower US goals in the model that feeds into them. Therefore, we
can see at a later stage in our analysis that the set of strategic goals for the US
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explained above in Table 6.1. Similarly, the USSR strategic goals set used for






(all explained in the same table above).
In summary, the second test helps identify for each player: what goals are in
the model just to capture the “why”; and what subset of strategic goals are rep-
resentative and more relevant to consider when it is time to calculate the player
preferences. The “why” goals are mostly higher goals in the player’s GCM goal-
tree/s. They are important to stay in the model in order to keep the analyst
reminded about the strategic importance of the player’s lower more relevant goals.
The very lower goals, which are at the bottom of the player’s GCM goal tree/s, are
usually not strategic enough to be considered in order to be used for calculating the
player’s preferences, but our Cuban Missile Crisis model shown in Figure 6.2 is a
special case. This is because the GCM models we have for the players are flat and
have two-level goal trees. So the distinction between what is very strategic high
level goal and what is very tactical lower level goal, within the goal trees, is not as
obvious or important as it would be if the goal trees were deeper multi-level trees.
In our case, we consider all of the US and the USSR goals are strategic for them
to consider as they analyze the conflict. But some of these goal are redundant,
and the effect on them is already been captured through other goals, for them to
be used for calculating the players’ preferences. Including them will constitute a
double counting problem.
The third test is to check for all combination of players’ alternatives that could
form valid conflicts states. Defining conflict states is not a straight forward binary
combinations of the two players’ alternatives. It is true some of the many binary
combinations are valid states, but not all. For example, the US to impose a blockade
on Cuba (A
US 1
discussed in Table 6.2) and the USSR not withdrawing the missiles
from Cuba (A
USSR 0
discussed in the same table) for a very valid state (state s2
shown in Table 6.3 discussed in the following section). However, a state based on
combining the actions of the US conducting one of its aggressive options, such as





and the USSR Negotiate (A
USSR 3
is impossible, because negotiation of a deal needs
both parties to choose to negotiate as their action.
At the same time, the question about whether a state is a valid state or not is
not black and white. Some states are not clear wether they form valid states or
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not. For example, a state based on the US chooses threatening as its action plan
(A
US 0
) while the USSR chooses to escalate (A
USSR 2
) is not an impossible state to
exist, but it is logically a very not likely state to exist. If at any point the analyst
is in doubt, then he should try to add the state at the sensitivity testing stage of
the conflict analysis process. The analyst there can test different what-if scenario
variations of the base model.
But, this step of the process is not only about establishing a set of all valid
states for the conflict to analyze. It is also about adding additional alternatives
because they make the states more clearly defined; or removing alternatives because
they proved redundant. For example, and based on the model that we built for
the conflict, the USSR’s A
USSR 1
“Withdrawing the Missiles from Cuba” alternative
could be also used as the USSR’s “Do Nothing when the US destroy the missile base
in Cuba” alternative. Both alternatives will have the same effect on the USSR’s
goals. So if we originally added an alternative for the USSR representing the Do
Nothing action that it may take, we should remove it and combine the Do Nothing
part to the A
USSR 1
, as we did in Table 6.2. Nevertheless, if for some reason the
modeller felt that there is an important difference, then by all means he should add
an alternative node to the USSR’s GCM model, in the base model for the conflict,
to represent the “Do Nothing” option and wire it to the USSR’s goals showing the
effect it has on them once adopted as “the” alternative to act on. Alternatively,
the modeller could have a variation model to the base one and conduct the analysis
on it at the sensitivity testing stage of the overall conflict analysis process.
By now, we have enough information about the conflict and we are ready to
define the conflict states and the players’ preferences over them.
6.5.5 The Conflict’s States
Table 6.3 shows a complete list of the valid states for the Cuban Missile Crisis
conflict, based on the analysis done above to the conflict model (the US and USSR’s
GCM model interacting with each other). The table defines each state in terms
of the alternatives the players selects. The table rows correspond to the state
definition notation we are using. For example, the first state’s row in the table









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.3: Cuban Missile Crisis: Defining the Game States
The Set of All States S for the US x USSR Cuban Missile Crisis:
State US Options USSR Options
s
0



























































6.5.6 Player’s Preferences over the States of the Conflict
To calculate the preferences of the players over the conflict’s states, we calculate
how much each state (with all its players’ alternatives selected) contribute to the
achievement of the players’ strategic goals. The sets of strategic goals for the



















}. Each of the individual goals is explained above in Table 6.1.
The set of the conflict’s states is defined earlier to be: S = {s0 , s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 , s5 , s6 , s7 ,
s8 , s9}, each of which is defined in Table 6.3.
The players’ preferences, and the strength of their preferences, depend on the
level of achievement each state contribute to the players’ strategic goals, when the
state is in place (i.e. when the players select the alternatives as defined by the
state). For example, the contribution of state s3 (the US impose a Blockade on
Cuba and the USSR Withdraw the missiles from Cuba) to both players’ goals is
calculated by first setting the US’s alternative A
US 1
= F and the USSR’s alternative
A
USSR 1
= F in the conflicts’ model (the interacting players’ GCM models presented
in Section 6.5.4). Then, run the forward label propagation reasoning algorithm
(Algorithm 3.1 discussed in Chapter 3). The state’s contribution to the players’
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strategic goals can be seen from the conflict’s model shown in Figure 6.3. Note that
we removed the effect of the constraints on the alternatives in the model shown,
this is to conduct the stability analysis for the conflict under the assumption that
all players’ alternatives are equally valid and possible. This will allow us to elicit
the states’ stabilities without limiting their validity with whether the players could
afford to commit to the alternatives defining these states. This produces a broader
sense of the states’ stabilities.
Finally, we calculate the Weighted Payoff value for each player using the method
presented in Section 5.4.2 of of the previous chapter. The players’ weighted payoffs
for each state of the conflict are shown in Figure 6.4. The figure shows the level
of achievement the state contributes to the players’ strategic goals. It also shows
the strategic importance and the emotional valence each of the players has for their
respective strategic goals (all assumed to be fully important in our base model); in
addition to the Rationality and Emotionality Factors for both players (assumed in
the base model to be set to Full and None, or 1.0 and 0.0, respectively, in other
words the players are assumed fully rational and not emotional as one could expect
from governments with institutional collective rationality). The analyst can test
different rationality and emotional values, and the implication of such values, by
setting up what-if scenario models as variations to the base model as part of the
sensitivity analysis stage.
Now, from the calculate weighted payoffs of each state to each of the players, we
calculate the Ordinal Preferences for the players over the conflict’s states. Figure
6.4 shows both the weighted payoffs and the ordinal preferences for each state of
the conflict, for each player.
The strengths of the players’ preferences of each state over each of the other
states are also calculated from the calculate weighted payoffs using the method
discussed in Section 4.5. Table 6.4 shows the US and USSR’s preferences vectors,
and the preferences strengths of each state over each other state in the conflict.
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Table 6.4: Cuban Missile Crisis: Players’ Preferences

























s3 s1 s4 s2 s0 s6 s5 s8 s7 s9
s
3
N N N L L L L L L S
s
1
N N N N L L L L L L
s
4
N N N N L L L L L L
s
2
-L N N N N N L L L L
s0 -L -L -L N N N N N N L
s6 -L -L -L N N N N N N L
s5 -L -L -L -L N N N N N L
s
8
-L -L -L -L N N N N N N
s
7
-L -L -L -L N N N N N N
s
9
-S -L -L -L -L -L -L N N N
USSR’s Preferences (Most to Least Preferred)
Pref(USSR) s8 s0 s1 s3 s2 s4 s6 s5 s7 s9


























N L S S S S M M B B
s
0
-L N N L L L S S Mo Mo
s
1
-S N N N N L S S S S
s3 -S -L N N N L L S S S
s2 -S -L N N N N L L S S
s
4
-S -L -L -L N N L L L S
s
6
-M -S -S -L -L -L N N L L
s
5
-M -S -S -S -L -L N N N L
s
7
-B -Mo -S -S -S -L -L N N N
s
9
-B -Mo -S -S -S -S -L -L N N
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Figure 6.4: Cuban Missile Crisis: Players’ Ordinal and Normalized Weighted Pref-
erences
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6.5.7 Player’s Moves over the States of the Conflict
At this step, we define the unilateral moves for each of the US and the USSR.
These moves are shown in Figure 6.5. We should note that the states in the figure
are shown with their corresponding numbers. For example state s5 is shown as a
circle with the number 5 at its centre. It is also worth noting that the conflict’s
states includes a Negotiation state, or s8 , which none of the players can move to it
unilaterally. This state is considered a cooperative move, a type of players’ moves
that we will define later when we discuss cooperative games. But because of the
nature of the conflict and the players’ preferences structures, this state will not
materialize as an improvement move (unilateral or cooperative). As a result, it will
not affect the analysis of the conflict by demanding the conflict to be analyzed as
a cooperative game.
Figure 6.5: The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Unilateral, Cooperative and Unilateral
Improvement Moves by the players, the US and the USSR
By feeding the players’ UMs and preference structures to Algorithm 6.1, the
Player’s UI moves are defined. Figure 6.5 shows that the US has two UI moves
from the status quo state s0 to states s2 and s4 (the states in which the US imposes
a Blockade on Cuba, and the US commits a surgical Air Strike to remove the
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missiles, respectively); and another UI from state s2 to state s4 . On the other
hand, the USSR has only one UI move, and that is from state s2 , the US imposing
a Blockade state, to state s3 in which the USSR Withdraw the missiles from Cuba
after the US’s Blockade.
6.5.8 Stability Analysis of the Cuban Missile Crises States
The stability of each of the Cuban Missile Crisis’s states for both players, the US
and the USSR, is defined in Table 6.5. The table shows whether each state is stable
under the stability solution concept of NASH, GMR, SMR, and SEQ (defined in
Definitions 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3, and 6.3.4 respectively); and what is the strength of
this stability (as per Definitions 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.3, and 6.4.4 respectively, and their
implementations given in Algorithms 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 respectively).
First, Table 6.5 shows the stability analysis of the conflict’s states for the US. At
the top of the US’s table, the states are listed in the order of the US’s preferences
vector deduced in Section 6.5.6, and shown in Table 6.4. Beneath some of the states
in the preferences vector are states that the US can move unilaterally to, improving
its position (preference order and weighted payoff). The result of the UI move is
a state appears to the left of the column of the current state the UI occurs from,
reflecting the fact that the UI move will result with a more preferred state. For
example, the US has two UIs from the status quo just-threaten state s0 . One to the
impose-blockade state s2 , and the other to the perform-surgical-air-strike state s4 .
Both of s2 and s4 are preferred to the US than the status quo s0 . Recall that in all
of the three states, the USSR maintains having the same alternative as its strategy
to deal with the conflict, and that is Not Withdraw the Missiles from Cuba (A0).
The US, on the other hand, chooses a different alternative in each of these states
as a strategy to deal with the conflict. This is why the US is considered moving
unilaterally among them. In a similar manner all the USSR’s Uls are listed under
the appropriate state in the USSR’s preference vector in the stability analysis Table
6.5.
Second, the table shows beneath each state in the player’s preference vector
the strength of the state’s stability for the player under each of the four stability
solution concepts (NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ), if and only if the state is stable
for the player under the speechified solution concept. If the state is not stable
for the player under the specified solution concept, the table will show nothing.
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For example, consider state s0 for the US. The US has two UIs out of this state,
making it unstable under any of the solution concepts as per the mathematical
properties given for each in Definitions 6.3.1 - 6.3.4. Therefore, Table 6.5 shows
nothing in the US tabular under s0 . On the other hand, state s0 is stable for
the USSR under NASH stability Definition 6.3.1 (with Extreme stability strength
based on NASH Stability Strength given in Definition 6.4.1); and therefore stable
for the USSR under GMR, SMR and SEQ stability solution concepts as per their
respective definitions indicated earlier (with None stability strength based on the
stability strength respective definitions and algorithms indicated earlier). These
stability strengthes are shown under state s0 in the USSR tabular within Table 6.5.




























NASH Ex Ex N Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
GMR N N N L N N N N N
SMR N N N L N N N N N

























NASH Ex Ex Ex N Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
GMR N N N N N N N N N
SMR N N N N N N N N N
SEQ N N N N N N N N N
Table 6.6: Cuban Missile Crisis: Equilibrium States
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
NASH EQ. Ex N N Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
GMR EQ. N N N N N N N N
SMR EQ. N N N N N N N N
SEQ EQ. N N N N N N N N
While Table 6.5 shows the stability for each of the conflict’s states being an-
alyzed from a particular player’s point of view, Table 6.6 shows the equilibrium
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states of the conflict. Under each state on the top row of Table 6.6, the table
lists the strength of the equilibrium under each of the stability solution concepts
if the state constitutes an equilibrium under the solution concepts. If the state is
not an equilibrium state for the conflict under the specified solution concept, then
the table will show nothing under the state. Recall that the state is considered
an equilibrium under a specific solution concept if it is stable under the solution
concept for both players (Definition 6.3.5); and the strength of the equilibrium is
determined by applying Definition 6.4.5 and its implementation procedure given in
Algorithm 6.6.
6.5.9 Results of the Cuban Missile Crisis Analysis
The results of the above analysis provide us with significant insights into the Cuban
Missile Crisis. We will first discuss the insights gained, focusing on two aspects:
analyzing the equilibrium states of the conflict found by the previous step of our
analysis; and analyzing how the conflict is expected to evolve over time starting
from the status quo state s0 . Then, we will compare our findings with what actually
happened in this important historical conflict. Finally, we will compare what we
learned from our analysis with the analysis of other methods found in the conflict
analysis literature which addresses the Cuban Missile Crisis conflict. For our com-
parison analysis we will specifically compare our work to the work of Fraser and
Hipel (1984), and the very famous work of Allison and Zelikow (1999).
1) Analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis’s Equilibrium States:
Table 6.5 shows both the US and the USSR have states s1 , s3 , s4 , s5 , s6 , s7 ,
s8 , and s9 all as NASH stable states. This reflects the fact that both players
have no UI moves out of any of these states. As a consequence, all these states
are shown in the equilibrium analysis, Table 6.6, to be equilibrium states for the
conflict under NASH stability solution concept. Two questions immediately arise:
1) how could the conflict have as many equilibrium states? Normally, conflicts
have few equilibrium states; and 2) why Table 6.6 shows the strength of the NASH
equilibrium stability for states s3 and s4 to be at the None level while the rest of
the states have their NASH stability shown to be at the Extreme strength level?
First, most conflicts will have few equilibrium state, as our case studies in this
thesis work show and as suggested by many scholars (e.g. Fraser and Hipel (1984)).
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This fact is in general a reflection of the complexity of the conflicts analyzed. If a
conflict has many of its states found to be stable for all players, particularly under
NASH solution concept, and therefore form equilibriums (NASH EQs) suggesting
that the conflict could end at any of them, then this represents a situation where the
players have less maneuverability in the conflict. This is exactly what we find in the
Cuban Missile Crisis. None of the players wants to escalate the conflict to a point
where a nuclear war becomes possible. Figure 6.5 shows this clearly. States that
have the US, the USSR or both adopt a very aggressive alternative, such as “full
attack” or “escalate”, the players have no UI moves to them (leading to them) and
from them (taking them to a more aggressive state escalating the conflict further).
In fact, this proves that none of the players was willing to take the risk of leading
the conflict in that direction.
Another reason, for this too-many-equilibrium-states situation, is the possibility
that some or many of these equilibrium states should not be considered as legitimate
states, in the first place, in our stability analysis. This might be true, for example,
in the case of the Negotiation state (s3). Indeed our analysis of the players’ GCMs
and alternatives, conducted earlier in Section 6.5.4, showed that the US will not
take this alternative as an option, and the USSR should cut any hopes of having
this alternative as a valid strategy that the US will agree to. This is especially true
because of the fact that the US’s U2 spy planes had uncovered the USSR’s Cuban
missiles scheme before the missiles were operational or close to be operational. This
removed the element of surprise which the USSR was counting on; and of course
took out with it the possibility for the USSR to use this Cuban missiles base as a
counter measure to the US’s Turkey missile bases, or even as a bargaining chip to
negotiate the removal of the US’s Turkey bases in exchange of the removal of the
USSR’s Cuban base. This not-operational-missile-bases fact and its effect on the
players’ alternatives, and by propagation on their strategic goals, were captured
in the conflict model we showed then. This should have suggested that including
the negotiation s3 state was extra and not necessary. We said then that we are
including it to enrich the analysis and to see if this state will have any chance to
form an end to the conflict (recall that to do so we removed the not-operational
constraining effect when eliciting the players preferences). Despite this, the state
came at the end of the US’s preference vector, while came first, as expected, at
the USSR’s vector. And, with no UIs for the players to reach to it from the status
quo state s3 , as we will see later in this section, it ended to be a mere hypothetical
equilibrium that could not materialize as a resolution state to the conflict.
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Second, a state’s equilibrium strength under a specific solution concept is a
function of its stability strength, under the same solution concept, for each of the
players, as noted in Definition 6.4.5. For states s1 , s5 , s6 , s7 , s8 , and s9 , both
the US and the USSR have them stable under NASH stability concept. Because
none of these states have UIs leading to them, by the players individually, these
states are assigned Extreme strength for their NASH stability for each player (as
per Definition 6.4.1 and Algorithm 6.2). As a result, these states all form Extreme
Equilibriums for the conflict under NASH stability concept.
On the other hand, while both players have no UIs away from states s3 and s4 ,
and therefore have these two states stable under NASH, but the stability strength
for them are showed to be in Table 6.6 at the None strength level (i.e. with very
little/weak strength). This is due to the fact that the players can reach these two
states as a result of using UIs from other states which are less preferred to them.
For the US, s4 can be reached through its UIs from s0 or s2 , and we know from
Table 6.4 that s2 
N
US , t
s4 and that s0 
−L
US , t
s4 . By applying Definition 6.4.1 and its
accompanying Algorithm 6.2, the NASH stability of state s4 to the US is determined
to be at the None strength level. For the USSR, state s3 can be reached by using a
UI from s2 , and Table 6.4 shows that s2 
N
USSR , t
s3 . By applying the same definition
and algorithm, the strength of s3 ’s NASH stability, to the USSR, is determined
to be at the None strength level too. Applying Definition 6.4.5, the strength of
the NASH equilibriums at s3 and s4 will be the minimum of the NASH stability
strength for the two players of the conflict, making these two states at the None
NASH equilibrium strength level.
It is important to remember here that the fuzzy strength label for a stability or
an equilibrium set to be None does not mean that there is no stability or equilibrium
here. It just means that the strength is at the “very little/weak” level, or at 10%
or less level based on the fuzzy membership function we used to define the label
None. Also, recall that if a state has no UIs out of it for a player, i.e. NASH stable
for him, it will automatically be GMR, SMR and SEQ stable for the player, as
per Definitions 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4, respectively. The strength of these GMR,
SMR and SEQ stabilities will be set to None level as per Definition 6.4.2, 6.4.3 and
6.4.4, respectively (and by applying their accompanying Algorithms 6.3, 6.4 and
6.5, respectively).
We so far discussed how and why our analysis found too many equilibrium
states for the Cuban Missile Crisis, and how valid these states as resolution end
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points for the conflict. We will now further validate our findings that many of
these equilibrium points are hypothetical and do not form real resolution stable
end points for the conflict. We will do so by conducting an analysis on the possible
pathes that the conflict could take, or evolve to, starting for the status quo state
of the conflict (October 14, 1962). As we will see below, many of these states are
unreachable by the players, if both players will act “rationality” in this conflict,
i.e. act consist with their respective preferences order. Despite the fact that the
“rationality” assumption is a very valid and realistic assumption, considering the
collective rationality of the players’ institutions and their understanding of the
consequences for acting against it, one should not rule out the possibility that one
of the players could decide, by mistake or by design, escalate the conflict putting
it at a path that could lead to the most destructive war humanity could face: a
nuclear war. We will look also at how this unfortunate evolution could happen.
2) Evolution of The Cuban Missile Crisis Starting from the Status Quo:
Table 6.7 shows the possible scenarios of how the Cuban Missile Crisis could evolve
starting from the status quo state s0 , where the US threatens (and does nothing
else or uses only diplomatic pressure) and the USSR decides to keep the missile
base in Cuba (working on completing the installation of it or hoping to do so in
the near future). Giving the status quo’s current time the symbol t, we will look
at the player’s option at time t and moving forward:
At time t: Let us consider at this point whether the US and the USSR both will be
compelled to stay at the status quo s0 state, and as a result the conflict would
never progress beyond this point (Scenario 1 in Table 6.7). This scenario is
unlikely to persist because s0 is unstable to the US (see Table 6.5) even though
it is a NASH stable state for the USSR. The US has a UI out of this state
to either state s2 or state s4 , and will rationally activate one of them leading
the conflict to adopt Scenario 2 or Scenario 6, respectively.
At time t + 1: With the exception of Scenario 1, all the scenarios presented in
Table 6.7 expect the conflict to extend beyond the status quo state. And,
knowing that Scenario 1 is unlikely to persist, as discussed above, then most
likely the conflict will move one step further reaching an end at or after t+ 1.
Looking at the scenarios extending the conflict beyond t, we find that all
show the US taking one of the two UIs it has out of the status quo state s0 .
227
Table 6.7: Cuban Missile Crisis: Evolution Scenarios (starting from the status quo s0 )
Scenario No.of Conflict Evolution End State
No. Steps 0 1 2 3 EQ Stability for US Stability for USSR
1 0 Unstable NASH (Ex)
2 1 GMR (L) & SMR (L) Unstable
3 2 NASH (N ) NASH (Ex) NASH (N )
4 2 NASH (N ) NASH (N ) NASH (Ex)
5 3 NASH (Ex) NASH (Ex) NASH (Ex)∗∗
6 1 NASH (N ) NASH (N ) NASH (Ex)
7 2 NASH (Ex) NASH (Ex) NASH (Ex)∗∗
∗∗ irrational last move by the USSR (made just to hurt the US)
Scenarios 2, 3, 4 and 5 show the US takes a UI to s2 , while Scenarios 6 and
7 show the US takes a UI to s4 .
One of the two maneuvers the US could do, after threatening the USSR and
the USSR ignoring its threat (state s0), is to activate a UI move it has out
of s0 to state s2 where it imposes a blockade on Cuba. The purpose of this
blockade is mainly to not allow the USSR to complete the missiles installation
in Cuba, and also to inflict strict economical sanctions on Cuba. The second
maneuver is to activate the UI it has from s0 to state s4 where it carries
out a surgical air strike against the missile base in Cuba destroying it and
eliminating its threat. This option is direct to the point but bear some serious
risk. So what is the most rational move the US could have out of s4? Let us
consult the the stability analysis presented above.
s2 is GMR and SMR stable for the US, with a higher degree of stability
strength than the NASH (with its by product de facto None weak GMR
and SMR) stability to be gained if the US moved to s4 instead. Recall that
GMR and SMR stability concepts consider other players’ counter moves, while
NASH does not. s4 is mainly NASH stable for the US. The GMR and SMR
stability for the US for this state is because the US has no UIs out of it and
not because we considered the USSR’s counter moves. s2 , on the other hand,
is not NASH stable for the US, but GMR and SMR stable, this is due to the
possibility of the USSR moving to s5 if the US decided to use a UI move it
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has to s4 from s2 , putting itself and the US at a less preferred position where
the conflict could escalate further by both players acting irrationally to hurt
each other.
This makes the US moving to state s2 from the status quo state s0 , reaching
it at time t + 1, to be a more likely scenario (Scenario 2 in Table 6.7) than
the one in which the US moves to state s4 from s0 (Scenario 6 in the same
table), reaching it at time t+ 1. In addition, moving to state s2 gives the US
more maneuverability since it can escalate and take the conflict to state s4
(Scenario 4) if the USSR does not take its UI to state s3 removing the missiles
from Cuba (Scenario 3). On the other hand, if the US moves the conflict to
state s4 then the USSR could act just to hurt the US by taking a non-UI
move it has to state s5 putting itself and the US at a less preferred state
(Scenario 5). In other words, for the US, while choosing to adopt Scenario 2
gives the USSR a chance to take a UI leading the conflict to evolve to Scenario
3, choosing to adopt Scenario 6 leaves the USSR with one of two: living with
a less preferred state (Scenario 6); or choosing to hurt/punish the US even
if this means the USSR itself will end at an even further less preferred state
(Scenario 7).
One question we should answer here: Will the conflict end at one of the
two states s2 and s4 reached at the t + 1 point of time (Scenarios 2 and 6,
respectively), or will it continue beyond this point? State s2 is unstable for the
USSR since it has a UI out of it to state s3 which the US cannot disimprove
upon. But, state s2 is GMR and SMR stable for the US, and this will make
the US try to hold on to it and not take its UI to state s4 out of it, in fear of
the USSR retaliating by moving to state s5 in an effort to hurt the US and
save its face as a superpower in the world, even if this means hurting itself
too. This makes state s2 not an equilibrium for the conflict and a less likely
candidate to mark the end of it. But, it is definitely a more rational state to
be in, for the US, than moving directly to s4 from the status quo s0 .
Ending the conflict by having the US move to s4 is possible, since the state in
NASH stable for both players. They both have no UIs out of this state. So if
the US and the USSR both acted rationally, state s4 is a NASH equilibrium
and could be a possible end to the conflict. But, if the USSR decided to act
irrationally, i.e. against its justifiable preferences order seen in Table 6.4, in
order to just hurt the US as we said above, then the USSR will take a step
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move to s5 escalating the conflict (this could be done by invading/attacking
West Berlin for example - something the US does not want to happen). From
state s5 , the conflict will likely escalate further by both players, each acting
against their respective preferences order, just to hurt the other player and
save its superpower face in the world. For this reason, and rationally speaking,
the US is not likely to move to s4 reaching at time t+ 1 in the first place, but
try instead to maintain an s2 position at t + 1 giving the USSR a chance to
act rationally and utilize a UI move it has to s3 removing the missiles from
Cuba and putting an end to the conflict.
At time t + 2: There are four scenarios from the ones presented in Table 6.7 that
could extend the conflict beyond the t + 1 point of time. Three of these
scenarios, Scenarios 3, 4 and 5, extend the conflict if the US chooses to move
to state s2 at time t reaching it at time t + 1, and the conflict did not end
at s2 (i.e. did not end to be a Scenario 2 situation). The fourth scenario is
Scenario 7 which extends the conflict if the US chooses to move to state s4
at time t reaching it at time t+ 1, and the conflict did not end at s4 (i.e. did
not end to be a Scenario 6 situation).
The most rational evolution of the conflict will be consistent with Scenario
3. As said before, the US took this route to give the USSR the chance to
act rationally and utilize its UI out of s2 reaching state s3 at time t + 2 by
dismantling the Cuban missiles and as a result ending the conflict. But, if the
USSR delayed taking its UI to s3 from s2 , then the US will interpret this as a
sign that the USSR decide to complete the installation of the missile base in
Cuba. A hint of such action by the USSR, will immediately make the US take
the conflict to state s4 , acting on a UI it has from s2 . This is a rational move
by the US and will definitely put the conflict at a NASH equilibrium. The
US has the missiles destroyed by the carried out surgical air strike and has
no further rational intention, or UI, to escalate the conflict beyond this point
(t + 2). Similarly, the USSR has no UI out of s4 , and rationally should not
escalate the conflict beyond this point. In other words, the conflict could end
rationally at either s3 or s4 (Scenario 3 or 4, respectively). Both states are
NASH equilibrium states, but state s3 is a more likely ending of the conflict
(Scenario 3) because it constitutes ending the conflict at a more preferred
state. Recall, from Table 6.4, that s3 
N
US , t
s4 and s3 
L
USSR , t
s4 making state s3
more preferred than s4 for both players. And therefore, Scenario 3 constitutes,
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for both players, a more preferred path for the conflict to evolve to than
Scenario 4.
On the other hand, the US could move to state s4 because it ran out of
patience for having the USSR take a UI to s3 after it made its move to state
s2 from the status quo state. It also, out of fear from allowing the USSR
to finish installing the missiles, could moved to state s4 directly from the
status quo state. In any of these two scenarios takes place, and as a response
the USSR acts irrationally escalating the conflict in retaliation, moving it to
state s5 , then conflict could end up been taken the Scenario 5 route, or the
the Scenario 7 route, based on whether the US moved to s4 from s2 or directly
from s0 , respectively. In both cases, the USSR acts irrationally against its
own preferences order, motivated only by revenge and the fact that this will
hurt the US. This makes the conflict ends at a less preferred state for both the
US and the USSR. These are unlikely evolution paths for the conflict, because
both assume that the USSR will act irrationally hurting itself. But, they are
very possible scenarios considering that the cold war politics at the time did
not mature enough. In such scenarios, it is possible that both parties will
come to their senses, act rationally not escalate the conflict further, and end
the conflict at state s5 , a NASH equilibrium. But we have to remember that
at the time both parties were in their early stages of their coalitions building
and they both were topping each other in their military capabilities. Going
to state s5 , for the USSR means showing the world, and possible coalition
partners, that it is a superpower and equal to the US. One could expect, as
a result, the US to have a change of its preferences vector (the one shown
in Table 6.4) making a retaliation and further escalation a possible scenario.
Indeed, a very dangerous and destructive evolution of the conflict. For this
reason, both players are not likely to take the conflict these two scenarios’
ways.
At time t + 3: if the conflict extended beyond t+2 and was not resolved by then,
then there is only one scenario the conflict is going: Scenario 5. According
to this scenario, the US had moved to s2 from the status quo state, then
waited for the USSR to remove the missiles from Cuba taking a UI to state
s3 but the USSR did not. The US, then, carried out a surgical air strike
destroying the missiles and putting the conflict in state s4 at time t+ 2. The
conflict did not end by the USSR acting rationally according to its preferences
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order (Scenario 4). Instead, the USSR retaliated by escalating the game and
putting it in state s5 at time t + 3 (Scenario 5). As we said above, if the
conflict actually evolved to be following this dangerous route, then this could
lead to either: both parties act rationally and end the conflict at state s5 , a
NASH equilibrium; or act irrationally and take further steps to escalate the
conflict beyond s5 , maybe all the way to the nuclear war (state s9).
We can conclude from the analysis above that while Scenarios 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7 shown in Table 6.7 form possible evolution paths for the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Scenario 3 proves to be the most logical evolution path for the conflict. Second to
it is Scenario 4. This is true if and only if both the US and the USSR act rationally
(according to preferences order). If, on the other hand, one or both of them act
in an irrational manner, for some reason or another, the possibility of having the
conflict reach the escalating point of s5 (Scenario 5 or 7), or go beyond (dragging
the conflict further to s7 or s9), becomes very real.
3) Comparing our Analysis with What Really Happened:
Let us compare how the conflict actually evolved, historically, to how our analysis
predicts it would. Table 6.8 presents the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis in their
historical order, as given by Allison and Zelikow (1999), starting from the time the
US put the conflict at the status quo state, with information about the state that
the conflict is at during the event, who made the move to the state (in brackets
we show whether the move is a UI move for the mover), the step number (or as
it could be read: time t+ no. of steps/moves by the players so far), in addition to
comments added to the event’s description.
As Table 6.8 shows, the conflict in reality followed Scenario 3, which we de-
scribed in Table 6.7 and discussed above. One should take note of important
observations from how the conflict historically followed Scenario 3, and how much
the analysis produced by our framework resembles what had had happened on the
ground at the time. First, it is interesting to see that the US at the same time (Oc-
tober 22, 1962) it threatened the USSR demanding a removal of the Cuban missiles,
putting the conflict at the status quo state s0 , it actually moved the conflict to state
s2 immediately after that, by announcing the plan to impose the blockade on Cuba.
In effect, this shows that the US was certain that the USSR will not move from
state s0 to s1 removing the missiles. This is because the USSR has no UI move
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Table 6.8: Cuban Missile Crisis: Analysis vs.Reality
Step Date Actual Conflict Evolution Move by to/at State
0 Oct. 22, 1962 Kennedy initiates a public confrontation by announcing US s0
the Soviet action to the world, demanding Soviet removal
of their missiles, putting U.S. strategic forces on alert, and
warning the Soviet Union that any missile launched from
Cuba would be regarded as a Soviet missile and met with
a full retaliatory response.
Status Quo
1 Oct. 22, 1962 Kennedy as part of his public confrontation ordered a U.S.
quarantine of Soviet weapon shipments to Cuba.
US (UI ) s2
Oct. 23, 1962 Khrushchev orders Soviet strategic forces to alert and
threatens to sink U.S. ships if they interfere with Soviet
ships en route to Cuba.
s2
Oct. 24, 1962 Soviet ships stop short of the U.S. quarantine line. s2
Oct. 26, 1962 Khrushchev private letter, to Kennedy, says the necessity
for the Soviet deployment would disappear if the U.S. will
pledge not to invade Cuba. Khrushchev tries to suggest
for both parties to negotiate a deal, i.e. go to state s8 .
s2
Oct. 27, 1962 Khrushchev second, but public, letter demanding US with-
drawal of Turkish missiles for Soviet withdrawal of Cuban
missiles. Khrushchev tries, again, to suggest for both par-
ties to negotiate a deal, ie.e go to state s8 , citing here the
real concern of the USSR: the US missiles in Turkey.
s2
Oct. 27, 1962 US responds affirmatively to first Khrushchev letter but
says that, first, missiles now in Cuba must be rendered
inoperable and urges quick agreement. Robert Kennedy
adds privately that missiles in Turkey will eventually be
withdrawn but that the missiles in Cuba must be removed
immediately and a commitment to that effect must be
received the next day, otherwise military action will follow.
In effect, the US is hinting here a move to state s4 , if the
USSR does not move to state s3 , and is telling the USSR
that state s8 ’s negotiation is not an option at this time.
s2
2 Oct. 28, 1962 Khrushchev publicly announces that the USSR will with-
draw its missiles in Cuba
USSR (UI ) s3
Scenario 3
from s0 to s1 , so the US decided to move directly to state s2 and save precious time
could have been wasted otherwise.
Second, the US chose to move to s2 , from the status quo state s0 , and not move
to state s4 instead. The analysis provided above sheds light on why the US chose
the s2 path. It is less risky. It gives the USSR a chance to utilize a UI it has from s2
to s3 removing the missiles from Cuba and ending the conflict. That is if the USSR
acts rationally. It, also, allows the US to test the USSR’s preferences order, and
how rational the USSR will act in the conflict. Judging from the USSR response
and reaction, whether the USSR will respect the blockade or try to escalate, how far
the USSR managed to get the missiles operational. If indeed the the missiles were
operational or very close to be, then the USSR will act aggressively and decisively,
otherwise it will pay lips service but respect the blockade. In addition, the move
to state s2 does not eliminate the option of going to state s4 (carry out air strikes
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to destroy the missiles). Going to s4 after being in s2 is still a valid option. In
fact the US has a UI to do so, if the USSR fails to take its own UI from s2 to s3
in a reasonable time (a long period beyond the week time frame means that the
USSR is working on making the missiles operational). If, instead, the US moves
to state s4 carrying out air strikes, then this does not give the US the option to
use blockade if the air strikes fail to destroy the missiles (a complete impressment
to the US considering its earlier failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion). The US also
does not to invoke an irrational a move by the USSR escalating the conflict beyond
Cuba. By moving to state s2 it ensures the conflict stays about Cuba and not get
escalated to include Europe (West Berlin specifically).
Third, once the conflict reached state s2 , the USSR while initially paid lip
service to not caving in to the US demands and blockade threats (event of October
23, 1962), it actually did respect the blockade. This demonstrated by the event of
October 24, 1962, when the Soviet ships stopped short of the US quarantine line.
This shows that the USSR had no intention to move the conflict to the escalation
path. This is confirmed by our analysis showing that the USSR has no UI out of
state s2 to a state where it escalates the conflict, such as states s5 , s7 or s9 .
Forth, one could not but notice the attempt by the USSR to suggest going
the negotiation path. Khrushchev letters of October 26 and 27, 1962 shows two
things. It shows the true strategic goals the USSR have in mind, and why it tried
to deploy the missiles in Cuba. These goals were modelled within the GCM we
have for the USSR. Recall that we have tested each alternative the USSR have,
and by extension each state of the conflict, against these strategic goals. These
alternatives/states contribution to the achievement of these goals guided the process
of eliciting the true preferences order for the USSR. In addition, these letters confirm
the preferences order we elicited for the USSR. They show how the USSR prefers
going to the negotiation state s8 more than anything else because it provides the
best achievement to its strategic goals.
Fifth, the move by the US to ignore USSR’s suggestion to go to the negotiating
rout (go to state s8 from state s2) is fully explained by our conflict model and
analysis, presented in Section 6.5.4. The effect of the realities on the ground, the
constraints modelled as part of the plays GCM models, show that the fact the lack
of operationally of the missiles at the status quo time rendered the negotiation
alternative for the US to be not needed or desired. It also show that the USSR
should not keep it hopes up for the US choosing this option. The USSR, by sending
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these letters, tried to confirm if the US is aware of the actual stage of completion
and operationally of the Cuban missiles at the time, or they are ignorant about
it. The US responded on October 27 by ignoring USSR’s suggestion to go to state
s8 moving together to negotiate a deal to end the conflict, and instead threatened
to go state s4 if the USSR does not go to s3 removing the missiles. This response
by the US confirmed to the USSR thatthe US is aware of the fact that they had
discovered the missiles before they are operational or close to be operational.
Last, the path the conflict took, or Scenario 3, confirms that the analysis was
right in predicting rational behavior by both the US and the USSR. None of the
players have any incitive in escalating the conflict or expanding it. In fact, for
most of the observers and analysts (Allison and Zelikow (1999) for example), the
moves by the US to impose a blockade (s2) instead of carrying out air strikes
(s4), and by the USSR to state s3 removing the missiles instead of escalating the
conflict, were puzzling and needed much lengthy discussion on how and why, with
no mathematical or logical models to provide the answers to these question in a
concise manner. The models and analysis we provided provides a clear cut answer
to why each step the players took in reality, during the conflict, is the most rational
step to take; and why the sequence of events observed in reality is the most rational
sequence of events for the conflict to take.
4) Comparing our Model and Analysis with Others’ Work:
We will look at how our model and analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis compare
to the models and analysis of two important works in the field: The first is the
work of Fraser and Hipel (1984), which presents a fairly normative and mathe-
matical modelling and analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis; and the second is the
work of Allison (1971), the very famous and the most elaborate work on the crisis
(updated to include many information revealed from the archives of the US and
the USSR after the cold war ended in the early 90’s and published as Allison and
Zelikow (1999)), which provides mostly a descriptive analysis of the conflict, with
no mathematical models to backup the analysis.
The work of Fraser and Hipel (1984) provides a normative conflicts modelling
and analysis framework similar to the ones typically presented in the game theory
literature, but differ in an important aspect: it is based on an ordinal representation
of the players’ preferences over the states of the conflict, not a cardinal one. The
states are given binary numbers reflecting the selections players made from a menu
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of options/actions they can take. The work is based on solid mathematical grounds
and provides many analytical tools, building on the work of Howard (1971), but
suffers from some of the many weaknesses typical game theory methodologies suffers
from (see the discussion in Chapter 2).
First, the work provides no means to model the mapping between the prefer-
ences and their ordering and the strategic objectives the players have, within the
context of the conflict or in general. For example, the model of Cuban Missile Crisis
presented does not show or explain why the the players’ preferences are the way
given in the model, and what should change, in terms of players’ goals/priorities
or realities on the ground, to make the preferences have different order. Com-
paratively, in our models we show the direct link between the players goals and
conflict realities to how the players’ preferences are modelled, or elicited as should
be noted. In fact, any change to the players’ goals, priorities, internal or external
constraints/realities will be reflected on how these preferences get ordered. The
analyst can immediately test why a state is more/less preferred than another for a
certain player, and what should be done to reverse this order or change it.
Second, the ordinal representation of the players’ preferences does not show
any degrees of preference’s strength beside the simple binary relations the ordering
is based on: indifferent ∼ relation and the preferred-to  relation. The work
of Hamouda et al. (2004) tried to rectify this weakness by proposing degrees of
preference to mainly the the preferred-to  relation, offering relations such as 
to show much-preferred status. Still, all these relations do not show “why” the
degree of preference existed in the first place, and how it will affect the satisfaction
of the player’s strategic goals. The relations presented in Fraser and Hipel (1984)
and the modified ones in Hamouda et al. (2004) are all based on strict logic: yes or
no, applies or does not apply. On the other hand, our models provide a one complete
preferred-to relation that: 1) has fuzzy qualifier to show the degree of strength for
the preference, in addition to the preference order; and 2) offers traceability of the
preference order and degree of strength back to the player’s strategic goals and
realities, answering why and how the preference came to be the one elicited. In
our models, the analysis does not take the player word, or more accurately, his
guess as a justification for the preferences order and strength. The justification,
and validation, process is embedded within the way the preferences are elicited and
represented.
Take for example how Fraser and Hipel (1984) show that the US prefers imposing
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a blockade while the USSR keeps the Cuban missiles (what we call state s2) over
conducting a surgical air strike to destroy the missiles (state s4 in our model).
Why? Is this a true preference order that reflects the benefits the US gets from
both states? In reality, the US benefits more from the air strikes. As shown from
the contribution that the states have to the strategic goals of the US in its GCM
model: s4 will ensure not giving the USSR time to complete installing the missiles;
it will make sure the missiles are destroyed; it will provide some face saving at the
world stage after the damage happened because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs
invasion; and it will help the US in its long established strategy of bringing south
American countries to its fold by any means (including fear and force). And, if
its true that the US prefers s2 over s4 , then the US has no improvement out of
imposing the blockade state s2 to the air strike state s4 if and when the USSR do
not remove the missiles because of the blockade. In reality, and as reflected in our
model, the US prefers s4 over s2 (as also indicated by the discussion of the US’s
Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, Allison and Zelikow (1999)). The only reason the
US did not go to s4 , and instead went the s2 way is the fear that the USSR will
escalate the conflict out of retaliation (this fact is presented in our analysis of Table
6.5 as s2 has GMR and SMR stability reflecting the US’s fear in taking the UI it
has from s2 to s4).
Third, because of the way Fraser and Hipel (1984) defines the State concept
and the UI move concept, some of the states and UIs presented in their model
of the Cuban Missiles Crisis are not realistic or feasible. For example, the model
presents and includes in the stability analysis the following two states: A state
in which the US chooses to conduct a surgical air strikes to destroy the Cuban
Missiles, while the missiles neither destroyed or withdrawn; and another where the
US conducts the air strikes with the USSR withdrawn the missiles. Conducting a
surgical air strikes, in principle, will not lead to the missiles withdrawal but rather
to the missiles destruction. The failure in carrying the air strike and not destroying
the missiles is not a reasonable assumption, considering the proximity of Cuba, the
US’s powerful means and capabilities in doing so, and the fact that this is not an
invasion where failure is a possibility. As a second example, their model presents
states where the US implement both a blockade on Cuba and Air strikes. This
contradicts the logical sequence of possible events. There is no need for a blockade,
if air strikes are carried out; and blockades usually are used to help control the
environment and weaken the enemy before carrying aggressive military actions. In
our models, the analyst can rely in logical reasoning to eliminate redundant states,
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such as the ones included by Fraser and Hipel (1984) for only mathematical reasons
(the states are presented as binary numbers where players’ options are given a one
bit of true or false (1 or 0) selection).
We also believe that UI representation in Fraser and Hipel (1984) models is an
additional problematic area. Consider, for example, how the US is shown to have a
UI move from a state where the US conducts an air strike and simultaneously impose
a blockade to a state where it just carries out air strikes alone. In effect, the provided
model suggests that the US will be able to eliminate the fact that it carried out a
blockade after this has been done. This is not a realistic, or even valid, assumption
to have. Once things happen in real-life, they cannot be reversed and deemed
undone. Such problem is shown in the model because the conceptual modelling
foundation of the Fraser and Hipel (1984) is putting mathematical representation
in the driving seat. A UI move, to it, happens when all the bits, of the states’
binary numbers, for one player is changing from less preferred state to a preferred
state, while the bits of the other player are not changed. The representation is less
concerned with the validity of such move, or the ability of the player to take it in
real-life.
A problem that we do not have in our conceptual modelling framework. The
analyst in our case is in the driving seat. He will, and should, examine the validity
of each move. In our models, and consistent with a realistic view of how things
happen in real-life, a UI move is a real unilateral move the player can take to
enhance his position. The automated DSS system implementing our framework, as
a knowledge modelling and management framework, demands justification of the
beliefs held by the analyst of the ability players to make moves, UM or UIs. It
cannot sacrifice validity in favor of ease of automating and reliance on binary value
flipping as a justification. In fact the later works of the research group behind Fraser
and Hipel (1984) rectified some of these problems, but not completely, by enhancing
the representation scheme of the moves specifically to be based on directed graph
presentation instead, at least at the visual level, while still relaying in checking for
binary bits flipping as a mechanism to trigger the identification of players’ moves.
In summary, when we compare the work of Fraser and Hipel (1984) to our
work presented in this chapter, we used how Fraser and Hipel modelled the Cuban
Missile Crisis as an example to illustrate the differences. While both works rely
on mathematical and logical modelling and analysis schemes, they differ in many
areas. The work of Fraser and Hipel, as most of the game theory methodologies in
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the literature, does not model the decision makers’ goals and realities, and there-
fore do not provide direct mapping between how the preferences over the conflict’s
states happen to be modelled and how these states satisfy the strategic needs and
wants of the players, or get affected by the realities on the ground. This important
feature is at the heart of what we believe should be the starting point of modelling
strategic conflicts. Dealing with strategic goals satisfaction through proxies such
as stated preferences order or deceiving subjective utilities, while makes the math-
ematical presentation looks simpler and nicer, violates the principal of rationality
employed by the normative decision analysis literature: choosing the best option
that satisfies/satisfices the goals of the decision maker. We also differ in the way
how states, players moves, as well as preferences relations and structures, defined
and presented. We discussed how the models and analysis we provided in this
chapter resulted on more insights about conflict’s dynamics and better analysis of
the players’ options.
At a different front, comparing the rich and extensive study of the Cuban Missile
Crisis provided by Allison (1971) to our model and analysis is quite an undertaking.
So while we intend to do this in a separate extended analytical comparative study
(a future work), in order to give justice to it, we will focus our discussion here on
some few important differences.
Allison (1971) is a descriptive analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, whilst our
work, presented in this chapter, is a normative one in its nature. Game theory
literature, and the conflict analysis literature in general, differentiate between the
two. Normative analysis prescribes (says what should be done) or evaluates (says
what’s good/bad); and a descriptive one describes (says how the world in fact
is/was/will be). Beside the motivation difference, the methods employed also dif-
fers, dramatically. Normative decision making and conflict analysis studies rely on
mathematical and logical models to shed light on conflicts, suggest optimal courses
of actions and/or predict the flow of events. At the same time, descriptive studies
uses experimental methods and/or fact findings analytical techniques. This leads
to a list of important distinctions and observations:
First, Allison’s model is an important model because it provided an account of
the conflict based on what had happened, factually and based on hard evidence.
But this account will only be possible after the fact. It will not help, or guide, the
decision makers on what actions they have or should take at/during the conflict.
The only possible way that the players can use such modelling technique is to rely
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on setting up a set of hypothesis, hopefully the right ones, and test them through
discussion and textual analysis. Much the same way Allison did in his Rational
Actor model for the Cuban Crisis. The lack of visuals, mathematical and logical
tools, stability solution concepts, and so on, in such approach make the process
one of a kind each time, each and every time it takes place. This one-of-a-kind
modelling and analysis process has many problems: 1) it is more troublesome to
conduct and follow for the non-specialist (most decision makers fall under this
category of people); 2) not easy to verify or validate the produced models and
analysis; and 3) transfer of lessons-learned (and the knowledge gained in general)
from one conflict to another, or one iteration of a conflict to another becomes very
hard to specialists, not to mention novices, because of the nature of the specific
on-of-a-kind descriptive models/analysis. Consider the fact that a specialist such as
Allison had to rewrite, not just update, the book once new documents/facts came
to light. If this is so for Allison, then what should a bureaucrat/professional, who
is expert in his field but not grounded on the since of decision making and conflict
analysis, should do.
On the other hand our modelling technique provided a systematic and method-
ological process to follow each and every time a conflict, or a new evolution/what-
if-variation of the same conflict, is to be analyzed. This makes the analysis of
each conflict, or variation of the conflict, to be easily compared to other con-
flicts/variations and easily verifiable ensuring: all the right questions are asked,
all the steps are followed, all the options are explored and all scenarios are studied.
Second, we see the two types of modelling techniques, the normative and the
descriptive, complementary. Each of the two needs the other. The normative
model needs verification, to ensure reflecting reality; and the descriptive model
needs validation, to ensure proof of the hypotheses it is examining, and to ensure
broadening the analysis beyond such hypotheses and without relying on narrow
selective/emotional fact finding.
A normative model such as ours needs to be validated through comparison with
what had happened in reality to: uncover any deficiencies and why the models
missed to address them; and learn from this to enhance the process, add safe
guards to ensure adequate attention is given to address such deficiencies in the
next iteration of the conflict or in any new conflict we analyze.
Third, when one look at what Allison (1971) calls the Rational Actor model
for the Cuban Missile Crisis, one will immediately notice the difference between
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that model and our model, or even Fraser and Hipel’s (1984) model which is a
normative model too. Allison (1971)’s model is a textual descriptive account of how
the events went and why based on governmental documents. In fact, Allison found
himself compelled to publish an update, a second edition (Allison and Zelikow,
1999), rewriting the original book published in 1971, once many of the cold war era
governmental archives for both the US and the Soviets had been declassified in the
early 90’s. Allison did not present in his Rational Actor model any mathematical
or logical presentation/analysis of the conflict.
Fourth, the one of kind (changes every time) process that Allison (1971) adopts,
while rich and detailed, it will be hard to automate in the form of a Decision Support
System (DSS). The maximum one could expect for automating this process is by
developing a check list to ensure the analyst cover all aspects of the model/analysis.
On the other hand, our modelling and analysis framework is easy to automate in the
form of a DSS system, as we did and will show at the end of this thesis work. This
is because it is a systematic, methodological, mathematical and logical approach to
modelling and analysis. The analysis, expert or novice, can use it and benefit from
it. Surely, the expert the models and produced analysis will get more insight and
add more value, compared to the novice. Nevertheless, the system will benefit the
novice by providing good start to conflict modelling and analysis, and help/guide
his training to become an expert.
Fifth, Allison (1971), and its rewrite Allison and Zelikow (1999), provide three
models to the Cuban Missile Crisis: 1) the Rational Actor model; 2) Organizational
Behaviour model; and 3) Governmental Politics model. The author/s claim is that
the second and third models are needed to cover for the unexplained events of the
conflict which the first model could not explain. For example, why the Soviets
did a poor job hiding the missiles in Cuba? the imposition of the blockade by the
US? the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba? Clearly, our model of the conflict
answer many of the questions that Allison and Zelikow states as unanswered by
(traditional) rational modelling and analysis techniques. For instance, our model
and analysis of it show why the US chose to impose the blockade in stead of invade
or carry out air strikes, and why USSR decided to withdraw the missiles instead of
escalating the conflict. We show also the logical analytical proof of why these moves
were been chosen by the players. Nevertheless, some of what Allison and Zelikow’s
put in their second and third model is important. Namely, the inter-organizational
dynamics in each of the US and the USSR governmental institutes, and especially
the misalignment in the goals and practices. Such dynamics, and misalignments,
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which is mostly uncovered by the declassification of the US and USSR’s archives
of the cold war time, are usually and in fact almost always ignored by rational
models of game theory, decision analysis, and conflict analysis literature. So, does
our framework ignore such important aspects of real-life conflicts? The answer is:
No it does not.
We focused our discussion on this thesis work on implementing better rational
models that tie the objectives and realities of the decision makers to the actions and
option they have, elicits from the player’s objectives their preferences, and provide
analytical methods, tools, and concepts that will guide strategists in their strategic
decision making situations. But, one has to remember that this thesis work is an
extension to our previous research work: the Viewpoint-based Value Driven Enter-
prise Knowledge Management (ViVD-EKM) framework. The main objective of the
ViVD-EKM framework and its conceptual modelling and analysis tools is to offer
the analysts more than what traditional game theory, decision analysis, require-
ments engineering methods is offering: a Knowledge modelling and Management
tools capable of dealing with the complexity of the real world conflicts, problems,
and systems/software modelling needs. For example, the ViVD-EKM framework
models agents and sub-agents (such as internal organizations/entities within the
bigger political entity), each with their goals and realities, exploring misalignment
problems in the goals and realities that could happen. Not only this, the ViVD-
EKM models of agents/entities model the knowledge transfer and movement among
the agents, exploring the possibility of miscommunication or broken-links for ex-
ample. Something that Allison and Zelikow’s second model attributes the failure
of the USSR to hide their missiles deployment efforts in Cuba to.
So, while we intentionally focused our modelling and analysis of the Cuban
Missile Crisis on the rationality aspect of the conflict, we intended to show how
the ViVD-EKM framework, as a whole, will be used to model the organizational
behaviour and governmental politics of the conflict and produce results comparable
to the results of Allison and Zelikow’s second and third models. This extended and
thorough modelling and analytical study is beyond the scope of this thesis work,
and will be done separately as a future work.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced many concepts that are important for to analyze non-
cooperative games. The chapter started by defining the types of moves the players
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in these games are allowed to take: unilateral moves (UMs), unilateral improvement
moves (UIs), sanction moves (SMs), and inescapable sanction moves (ISMs). The
definitions provided for such moves are then used in defining the four different
solution stability and equilibrium concepts: Nash (NASH), General MetaRational
(GMR) , Symmetric MetaRational (SMR), and Sequential (SEQ) stabilities. The
chapter then defined the strength of the stability under such solution concepts, and
proposed a set of algorithms to help identify the strength level of each of these
stabilities.
The chapter finished with a case study in which we applied the concepts and
methods proposed in it. In the case study, we analyzed thoroughly the Cuban
Missile Crises. We started by giving a brief background on this important polit-
ical conflict. We, then, modelled the players goals, constraints and alternatives;
analyzed their GCMs; identified the conflict’s states; elicited the players’ cardinal
and ordinal preferences over these states; and then identified the players unilateral
moves among these states. The stabilities of the conflict’s states were analyzed
under the four stability solution concepts, and the strength of these stabilities were
identified for each state, for each player. We looked at the equilibrium states for
the conflict; and how the conflict could have progressed from the time the US dis-
covered the missile bases in Cuba. We concluded the case study by showing how
our analysis results compares to what historically happened in the conflict, and to
what others offered as models and analysis to the conflict, after the fact.
The next chapter will study further the four solution concepts we defined in this
chapter, and will be used in later chapters. It will look at the characteristics of
each, how they relate to each other, and how understanding such characteristics and
relations enrich the process of modelling and analyzing multi-agent conflicts. The
two chapters after that will take the same concepts and methods (moves, stability
solution concepts, strength of stability under these concepts, etc.), redefine and
extend them to fit with the characteristics of cooperative games, without and with









In this chapter, we discuss the differences and similarities among the stability so-
lution concepts, beyond the mathematical definitions introduced in the previous
chapter. These solutions concepts, which will continue to be used in the following
chapters, are at the heart of our conflict analysis framework for non-cooperative
conflicts and cooperative conflicts, with and without coalitions analysis. The chap-
ter intends to answer: how these concepts differ? What are the main characteristics
that differentiates them? And, are there any interrelationships among them? If so,
what are the interrelationships among the strength sets of them?
First, the chapter compares the four solution concepts introduced in the previous
chapter, NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ, based on common and important practi-
cal characteristics, or properties, of these concepts. Second, the chapter presents
interesting theoretical relationships among the solution concepts, and among the
strength sets of these solution concepts. The chapter, then, looks at how the knowl-
edge about how the solution concepts differ, and the interrelationships among them,
can be very informative when analyzing conflicts and how it helps shed additional
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insight on the conflicts and their analysis. This will be done by case studies, in which
additional non-cooperative conflicts are modelled and analyzed. Namely, the chap-
ter will analyze two of the few games collectively called Paradoxes of Rationality.
Both, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and game of Chicken will be modelled and analyzed
at the end of this chapter, with special emphasis given to how understanding the
differences and interrelationships among the stability solution concepts bring addi-
tional insight into conflict analysis. Finally, the chapter will close with a summery
of what has been discussed in it.
7.2 Characteristics of the Different Stability
Solution Concepts
We start by looking at the characteristics that the four stability solution concepts,
we discussed in the last chapter, have. Figure 7.1 presents a comparison table
of these concepts based on some important criteria shown in the header of the
table’s columns. An early version of this table was given by Fang et al. (1993). We
have expanded, clarified and added additional comparison criteria to that of Fang
et al. (1993), discussing the four stability solution concepts within the context,
terminology and notation of the Constrained Rationality framework. The first two
columns of the table, in Figure 7.1, give respectively the names of the solution
concepts accompanied by the acronym we use to reefer to the concept, and a brief
description about it.
The third column presents an important aspect to differentiate the stability
solution concepts based on: Foresight. Foresight, here, reefers to the number of
lookahead steps in the future that the decision maker, whom the stability solution
concept is defined from his perspective, uses when adopting the solution concept
as criterion to decide wether the current state is stable or unstable. For example,
NASH stability considers no moves ahead. All, what the decision maker needs to
know is if he/she has any UIs out of the current state at this point of time. Compare
this to the one step ahead the decision maker needs to identify whether his current
state is stable based on GMR or SEQ stability concepts. If he takes a UI out the
current state at this point of time, will one of his opponents have a sanction move
against it in the next step of the conflict? The SMR stability solution concept has
the highest foresight, comparatively speaking. The decision maker has to know if
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of the Stability Solution Concepts based on some of their
important characteristics and assumptions
point of time. Then, he has to consider, 2 steps later, whether he has a counter move
to mitigate this sanction or no. Of course, there are other solution concepts in the
literature that considers higher degree of foresight than SMR, such as nonmyopic
stability (Brams and Wittman, 1981b). But these stability concepts are mostly
impractical considering the dynamics of strategic conflicts and the creativity of
decision makers to come up with new alternatives if given the time. This makes the
0-3 lookahead steps range much practical to consider in stability solution concepts
definition for real-life conflicts.
The Disimprovement column in the table shown in Figure 7.1 describes the
disimprovement others can do to the focal decision maker’s position at the current
state of the conflict. it also shows whether the the decision maker to recover back
or mitigate the disimprovement is considered within the stability solution concept’s
definition. For example, all the stability concepts consider the disimprovement by
others to a decision maker’s UI from the current state when it is time for them
to move. Only NASH does not consider disimprovement moves by others. This
makes it possible for others to disimrpove a position/state claimed by NASH to be
stable for a decision maker. The table also shows that SMR is the only solution
concept that considered a countermove by the decision maker to recover/mitigate
the disimprovement caused by others’ sanctions to his UI from current state. But,
SMR stability, by definition, considered all possible countermoves to each and every
sanction move and declared them to be insufficient to put back the decision maker
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to the same level of preference he advanced to by his UI move. Other solution
concepts do not consider the decision maker’s countermoves, and therefore recovery
from others’ disimprovement moves is possible but not guaranteed.
The third criterion used in Figure 7.1’s table to compare solution concepts is the
focal decision maker’s Knowledge of Preferences. As shown in the table, all solution
concepts, by definition, assume that the focal decision maker has full knowledge
of his own preferences (over the conflict’s states). SEQ is the only concept that
assumes full knowledge by the decision maker of his opponents’ preferences, whilst
NASH is the only solution concept that assumes that the decision maker has no
knowledge of others’ preferences.
The final criterion is the Attitude towards Risk Taking that the focal decision
maker is showing, as per the definition of the stability solution concept if and when
he uses this concept to define whether the current state is stable for him or not.
This attitude is in some way connected to the assumption by the solution concept
of whether the focal decision maker’s opponents could act irrationally, i.e. against
their preferences order. The last sub-column of the Knowledge of Preferences col-
umn in Figure 7.1’s table shows if the concept considers the opponents fully rational
people/actors or not. For example, SEQ considers all players to be rational actors,
therefore a decision maker who uses SEQ to define the stability of his current posi-
tion/state is, in fact, decided to take some risk. The risk here is the possibility for
some of the opponents to act irrationally, or against the order of their preferences
vector. NASH, on the other hand, because it neither demands knowing the oppo-
nents’ preferences nor assumes all opponents to be fully rational actors, is a concept
that advocates ignoring risks. Finally, both GMR and SMR concepts assumes that
opponents could act irrationally against their preferences, if it happened that the
focal decision maker happen to know these preferences. Therefore, both suggests
that the decision maker should avoid risking his current position at the current
state of the conflict. He should not use any of his UIs out from the current state
to a better state, out of fear that his opponents might sanction his UI moves even
if the sanction move is irrational to them (against their preferences order). Both
concepts, in effect, assumes the opponents will be motivated to take such sanction
moves in order to hurt the focal decision maker, even if they get hurt too.
We can conclude this section with the observation that the stability solution
concepts, we introduced in the previous chapter and will continue to use in the
following chapters, satisfy different characteristics and assumptions about the focal
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player and his opponents in the conflict. These assumptions and characteristics
makes each solution concept a vital tool for analysts to analyze the conflict and
its players’ behaviour. In the next section, we move to study the fundamental
interrelationships among the solution concepts.
7.3 Interrelationships among Stability Solution
Concepts
The following interrelationships among NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ have been
proven by Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al. (1993) for their respective con-
flict stability analysis frameworks. We prove them here too for our Constrained
Rationality conflict modelling and analysis framework.
Theorem 7.3.1 (Interrelationships among NASH, SMR and GMR): For




















(s) = ∅ as per Definition 6.3.1. And, as indicated earlier, having
SUI
DMi,t
(s)=∅ is a special case that trivially satisfies Definition 6.3.3 of SMR stability.
Therefore, s is an SMR stable state, or s∈SSMR
DMi,t
.
Now, if s is an SMR stable state for DMi at time t, then any sanction move,
others have against any of DMi’s UIs from s, that satisfies the the requirements
of Definition 6.3.3 will definitely satisfy the weaker requirements of the sanction










The relationship between NASH, GMR and SMR given above in Theorem 7.3.1
is shown graphically in the Venn diagram presented in Figure 7.2. The Venn dia-











Figure 7.2: Interrelationships among NASH, GMR and SMR Solution Concepts
Theorem 7.3.2 (Interrelationships among NASH, SEQ and GMR): For




















(s) = ∅ as per Definition 6.3.1. And as indicated earlier, having
SUI
DMi,t
(s)=∅ is a special case that trivially satisfies Definition 6.3.4 of SEQ stability.
Therefore, s is an SEQ stable state, or s∈SSEQ
DMi,t
.
If s is an SEQ stable state for DMi at time t, then any sanction move, others
have against DMi’s UIs from s, that satisfys the the requirements of Definition 6.3.4
of having the sanction move be also a UI move, for the other player, will definitely
satisfy the weaker requirements of the sanction moves given in the GMR stability
Definition 6.3.2, which demands the sanction move to be only a UM move for the
other player. This means, if s is an SEQ stables state, or s∈SSEQ
DMi,t
, then it must









The relationship between NASH, GMR and SEQ given above in Theorem 7.3.2
is shown graphically in the Venn diagram presented in Figure 7.3. The Venn dia-











Figure 7.3: Interrelationships among NASH, GMR and SEQ Solution Concepts
Observation 7.3.3 (Interrelationships among SEQ and SMR): For decision








Proof. This observation can be proved by looking at two cases one to prove that




, and another to show




. We use Figures 7.4 and 7.5 to illustrate the
two cases.
Case 1: As suggested by Figure 7.4a, let decision maker DMi, at time t of the
game, have only one UI move from state s to state s1 . Let us also assume
that an opponent of DMi, another player of the game who we call DMj in the
figure, has a sanction move (to DMi’s UI). This sanction move is a UI move
to DMj; and will put DMi at state s2 which is a worse place for DMi than
the original state s, the state he exercised his UI out of it. This sanction will
qualify s to be an SEQ stable state for DMi, as per Definition 6.3.4. This
makes s∈SSEQ
DMi,t
. Similarly, let DMi have another state ŝ which is also an SEQ
stable state, as illustrated in Figure 7.4b. As a result, SSEQ
DMi,t
= {s, ŝ}.
Now, let state s also be an SMR stable state for DMi, because DMi has a
countermove to the sanction (from state s1 to state s2) imposed by DMj. As
shown in Figure 7.4a, this countermove will make DMi’s position better (at
state S3), but still worse than his original position at s before he executed his
UI move to s1 . For state ŝ, let DMi has a UM countermove to the sanction
move that could be imposed by DMj on DMi’s UI (out from ŝ to ŝ1). But, let
this countermove puts DMi at a position better than his original position at
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(a) State s is SEQ and SMR stable
for DMi at time t
(b) State ŝ is only SEQ stable for
DMi at time t





ŝ, as illustrated in Figure 7.4b. In other words, while state s is SMR stable for
DMi at time t, state ŝ is not SMR stable for him. As a result, SSMRDMi,t = {s}.






(a) State s is SEQ and SMR stable
for DMi at time t
(b) State s is only SMR stable for
DMi at time t





Case 2: Let us change Case 1 slightly. Let us assume that there is no other SEQ
stable state to DMi at time t other than state s, making SSEQDMi,t = {s}. And,
as in Case 1, let state s be SMR stable for DMi at time t, as shown in Figure
7.5a. But here in Case 2, let us assume that we have state s which is an SMR
stable state to DMi at time t but not an SEQ stable state to him, because, as
illustrated in Figure 7.5b, the sanction that the other player have to DMi’s
UI move (away from s to s1)is a UM but not a UI move for the other player.
This makes SSMR
DMi,t
= {s, š}. And as a result, in this case, and for DMi at time
















Figure 7.6: Interrelationships among NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ Stability Solu-
tion Concepts








could be true, for different situations, the Observation is proven.
As a consequence to Observation 7.3.3, and the relationships established by
Theorem 7.3.1 and Theorem 7.3.2 above, is shown in Figure 7.6. This figure com-
bines the separate Venn diagrams shown in Figures 7.2and 7.2 in one overall Venn
diagram that represents the interrelationships among all of the solution concepts:
NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ.
7.4 Interrelationships among Strength Sets of the
Stability Solution Concepts
In this section, we present, and prove, a new set of interrelationships that exist
between the Stability Solution Concepts, and their respective strength sets. This
new set is unique to our Constrained Rationality framework and the way it defines
stability strength for each of the solution concepts. We believe our framework’s def-
initions and the interrelationships that follow from them are more representative of
the dynamics and characteristics of real-life conflicts, as we will see later from the
case studies provided later in the chapter.
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Observation 7.4.1 (Strength Subsets of NASH, SEQ, SMR and GMR):
For decision maker DMi at time t:
∀L
SS

































Proof. The above observed relations can be easily proved using the corresponding
definitions for the stability concepts (Definitions 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4) and
their respective strength definitions (Definitions 6.4.1, 6.4.2,, 6.4.3, and 6.4.4). It
is worth mentioning here why the label “Null” is excluded from being a strength
label. Because, when a stability concept for a state s has a “Null” assigned to it,
this means that s is not stable at all, for the decision maker at the time, under this
specific stability concept definition.
Theorem 7.4.2 (Strength of NASH in relation to Strengths of SEQ, SMR










Proof. The theorem states that: If a state s is NASH stable, then no matter what
the strength of s’s NASH stability is, it will always be SEQ, SMR and GMR stable
and the stability strength for each will be at the None level.
If a state s is NASH stable, then no matter what the NASH stability strength
for s is, to DMi at time t, it will be always true, as per Definition 6.3.1, that
SUI
DMi,t
=∅. It thus follows from this fact, as per the GMR strength’s Definition 6.4.2,
that the StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) = None, so as to make the statement
(s∈SGMR(N)
DMi,t
) be always true.
Similarly, following the same logic and by applying the SMR strength’s Defini-
tion 6.4.3 and the SEQ strength’s Definition 6.4.4, respectively, we can prove that
if a state s is NASH stable, and no matter what the NASH stability strength of s




























Corollary 7.4.3 (NASH’s Strength Subsets in relation to GMR and SMR’s







Proof. The set of all states that are NASH stable for DMi at time t, regardless
of the strength of each state’s NASH stability, is shown in Observation 7.4.1 to
be SNASH
DMi,t







Theorem 7.4.2 states that if a state s is NASH stable for a specific decsion maker
at a specific time, then s will belong to none other than the None strength level












Corollary 7.4.4 (NASH’s Strength Subsets in relation to GMR and SEQ’s







Proof. The set of all states that are NASH stable for DMi at time t, regardless
of the strength of each state’s NASH stability, is shown in Observation 7.4.1 to
be SNASH
DMi,t







Theorem 7.4.2 states that if a state s is NASH stable for a specific decision maker
at a specific time, then s will belong to none other than the None strength level












Theorem 7.4.5 (Strength of SMR in relation to Strength of GMR): For
decision maker DMi at time t:





[StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ N ].
Proof. From Definition 6.4.2, it is clear that StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t)≥
None; and from Definition 6.4.3, it is clear that StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t)≥
None. This is because if it happened that a GMR or an SMR Stability for a state
is given the label “Null”, then that state is not at all stable under GMR definition,
nor stable under SMR definition.
From the definitions of both GMR and SMR (Definitions 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, re-
spectively), we know that for the same game, at the same state s and time t,
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the same set of sanction moves (SMs) by other players (other than DMi) will be
used/considered to check if the state s is GMR stable and to check if it is SMR
stable. And, from Theorem 7.3.1, we know that any state s which is SMR stable,
then it will also be GMR stable. This is because SMR stability for a state requires
that it must have an inescapable sanction (ISM), by one or more of the other play-
ers, for each DMi’s UI out of s (the state tested for stability), that will put DMi
at a lower or equally preferred state to state s. In other words, s must be GMR
stable (GMR’s Definition 6.3.2 asks for a sanction only) before it could be tested
for the stricter and additional requirements of an inescapable sanction needed for
s to be SMR stable (as per Definition 6.3.3).
From Definition 6.4.2, the strength of GMR stability is defined to be the strength
of the worst of the sanction moves imposed by other players, sanctioning DMi’s UIs
out of s. This is measured by how much the end state of the worst sanction move is
less-preferred compared to s. The definition takes in consideration that DMi when
considering how bad the idea is to take any UI out of s, the essence of the GMR
stability definition, he will most likely look at each of his UIs out of s and how bad
the sanction will be for each. Then, the UI that will lead to the least less-preferred
end state by the sanctions of others, or the best out of all bad scenarios, will be
the one UI to use in quantifying the strength of s’s GMR stability for DMi.
The same set of UIs (by DMi out of s), and the same sanction moves (by others)
will be used to test the state s for SMR stability. But, now one should consider
any countermoves DMi has to mitigate/lessen the effect of the sanctions. As per
Definition 6.4.3, if DMi has only countermoves that will lead to even worse state,
i.e. less-preferred state than the one the sanction move end up with, then s is SMR
stable with strength that matches the less-preference strength of the sanction’s
end state. Otherwise, if DMi has countermoves that will lessen the bad effect of
the sanction move, i.e. the countermove will end up with a state that is still less
preferred that s (needed for the state to be called SMR stable as per Definition
6.3.3) but more preferred than the end state of the sanction move, then s is SMR
stable with strength that matches the less-preference strength of the countermove’s
end state. In other words, SMR strength will either has the same strength as the
sanction, or less than that. And since we know that the strength of GMR stability of
a state is measured by the strength of the sanctions, then SMR’s stability strength
will always be equal to the GMR’s stability strength or less than that. But, we
also proved earlier that both GMR and SMR stability’s strengths for a state s are
always bigger or equal than the None strength level.
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Therefore, for a state s that is both GMR and SMR stable, for DMi at time t,
StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ N .
Corollary 7.4.6 (SMR’s Strength Subsets in relation to GMR’s Strength
Subsets): For decision maker DMi at time t:











Proof. To prove the Corollary, we will give the proof for only two values of L
SS
∈
{L−{Null}}. For the rest of L
SS








. For DMi at time
t, for all states that are SMR stable with stability strength at level None, i.e.
∀s∈SSMR(N)
DMi,t
, StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t) = N . Theorem 7.4.5 states that Sta-
bilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ N for each
state s that is both GMR and SMR stable for the given decision maker at the
specified time. This makes StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ N , and therefore
s∈SGMR(≥N)
DMi,t




















. For DMi at time
t, for all states that are SMR stable with stability strength at level “Extreme”,
i.e. ∀s ∈ SSMR(EX)
DMi,t
, StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t) = Ex. Theorem 7.4.5 states
that StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ N for
each state s that is both GMR and SMR stable for the given decision maker at the
specified time. This makes StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ Ex, and therefore
s∈SGMR(≥Ex)
DMi,t













. Interestingly enough, this also
shows that SMR stable states with “extremely strong” strength level will only be
part of the set of “extremely strong” GMR stable states, and will not be part of
any other set of less-strong GMR stable states.
The relationships between the strength sets of each of NASH, GMR and SMR,
given above in Corollary 7.4.6 and Corollary 7.4.3, are illustrated graphically in the
Venn diagram presented in Figure 7.7.
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N  L      .....    Si Ex
Figure 7.7: Venn Diagram showing the Interrelationships among the Strength Sets
of NASH, GMR and SMR Solution Concepts
Theorem 7.4.7 (Strength of SEQ in relation to Strength of GMR): For
decision maker DMi at time t:





[StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t)≥N ].
Proof. From Definition 6.4.2, it is clear that StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t)≥
None; and from Definition 6.4.4, it is clear that StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMi, t)≥
None. This is because if it happened that a GMR or an SEQ Stability for a state
is given the label “Null”, then that state is not at all stable under GMR definition,
nor stable under SEQ definition.
From Theorem 7.3.2, we know that any state s which is SEQ stable, then it will
also be GMR stable. And, from the definitions of both GMR and SEQ (Definitions
6.3.2 and 6.3.4, respectively), we know that for the same game, at the same state s
and time t, the set of sanction moves (SMs) by other players (other than DMi) which
will be used/considered to check whether the state s is SEQ stable, or not, is only a
subset of the sanction moves to be used for considering whether s is GMR stable, or
not. This is because SEQ stability for a state requires that it must have a sanction
by another player (other than DMi) that is also a UI for the player performing
the sanction move, not just a merely UM for him. In other words, sanction moves
demanded for SEQ stability must be SMUIs (as per Definition 6.3.4), not just SMs
as GMR stability requires (as per Definition 6.3.2). This means that s must be
GMR stable before it could be tested for the stricter requirements of SEQ stability.
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From Definition 6.4.2, the strength of GMR stability is defined to be the strength
of the worst sanction moves imposed by other players, sanctioning DMi’s UIs out
of s. This is measured by how much the end state of the worst sanction move is
less-preferred compared to s. The definition takes in consideration that DMi when
considering how bad the idea is to take any UI out of s, the essence of the GMR
stability definition, he will most likely look at each of his UIs out of s and how bad
the sanction will be for each. Then, the UI that will lead to the least less-preferred
end state by the sanctions of others, or the best out of all bad scenarios, will be
the one UI to use in quantifying the strength of s’s GMR stability.
The same set of UIs (by DMi out of s), but only a subset of the sanction moves
(must be also UIs for the players imposing the sanctions) will be used to test the
state s for SEQ stability, as per Definition 6.4.4. If the worst sanction move that is
used to define GMR stability of s happens to be a SMUI move as well, not just an
SM move, then the strength of s’s GMR stability will be the same as the strength
level of its SEQ stability. Otherwise, if the worst sanction move (SM) is not an
SMUI move, then this means that the worst sanction move will be used to define
s’s GMR stability’s strength and the not-as-worse sanction (the SMUI) will used
to define s’s SEQ stability’s strength. In other words, SEQ strength will either
has the same strength as the sanction used to identify s’s GMR strength, or less
than that. Therefore, SEQ’s stability strength will always be equal to the GMR’s
stability strength or less than that. But, we also proved earlier that both GMR and
SEQ stability’s strengths for a state s are always bigger or equal than the None
strength level.
Therefore, for a state s that is both GMR and SEQ stable, for DMi at time t,
StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t)≥StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMi, t)≥None.
Corollary 7.4.8 (SEQ’s Strength Subsets in relation to GMR’s Strength
Subsets): For decision maker DMi at time t:











Proof. To prove the Corollary, we will give the proof for only two values of L
SS
∈
{L−{Null}}. For the rest of L
SS








. For DMi at time
t, for all states that are SEQ stable with stability strength at level None , i.e.
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Figure 7.8: Venn Diagram showing the Interrelationships among the Strength Sets
of NASH, GMR and SEQ Solution Concepts
∀s ∈ SSEQ(N)
DMi,t
, StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMi, t) = N . Theorem 7.4.7 states that
StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMi, t) ≥ N for each
state s that is both GMR and SEQ stable for the given decision maker at the
specified time. This makes StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ N , and therefore
s∈SGMR(≥N)
DMi,t




















. For DMi at time
t, for all states that are SEQ stable with stability strength at level “Extreme”,
i.e. ∀s ∈ SSEQ(EX)
DMi,t
, StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMi, t) = Ex. Theorem 7.4.7 states
that StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMi, t) ≥ N for
each state s that is both GMR and SEQ stable for the given decision maker at the
specified time. This makes StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ Ex, and therefore
s∈SGMR(≥Ex)
DMi,t













. Interestingly enough, this also
shows that SEQ stable states with “extremely strong” strength level will only be
part of the set of “extremely strong” GMR stable states, and will not be part of
any other set of less-strong GMR stable states.
The relationships between the strength sets of each of NASH, GMR and SEQ,
given above in Corollary 7.4.8 and Corollary 7.4.4, are illustrated graphically in the
Venn diagram presented in Figure 7.8.
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Observation 7.4.9 (The Strength of SEQ in Relation to Strength of SMR):




It is not necessarily always true that
[ StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t)≥StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t)≥N ], nor that
[ StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t)≥StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t)≥N ].
Proof. First, the observation states that for a state s which is stable under both
SMR and SEQ stability solution concepts, SMR and SEQ’s stabilities strengths for
s are greater than or equal None strength level. This part of the observation is easy
to prove. From Definition 6.4.3, it is clear that StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t)≥
None; and from Definition 6.4.4, it is clear that StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMi, t)≥
None. This is because if it happened that an SMR or an SEQ Stability for a state
is given the label “Null”, then that state is not at all stable under SMR definition,
nor stable under SEQ definition.
We now prove the second part of the observation which states that for a state s
which is stable under both SMR and SEQ stability solution concepts there will be
times where StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t)≥StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t) is
true, and times where the opposite is true. This part of the observation can be
proved by looking at two cases one to prove that StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t)≥
StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t) is true is true, and another case to show that
StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t)≥StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t) can sometimes
be true too. We use Figure 7.9 to illustrate the two cases.
Case 1: We use Figure 7.9a to illustrate this case. Let decision maker DMi, at
time t of the game, have only one UI move from state s to state s1 . Let us
also assume that an opponent of DMi, another player of the game who we
call DMj in the figure, has two sanction moves (to DMi’s UI). One sanction
move is a UM move from s1 to state s2 putting DMi at an extremely less
preferred state than the state he was originally in, state s. We will call this
move by the acronym we decided to use for such moves: SM (for Sanction
Move). The other sanction move, DMj has, will take DMi from state s1 to
state s2 , a moderately less-preferred state to state s. This second sanction
move by DMj, happen to be also a UI for DMj, making it a special kind of a
sanction move which we used the acronym SMUI for. The presented case so
far tells us that state s is stable under both GMR and SEQ solution concepts.
The strength of the s’s GMR stability is calculated using Algorithm 6.3 using
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(a) Case 1: The SEQ stability’s strength
for state s is greater than its SMR sta-
bility’s strength
(b) Case 2: The SMR stability’s strength
for state s is greater than its SEQ sta-
bility’s strength
Figure 7.9: Proving Observation 7.4.9 by showing that, for a specific state that is
both SMR and SEQ stable, the strength of its SMR stability could be sometimes
greater than, and some times less than, the strength of its SEQ stability
the sanction move, out of the two, that will yield the biggest disimprovement
level to DMi. This makes GMR uses the absolute value of the disimprovement
level reached by SM. For SEQ’s stability strength, only SMUI can be used,
as per SEQ’s Definition 6.3.4. Using Algorithm 6.5, SEQ’s stability strength
will be the absolute value of the disimprovement level reached by SMUI.
This case’s illustration, given in Figure 7.9a, also shows that DMi have two
countermoves. One out of s2 to state s3 , mitigating the effect of DMj’s SM;
and the other out of s2 to state s3 , mitigating the effect of DMj’s SMUI. Note
that both countermoves put DMi at the same end state of s3 . A state which
better where the sanctions left DMi in, but still less-preferred than his original
state s. This makes s to be an SMR stable state for DMi. The strength of
this stability will be calculated using Algorithm 6.4 to be the absolute value
of the disimprovement level reached after DMi makes his countermoves. In
this case, the same disimprovement level is reached by both countermoves,
the one DMi makes as a response to SM and the other he takes as a re-
sponse to SMUI. This makes s’s SMR stability less than its SEQ stability
(which less-than its GMR stability). In other words, this case proved that
StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t)≥StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t).
Case 2: We use Figure 7.9b to illustrate this case. Notice that this case is similar
to case 1 discussed above, in terms of DMi’s UI move out from state s to state
s1 , and also in terms of the SM and SMUI sanction moves DMj has out of s1
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to states s2 and s2 , respectively. Such similarity, makes the strength of both
s’s GMR and SEQ stability to be at the same strength levels calculated for
case 1, as shown in Figure 7.9b when compared to case 1’s Figure 7.9a.
The difference in the two cases is in the countermoves DMi have to the sanc-
tion moves SM and SMUI. Figure 7.9b shows that DMi has a countermove
out of each. The first countermove taks him out of s2 to state s3 , putting
him at an even worse position than the one which SMUI left him at. This
makes Algorithm 6.4, which is used for calculating the strength of SMR sta-
bilities, assumes that DMi, being a rational and intelligent decision maker,
will not take the countermove he has out of s2 to state s3 . The Algorithm
will calculate the strength of s’s SMR stability, if done only based on the
SMUI sanction move with no consideration to the SM move, to be at the
same strength level of s’s SEQ stability.
The second of DMi’s countermoves is shown in Figure 7.9b to take him from
state s2 to state s3 . This enhances DMi’s position a bit, since s3 is a little
more preferred to him than s2 . But, still this countermove leaves him at a
less preferred state than the original state s, making the situation satisfy the
requirement of SMR stability. Recall that Algorithm 6.4, and the definition of
SMR Strength (Definition 6.4.3), assumes that DMi’s opponents in the game
knows his moves, countermoves and preferences, therefore they will try to put
DMi at the worst disimprovement level possible. In this case, and as per the
illustration given in its figure, DMi’s opponents will prefer to take the SM
sanction, and not the SMUI one (SMUI type of sanctions are not required
by SMR Definition 6.3.3). As a result, the Algorithm 6.4will calculate the
strength of s’s SMR stabilities to be the absolute value of the disimprovement
level which DMi end up with after taking the s2-to- s3 countermove, i.e. the
disimprovement level at state s3 .
As shown Figure 7.9b, this makes s’s SMR stability greater than its SEQ
stability (notice that both stabilities have their strengths to be still bound by
the upper/higher stability strength of GMR). In other words, this case proved
that StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t)≥StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t).
Neither StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t)≥StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t) nor
StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t) ≥ StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t)) can be the
case all the time. By showing that one can be true in some cases, while the other
is true in some other cases, this Observation is proven.
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Figure 7.10: Venn Diagram showing the Interrelationships among the Strength Sets
of NASH, SMR and SEQ Solution Concepts, and their relationship with the generic
set of the GMR Solution Concept
The above observation leaves us with no established formal generic relationships
that could link the strength sets of SMR stability with the strength sets of SEQ
stability, such as the ones we proved to be among GMR and SMR strength sets
(Corollary 7.4.6), or the ones we proved to be among GMR and SEQ strength sets
(Corollary 7.4.8). This is not surprising, given the fact that we observed earlier this
lack of established generic and consistent formal relationship among the generic-
SMR, the set of all SMR strength subsets, and the generic-SEQ, the set of SEQ
strength subsets, when we discussed and proved Observation 7.3.3.
As a consequence to Observation 7.4.9 above, and the relationships established
before by Corollaries 7.4.3 and 7.4.4, is shown in Figure 7.10. This figure is similar
to Figure 7.6 presented in the previous section of this chapter, but in this figure
the strength subsets of NASH, SMR and SEQ are shown. Notice that this new
figure does not show the strength subsets of GMR. This is done to not complicate
the Venn diagram. Recall that a Venn diagram showing the relationships between
the strength sets of NASH, GMR and SMR is shown above in Figure 7.7; and
another one showing the relationships between the strength sets of NASH, GMR and
SEQ is shown in Figure 7.8. The two earlier Venn diagrams illustrate, separately
and respectively, how GMR’s strength sets relate to SMR’s strength sets and how
GMR’s strength sets relate to SEQ’s strength sets. All of NASH’s strength sets fall
within the None strength set of GMR, SMR and SEQ, as given by Theorem 7.4.2
264
and illustrated by the three diagrams shown in Figures 7.7, 7.8 and 7.10.
7.5 Case Studies: Paradoxes of Rationality
7.5.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
7.5.1.1 Background
In this section we will model and analyze the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game
using the Constrained Rationality framework. We will not discuss here the history
of the game, and the importance of it. It is one of the most discussed and analyzed
games, not only within the game theory literature, but also across many economical
and social sciences. This is mainly due to the cited usefulness of the game, as it
represents a simplification of many real-life conflict situations, and also because of
the trouble the game causes to anyone tries to solve it.
Poundstone (1992) provides a good review of the game, and its history. Pound-
stonealso summarizes the challenge PD poses: “How one should act in a prisoners’s
dilemma? In the main this is still an unanswered and probably unanswerable ques-
tion”. And, ends with few words on what the game theorists Luce and Raiffa, who
gave the poisoner’s dilemma great emphasis in Luce and Raiffa (1957), wrote: “The
hopelessness that one feels in such a game as this cannot be overcome by a play on
the words ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’; it is inherent in the situation”.
In short, the PD game is a 2x2 zero-sum game, and while the description of the
game took many variations over the years, the hypothetical story behind the game
and its name is still the same. The story goes as follows: two criminals have been
arrested under the suspicion of having committed a crime together. The police do
not have enough evidence for prosecuting and convicting them. So, the police try
to cut a deal with at least one of them. While keeping them separated in different
rooms, the police offers each of them the same deal.
The prisoner who confesses, i.e. defects his partner, will get a lesser sentence. If
they both cooperate with each other, by rejecting the police’s offer and both refuse
to confess to the crime, each of them will get a short jail time sentence (for what the
police has as evidence on them and be able to get a conviction for). If, on the other
hand, they both defects and confesses on the crime they committed, then each of
265







10 years for P
a
, and
3 moths for P
b
(2∗, 2∗∗) (4, 1)
Confess
3 moths for P
a
, and
8 years each10 years for P
b
(1, 4) (3, 3)
* Ordinal Preference for Player Pa (1-4: highest to lowest)
** Ordinal Preference for Player P
b
(1-4: highest to lowest)
them will get a longer, but the same for both, prison time. However, if only one
defects his partner and confesses, while the other does not confess, then the person
who defects will get a very minimal jail time and the other will get a very long
prison time. Let the penalties for cooperating with each other (or not confessing)
and defecting (or confessing) be the times set in the table shown in Table 7.1.
In fact, Table 7.1 represents the PD game using the mostly used game modelling
technique in the game theory literature: the Normal Form modelling. A game’s
Normal Form model is a tabular with rows and columns. The rows represent one
player’s’ different options/strategies, whilst the columns represent the other’s dif-
ferent options/strategies. Each of the tabular cells represents an outcome, or what
we refer to in our framework as a game’s state. Each of the cells will also show
the ordinal/cardinal preference for that outcome/state for each of the players. For
example, in the PD’s Normal Form shown in Table 7.1, the red ordinal preference
numbers represent the ordinal preferences for each of the game’s states for the “col-
umn” player, Pa , while the blue ordinal preferences shown represent the preferences
for the “row” player, P
b
.
The dilemma arises from each prisoner need to make a wise decision which is
not possible without knowing the other’s choice. A restriction that is embedded in
the structure of the game. None of the players knows what the others’ will select
as their option/strategy moving forward in the game. This is a common restriction
in game theory literature. Table 7.1 shows why PD is considered a dilemma, in
fact one of the most known talked about paradoxes of rationality games. Let us
take for example the prisoner represented in the rows of the game’s Normal Form
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shown in the figure. This prisoner could decide to defect, act selfishly and confess
to police, because this is the only way for him to get the least punishment of 3
months jail time. He surely could get this least punishment, but only if the other
prisoner did not confess. Since both prisoners kept separated while held in the
police’s custody, our “row” prisoner, or Player Pa as called in the figure, will not be
able to know what the “column” prisoner, or Player P
b
decides or is leaning towards.
If it happened that prisoner P
b
is also acting selfishly, defecting and confessing, then
our first prisoner, Player Pa , will sure get hit by a very long prison time of 8 years.
Rationally talking, at least according to the very famous John Nash and his Nash
Stability definition, each of the prisoners is better off acting selfishly by selecting
the defection/confession path. This game is called dilemma, or more accurately a
paradox as some refer to it, because the prisoners are actually collectively better off
if they cooperate with each other and not confess to the police. Doing so, each of
them will only get one year jail time, and more importantly not risk getting 8 or even
10 yeas prison time. Many scholarly attempts were made to build tools and solution
solution concepts that better help analyze the PD game, especially to show that
cooperation is better than defection as a rational choice for the prisoners/players.
The most famous of these attempts, is the successful attempt by Howard (1971)
proposing the meta-rationality concepts (GMR and SMR, discussed in the previous
chapter and defined with strength levels within the context of our own framework).
But the defection choice, or the NASH stable choice, is still the mostly used strategy
to show that the player is rational, otherwise if a player choses cooperation then
many in the game-theory community, specially the economists among them, will
definitely not be shy to call this player irrational, or exhibiting irrational behaviour.
We now model the PD game using the Constrained Rationality modelling and
analysis tools discussed in the previous chapter for non-cooperative games. We will
focus our attention, though, on illustrating the additional insight to the multi-agent
games gained by using the learnings from the concepts, theorems and observations
discussed earlier in this chapter to analyze these games, especially the PD game.
7.5.1.2 Players’ Strategic Goals and Alternatives
By design, the PD game, in its structure, does not present the players/prisoners
with more than one goal for each: achieve “Best Deal”. The best-deal is the one
minimizes the prisoner’s jail/prison time, knowing after-the-fact what the other
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P(1) Coop with Police P(2) Coop with Police
 G0   :  Best Deal for Prisoner (1)
 G1   :  No Jail Time for P(1)
 G2   :  Minimum Jail Time for P(1)
 G3   :  Best Deal for Prisoner (2)
 G4   :  No Jail Time for P(2)
 G5   :  Minimum Jail Time for P(2)
 G6   :  P(1) Coop with Police








(b) Prisoner’s Dilemma with Prisoner (1) Not Defecting (i.e. Not Co-
operating with the Police) and Prisoner (2) Defecting
Figure 7.11: Prisoner’s Dilemma: GCM models for the players, and the how the
















P(1) Coop with Police P(2) Coop with Police
 G0   :  Best Deal for Prisoner (1)
 G1   :  No Jail Time for P(1)
 G2   :  Minimum Jail Time for P(1)
 G3   :  Best Deal for Prisoner (2)
 G4   :  No Jail Time for P(2)
 G5   :  Minimum Jail Time for P(2)
 G6   :  P(1) Coop with Police








(c) Prisoner’s Dilemma with both Prisoners Cooperating with each
other (i.e. both are Not Cooperating with the Police
Figure 7.11: Prisoner’s Dilemma: GCM models for the players, and the how the
players’ decsions to cooperate or defect affect their respective ultimate strategic goal
in the game
structure. In summary, the game is not a game of many-goals to reason about, but
rather a game of a challenging structure.
Table 7.2: Prisoner’s Dilemma: Players’ Alternatives/Options







Do Not Defect by not confessing and cooperating with Police.
A
Pa 1
Defect by confessing and cooperating with Police, in other words
turn in Prisoner b in exchange for getting lesser jail time.















Defect by confessing and cooperating with Police, in other words
turn in Prisoner a in exchange for getting lesser jail time.
The alternatives that the prisoners have in the game are also limited to two for
each: Not to Defect (not confessing to police), and Defect (confess to police). Let
the names of the prisoners in the game be: Player Pa and Player Pb ; and let the
players’ alternatives named as shown in Table 7.2.
Even though that the game is not a game of many-goals to reason about, but
rather a game of a challenging structure, still it is worth looking at the players’
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GCM models and how they interact especially when different players’ alternatives
are activated. Figures 7.11a - Figure 7.11c show the GCMs model of all scenarios
possible, as provided by the definition of the PD game. The figures show that the
win-win scenario happens only when both players cooperate with each other and
not confess to the police (Figure 7.11c). All other scenarios will produce less than
full satisfactory achievement to both prisoners.
The GCMs model, also, offer a better understanding of the game’s structure and
challenges, because the models capture formally the game’s assumptions and struc-
ture beyond what game theory, and related, forms (whether tabular or graphical)
offer. Game theory, and related, forms only provide a description of the players’
preferences in the game, such as what the famous Normal Form shown inTable
7.1 provides. No explanation is given to why the prisoners’ preferences are as the
way they are presented. Furthermore, such models do not show what will happen
to the game’s structure and player’s ultimate goals when some tweaks happen to
the game’s assumptions (testing what-ifs). In the GCMs model of the PD game,
everything is captured within the model, even though the game is not a typical
game of many-conflicting-goals as most real-life business and political games are.
Knowing that the GCMs model reveals the effect of the players’ choices (the
strategies/alternatives) they adopt on their respective strategic goals, make the
model a great tool to elicit the players’ preferences for the game. No need to
assume the players’ preferences, or even take their word. The analyst, now, can
verify the players’ preferences. But, let us first identify the game’s states.
Table 7.3: Prisoner’s Dilemma: Defining the Game’s States












































By design, the game has two alternatives only for each player. This is the reason
behind calling it 2x2 game, giving it four outcomes, or states, only. These states
are shown in Table 7.3 with the players’ selected alternatives for each.
7.5.1.4 Players’ Preferences over States of the Game
The jail/prison time the prisoners will be given for each of the states (their selected
alternatives) is shown in the Normal Form of the game, Table 7.1. We use these
jail/prison times as measurements of how much punishment, or prevention of free-
dom. We assign these values, after fuzzification, to each of the prisoner’s Prevention
Prvn value property of their strategic goal of best deal (or least jail/prison time).
For example, Player Pa ’s Prvn(SG) will get the following values: Little for state s1
(for the 3 months jail time he will get if this state materialized); Full for state s2
(for the 10 years prison time he will get if this state materialized); None for state
s3 (for the no jail time he will get if this state materialized); and Big for state s4
(for the 8 years time he will get if this state materialized). We then continue the
process of eliciting both the ordinal (numerical order) and the cardinal (weighted
value) preferences for each of the prisoners over the game’s states. The final results
are summarized in Figure 7.12.
Figure 7.12 show the prisoners each with one strategic gaol, as per the game
design as we discussed earlier. It also shows that the prisoners give their respective
one-strategic-goal, understandably, Full strategic importance (i.e. SImprt(SG) =
F ) and INdifferent emotional likeness (i.e. EV lnc(SG=IN). The figure shows that
both prisoners have Full label for their respective rationality factor (RF =F ) and
Full label for their respective emotionality factor (EF =N). These values ensure
that the game is modelled as designed and used in the literature: full rationality
with no emotionality.
From Figure 7.12, the preferences vector for each of the prisoners/players is
defined and shown in Table 7.4. The table also shows the strength preferences, for
each of the players, over all the game’s states.
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Figure 7.12: Prisoner’s Dilemma: Players’ Ordinal and Weighted Preferences
Table 7.4: Prisoner’s Dilemma: Players’ Preferences
P
a
Preferences (Most to Least Preferred) P
b
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7.5.1.5 Players’ Moves over States of the Game
As per the classical PD game, the players have no moves between states. This is
because the game is a one-shot, or one-time, game. Each of the players is expected
to select one alternative: confess or do not confess. The players are not allowed to
change their selection, and the game’s state is defined after the fact based on their
selected alternatives. No player is allowed to have a second move. Consider for
example the situation where prisoner Pa chooses to not-defect, i.e. alternative APa 0 ,
and P
b




. Recall that, as per the game rules,
they select their choices in separation and none of them know what the other’s
selection will be. The game, based on the prisoners’ selections, is now at state s2 .
What is next? Nothing. The game is complete, and both prisoners get the expected
punishments as set by state s2 : Pa gets 10 years prison time, and Pb gets 3 months
jail time. Can Pa change this situation, by deciding to defect now for example? No.
For a one-shot game, where players are not allowed to sanction each other or
respond with countermoves, modelling the UMs and UIs of the players become
useless. In fact, this restriction, among others the PD game has, form the basis of
the criticism the game receives from many scholars and practitioners alike for its
limited use. Sure, the classical PD represents a real-life game that had happened
and continues to happen in police stations around the world , but it is hard to
imagine that it represents economical, trade or business conflicts, as some argue.
To make the standard PD more useful, a slightly modified version of it, was proposed
allowing the player/prisoner to punish the other player if the other player defected
when he didi not This new modified game is referred to in the literature as the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD).
The first reported experiment that involved IPD was the 1950 experiment done
by the two RAND scientists, Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher, who invented the
PD game. Flood and Dresher were concerned that John Nash’s NASH equilibrium
point solution could be unsatisfactory; and there can be cases where the NASH
equilibrium state is not a good outcome. Their experiment, in which they recruited
two RAND employees to be the players in it, involves playing what came to be
known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game repeatedly 100 times. The experiment
and its results were published in Flood (1952). But by far, the most important result
this experiment has in the filed of game theory, and conflict analysis in general, is
introducing: 1) the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game; and 2) the concept of repeated
or iterative games, especially the Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game.
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After the Flood (1952) report, the interest in IPD game grew steadily. One
reason for this is IPD seemed more realistic with more practical applications than
the one-shot PD. There are many flavours of IPD in the literature, some employ
sophisticated strategies and some employ simple ones in order to allow the player
to gain the best. The interest on IPD and IPD’s strategies had sparked by the
effort of by Robert Axelrod, and his IPD tournaments, and his book The Evolution
of Cooperation (1984).
We will start our analysis of the players moves in the PD game by looking at
the moves the players can have in the two flavours of PD we talked about so far: 1)
the standard classical one-shot PD; and 2) the standard IPD. The standard IPD is
simply a repeated PD game with no pre-defined strategies the players follow. Later
in this chapter, we will analyze IPD games with players using one of the most
known strategies, and by far the most successful: the Tit for Tat (TFT) strategy.
But for now, we will consider only the standard, no pre-defined player’ strategies
PD and IPD game.
1) Players’ Moves over States of the Classical One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma:
The classical one-shot PD gives the prisoners/players no moves or second chances
after their one and only one selection of their alternatives. But, we can assume
fairly that the game starts for each prisoner/player at the No-Confess , or the No-
Defection, option, because the prisoners did actually confess at the beginning before
the game starts. Now, hypothetically speaking, the prisoners mentally, but not
physically, can have some moves starting from that option. Consider for example
the case of prisoner Pa . He starts the game knowing that he did not confess/defect
yet.
This makes his version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game actually starts at either
state s1 or state s2 , based on whether he thinks/believes Pb will select to Not Defect
or Defect, respectively. Pa can envision mentally changing his selected alternative
from Not Defect/Confess to Defect/Confess, before he actually change his selection
to Defect/Confess. This makes him has two mental UM moves. One from s1 to s3 ,
and a second from s2 to s4 . Both UMs are, in fact, UI moves for Pa based on his
preferences. These mental Pa moves, and the equivalent moves for prisoner Pb are
shown in Figure 7.13.
The figure does not show reverse UM moves for Pa from s3 to s1 or from s4
to s2 , because Pa can not change his position/selection from Confessing to Not
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Confessing. Even if we modelled this as a mental UM move for him, this move
will never be able to materialize. Once a confession is doe, it is done. There is go
back. This is especially true knowing that the prisoner in this one-shot game can
not even change his strategy/selection in a following game, or iteration of a game.
Similarly, there are no reverse UM moves for P
b
from s2 to s1 or from s4 to s3 , as
Figure 7.13 correctly show.
Figure 7.13: The Prisoner’s Dilemma - One-Shot Standard Game: The Unilateral
Moves and the Unilateral Improvement Moves by the players
Figure 7.14: Prisoner’s Dilemma - Iterated Standard Game: Players’ Unilateral
Moves and Unilateral Improvement Moves
2) Players’ Moves over States of the Iterated Standard Prisoner’s Dilemma:
For the IPD, and unlike the one-shot classical PD, the prisoners actually can change
selection from confessing to confessing in the iteration that followed. It is true that
each iteration is an instant of the one-shot PD, but each of the prisoners will have
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the chance to change his position, or retaliate, in the following instance of the game.
Therefore, the physical restriction that the one-shot game has of not allowing player
to not confess if he already confessed, is no longer a restriction of the players moves
in the iterated version of the game. This is illustrated in Figure 7.14 by showing
the players have the reverse moves prohibited to have in the classical one-shot PD.
7.5.1.6 Stability Analysis and Analysis Results of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this section we analyze both versions of the PD game, the classical one shot
and the iterated one. For each version of the game, we follow the same process
we use in our framework for stability analysis and results discussion. We start by
conducting stability analysis, followed by equilibrium states analysis, and closing
by some results and comparisons.
1) Analysis of the Classical One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma:
The classical one-shot PD has no moves by the focal decision maker, nor sanction-
ing moves by others after the one and only first move is completed. This makes
the concept of sanction moves (SMs), defined in defined in Definition 6.2.3, not ap-
plicable to this type of game. Recall that GMR, SMR and SEQ stability solution
concepts require in their definitions (Definition 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4, respectively)
some form of SMs to exist. Therefore, these solutions concepts are not applicable
to this game by design. Only NASH does not require, in its Definition 6.3.1, SMs
by others to declare a state stable after the focal decision maker takes a UI move
out of it.
One also can immediately notice the implication of this, and the complication
this could cause to finding an equilibrium to the classical one-shot PD game. The
first implication is that by allowing only one move per player, i.e. no retaliation
is allowed or even considered, the game become with foresight of zero steps. As
we discussed in Section 7.2, one of the main characteristics of NASH is it has a
foresight of zero lookahead steps. The players who uses NASH solution concept to
define wether a state is stable for him or not does not need to know anything but his
UI moves. He is not even required to know the preferences of others or their moves,
if they are different from his. This leads us to the second implication: the absence
of knowledge about others’ preferences and moves, makes the focal decision maker
vulnerable to others’ moves to disimrpove his positions, as shown in Figure 7.1.
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The third implication is a result of the first two ones. The believers in NASH, as a
stability solution concept, exhibit an attitude toward risk taking that is correctly
could be describes as: ignoring risks. Ignoring risks does not mean the risks are
not there.
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Table 7.6: Prisoner’s Dilemma - One-Shot Standard Game: Equilibrium States
S1 S2 S3 S4
NASH EQ. L
The stability analysis of the classical one-shot PD is provided in Table 7.5.
Notice that states are only tested for NASH stability for each of the players, as
per our discussion above; and that each has two states that are NASH stable with
strength calculated using Algorithm 6.2. But, only one state is NASH stable for
both players. It is state s4 , the state that both player defect/confess. This makes
s4 the only equilibrium state for the game, as shown in Table 7.6. A bad state for
both players to be in, based in their respective preferences and the long prison time
both will get out of it.
The complication that arises from the implications listed above is demonstrated
by the stability analysis results shown in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. This complication is
at the heart of why the PD is considered a dilemma or a paradox of rationality. At-
tempts to solve, or suggest solution concepts, to a dilemma that represents a conflict
with a multi-agent social context to it by just ignoring all other agents/players and
concentrate on own gains and moves, will definitely fail to recognize the dangers as
well as the opportunities lie ahead. So, it is understandable that others questioned
the logic behind the self imposed restrictions of the one-shot classical PD, by its
own design, and proposed instead to look at it as a repeated/iterated game to give
it the depth, the foresight, and dynamics it deserves as a social conflict.
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2) Analysis of the Iterated Standard Prisoner’s Dilemma:
In the IPD, players are allowed to retaliate, punish, and reward other players po-
sition/moves of the previous iteration/instance of the game. Sanction moves here
are considered, and as a result all solution concepts are allowed to compete in
their findings. Table 7.7 shows the stability analysis of the game based on all four
solution concepts.
Beside the NASH stable states that the stability analysis for the classical one-
shot PD, shown in Table 7.5, there is now a new state emerging to be stable for
under GMR, SMR and SEQ solution concepts. State is s1 , where both players
select to cooperate with each other and not defect/confess, is now stable stable for
both players, and therefore form a new equilibrium state for the game, as shown in
Table 7.8.
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The stability analysis results of the IPD (the standard game) given in Tables 7.7
and 7.8 provide us with much insight, especially when compared with the results
of the classical one-shot game given in Table 7.5 and 7.6. The following is a list of
some of the most insightful observations:
• Foresight: By allowing the players the ability to react, sanction or have coun-
termoves in general, the IPD gives the players the ability to strategize and
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think ahead of the consequences of their initial moves. The one-shot classi-
cal PD deprives the players from this strategy-playing, and instead the game
come across as take-a-chance game (this could explain why people went on to
add probabilities to the mix).
• Risk taking: while the classical one-shot game forced all players to adopt an
attitude of ignoring risk, the iterated version of the game allowed each of the
players to chose among many attitudes to adopt: 1) ignore risks, therefore use
NASH stability analysis to guide his decisions on what he should do; 2) avoid
risks, for this he can use GMR stability analysis to know if the other player
can sanction his UI, even if this sanction is made solely to hurt him, or go even
further using SMR to check if he will be able to mitigate any sanction others
can impose on him; or 3) strategize by taking acceptable risks, risks with the
assumption that the other player is rational player and will not sanction him
just for the sack of hurting him, for this he can use the SEQ stability analysis.
• Stability of selfishness: The states in which the players act selfishly to max-
imize their gain (minimize their jail/prison time), or states s2 and s3 , are
not equilibria states, i.e. they are not stable for all players at the same time.
Once of a state of them is reached in an instance of the game, in the second
instance a retaliation will happen brining the game to the all-must-loose s4
state. Making any short maximization of gains by one of the players to be
short lived. The player who acted selfishly will find himself in state s4 , loosing
in the second round much more what he gained in the first round.
• How much gain is there in defection? The gain one should expect by moving
from not-defecting, or not-confessing, states to defecting, or confessing, states
is indeed Little. Table 7.9show the amount of gain a prisoner should expect
from defecting/confessing. It is clear from the table that gain is little. This
fact is also can be elicited from looking at the preference strength between
no-defection states and defection states. The preferences’ strength as shown
to be in Table 7.4 at the L, or Little, level for both the one-shot classical
game and the iterated one. This fact is also reflected more clearly in the
NASH stability and equilibrium’s strength for defection states, for both types
of games, as shown in Tables 7.5 - 7.8.
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• Cooperation’s stability in comparison to defection: For the players individ-
ually, the defection states (shown in the “To” column in Table 7.9) are all
NASH stable with Little strength. This true for both types of PD games, the
classical one-shot and the iterated one, as can be seen from Table 7.5 and
Table 7.7, respectively. Recall that NASH stability, no matter what strength
it has, is still a weak stability when it is compared to stability under all other
solution concepts we studied (Theorem 7.4.2). Therefore, all these defection
states have weak stabilities for the individual players, and when one is stable
for both players then it forms a weak NASH equilibrium. Compare this with
the cooperation state. When both players cooperate with each other in the
game they move to state s1which is stable for both players under GMR, SMR
and SEQ solution concepts, with strength level of Much. In other words, the
cooperation state has a higher stability type, and stability strength, once the
players start thinking strategically and start looking ahead to see what others
have to sanction/disimprove their moves.
7.5.2 Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma : The Tit for Tat Way
7.5.2.1 Background
Tit for Tat (TFT) is a highly effective well known strategy for the IPD. It was first
proposed by Anatol Rapoport in Robert Axelrod’s two tournaments, held in the
late 1970’s. It was introduced in Axelrod (1980a,b) to be the most effective strategy
for the IPD game, as per the tournaments results, in spit of the fact that it was the
simplest and the least sophisticated (the TFT submission to the tournament was
a BASIC program with four lines of code). A player adopting a TFT strategy in
playing the IPD will start the first iteration/instance of the game by cooperative
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action and then behaves the same as the other in future steps. So after the first
iteration, the player will follow what the other player did in the previous iteration.
If the other player defected in the previous iteration, he will defect in this one; and
if the other player cooperated, then he, likewise, will cooperate in this one too.
We will model and analyze the IPD with two players using the TFT strategy
against each other, and with one player playing using TFT and the other uses
the standard IPD game that we discussed above in this section. Because the two
versions of the IPD TFT games we are concerned with in this section assume that
the players have the same alternatives the players of the standard PD (single-shot
and iterated) have,. These alternatives are discussed above in Section 7.5.1.2, so
we will not re-discuss the players’ alternatives again. And because the players’
alternatives do not change in the TFT versions of the game, The TFT games will
still have the same four states that the standard games have. So, we will also not
re-discuss the TFT games’ states, because they are discussed already in Section
7.5.1.3. But, we will start the modelling and analysis process of the TFT games
from the players’ preferences elicitation step, where change is start to happen.
7.5.2.2 Players’ Preferences over States of the Game
Traditionally, when people model the TFT IPD, they will model the actions and the
mechanical moves the players who adopt TFT do in the game. But, Axelrod (1980a)
when introduced Rapoport’s TFT submission to his IPD tournaments, he actually
did an important analysis to find out what common characteristics TFT and the
other runner up submissions have. His findings were descriptive, but insightful in
a sense that they shed light on the motivation/goals behind such strategies.
Axelrod (1980a,b) described these characteristics as properties of successful rules
(of game playing), and they are, in order: niceness, effectiveness with the kingmak-
ers (strategies which exhibit not-niceness and do not do for themselves but help
establish the ranking of the top contending strategies in the tournament), forgive-
ness, provocability (immediately defects after an uncalled-for defection from the
other, but goes to forgiveness once the other goes back to cooperation). There are
many ways to model these “attitudes” using our Constrained Rationality frame-
work. One way to model these here is by adding another strategic goal to the TFT
strategy adopter. Recall that each player of the PD is given in our model, so far,
one strategic goal “Get the Best Deal”, denoted as SGPa 0 or SGPb 0 depends if the
player is Pa or Pb , respectively. Now, the players who adopt TFT will have an
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additional strategic goal “Win By Cooperating with Cooperators”. This goal could
alternatively be called “Have a Win-Win Deal”. Let this strategic goal be denoted
SGPa 1 or SGPb 1 depends if the player is Pa or Pb , respectively.
It is also very apparent form Axelrod’s list of attitudes exhibited by TFT, and a
like strategies, adopter that these attitudes/qualities have emotional dimension to
them. Considering that the very first attitude in the list, and the most important
was niceness, one can not just capture the importance of this attitude with just a
strategic goal, even if we add to this goal a full rational strategic importance. Nice-
ness, forgiveness and provocability are emotional attitudes, and can be captured
effectively in the model by addition an An Extremely Liked emotional valance label
to this second strategic goal we just added. Then, for those with the new strate-
gic goals and emotional valences, we re-elicit their preferences based on the new
GCM model they have. Because TFT player’s goals and the strategic/emotional
importance of these goals are different than the ones that players of standard PD
games have, then the TFT players’ preferences will be different. Therefore, we will
start by looking at the changes happening to the players’ preferences structure and
strength over the game’s states.
1) Players’ Preferences over States of the Tit-For-Tat-Both-Ways Pris-
oner’s Dilemma:
In the IPD game where both players playing Tit for Tat, both players have two
rational strategic goals, with the second goal for each is also emotionally extremely
liked. Figure 7.20 shows the elicitation of the ordinal and weighted/cardinal pref-
erences of both players over the four states of the games. Table 7.10 shows the
preferences vector and preferences’ strengths for both players.
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Figure 7.15: Prisoner’s Dilemma - Tit For Tat by Both Players: Players’ Ordinal
and Normalized Weighted Preferences
Table 7.10: Prisoner’s Dilemma - Tit For Tat by Both Players: Players’ Preferences
P
a
Preferences (Most to Least Preferred) P
b
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2) Players’ Preferences over States of the Tit-For-Tat-One-Way Pris-
oner’s Dilemma:
In the IPD game where only one of the players uses Tit for Tat as a strategy, then
only this player will have two rational strategic goals, with the second goal for each
is also emotionally extremely liked. The player who does not use TFT, but rather
the standard IPD, then he will maintain having only one strategic goal as before.
Figure 7.16 shows the elicitation of the ordinal and weighted/cardinal preferences
of both players over the four states of the games.
Figure 7.16: Prisoner’s Dilemma - Tit For Tat by Pa and Standard by Pb : Players’
Ordinal and Normalized Weighted Preferences
Table 7.11 shows the preferences vector and preferences’ strengths for both
players. Notice that the TFT player has his preferences changed, while the player
who uses the standard strategy maintained the preferences order and strength as
shown in Figure 7.12 and Table 7.4of the standard PD (both the one-shot and the
iterative versions).
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7.5.2.3 Players’ Moves over States of the Game
Because the players’ preferences changed in the TFT IPD games, while the players’
unilateral moves are the same, only the unilateral moves of the players actually
change.
1) Players’ Moves for the Tit-For-Tat-Both-Ways Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Figure 7.17 shows the UMs and UIs for the two players playing an IPD while each
adopting TFT as their strategy.
Figure 7.17: Prisoner’s Dilemma - Tit For Tat by Both Players: Players’ Unilateral
Moves and Unilateral Improvement Moves
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2) Players’ Moves for the Tit-For-Tat-One-Way Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Figure 7.18 shows the UMs and UIs for the two players playing an IPD with one
adopting TFT as his strategy while the other playing the standard strategy.
Figure 7.18: Prisoner’s Dilemma - Tit For Tat by Pa and Standard by Pb : Players’
Unilateral Moves and Unilateral Improvement Moves
7.5.2.4 Stability Analysis and Analysis Results of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Earlier, we said that the IPD players are allowed to retaliate, punish, and reward
other players position/moves of the previous iteration/instance of the game. Sanc-
tion moves here are considered, and as a result all solution concepts are allowed
to compete in their findings. But, the players have consistent similar preferences
structures and strategies to direct their moves in the game. On the other hand, in
the two special IPD games, which we are analyzing here, the players, or some of
them, have special (other than the standard) strategies to direct their retaliation
process and therefore the game flow of events and/or have different strategies to do
so. These changes will effect the stability of the game’s states for the players, and
on the game as a whole.
1) Analysis of the Tit-For-Tat-Both-Ways Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Table 7.12 shows the stability analysis based on all four solution concepts for the
IPD in which both players player the TFT strategy. Table 7.13 shows the equilib-
rium states for the game under the same solution concepts. One will notice im-
mediately some differences between these two tables and the stability/equilibrium
analysis for the standard IPD shown in Tables 7.7 and 7.8.
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NASH L L L L
GMR N Mo N N Mo N
SMR N S N N S N
SEQ N N N N
First, It is true that in the standard IPD each player have two NASH stable
state. But, as Table 7.7 only one is a shared NASH stable state, and that is state
s4 which is a very bad state, based on the players’ preferences and the punishment
received, reached by both players defect/confess. Now, in the IPD game where both
players adopt the TFT strategy, and as shown in Table 7.12, there are two NASH
stable states for each player and these states are the same for both players. Both
players, now, have states s1 and s4 stable under NASH. This makes this game to
have two states to be equilibrium states under NASH stability solution concept, as
Table 7.13 shows.









NASH EQ. L L
GMR EQ. N N
SMR EQ. N N
SEQ EQ. N N
Second, in this game we notice that the state which represents the players
cooperating with each other and not defecting/confessing is stable. Not only this,
but knowing that the first iteration/instance of the IPD game always starts from
no-confession, or no-defection, by both players (state s1), this makes none of the two
players have any incentive (UI) to move from the cooperation s1 state. Therefore,
state s1 is expected to persist from the time the game has its first iteration. This
will only change if one of the players moved irrationally against their preferences
and UIs.
Third, we can see from Table 7.12 that state s3 is now a GMR and SMR stable
to Pa . Similarly, s2 is now a GMR and SMR stable to Pb . Recall that these two
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states are NASH stable for the standard IPD game, as shown by Table 7.7 above.
These states are now GMR and SMR stable for their respective players, because the
players should expect to get sanctioned if they decide to take their respective UIs
out from them to state s1 . The question is why one of the player decides to sanction
his opponent if that opponent is actually taking him to his at most preferred state
s1 . As Table 7.10 shows, s1 is the at most preferred state for both players of this
type of game. The answer is simple. GMR and SMR do not assume the opponent
to be a fully rational agent. In fact GMR and SMR assumes that the opponent
could move in the game against his own preferences, motivated only by the desire
to hurt the focal decision maker.
For example, in this case, s3 is GMR stable for Pa because if Pa decides to take
his UI to s1 from s3 , Pb could sanction this UI by utilizing a normal UM he has from
s1 from s2 which a less preferred state to Pa than state s3 which Pa started from. s3
is also SMR stable for Pa because Pa will not be able to recover from Pb ’s sanction.
Importantly, both states s3 and s2 are not SEQ stable to Pa and Pb , respectively.
Why? Because SEQ stability concept assumes full rational players that do not act
against their preferences and UIs. In summary, s3 and s2 stability can only be
considered seriously if the assumption that all players are rational players is called
into question.
Finally, Table 7.13 is clear in it finding. The are two equilibrium states for
this game. One is s1 , the both cooperating state; and the other is s4 , the both
defecting state. Bust since we know that the game in its first iteration starts at
state s1 , the expectation is that rational players in the game will not move out of this
state, and cooperation will persist. If one, or both, players decided to act selfishly
(and irrationally according to the their preferences structures), then it is expected
that the game will progress reaching state s4 within few rounds (two iterations -at
least- to be specific). So, if one defect, or try defecting in an iteration, then the
other surely will defect. The real problem for both players start her. Because,
according to the TFT strategy, the players will be stuck at s4 . This especially
true in an automated IPD game, where the players are automated agents that are
programmed to act based on their preferences and moves. The only solution for
the players, or automated agents, is to test the willingness of the other player to go
back cooperating with each other. If the other player is willing, or acting rationally
according to his preferences, then surely it will take a UI to state s1 where both
can claim a Win-Win situation. Otherwise, if the other player failed the test, and
continue defecting, then the focal player can bring the game back to s4 .
288
From above, one can see the opportunity and danger that adopting TFT has for
both players. It is either all-cooperate or all-defect. In other words, both players
are expected to gain almost the same. There will be no player to be called the real
winner in the game, or the one who claim the most out of the game. One could
argue if one of he players become unpredictable, then this player might harness
more from the game than the player who strictly follow TFT. This is actually
proven to be untrue. Many simple and sophisticated strategies, including selecting
moves randomly, were tried against TFT over the years, but TFT continued to
show superiority in effectiveness against any players’ manipulation or selfishness
behaviour (Axelrod, 1980b). Next, we show that this is consist of our analysis of a
IPD with only of the players adopting TFT as a strategy while the other adopting
a standard IPD strategy.
2) Analysis of the Tit-For-Tat-One-Way Prisoner’s Dilemma:
We analyze here the IPD game where Pa plays according to the TFT strategy (TFT
goals, preferences and moves) while P
b
plays a standard IPD strategy (one goal, self
behaviour, etc.). First, Table 7.14 shows the players have different stable states for
them under the fours stability solution concepts we use in our study. For example,
the TFT player Pa has s1 and s4 to be NASH stable; and the standard IPD player
P
b
has s2 and s4 to be NASH stable.
Table 7.14: Prisoner’s Dilemma - Tit For Tat by Pa and Standard by Pb : Stability
Analysis
Pa Pb
S1 S3 S4 S2 S2 S1 S4 S3
UIs S1 (UI) S4 (UI) S2 (UI) S4 (UI)
NASH L L L L
GMR N Mo N N S N
SMR N S N N S N
SEQ N Mo N N S N
In addition, notice that Table 7.14 shows s3 to be GMR, SMR and SEQ stable
(with stability strength that range from small to moderate) for Pa . This means
that it does not matter if Pa believes Pb to be a rational or irrational player (acts
according to his preferences or against them, respectively), Pa has s3 stable for the
long run. He should not move out of it by taking a UI to s1 , the more preferred
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state to him. Why? because the GMR, SMR and especially the SEQ stability of s3
to him means that P
b
will try to take advantage of his UI move to s1 by sanctioning
it (this is an SM as well as SMUI move for P
b
at the same time). In other words,
player Pa is advised to demonstrate some selfishness if he reaches s3 knowing that
the other player does not cooperation as he does.
Similarly, Table 7.14 shows s1 to be GMR, SMR and SEQ stable (with small
stability strength) for P
b
. This is because if P
b
takes advantage of the cooperation
Pa is demonstrating, by staying at s1 , and decide to active a selfish UI he has to
s2 , Pa will definitely retaliate moving the game to the all-loose state s4 . In other
words, P
b
is well advised to show some restrain and not to act selfishly when the
game reach the all-cooperate s1 .











GMR EQ. N N
SMR EQ. N N
SEQ EQ. N N
Table 7.15 shows that this game has one NASH equilibrium state, and that is
state s4 . Not a good state for both players. It is clear is clear that the selfishness
of one of the players will definitely doom the game to go that way, in spite of the
other player’s appreciation and well intentions to cooperate. The table also, shows
a weak equilibrium, under GMR, SMR and SEQ solution concepts, at state s1 .
This send also a clear message that cooperation is stable to both players if and only
if both of them think strategically and have a longer foresight when analyzing the
game (lookahead to see what the other player have as sanctions to your moves). But
notice that s1 is a very weak equilibrium under GMR, SMR and SEQ, with strength
of None (0-10% in a numerical none-fuzzy scale). The weakness of this stability is
because of the selfishness that one player demonstrates, and the cautiousness the
other will show in response. Indeed, a very insightful experiment that is consistent
with both Axelrod (1980a,b) findings and his tournaments results.
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7.5.3 The Game of Chicken
7.5.3.1 Background
Same like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Game of Chicken poses a paradox of ratio-
nality. The game of Chicken is a game that has been studied extensively in the
game theory literature. Rapoport and Guyer (1966) in their survey of 2x2 games
included Chicken as game number 66. The name ”Chicken” has its origins in a
daredevil duel in which two drivers drive towards each other on a collision course.
One driver must swerve, or both may die in the crash. But, if one driver swerves
and the other does not, the one who swerved will be called a “Chicken” (means a
“coward”).
The game of Chicken is initially used in the literature to represent generally,
or symbolically, conflicts where two parties engage in a showdown where they have
nothing to gain, and only pride stops them from backing down. Then, the game
is developed in game theory literature to represent a mathematical phenomenon
with the preference structure in Chicken is the main item of interest; the story of
the car drivers driving towards each other merely adds colour and intuition to the
analysis. But later on, the game of Chicken started to be taken more seriously
to represent real-life problems, especially after Bertrand Russell famously used the
game to model geopolitical conflicts, namely Russell (1959) saw in the Game of
Chicken a metaphor for nuclear stalemate. The game now is used to represent,
with simplification, a class of problems that involves the introduction of an ele-
ment of uncontrollable risk. Even if all players act rationally in the face of risk,
uncontrollable events can still trigger the catastrophic outcome.






Don’t Swerve 4∗, 4∗∗ 1, 3
Swerve 3, 1 2, 2
* Ordinal Preference for Player Pa
** Ordinal Preference for Player P
b
*,** 1-4 Preference: highest to lowest
Again here, we will not discuss further the history or applications of the game
of chicken. We will present how the game which is typically modelled within the
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game theory literature in its normal formal, as shown in Table 7.16, can be modelled
and analyzed using the Constrained Rationality framework. The new model and
analysis of the game will provide more information and insight into the dynamics
of the game and the stability of its states to its players.
7.5.3.2 Players’ Strategic Goals and Alternatives
The Game of Chicken, as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in its structure does not present
the players with more than one goal for each: achieve “Best Deal” for the player.
The best-deal is the shows the player as the “brave” one, hopefully while still alive,
knowing after-the-fact what the other player chose as a strategy. The game has
many assumptions inherent in its structure; and ultimately it is not a game of
many-goals to reason about, instead it is more a game of a challenging structure.
Saying so, still here too as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, modelling the game using the
Constrained Rationality framework will show that the win-win scenario will only
happen with both player cooperating with each other, i.e. both Swerve. All other
scenarios will produce less than full satisfactory achievement to both players.
We provide in this section a very rational model for the game of Chicken. This
model will not involve an emotional valences or factors, even though the game by
its nature as a daredevil automobile duel has a very visible emotional dimension
to it. After all, the players are fighting for their pride, to show they are “men”
and to boost their status among their peers. But, our choice to model the game
as a complete rational game, with no emotional component to it, come because
the game is mostly used to symbolize real-life similar conflict where the players
involved are rational individuals, or entities with collective institutional rationality.
The importance of the game does not come from its roots as a daredevil automobile
duel, but rather from the fact that it shows, with simplification, a way to model
geopolitical conflicts. For example, Russell (1959) saw in the game of Chicken a
metaphors for nuclear stalemate.
In a game of Chicken among two completely rational players, we model the
GCM for each with one strategic goal: Reach the Best Outcome. This “Best
Outcome” goal is reduced, using reduction goal-to-goal relationships, to three goals
that explain what it means to reach a best outcome for the player: 1) come out of
the game Alive; 2) come out Not a Chicken; and 3) Do Not Swerve. The following
figures, Figures 7.19a - 7.19c, show the players’ GCM models and how they interact
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Table 7.17: Game of Chicken: Players’ Alternatives/Options























with each other for all scenarios possible, as provided by the definition of the Game
of Chicken.
By design, the standard structure of the game of Chicken gives each of the player
two options only: Swerve or Do Not Swerve. These options are shown in Table 7.17.
Each one of these alternatives contributes differently to the player’s achievement
of his ultimate strategic goal of “reaching the Best Outcome”. Notice that the
options selected by each of the players will also contribute positively or negatively,
depending on the selected option, to the other player’s achievement of his ultimate
strategic goal. Hence the lateral relationships across the players’ GCMs shown in
Figures 7.19a - 7.19c.
The Constrained Rationality model of the players’ GCMs for the game of
Chicken offer a better understanding of the game structure and challenges, because
the models capture formally the game assumptions and structure beyond what the
game theory, or related, forms whether tabular or graphical provide. All what the
game theory, and related, forms provide is a game of preferences, such as the one
shown in Table 7.16. No explanation is given to why the prisoners’ preferences
are as the way they are presented. Furthermore, such models do not show what
will happen to the game structure and player’s ultimate goals when some tweaks
happen to the game’s assumptions (testing what-ifs).
In the players’ GCMs model everything is captured within the models, even
though the game is not a typical game of many-conflicting-goals, such as the ones
happen in most of real-life conflicts. Knowing that the GCMs model reveals the
effect of the players’ choices in the strategy/alternative to adopt on their strategic
goals, make the model a great tool to elicit the players’ preferences for the game.
No need to assume the players’ preferences, or even take their word. The analyst,
now, can verify the players’ preferences.











Agent (1) Agent (2)
 G0   :  Best Outcome in the game for Agent (1)
 G1   :  Agent (1) is alive
 G2   :  Agent (1) is Not a Chicken
 G3   :  Agent (2) do not swerve
 G4   :  Best Outcome in the game for Agent (2)
 G5   :  Agent (2) is alive
 G6   :  Agent (2) is Not a Chicken
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(b) Game of Chicken with Player (1) Not Swerving while
Player (2) Swerves
Figure 7.19: Game of Chicken: GCM models for the players, and the how the
players’ decisions to swerve or not-to-swerve affect their respective ultimate strategic
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 G3   :  Agent (2) do not swerve
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(c) Chicken Game with Both Players Not Swerving
Figure 7.19: Game of Chicken: GCM models for the players, and the how the
players’ decisions to swerve or not-to-swerve affect their respective ultimate strategic
goal in the game
players cooperate with each other, i.e. both Swerve. All other scenarios will produce
less than full satisfactory achievement to both players. We will use these modes to
elicit the players’ preferences in the game, and use these preferences to analyze the
stability of the game. But, let us first identify the game’ s states.
Table 7.18: Game of Chicken: Defining the Game States












































Each of the players is given two alternatives to choose one from: Swerve or Not-
to-Swerve. The game in its structure, and as proposed by the literature, has 4
outcomes/states. These states are shown in Table 7.18.
7.5.3.4 Players’ Preferences over States of the Game
Using the GCM models shown above to represent the players in the game of
Chicken, the analyst will be able to elicit the cardinal/weighted and ordinal pref-
erences for the players over the four states the game has. These preferences are
shown in Figure 7.20. Then, the preferences’ strengths are calculated and shown
in Table 7.19.
Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for Pa & Pb) Game of Chicken
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for Pa & Pb) Pa Pb
DMs' Strategic Goals    SGs: SGPa SGPb
SGPa 0 SGPb 0
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) F F




Don’t Swerve, Don’t Swerve FAchv(SGk) F F
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -1.00 -1.00
{ Achv(APa 0)=F, WP(S1, DM) 0.000 0.000




Don’t Swerve,  Swerve FAchv(SGk) F B
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 1.00 -0.80
{ Achv(APa 0)=F, WP(S2, DM) 1.000 0.100




Swerve, Don’t Swerve FAchv(SGk) -B F
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.80 1.00
{ Achv(APa 1)=F, WP(S3, DM) 0.100 1.000




Swerve, Swerve FAchv(SGk) -L -L
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.20 -0.20
{ Achv(APa 1)=F, WP(S4, DM) 0.400 0.400
  Achv(APb 1)=F } OP(S4, DM) 2 2
Figure 7.20: Game of Chicken: Players’ Ordinal and Normalized Weighted Prefer-
ences
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Table 7.19: Game of Chicken: Players’ Preferences
P
a
Preferences (Most to Least Preferred) P
b





















WP 1.00 0.40 0.10 0.00 WP 1.00 0.40 0.10 0.00
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7.5.3.5 Players’ Moves over States of the Game
We said above that we will model the game of Chicken as an iterative game, with the
game’s states represent the outcome of an iteration/instance of the game. Figure
7.21 presents the UMs of the players in the game. Notice the similarity between
the players’ UMs of the Chicken game and the ones shown earlier in Figure ?? for
the players in the IPD game. In fact, this similarity is not limited to these two
types of games, but shared across all 2x2 games. But, in this game, and as Figure
7.21 shows, the players will not have UMs our of state s1 . This state represent full
destruction for both players, or the doom scenario. So, once this state is reached
the players will not be able to get out of it.
Figure 7.21: The Game of Chicken: The Unilateral Moves and the Unilateral
Improvement Moves by the players
The game of Chicken has unique UIs for the players, not similar to the ones
IPD has. Recall that UIs, by Definition 6.2.2, are UMs but the destination state is
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more preferred to the player than the start/source state. Knowing what UMs the
players have in this game and their preferences structure as presented above, and
using Algorithm 6.1 the players’ UIs are identified. They are as shown in Figure
7.21.
7.5.3.6 Stability Analysis and Analysis Results of the Game of Chicken
Table 7.20 presents the stability analysis of the game of Chicken’s four states, for
both players, under NASh, GMR, SMR and SEQ solution concepts. Table 7.21
shows the equilibrium states for the game under the four solution concepts.
Table 7.20: Game of Chicken: Stability Analysis
Pa Pb






NASH M Ex Ex M Ex Ex
GMR N S N N N S N N
SMR N S N N N S N N
SEQ N N N N N N









NASH EQ. Ex M M
GMR EQ. N N N S
SMR EQ. N N N S
SEQ EQ. N N N
The analysis shows that all the game of Chicken’s states are stable for the
players, individually and collectively, in one stability solution concept or another.
But, the differences are in the strength of the stabilities, as well as the in the types
of solution concept under which the stabilities are formed. The tables provide much
insight on the game dynamics.
First, Table 7.20 shows that the doom-scenario state, the nobody-swerve state
s1 , is NASH stable for both players with Extreme strength level. This state has
no UIs for the players to move out of it, hence its is NASH stable. But for this
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state, there is no option. The destruction that happens to both players because
of reaching this state, leaves the players unable to take another round/iteration of
the game. Also, the fact that the strength of the NASH stability for the state is at
the extreme level, and that it has no UIs leading to it by any of the players, shows
that no rational player will go willingly to this state.
Second, if a previous iteration/instance of the game ended with both players
swerving, i.e. ended at state s4 , then each player has an incentive to use his UI out
of s4 . Pa can go to state s2 by not swerving in this iteration, assuming that Pb will
also “chicken” out this time too. Similarly, P
b
can use his UI from s4 to state s2 by
not swerving in this iteration, assuming that Pa will “chicken” out this time too.
This makes s4 not a NASH stable for both players. Notice that the states which the
players have just moved in are “much” preferred that s4 they left, and the players
have no UIs out of them, making these states to be NASH stable for the players at
“much” strength level.
Third, by the time state s2 or state s3 is reached in a previous iteration of
the game, the players now have their positions revealed. Who is the “Chicken” is
known now. If the previous iteration ended with state s2 , then Pb was the “Chicken”
because he swerved. Pa does not have a UI move from this state, and would like
to stay at s2 , his most preferred state according to his preference vector shown in
Table 7.19. For P
b
, if it happened that the previous iteration of the game ended
with state s3 , then Pa was the “Chicken” and Pb has no incentive/UI to move out
from his most preferred state, s3 .
But states s2 and s3 pose a real challenge to the other player who ended up
the “Chicken” at them. For example, if the previous iteration of the game ended
with s2 , then Pb was declared the “Chicken”. The fact that Pa now knows that Pb
swerved in the previous iteration enforces his feeling of stability at s2 . So, Pa will





this time, the game will end with state s1 which is disastrous for both players.
Recall that, for P
b
, state s1 is less preferred than state s2 . This means that Pb has
no UI of s2 and therefore it is NASH stable for him. Any move out of s2 is not
rational for P
b
. In other words, once a player is found to be the “Chicken” in an
iteration, this player can not change this status without the serious risk of ending
up at the doom-scenario state, state s1 .
Finally, Table 7.21 show that state s4 , where both players end up swerving, is
the only state with stability that is reached by having a higher foresight of looking
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ahead beyond the current state one is at. s4 is found to be GMR and SMR stable
for both players; and by avoiding risks. A player at this state will fear the sanction
the other player will impose on any UI he has out of s4 . The SMR stability adds
to this fear, the fact that recovery from this sanction will not be possible. So, the
player is better off staying at s4 and not move out. Notice that the sanctions which
the players have to each other UIs out of s4 are not UI moves themselves. So, if
a player wants to avoid risks only if they are rational risks, i.e. if the other player
is motivated by improving his respective position not by his desire to hurt others,
then s4 is not stable. Hence, s4 is not SEQ stable for each of the players.
In summary, Table 7.21 shows that if the players believe they should avoid
risks completely, they should stay at s4 by not playing this game, or declare/find
everybody to be a “Chicken”. Otherwise, if the players are of the type that ignore
risks, believe that others will never act to hurt themselves just to hurt others, or
have a foresight of zero steps ahead, then by all means they can rely on the NASH
stability of the other states. But, they have to be cautious because they could end
up with either the doom-scenario state s1 , or a state where one of them is found to
be the “Chicken” and there is no recovery is possible.
7.6 Summary
The chapter started by comparing the four solution concepts introduced in the
previous chapter, NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ, based on common and important
practical characteristics, or properties, of these concepts. The chapter, then, pre-
sented interesting theoretical relationships among the solution concepts, and among
the strength sets of these solution concepts. Finally, the chapter looked at how the
knowledge about how the solution concepts differ, and the interrelationships among
them, can be very informative when analyzing conflicts and how it helps shed ad-
ditional insight on the conflicts and their analysis. This was done by modelling
and analyzing additional two non-cooperative conflicts: the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and the game of Chicken. Both games were modelled and analyzed, with special
emphasis given to how understanding the differences and interrelationships among




Analysis and Stability Solution
Concepts
8.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the analysis of cooperative multi-agent games, as per the
Constrained rationality framework The decision makers of this type of games are
able to make move types that are unilateral non-cooperative moves, as well as
cooperative one-step moves. In other words, the decision makers in these games
not only are able to take individually the traditional unilateral non-cooperative
moves, discussed in Chapter 6, but also they are able to take cooperative moves as
groups. These cooperative moves are unique to the cooperative games.
But this chapter will not deal with all cooperative games. Some of these games,
namely the cooperative games with coalitions have wider range of cooperative moves
for the decision makers to select from. Coalitions move as a group with collective
objectives and power. They can take few hits, i.e. some of the players might get
disadvantaged for short periods of time. All for the good of the coalition as a whole.
Coalitions can stage multi-step moves that include individual players’ moves and
cooperative players’ moves, but all players must be members of the coalition.
On the other hand, in the games discussed in this chapter, players are not
part of coalitions. They do not have aligned or even partially aligned objectives
and powers. They cooperate in simple one-step moves, such as decide to sign a
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binding agreement, or settle a law suit outside the court, etc. The players here
do not have shared goals and common enemies. What motivates them to take a
cooperative move is the common benefit that they will get for moving together in
the same direction for one step ahead to a specific state of the game. Something
they will not be able to do unilaterally. Therefore, no multi-step group moves will
be considered in this chapter. Such moves will be covered in cooperative games
with coalitions, which will be discussed in the following chapter.
We will start by looking at the type of moves the players of cooperative games,
without coalitions, are allowed to make, and are important to the stability analysis
concepts. Then, we will define for these games the same four different stability and
equilibrium solution concepts which we defined for the non-cooperative games in
Chapter 6 . These concepts will guide the stability analysis of each of the games’
states, for each of the games’ players. Next, we will define the strength of the
stability under such solution concepts, and propose a set of algorithms to help
identify the strength level of each of these stabilities.
We will finish with a case study in which we apply the concepts proposed in
this chapter. In this case study, we analyze thoroughly the Elmira Groundwater
Contamination Conflict, a 1989 environmental policy conflict between the provin-
cial government of Ontario and Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. We start by giving a brief
background on the conflict and the players. We model the players goals, constraints
and alternatives; analyze their GCMs; identify the conflict’s states; elicit the play-
ers’ cardinal and ordinal preferences over these states; and then identify the players
unilateral moves among these states. The stabilities of the conflict’s states will
be analyzed under the four stability solution concepts, and the strength of these
stabilities will be identified. We will look at the over all equilibrium states for the
conflict; and how the conflict could have evolved over time under different scenar-
ios. We conclude the case study by showing how our analysis results compares to
what historically happened in the conflict, and to what others offered as models
and analysis to the conflict, after the fact.
In terms of the notation used in this chapter it will be the same as the one
used in Chapter 6, included here as a reminder. Let the set of all the game states
be given as S = {s1 , s2 , . . . , sm}, where |S| = m the total number of states in the
game, and states are defined as discussed earlier. And let S a,b,...
D, t
⊆ S where S a,b,...
D, t
represents a subset of S’s states which has common characteristics described in the
subset’s notation as a, b, . . . as been perceived by decision maker D and at time t.
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The set of decision makers in the game is given as DM = {DM1, DM2, . . . , DMn},
where |DM| = n the total number of decision makers, the involved agents/players,
in the game.
Also as a reminder, we use the terms game and conflict interchangeably to mean
the same thing: a multi-agent strategic conflict. Also, the terms agent, player
and decision maker will be used interchangeably to mean the same thing: an au-
tonomous independent agent, in the strategic conflict, who is capable of perceiving
the world around, holding beliefs, justifying beliefs, holding knowledge, represent-
ing knowledge, extracting new knowledge, reasoning about held knowledge, and
acting independently.
8.2 Types of Decision Makers’ Moves
Decision makers in cooperative games can have either individual unilateral moves,
or cooperative one-step moves. First, we define the unilateral moves individual
players can have. These moves are similar to the ones individual players use in non-
cooperative games. Second, we define cooperative one-step moves which a group
of decision makers can have in cooperative, without coalitions, games. Lastly, we
define the type of sanction moves that players can do, as individuals or groups,
to block certain other players from benefiting from any unilateral or cooperative
improvement moves they have. Understanding these types of players’ moves is
essential to define the stability solution concepts which will be used to analyze the
stability of cooperative games’ states for the games’ players.
As a reminder, we discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1, and in Chapter 6,
Section 6.2.1, that we followed the steps of Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al.
(1993) in their definitions for UI, UM and SM moves for individual agents. But, we
defined all these type of moves to be within the context, terminology and notation
of the Constrained Rationality framework. These individual agent’s moves are the
same as the ones we defined in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative games, included here
for completeness and coherence of addressing the needs of modelling and analysis
of cooperative games, without coalitions, in this chapter.
It is also worth including a reminder here that the cooperative moves, defined
in this chapter for cooperative games without coalitions, are different from the co-
operative moves defined by Kilgour et al. (2001) and Inohara and Hipel (2008b,a)
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for GMCR. We discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1, how these GMCR’s coopera-
tive moves, or coalition moves as been called in the cited work, are limited in their
scope and in their applications to real-life conflicts. We mentioned there how the
Constrained Rationality provide broader, more advanced and practical cooperative
moves that reflect the needs of complex real-life multi-agent conflicts. In Con-
strained Rationality, the cooperation among agents within a conflict could happen
between agents that are not part of a coalition. Some of the Constrained Ratio-
nality’s cooperative moves will be discussed in this chapter, namely the one-step
cooperative moves, while the multi-step coalition ones will be added in Chapter 9
when we discuss cooperative games with coalitions.
8.2.1 Types of Non-Cooperative Moves by Individual DMs
In this subsection, we define the following important types of movements that an
individual decision maker, alone and non-cooperatively, can make in the game.
Definition 8.2.1 (Unilateral Move (UM)): For Decision Maker DMi∈DM at
time t and state s∈S of the game: a move to state sum∈S is considered a Unilateral
Move (UM) for DMi at time t from state s, denoted as sum∈S
UM
DMi, t
(s), iff DMi can
move unilaterally from state s to state sum in one move, reaching sum at time t+1.
Definition 8.2.2 (Unilateral Improvement (UI)): For Decision Maker DMi∈
DM at time t and state s ∈ S of the game: a move to state sui ∈ S is consid-
























One important step of analyzing a game is to generate the the UIs that DMs
will have from each state of the game. Given a Game-Structure for a cooperative
game, without coalitions, that resembles the one proposed for the non-cooperative
games and discussed in Chapter 6, we use Algorithm 6.1 to generate the UM and UI
sets for all DMs in the game. Notice that Algorithm 6.1 is the algorithm proposed
previously in Chapter 6 to be used for generating the UM and UI sets for the players
of non-cooperative games. The same algorithm is used for these two different type
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of games, non-cooperative and cooperative-without-coalitions, because UM and UI
sets exist for individual players regardless of the players’ abilities to have cooperative
moves.
Now, let each game has a Game Configuration Structure, referred to it as a
Game-Structure in Chapter 6. This data structure provides essential initial infor-
mation about the game and its players, all organized and in a computerized DSS
system is written in a file structure. As a reminder, a Game-Structure will describe
the game at a specific point of time t, as perceived and known by the focal decision
maker whom the game is modelled based on his knowledge of it. Any updates
or changes to what is known about the game by the focal decision maker should
initiate a generation of a new Game-Structure to reflect the changes; and a new
analysis of the updated game, treating the structure as a new game.
The Game-Structure for a cooperative game must have the same information
required for non-cooperative games, and listed in Section 6.2.1: the set of the game’s
states, S; the set of the game’s DMs, DM; SUM
DMi,t
(s) for each DM in the game;
and WP (s,DMi, t) for every DMi ∈ DM and for every s ∈ S. Game-Structures
for cooperative games, with no coalitions, differ from the one for non-cooperative
games in one aspect. A Game-Structure for cooperative games, without coalitions,
has additional information in its structure about the cooperative moves the players
have in such game, as we will see next when we discuss cooperative moves for
players. Something that non-cooperative games’ Game-Structures do not have.
8.2.2 Types of Cooperative Moves
The are two types of one-step movements that a set of decision makers, coopera-
tively, can make in the game. We assume here no coalition or alliance exist among
the decision makers of this set. They are only motivated to do such moves be-
cause they all have to agree and cooperate to make the move (as a condition to
reach the destination state)Most likely, these cooperative moves happen because
all cooperating decision makers benefit from the move.
It is important to note here that all types of moves we consider in this section
are one-step moves, i.e. no moves consistent of consecutive series of moves are con-
sidered. We consider this type of moves as coalition moves because it demands
strategic coordinating and grouping of the member decision makers’ moves to es-
tablish the final effect expected. In this section, we assume all decision makers are
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acting individually, each for his own benefit, but might “in some circumstances”
cooperate to reach a state that they will not individually be able to reach, such as
reaching a formal agreement to end the conflict.
Definition 8.2.3 (Cooperative Move (CM)): For a Group of Decision Makers
DMg⊆DM, where |DMg| ≥ 2, at time t and at state s∈S of the game, the move
by DMg from s in one step to state scm∈S is considered a Cooperative Move (CM)
for DMg from s at time t, denoted as scm∈S
CM
DMg,t
(s) iff DMg cannot make the move
unless each and every member of DMg agrees to the move and cooperates by doing
what is necessary to reach the state scm, from the starting state s.
As per the definition, a Cooperative Move is a movement from one state of the
game to another that requires a group of decision makers (more than two) to make
the move. No single decision maker can do the move on his own. Similarly no
subset of a group of decision makers can do the move on their own, every single
decision maker in the group is needed to participate in the move to make it happen.
Additionally, it is evident that SCM
DMg,t
(s) ⊆ S.
Definition 8.2.4 (Cooperative Improvement (CI)): For a Group of Decision
Makers DMg⊆DM at time t and at state s∈S of the game, the move by DMg from
s in one step to state sci∈S is considered a Cooperative Improvement (CI) for DMg
from s at time t, denoted as sci∈SCIDMg,t(s) iff 1) sci ∈ S
CM
DMg,t







>N , i.e. when PrefStrength(s
ci
, s,DMi, t)>None for
every DMi∈DMg.







One important step of analyzing a cooperative game, with no coalitions, is to
generate the CIs that DMs will have from each state of the game. The Game-
Structure for a cooperative game, without coalition (and even with coalitions as
we will see in the next chapter when we discuss coalition analysis), must include
information about the CMs that all the DMs have in the game from each of the
game’s states. It must include SCM
DMi,t
(s), for every DMi ∈ DM and for every s ∈ S,
given as a set of graphs describing the CMs that DMs have from each state the
game has (one graph per DM in the game, with the game’s states represented as the
graph’s nodes and the CMs are represented as its arcs (each of these arcs annotated
with the names of the other cooperating players). Given a Game-Structure, for a
cooperative game, without coalitions, that has all this required information, we use
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Algorithm 8.1 Generating the CM and CI Sets for Cooperating DMs in a Game
1: void Generate DMs CM and CI Sets (Game-Structure)
2:
3: // Game-Structure file starts with empty CM and CI sets for DMs.
4: // Only, S, DM, and the CM graph for DMs are given.
5: // A CM graph for DMs, has S’s states as vertices/nodes of the graph,
6: // while the directed arcs of the graph represent DMs’ CMs in the game.
7: // In addition, each directed arc is annotated with a list of the names
8: // of the DMs that must cooperate to make the move to the destination state.
9:
10: // make a list of the groups of Decision Makers who combined have CM moves.
11: // This is done by scanning all the CM arcs in the CM graph generating a
12: // a group for each new set of DMs that have any CM.
13:
14: for all DMg ⊆ DM do
15: // Generate DMg’s CM Sets (one for each of the game’s states), and
16: // for each state find DMg’s CI Set. All these CM and CI sets
17: // will be initially empty. If not, empty them [not included here].
18: // And, by the end, some of these CM/CI sets will be empty sets.
19:
20: for all s ∈ S do








23: // moving to s
cm
from s is also considered a CI for DMg



















31: Add all generated CM and CI sets for each group, for each state, to the Game- Structure file.
32: return
Algorithm 8.1 to generate the CM and CI sets for all DMs in the game.
8.2.3 Types of Sanction Moves
We will expand here the definitions for a sanction move (SM) and an inescapable
sanction move (ISM), to include sanction moves that are committed not only by
individual decision makers, but also by a group of decision makers acting coopera-
tively. Additionally, we will include in the new definitions sanction moves that are
intended to sanction a group of decision makers’s CI moves, not just individual’s
UI moves.
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Definition 8.2.5 (Sanction Move (SM)): For Decision Maker DMi∈ DM at
time t and at state s∈S of the game, a UI by DMi to state simp∈S
UI
DMi,t
(s), or a CI
by a group DMg : DMi ∈ DMg to state simp∈S
CI
DMg,t
(s), is said to have against it a


















As per the definition, a move to s
ui
by DMi is said to be sanctioned/able by
DMj’s move to ssm , and DMj’s move to ssm is called a Sanction Move (SM) against
DMi’s UI to sui. This definition, adds to the previous definition given in Chapter
6 for SM , the possibility that the SM could be a CM move by a group of DMs
instead of being only a UM move by an individual DM.
Figure 8.1 shows the four possible sanction move types available to players of
cooperative games, without coalitions, based on the definition above. Figure 8.1a
shows a UI by a DM faced with an SM that is a UM by another DM, whilst Figure
8.1b shows the same UI faced with an SM that is a CM by a group of DMs acting
cooperatively. On the other hand, Figure 8.1c shows a CI by a cooperative DMs
faced with an SM that is a UM by another DM, whilst Figure 8.1d shows the same
CI faced with an SM that is a CM by another group of DMs acting cooperatively.
In addition, it is important to notice that the definition of a SM does not as-
sume that the SM to be a UI or a CI move by the DM/s committing the sanction.
The definition assumes that the motive of the DM/s committing the sanction for
their SM is to hurt DMi and sanction DMi’s UI move to simp , or to hurt DMg and
sanction DMg’s CI move to simp , even if this SM will put the DM/s committing
the sanction himself/themselves at a less preferred state. To differentiate between
an SM by DM/s which is not required to be a UI or CI, as per the SM definition
above, and an SM which is also a UI or a CI move for the committing parties, we
will call the second SM type as SMI move (read as Sanction Move and Improve-





(instead of having the destination be state ssm which cannot be reached
by an SM that is also a UI or a CI). As we will see later, this stricter type of SM,
or SMI - as we decided to call it, is required for some stability solution concepts,
such as Sequential Stability (SEQ).
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DMi’s UI
























(a) A UI by a DM is faced with an
SM/ISM by another individual DM
DMi’s UI























(b) A UI by a DM is faced with an
























“None” Improvement Level from  “s”
Simp
Ssmi
(c) A CI by a cooperative group of DMs
























“None” Improvement Level from  “s”
Simp
Ssmi
(d) A CI by a cooperative group of DMs
is faced with an SM/ISM by another
cooperative group of DMs
Figure 8.1: Type of Sanction Moves available to players of cooperative games,
without coalitions
Definition 8.2.6 (Inescapable Sanction Move (ISM)): For Decision Maker
DMi∈DM at time t and at state s∈S of the game, a UI by DMi to state simp∈
SUI
DMi,t




said to have against it an Inescapable Sanction Move (ISM) at time t+1 to state
s
ism















) sesc ∈ S
≤N
DMi,t

















As per the definition, the DMi’s UI move to sui , from s, is said to have against
it an inescapable sanction move (ISM) by DMj’s move to sism , because DMi has no
move away from s
ism
by which he will be able to mitigate, or lessen, the negative
effect DMj’s sanction to sism lift DMi in. This definition, adds to the previous
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definition given in Chapter 6 for ISM , the possibility that the ISM could be a CM
move by a group of DMs instead of being only a UM move by an individual DM.
These additional cases as shown in Figure 8.1.
8.3 Stability Solution Concepts and Equilibriums
for Cooperative Games without Coalitions
The same four stability solution concepts, we discussed in Chapter 6 for non-
cooperative games, will be discussed in this chapter for cooperative games, without
coalitions. But we will expand these solution concepts to accommodate the new co-
operative moves that decision makers in cooperative games, without coalitions, can
have. We will group these solution concepts into two classes, as we did in Chapter
6 for non-cooperative games: 1) solution concepts that are extremely individualis-
tic and shortsighted in their definitions, in a way that they do not consider other
players countermoves; and 2) solution concepts that tries to include other players’
countermoves, therefore these concepts show more foresight.
As a reminder, we said in Chapter 6, Section 6.3, that we followed the steps
of Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al. (1993) in their definitions for the four
stability solution concepts for non-cooperative games. But, we defined all these so-
lution concepts, for non-cooperative games, to be within the context, terminology
and notation of the Constrained Rationality framework; and using the definitions
of the agents’ non-cooperative unilateral moves and sanction moves introduced in
Chapter 6. In this section, we will extend the definitions of the four stability solu-
tion concepts, presented in Chapter 6, to deal with the Constrained Rationality’s
new additional cooperative moves introduced above for cooperative games without
coalitions; and to deal with the changes happened accordingly to the definitions of
sanction moves in such games (presented above in this chapter).
It is also worth including here a reminder that the definitions of the stability
solution concepts for cooperative games without coalitions, which will follow, are
different from the ones presented by Inohara and Hipel (2008b,a) for GMCR and
called coalition stability solution concepts. This is due to the different moves that
GMCR and Constrained Rationality employ. We discussed in Chapter 5, Section
5.5.1, how the GMCR’s cooperative moves, or coalition moves as been called by
Inohara and Hipel (2008b,a), are limited in their scope and in their applications to
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real-life conflicts; and how the Constrained Rationality provide broader and more
practical collection of cooperative moves that reflect the needs of complex real-life
multi-agent conflicts. We discussed there how the Constrained Rationality allow
for cooperation among agents within a conflict could happen between agents that
are not part of a coalition. And, because each framework employs different cooper-
ation among agents and different definitions of cooperative moves, the frameworks’
definitions of the stability solution concepts, which are based on the definitions of
the cooperative moves employed, will definitely be different.
8.3.1 Solution Concepts with No Consideration to Others’
Moves
NASH solution concept is the only stability solution concept that does not consider
in its definition the moves and countermoves of other players. We expand its
definition to include the cooperative moves that players within cooperative games,
without coalitions, can have.
Definition 8.3.1 (Nash Stability (NASH)): For Decision Maker DMi∈DM at





(s)=∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMg ⊆ DM : DMi ∈ DMg) SCIDMg,t(s)=∅ ].
As per the definition, state s is considered NASH stable for a decision maker
DMi at time t if and only if s is the best that DMi, individually or cooperatively,
can achieve at time t, given the total states of the game S. Therefore, states that
are not NASH stable are unstable states since DMi can improve his position from
any one of them: unilaterally by activating one of his UIs out of these states; or
cooperatively by activating one of the CIs that he and other individual DMs have
from these states.
8.3.2 Solution Concepts with Consideration to Others’ Moves
We will discuss here the same three stability solution concepts we discussed in
Chapter 6 for non-cooperative games, General MetaRationality, Symmetric Meta-
Rationality and Sequentially Stability. But we will expand the definitions of these
solution concepts to include the cooperative moves that players within cooperative
games, without coalitions, can have.
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Definition 8.3.2 (General MetaRational (GMR) Stability): For Decision
Maker DMi∈ DM at time t, a state s∈ S is considered a General MetaRational



























The previous GMR stability definition given in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative
games, is expanded in this definition to account for the possible CI moves DMi has
from state s at time t. It is also expanded to include not only sanctions that could
be imposed by individual decision makers against DMi’s UIs/CIs from s, but also
sanctions that could be imposed by groups of decision makers cooperating together
to hurt DMi and put him at a less preferred state than even the original state s
from which his UIs/Cis start from.
The GMR stability solution concept assumes that decision maker DMi believes
that other players surely would apply, unilaterally or cooperatively, a sanction
against any of his UIs/CIs out of s. Therefore, he will not move away from s, and
s is a GMR stable state for him.
Definition 8.3.3 (Symmetric MetaRational (SMR) Stability): For Decision




























[∃ ((DMp⊆{DM−DMi}) ∧ (s2∈S
CM
DMp,t+1











The previous SMR stability definition given in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative
games, is expanded in this definition to account for the possible CI moves DMi has
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from state s at time t. It is also expanded to include not only inescapable sanctions
that could be imposed by individual decision makers against DMi’s UIs/CIs from s,
but also inescapable sanctions that could be imposed by groups of decision makers
cooperating together to hurt DMi and put him at a less preferred state than even
the original state s from which his UIs/Cis start from.
The SMR stability solution concept assumes that decision maker DMi believes
that other players surely would apply, unilaterally or cooperatively, a sanction
against any of his UIs out of s, and this sanction is an inescapable one (i.e. an
ISM). In other words, DMi will not be able to benefit from any move away from
the state produced by the inescapable sanction move. Therefore, DMi will not
move away from s, and s is SMR stable for him. Notice that SMR takes into
consideration one further move in the game (the possible countermove -but not
helpful one- by DMi after the sanction) than what GMR considers. GMR does
not consider whether DMi have countermoves after the sanction to mitigate the
sanction’s effect.
Definition 8.3.4 (Sequentially Stability (SEQ)): For Decision Maker DMi∈




























The previous SEQ stability definition given in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative
games, is expanded in this definition to account for the possible CI moves DMi has
from state s at time t. It is also expanded to include not only the SMI sanctions
that could be imposed by individual decision makers against DMi’s UIs/CIs from
s, but also SMI sanctions that could be imposed by groups of decision makers
cooperating together to hurt DMi and put him at a less preferred state than even
the original state s from which his UIs/Cis start from.
Recall that the SEQ solution concept requires that the imposed sanction against
DMi’s UIs/CIs from s to be also a UI, a CI or a G-CI by the party committing the
sanction. In other words, SEQ assumes that all decision makers in the game to be
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rational. Unlike the GMR solution concept, SEQ assumes that no player will move
in the game, whether individually or cooperatively, for the sake of hurting others
and in the process hurt himself/themselves. All players in the game will only
commit themselves to moves that will benefit them. The SEQ stability solution
concept also assumes that decision maker DMi believes that other players surely
would apply, unilaterally or cooperatively, a sanction ( must be an SMI sanction)
against any of his UIs/CIs out of s. Therefore, he will not move away from s, and
s is a SEQ stable state for him.
8.3.3 Equilibrium States in Cooperative Games without
Coalitions
The concept of an Equilibrium states is an important concept in game theory and
conflict analysis. Equilibrium is tied to the concept of Stability Solution Concepts,
and explains ultimate stability states in the game. The same definition for an
Equilibrium state which we provided in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative games is the
same as the one we provide here for cooperative games, without coalitions. This
is because both types of games consider the games’ players as individual DMs who
are concerned only with their own well-being, regardless of the fact that they are
able to cooperate in certain one-step moves within the context of cooperative games,
without coalitions. Both game types assume that he players will not surrender their
concern for their own well-being to any other DM or group of DMs. Therefore, the
concept of overall stability, or equilibrium, for the games at a certain state must
account for the stability of this state to each and every player in the game.
Definition 8.3.5 (Equilibrium (EQ.)): A state s∈ S is considered an Equilib-
rium for a cooperative game without coalitions, at time t, under a specific Solution
Concept SC definition, denoted as s∈SSC EQ.
DM,t
, iff ∀DMi∈DM s∈SSCDMi,t.
As per the definition, a state s is stable for a cooperative game, without coali-
tions, as a whole, i.e. an equilibrium for the game, under a specific solution concept,
such as NASH or SMR, if and only if the state s is stable under this solution concept
for each and every decision maker in the game.
In any specific cooperative game/conflict, without coalitions, there may be a
number of equilibrium states under one or more stability solution concepts. Equi-
librium states represent the most likely outcomes for the game, and constitutes
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possible resolutions to the game. Once one of these states arise, this state is likely
persist. But, the strength of this persistence depends on which solution concept the
equilibrium state is under, and what is the strength of the state’s stability under
this solution concept for each of the DMs in the game.
8.4 Stability Strength of Solution Concepts and
Equilibriums for Cooperative Conflicts with-
out Coalitions
In this section, we will discuss the mechanisms by which one can identify the
strength of the stability, under the four stability solution concept, for any given
state in a cooperative game without coalitions, for any given DM in the game. We
expand here the stability strength definitions and algorithms provided in Chap-
ter 6 for non-cooperative games to accommodate the new cooperative moves that
are possible within the context of cooperative games, and not possible in non-
cooperative games. Then, we will discuss the strength of an equilibrium under a
specific solution concept for a state in a cooperative conflict, without coalitions.
8.4.1 Stability Strength of Solution Concepts
The same Stability Concept Strength value property, denoted as StabilityStrength(St-
abilityConcept , s,DMi, t), discussed in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative games, will
continue to be used here for cooperative games, without coalitions. Also, the
same fuzzy linguistic value label LSS used for for StabilityStrength will continue
to be used here with the same fuzzy memberships functions given in Figure 4.4-
(a). And, the strength expressed by the LSS fuzzy label is meant to represent
the strength of the stability concept type StabilityConcept (where StabilityConcept
∈{NASH,GMR,SMR,SEQ}) for state s, for decision maker DMi at time t.
As a reminder, we said that the StabilityStrength value property before fuzzi-
fication and without normalized has numeric value is in the range [0, 2], there-
fore it will have a fuzzy label LSS ∈ {Extreme, Significant, Strong,Full,Big,Much,
Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null}={Ex, Si, St, F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}. And,
with the understanding that the complete order of these labels is: Ex>Si>St>F>
B>M>Mo>L>N>Null. And, when the StabilityStrength, before fuzzification,
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is normalized, i.e. its numeric value is in [0, 1] , then its fuzzy labels will include
the same labels as above with the exception of the three higher labels covering the
range from [1, 2] and those are: Extreme,Significant and Strong.
The LSS fuzzy label assigned to StabilityStrength(StabilityConcept , s,DMi, t)
will cover the stability strength satisfaction levels. Where the labels range from
representing Extremely strong stability of s (based on the definition of the solution
concept given in StabilityConcept) to None strength level for s (meaning very weak
stability strength and close to non-existing strength or close to indifferent). And,
with the understanding that the Null label represents an unknown stability strength
or totaly-non-existing-stability.
We define, now, the stability strength for cooperative games, without coalitions,
for each of the solution concepts we introduced in the previous section. Recall that
within the context of cooperative games, without coalitions, players are still looked
at and dealt with as individual players with individualistic aims and objectives in
the game, despite the fact that will be able occasionally to cooperate with other
player for specific one-step moves.
Definition 8.4.1 (Strength of NASH Stability): For decision maker DMi at
time t, and for a NASH stable state s∈SNASH
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s NASH stability,





















, s,DMi, t),−Extreme} |)
As per the definition, the strength of s’s NASH stability strength is the positive
strength equivalent of the negative preference of the state that the worst UI/CI
move executed/could-be-executed by DMi, individually or cooperatively, at time
<t in order to move to s.
Let the NASH’s stability strength of a state s for DMi at time t be denoted
as NASH (L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(NASH , s,DMi, t)=LSS . Algorithm 8.2 uses
Definition 8.4.1 to calculate the NASH’s stability strength and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
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Algorithm 8.2 Calculating a State’s NASH Stability Strength for a DM in a Co-
operative Game, without Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of NASH Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not NASH stable
3: NASH Strength = Null
4: // check if DMi has any UIs/CIs from s at time t
5: if [SUI
DMi,t




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t; find NASH stability’s strength
7: NASH Strength = Strength of Nash(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
8: end if
9: return NASH Strength
10:
11: strength-value-label Strength of Nash(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
12: // this routine will return the strength of the weakest UI by DMi, or CI by a cooperating
13: // group DMg he belongs to, that yields to reaching s. First, set Nash strength initially
14: // to “Extremely Strong” (this will be the case if s has no UIs/CIs that leads to it).
15: Strength = −Extreme
16: // find s’s NASH strength

















20: // return the equivalent positive strength label, if Strength<N
21: if Strength < None then
22: Strength = |Strength|
23: end if
24: return Strength
Definition 8.4.2 (Strength of GMR Stability): For decision maker DMi at
time t, and for a GMR stable state s∈SGMR
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s GMR stability, to
DMi at time t, i.e. StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t), is calculated as follows:
((SUI
DMi,t
























































⇒ (StabilityStrength (GMR, s,DMi, t) = None)
As per the definition, the strength of the GMR stability of s is the positive
strength equivalent of the negative strength of the worst sanction, imposed by
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other decision makers {DM− DMi}, against DMi’s UIs/CIs from s, individually
or cooperatively, given the fact that DMi will choose the UI/CI that will yield the
best less-preferred end state.
Let GMR’s stability strength of a state s for DMi at time t be denoted as
GMR(L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t)=LSS . Algorithm 8.3 uses Def-
inition 8.4.2 to calculate the GMR’s stability strength and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
Algorithm 8.3 Calculating a State’s GMR Stability Strength for a DM in a Co-
operative Game, without Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of GMR Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not GMR stable
3: GMR Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMi has any UIs/CIs from s at time t
5: if [SUI
DMi,t




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t
7: GMR Strength = None
8: else if (∀s1 : ((s1 ∈S
UI
DMi,t






(s)))) [∃ an SM sanction ] then
9: // sanction exists against each of DMi’s UIs/CIs ⇒ s is GMR stable; find GMR’s strength
10: GMR Strength = Strength of Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return GMR Strength
13:
14: strength-value-label Strength of Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
15: // this routine will return the strength of the sanction that yields the worst result for DMi,
16: // given the fact that DMi will choose the UI/CI that will minimize his loss
17: // set sanction’s strength initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
18: Strength = −Extreme
19: for all s1 : ((s1 ∈S
UI
DMi,t







20: SancStrength = None
21: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMi} do
22: for all s2 ∈ S
UM
DMj,t+1









26: for all DMp ⊆ {DM−DMi} do
27: for all s2 ∈ S
CM
DMp,t+1









31: Strength = max{Strength, SancStrength}
32: end for
33: if Strength < None then




Definition 8.4.3 (Strength of SMR Stability): For decision maker DMi at
time t, and for an SMR stable state s∈SSMR
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s SMR stability, to
DMi at time t, i.e. StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t), is calculated as follows:
((SUI
DMi,t




































































⇒ (StabilityStrength (SMR, s,DMi, t) = None)
As per the definition, the strength of the SMR stability of s is the positive
strength equivalent of the negative strength of the worst ISM sanction, imposed by
other decision makers {DM− DMi}, against DMi’s UIs/CIs from s, individually
or cooperatively, given the fact that DMi will choose the UI/CI that will yield the
best less-preferred end state.
Let SMR’s stability strength of a state s for DMi at time t be denoted as
SMR(L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t)=LSS . Algorithm 8.4, and its
additional routine listed as Algorithm 8.5, use Definition 8.4.3 to calculate the
SMR’s stability strength and assign the strength’s fuzzy linguistic label.
Algorithm 8.4 Calculating a State’s SMR Stability Strength for a DM in a Co-
operative Game, without Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of SMR Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not SMR stable
3: SMR Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMi has any UIs/CIs from s at time t
5: if [SUI
DMi,t




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t
7: SMR Strength = None












(s)))) [∃ an ISM sanction ] then
9: // ISM exists against each of DMi’s UIs/CIs ⇒ s is SMR stable; find SMR’s strength
10: SMR Strength = Strength of Inescapable Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return SMR Strength
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Algorithm 8.5 The “Strength of Inescapable Sanctions” used in Algorithm 8.4
1: strength-value-label Strength of Inescapable Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // this routine will return the strength of the ISM that yields the worst result for DMi, given
3: // the fact that DMi will choose a UI/CI and a counter move that will minimize his loss.
4: // Set sanction’s strength (after DMi’s counter move) initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
5: Strength = −Extreme
6: for all s1 : ((s1 ∈S
UI
DMi,t







7: ISancStrength = None
8: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMi} do
9: for all s2 ∈S
UM
DMj,t+1










10: ISancStrength = min{ISancStrength, PrefStrength(s
2
, s,DMi, t)}
11: CntrStrength = −Extreme




13: CntrStrength = max{CntrStrength, PrefStrength(s3 , s,DMi, t)}
14: end for
15: if ISancStrength < CntrStrength then




20: for all DMp ⊆ {DM−DMi} do
21: for all s2 ∈S
CM
DMp,t+1










22: ISancStrength = min{ISancStrength, PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMi, t)}
23: CntrStrength = −Extreme











27: if ISancStrength < CntrStrength then




32: Strength = max{Strength, ISancStrength}
33: end for
34: if Strength < None then




Definition 8.4.4 (Strength of SEQ Stability): For decision maker DMi at time
t, and for a SEQ stable state s∈SSEQ
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s SEQ stability, to DMi at
time t, i.e. StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t), is calculated as follows:
((SUI
DMi,t




⇒ (∀s1 : ((s1 ∈S
UI
DMi,t







[ [ (∀(DMj ∈{DM−DMi})∀(s2 ∈S
UI
DMj,t+1


























⇒ (StabilityStrength (SEQ, s,DMi, t) = None)
As per the definition, the strength of the SEQ stability of s is the positive
strength equivalent of the negative strength of the worst SMI sanction, imposed by
other decision makers {DM− DMi}, against DMi’s UIs/CIs from s, individually
or cooperatively, given the fact that DMi will choose the UI/CI that will yield the
best less-preferred end state.
But recall here that as per Definition 8.3.4, for SEQ stability to be established
the sanctions imposed by other players on DMi’s UIs/CIs out of s must be UI/CI
moves by those other-players, i.e. their moves must be SMI sanctions. In other
word, they must act “rationally”. They will not hurt themselves in order to sanction
DMi’s UIs/CIs. This is at the heart of the difference between GMR stability and
SEQ stability.
Let SEQ’s stability strength of a state s for DMi at time t be denoted as
SEQ(L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMi, t)=LSS . Algorithm 8.6 uses Defi-
nition 8.4.4 to calculate the SEQ’s stability strength and assign the strength’s fuzzy
linguistic label.
8.4.2 Equilibrium Strength
The same Equilibrium Strength value property attached to a state s of the game at
time t, denoted as EquilibriumStrength(StabilityConcept , s, t), discussed in Chapter
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Algorithm 8.6 Calculating a State’s SEQ Stability Strength for a DM in a Coop-
erative Game, without Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of SEQ Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not SEQ stable
3: SEQ Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMi has any UIs/CIs from s at time t
5: if [SUI
DMi,t




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t
7: GMR Strength = None












(s)))) [∃ an SMI sanction ] then
9: // an SMI exists against each of DMi’s UIs/CIs ⇒ s is SEQ stable; find SEQ’s strength
10: SEQ Strength = Strength of UISanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return SEQ Strength
13:
14: strength-value-label Strength of UISanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
15: // this routine will return the strength of the sanction that yields the worst result for DMi,
16: // given the facts that: 1) the sanction move must be a UI/CI (for the provider); and
17: // 2) DMi will choose the UI/CI that will minimize his loss.
18: // set sanction’s strength initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
19: Strength = −Extreme
20: for all s1 : ((s1 ∈S
UI
DMi,t







21: UISancStrength = None
22: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMi} do
23: for all s2 ∈ S
UI
DMj,t+1









27: for all DMp ⊆ {DM−DMi} do
















32: Strength = max{Strength, UISancStrength}
33: end for
34: if Strength < None then
35: Strength = |Strength|
36: end if
37: return Strength
6 for non-cooperative games, will continue to be used here for cooperative games,
without coalitions. Also, the same fuzzy linguistic value label LSS used for for
EquilibriumStrength will continue to be used here with the same fuzzy member-
ships functions. And, the strength expressed by the LSS fuzzy label is meant to
represent the strength of the equilibrium under the specific stability concept type
StabilityConcept (where StabilityConcept ∈{NASH,GMR,SMR,SEQ}) for state s,
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for decision maker DMi at time t.
As indicated in the equilibrium definition given earlier (Definition 8.3.5), the
equilibrium concept must be defined under a specific stability solution concept. An
equilibrium state under a specific stability solution concept is a state that is stable
for all the decision makers in the game under the same stability solution concept.
For example, if a state is an equilibrium under GMR, then this means that the
state is GMR stable from every player in the game. As a result, the strength of
the equilibrium for a specific state s under a specific solution concept SC is tightly
coupled with the strength of the SC stabilities of s for each player in the game.
As a reminder, we said that the StabilityStrength value property before fuzzi-
fication and without normalized has numeric value is in the range [0, 2], there-
fore it will have a fuzzy label LSS ∈ {Extreme, Significant, Strong,Full,Big,Much,
Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null}={Ex, Si, St, F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}. And,
with the understanding that the complete order of these labels is: Ex>Si>St>F>
B>M>Mo>L>N>Null. And, when the StabilityStrength, before fuzzification,
is normalized, i.e. its numeric value is in [0, 1] , then its fuzzy labels will include
the same labels as above with the exception of the three higher labels covering the
range from [1, 2] and those are: Extreme,Significant and Strong.
As for the StabilityStrength value property, and because of the dependancy, the
Equilibrium Strength fuzzy label LSS∈{Extreme, Significant, Strong,Full,Big,Much,
Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null}={Ex, Si, St, F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}. And,
with the complete order of Ex>Si>St>F>B>M>Mo>L>N>Null, where the
labels range from representing Extremely strong equilibrium stability (based on the
definition of the solution concept given in StabilityConcept) of s to None strength
level (meaning very weak equilibrium strength and close to non-existing strength)
for s.
The LSS fuzzy label assigned to EquilibriumStrength(StabilityConcept , s, t) will
cover the equilibrium stability strength satisfaction levels, with the understand-
ing that the Null label represents an unknown equilibrium stability strength or
totaly-non-existing-equilibrium. The fuzzy membership functions defining these
stability/equilibrium strength’s linguistic value labels are given in Figure 6.1. The
figure shows the membership functions for each label’s fuzzy set to be trapezoidal
in shape, for simplicity only (not as a restriction) as indicated in Al-Shawa and
Basir (2010). In practice, the number of fuzzy sets and their membership functions
should be defined based on the user needs and requirements, as we indicated in
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Al-Shawa and Basir (2009, 2010).
Now, we define the equilibrium strength for cooperative games, without coali-
tions, for each of the solution concepts we introduced in the previous section. Recall
that within the context of cooperative games, without coalitions, players are still
looked at and dealt with as individual players with individualistic aims and objec-
tives in the game, despite the fact that will be able occasionally to cooperate with
other player for specific one-step moves.
Definition 8.4.5 (Strength of an Equilibrium ): For DM, all decision makers
in a specific cooperative game, without coalitions, at time t, and for state s which is
an Equilibrium for the game under a specific Solution Concept SC, i.e. s∈SSC EQ.
DM,t
,









) → EquilibriumStrength(SC,s,t) = min
DMi
{StabilityStrength(SC,s,DMi,t)}
As per the definition above, the strength of the Equilibrium at s under the
Solution Concept SC is the minimum of the strength of s’s stability under SC for
each decision maker in the game. This means that s must be stable under SC for
each player in order for it to be an equilibrium for the game under SC (Definition
8.3.5, then the minimum of all DMs SC stabilities’ strengths is considered to be
the strength level of this equilibrium at s.
Let the Equilibrium’s stability strength of state s of the game at time t be
denoted as SC EQ(L
SS
), where EquilibriumStrength(SC, s, t)=L
SS
. Algorithm 8.7
uses Definition 8.4.5 to calculate the equilibrium’s strength and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
We said earlier that the same definition for an equilibrium state for cooperative
games without coalitions (Definition 8.3.5) is the same definition provided in Chap-
ter 6 for an equilibrium state in non-cooperative games. This is because both types
of games consider the games’ players as individual DMs who are concerned only
with their own well-being, regardless of the fact that they are able to cooperate in
certain one-step moves within the context of cooperative games, without coalitions.
Both game types assume that he players will not surrender their concern for their
own well-being to any other DM or group of DMs. Therefore, the concept of overall
stability, or equilibrium, for the games at a certain state must account for the sta-
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bility of this state to each and every player in the game. Therefore, the definition
for equilibrium strength for cooperative games without coalitions (Definition 8.4.5)
is the same as the definition for equilibrium strength for non-cooperative games
(Definition 6.4.5); and as a result Algorithm 8.7 used here is similar to Algorithm
6.6used for eliciting equilibrium strength in non-cooperative games.
Algorithm 8.7 Calculating a State’s Equilibrium Strength, under a specific Solu-
tion Concept SC, in a Cooperative Game without Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of Equilibrium (s, SC, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not an Equilibrium under SC
3: SC EQ Strength = NULL
4: // check if s is stable for all DMs in the game under Solution Concept SC




6: // s is an Equilibrium for the game under Solution Concept SC; find EQ’s strength
7: // set equilibrium’s strength initially to “Extremely Strong”
8: SC EQ Strength = Extreme
9: // find s’s equilibrium strength
10: for all DMi∈DM do
11: SC EQ Strength = min{SC EQ Strength, StabilityStrength(SC,s,DMi,t)}
12: end for
13: end if
14: return SC EQ Strength
8.5 Case Study: The Elmira Groundwater
Contamination Conflict
8.5.1 Background
The town of Elmira is a small but a prosperous town located in the rich agricultural
land of Southern Ontario, Canada, about 15 kilometers north of the twin cities of
Kitchener and Waterloo. An underground aquifer is the main source of water for
the town’s population of close 7,500 residents in the late 1989, at the time of the
conflict.
In 1989, the Ontario Ministry of Environment (MoE) discovered that a car-
cinogen, N-nitroso demethylamine (NDMA) was contaminating the underground
aquifer. Immediately, the pesticide and rubber products plant of Uniroyal Chemi-
cal Ltd (UR) was the main suspect. UR had a history of environmental problems
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and was known to use processes that could produce NDMA as a byproduct. As a
result, a Control Order was issued by MoE, under the Environmental Protection
Act of Ontario, requesting UR to implement a long term collection and treatment
system. UR cooperation was ordered to help in the determination of the cause as
well as the best way to cleanse the contaminated aquifer and to carry out the nec-
essary cleaning actions under the supervision of MoE. But, UR quickly responded
by appealing the Control Order, in what seemed as an effort by UR to lengthen
the process hoping that the Control Order would be canceled or at least modified.
The main decision makers (DMs) involved in this strategic environmental con-
flict were mainly: MoE and UR. The local governmental bodies, the township of
Woolwich and the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, have no actual say on the
strategic decisions of either MoE or UR, but has a lot of influence as they represent
the people who will mainly get affected by this environmental crisis. This explains
the fact that both MoE and UR tried to use the local governmental bodies as well
as local economical and environmental interest groups to put pressure on the other
main player. But, clearly this is a game/conflict between MoE and UR, ultimately
because environmental issues and control orders are handled by the provincial gov-
ernment. MoE has the responsibility over such issues not the local governments.
The local governments and the interest groups were encouraged and used by both
MoE and UR to influence the other party’s decision, but as the conflict unfolded
and the end results show: the only players in the game were really: MoE and UR.
We will model and analyze the conflict, based on the Constrained Rationality
framework and the concepts we discussed in this chapter. To do so, we will assume
that the modeller/analyst is called to perform this task just after MoE issued its
Control Order in 1989 and the immediate response taken by UR to appeal the
order, in effect employing delaying tactics. In other words, the starting point for
the conflict, or as will be referred to hereafter “the status quo” state for the Elmira
conflict, is the state of MoE has (or keeping its) Control Order against UR, and
UR employing delaying tactics.
8.5.2 Players’ Strategic Goals and Alternatives
In this illustrative case study analysis, we provide a simplified but sufficient and re-
alistic modelling of what the conflict’s decision makers’ Goals & Constraints Models
(GCMs) could look like at the time. These GCMs are shown in Figure 8.2. The
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Figure 8.2: The Elmira Conflict: The GCM models showing Goals and Alternatives
of both Decision Makers: Ontario Ministry of Environment (MoE) and Uniroyal
Chemical Ltd. (UR)
figure shows that the main decision makers (DMs), MoE and UR, have different
strategic objectives. Not only this, but as it is usually the case in strategic decision
making and conflict situations, each of MoE and UR has within their cognitive
thinking a set of conflicting goals to achieve.
As Figure 8.2 shows, MoE wants to carry out its environmental responsibilities in
an effective and efficient way (shown in the figure as Satisfy MoE Needs goal labeled
as G
MoE 1
). This strategic goal is reduced to two subgoals: starting immediately
the process of cleaning up the contamination, for safety and health concerns; and
protect the integrity of MoE’s Control Orders. G
MoE 1
goal reduction is shown in




respectively, are given in Table 8.1.
But unfortunately, MoE does not live in a vacuum. It is part of the provincial
government which was at that time trying hard to survive the late 80’s and early
90’s recession and economical hardships. So, MoE, logically speaking, must have
considered the implication of any decision it will take on the economical and em-
ployment situation at both the local township level and at the provincial economy
and industrial base. Therefore, within the MoE’s GCM model shown in Figure
8.2, we captured these provincial concerns of MoE under the strategic goal Satisfy
Ontario Government Needs labeled as G
MoE 2
. This strategic goal is also reduced to
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Table 8.1: The Elmira Conflict: Players’ Strategic Goals
MoE Strategic Goals:
Satisfy MoE Needs G
MoE 11
Starting immediately the process of cleaning up the
(G
MoE 1
) contamination (for safety and health concerns)
G
MoE 12
Protect the integrity of its Control Orders in order for these
orders to be taken seriously by the industry, and therefore
prevent any future environmental miss-behaving by all
operating industrial players in the province
Satisfy Ontario G
MoE 21






Maintain an attractive healthy economical system for
Ontario to current and future external substantial
industrial Investments
UR Strategic Goals:
Satisfy UR Long- G
UR 11
Fix the long-term implications of the public relation crises
term Goals (G
UR 1
) at hand (for all UR sites in Canada and in the World at




Maintain UR operational profitability for the Long-term
G
UR 13
Solve current MoE-UR problem for the long-run. This goal
is further reduced to two sub-goals: G
UR 131
, solve the current
MoE Control Order issue in way that will maintain and
protect the long term operation and revenue of the Elmira
site; and G
UR 132
, find another replacement site
elsewhere and make it operational, in order to substitute
for the operation and therefore revenue stream which is
currently supplied by the Elmira site.
Satisfy UR Short- G
UR 21
Control the public relation crises at hand (to maintain
term Goals (G
UR 2
) short-term gains and operations)
G
UR 22
Maintain profitability at the current level for the short-term
G
UR 23
Maintain for the short-term an equivalent operational
and production levels to Elmira site levels before the crisis.
This goal is further reduced to two sub-goals: G
UR 231
,
maintain the Elmira site operational for the short-term; and
G
UR 232
, find a short-term replacement site or arrangements
elsewhere to substitute for the loss of operation and
production at the Elmira site.
two subgoals: protect the economic and employment conditions of local communi-
ties; and maintain an attractive healthy economical system for Ontario. G
MoE 2
goal





respectively, are given in Table 8.1.
On the other hand UR would like the Control Order, which had been issued by
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MoE, to be lifted or modified. But, as we try to model UR goals to understand
its alternatives and preferences, we surely can see that UR, as an international
industrial business, considered the implication of any decision it may take on both
its short-term goals, as well as its long-term ones. In Figure 8.2, we show a simplified
but sufficient and realistic GCM model of UR that has two strategic goals, each
with its reduction goal-tree. The first strategic goal, UR has, is Satisfy UR Long-
term Goals, labeled in the figure as G
UR 1
. This strategic goal is reduced to a number
of subgoals, details of which are given in Table 8.1. These subgoals include dealing
with the long-term implications of the public relation crises at hand, maintaining
UR operational profitability for the Long-term and having a long-term solution to
MoE’s control order and the Elmira site.
But UR is surely not only concerned with the long-term issues at hand, but
also must deal with the short-term implications and issues. Therefore, the second
strategic goal, UR has and shown in Figure 8.2 labeled as G
UR 2
, is Satisfy UR
Short-term Goals. This strategic goal is reduced also to a number of subgoals, all
of which are detailed in Table 8.1. These subgoals are similar to the ones G
UR 1
is
reduced to, but those are short-term goals.
If MoE has two strategic goals as we said above, then which one of them is more
important to MoE? The analyst who is modelling the conflict from UR’s perspective
will not be sure whether the Ontario’s MoE will see its own needs (G
MoE 1
) as impor-
tant as the needs of the government of Ontario as a whole (G
MoE 2
), or less important.
A strong case could be made either way. The safest thing to do is to analyze both
scenarios. The first with SImprt(G
MoE 1
) =Full and SImprt(G
MoE 2
) =Full. And,
the second with SImprt(G
MoE 1
) =Little and SImprt(G
MoE 2
) =Full.
Similarly, for an analyst who is modelling the conflict from MoE’s perspective,
which of UR’s two strategic goals should she consider more important for UR? A
strong case could be made that UR, strategically speaking, will consider its long-
term strategic goal (G
UR 1
) as important as its short-term strategic goal (G
UR 2
).
But, the fact that UR is a public company, and such companies most of the time
act in favour of aggressively fixing short-term problems under the immediate pres-
sure of the market and bad publicity. Therefore, a strong case could be made
that UR will surely consider its short-term strategic goal more important than its
long-term one. But, for the analyst who is modelling the conflict from MoE’s per-
spective, the safest thing to do is to analyze the conflict under both scenarios. The
first with SImprt(G
UR 1
) =Full and SImprt(G
UR 2




) =Little and SImprt(G
UR 2
) =Full.
In this case, we will look at two versions of the four we have for Elmira conflict
(four possible versions of the conflict based on the 2x2 scenarios). The first, we
call Game 1, is the conflict with the assumption that both MoE and UR consider










) =Full. The second game, we will call Game 2, is the conflict
with the assumption that both MoE and UR consider only one of their respective
two strategic goals fully important while the other with little importance. In other
words, for MoE: SImprt(G
MoE 1
) =Little and SImprt(G
MoE 2
) =Full ; and for UR:
SImprt(G
UR 1
) =Little and SImprt(G
UR 2
) =Full.
Now, we move to the next step of modelling the conflict: finding the alterna-
tives/options that the conflict players have. Both MoE and UR have many alter-
natives in dealing with the conflict and operationalize their respective goals. Both
players are supposed to list all their known alternatives, and analyze their situa-
tion looking for any additional alternatives that they can come up with (whether
through a generic process such as brainstorming or a methodological creative think-
ing process such as lateral thinking (De Bono, 1971). The process of generating
players’ alternatives can be done by each individual player in the conflict, or as in
our case, and based on the discussion we have in Chapter 5, can be done by one of
the players modelling the whole conflict and all its players’s GCMs, including his.
Let us assume that conflict is modelled by MoE and UR separately and inde-
pendently; and that both players came up with the same list of alternatives for
themselves and the other player. The list of both decision makers alternatives is
given in Table 8.2, and shown in Figure 8.2.
MoE, as shown in Table 8.2, can choose to: insist that UR implement the control
order as-is; modify the issued control order to satisfy all UR demands (most likely
this will render the control order useless); modify the control order to satisfy some
of UR demands (a compromise solution); or lift the control order completely. UR,
on the other hand, is shown in Table 8.2 to have the following options: accept MoE
control order as it is; accept a modified control order by MoE that meets all what
UR asks MoE to change; accepts a modified control order by MoE that meets only
some of what UR asks MoE to change; employ delay tactics (use the legal system
and governmental bureaucratic processes to their fullest extent in order to exhaust
the government and keep the Emlira site operational for the longest possible time);
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Table 8.2: The Elmira Conflict: Players’ Alternatives/Options





Insist on UR to Implement the issued Control Order As-Is,
while UR is employing Delay tactics
A
MoE 1
Insist on UR to Implement the issued Control Order As-Is,
while UR decided to abandon site
A
MoE 2
Modify the issued Control Order to satisfy All UR Demands
A
MoE 3
Modify the issued Control Order to satisfy Some of UR Demands
A
MoE 4
Lift completely the issued Control Order against UR.





Accept the issued Control Order As-Is and implement it
A
UR 2
Accept a Modified Control Order that satisfy All UR demands
A
UR 3
Accept a Modified Control Order that satisfy Some UR demands
A
UR 4
Employ all available Delay Tactics for the short Term
A
UR 5
Abandon Elmira Site and Build a New Similar Facility Elsewhere (though it
will take time to build the site and for the site to be operational)
A
UR 6
Abandon Elmira Site and Use Other Facilities Elsewhere to cover the loss of
production at Elmira (no substantial loss of production will happen since UR
will be able within short period of time to use other facilities to reach the
same production levels of what is produced at the current Elmira site).
or abandon the Elmira site and stop the current, and any future, operational plans
in Ontario.





that seem to be similar. Both alternatives seem to cover MoE’s option to keep
its control order as-is and insist that UR implement it. But this option has two
different effect of MoE goals based on whether UR chooses to answer by employing
delay tactics or decide to take the drastic measure of abandoning the Elmira site
and any operational plans it has in Ontario. So, for the benefit of showing/studying
these two different effects, this one option could have in two different contexts, we
decided: it is better to model them as two alternatives in MoE’s GCM model, as
shown in Figure 8.2. This will be better, from modelling and analysis perspective,
than having two sets of GCM models for MoE; or modify the lateral relations which
connects what will be one alternative and MoE’s goals based on what UR choses.




, that seem to be
similar. Both alternatives seem to convey that UR abandons the Elmira site. But
upon examination, one should notice that A
UR 5
covers the site abandoning option
for UR, but with UR announcing clearly, or hinting indirectly, that it intends to
build a new similar facility to the Elmira one –it is abandoning– somewhere else.
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An option that will solve UR’s long-term needs, but will not solve the immediate
operational needs for UR, its sales forecast, market expectation, and/or contractual
obligations. On the other hand, A
UR 6
covers the same Elmira site abandoning option
for UR, but with UR communicating clearly, or hinting indirectly, that it will use
the extra production capacity that it has through its facilities elsewhere to cover
the loss of production at Elmira. This option will satisfy UR immediate short-term
needs while it is working on building its replacement site to the Elmira one.
Sure, A
UR 6
could be a true option for UR, if it actually has the capacity to
transfer the production supposed to be covered by the Elmira site to other facilities
around the world with no substantial loss of business. This option also could be
not true, and only intended to mislead MoE into believing that UR can abandon
the Elmira operation and still be able to meet its short-term and long-term goals
(i.e. a hypergame situation). Whether UR has actually the ability to implement
alternative A
UR 6
, or is successful in misleading MoE and Ontario Government in
believing that this alternative is a real option for UR, and UR has the ability to
implement/adopt it, MoE should feel at a serious disadvantage and tremendous
pressure given the economic situation at the time.







cause it is a real option, and A
UR 6
because it is a real option, or to test if it is
worth investing in making MoE believe that it is a real option for UR. From MoE’s
perspective, it should analyze both alternatives for UR because it is not sure what
UR is capable of doing. So, it is safe for MoE to analyze how the conflict can
progress in both scenarios. Therefore, we, as any good analysts, will analyze the
conflict with both scenarios: a) UR has A
UR 5





; and b) UR has A
UR 6
as an option, instead of A
UR 5
and
in addition to its other five alternatives. But, recall that we said above that we
will analyze the conflict under two goals-prioritization contexts in what we called
Game 1 and Game 2. This makes the different configurations, contexts, or what-if
versions of the Elmira conflict, which we will analyze, to be four:
Game 1:









) =Full ; and
• UR has alternative A
UR 5






Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5):









) =Full ; and
• UR has alternative A
UR 6






• for MoE: SImprt(G
MoE 1
) =Little and SImprt(G
MoE 2
) =Full ;
• for UR: SImprt(G
UR 1
) =Little and SImprt(G
UR 2
) =Full ; and
• UR has alternative A
UR 5





Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5):
• for MoE: SImprt(G
MoE 1
) =Little and SImprt(G
MoE 2
) =Full ;
• for UR: SImprt(G
UR 1
) =Little and SImprt(G
UR 2
) =Full ; and
• UR has alternative A
UR 6





Table 8.3 shows the differences in the definitions of these four what-if versions
of the Elmira conflict.
Table 8.3: The Elmira Conflict: The Four What-if Versions/Games of the Conflict
Strength of the Elmira-Abandonening Option for UR
(Strength in terms of how realistic the option is for UR)
State s5 State s6
UR could abandon the Elmira
site, but it will get affected
operationally at least in the
short-to-medium-term
UR could seriously abandon
the Elmira site and move its
production elsewhere without






SImprt(GMoE 1 ) =F ;
SImprt(GMoE 2 ) =F
needs of the Ontario Gov-
ernment are as important
as MoE’s needs
for UR: Game 1 Game 1 (s6 replacing s5)
SImprt(GUR 1 ) =F ;
SImprt(GUR 2 ) =F
UR short-term needs are
as important as its long-
term needs
for MoE:
SImprt(GMoE 1 ) =L ;
SImprt(GMoE 2 ) =F
needs of the Ontario Gov-
ernment are more impor-
tant than MoE’s needs
for UR: Game 2 Game 2 (s6 replacing s5)
SImprt(GUR 1 ) =L ;
SImprt(GUR 2 ) =F
UR short-term needs are
more important than its
long-term needs
Now, we will define the conflict’s states.
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8.5.3 Conflict’s States
Before defining the states of the the Elmira conflict, we need to review the integrated
model of players’ GCMs shown in Figure 8.2. This is to ensure that we have all the
player’ alternatives are included in the integrated GCMs model, and to understand
all the possible realistic states the conflict could have. The analyst, first, will
check the possible alternatives of the players, as we did in the previous subsection;
and ensure that they are all captured within each player’s GCM. Then, all de
facto combinations of the players’ alternatives, as well as all possible ones, will be
identified. Each of these combinations form a state.
States that cannot be reached unless both players move to them jointly are de
facto end-states of cooperative moves. For example, A
UR 2
alternative of UR is shown
in Figure 8.2 to be tightly coupled with MoE’s A
MoE 2
alternative by connecting each
alternative’s intention node to the other by a “=” lateral relation; and therefore a
strong candidate for a state and a CM’s end-state. The tight coupling of these two
alternatives is to demonstrate the fact that MoE cannot choose A
MoE 2
without UR
choosing to select A
UR 2
as its strategic move, and vice versa. This means that these
alternatives/moves are cooperative moves that must be taken by both parties at the
same time. It is not logical to assume that MoE will decide to modify the Control
Order it issued to satisfy all UR demands (as stated by A
MoE 2
) without negotiating
and agreeing with UR on what its demands are, how the control order will look
like, and UR agreeing to accept the modified version of the control order (as stated
by A
UR 2
). Nobody expects, at least not in a real-life like conflict, MoE to modify
the order and wait to see if UR will accept. If there is a chance that MoE, for
example, could do such move without cooperation (agreement between MoE and
UR) then the alternatives should be de-coupled in the integrated GCMs conflict





in Figure8.2 to be also tightly coupled forming an end-state for a cooperative move
to happen simultaneously by both MoE and UR.
Table 8.4 lists all the states that we found valid and realistic in this conflict,
each with the players’ choices/alternatives that makes up the state. In two of the
games/configurations, we are analyzing for the Elmira conflict, state s5 will be re-
placed by state s6 , which is exactly similar to s5 in the fact that it includes MoE
chooses A
MoE 1
as its option, but differ in the alternative that UR chooses. In s6 ,
UR chooses A
UR 6
as its alternative instead of A
UR 5
which it chooses in state s5 .
334
Table 8.4: The Elmira Conflict: Defining the Conflict’s States
The Set of All States S for the MoE-UR Conflict:
State s
0




















State s3 s4 s5














8.5.4 Players’ Preferences over States of the Conflict
To calculate the preferences of the players over the conflict’s states, we calculate
how much each state (with all its players’ alternatives selected) contribute to the
achievement of the players’ strategic goals. The sets of strategic goals for the players













of the individual strategic goals is explained above in Table 8.1. The set of the
conflict’s states is defined in Table 8.4. Two of the four games, or configurations,
we are analyzing for the Elmira conflict, have S = {s0 , s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 , s5}, and those
are Game 1 and Game 2. The other two games have S = {s0 , s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 , s6}, and
those are Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5) and Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5).
For each of the four games, we calculate the Weighted Payoff value for each
state for each player using the method presented in Section 5.4.2. The players’
weighted payoffs for each state of the conflict, for all four games, are shown in
Figure 8.3. The figure shows the level of achievement the state contributes to the
players’ strategic goals. It also shows the strategic importance, each of the players
has for their respective strategic goals (differ based on the game/configuration);
in addition to the Rationality and Emotionality Factors for both players (assumed
in the games/configurations’ base models to be set to Full and None, or 1.0 and
0.0, respectively, in other words the players are assumed fully rational and not
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Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for UR & MoE) Game 1 Game 2
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for UR & MoE) UR MoE UR MoE
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGUR SGMoE SGUR SGMoE
SGUR 1 SGUR 2 SGMoE 1 SGMoE 2 SGUR 1 SGUR 2 SGMoE 1 SGMoE 2
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) F F F F L F L F
State S0 
Achv(SGk) N L N M N L N M
Prvn(SGk) S N F N S N F N
Status Quo (1989) MoE FAchv(SGk) -S L -F M -S L -F M
Keeps Order & UR Delay TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.40 0.20 -1.00 0.60 -0.08 0.20 -0.20 0.60
{ Achv(AMoE 0)=F, WP(S0, DM) -0.10 -0.20 0.06 0.20
  Achv(AUR 4)=F } OP(S0, DM) 4 6 (Worst) 3 5
State S1 
Achv(SGk) N N F F N N F F
Prvn(SGk) S F N N S F N N
MoE Keeps Order FAchv(SGk) -S -F F F -S -F F F
As-Is & UR Accepts TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.40 -1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.08 -1.00 0.20 1.00
{ Achv(AMoE 1)=F, WP(S1, DM) -0.70 1.00 -0.54 0.60
  Achv(AUR 1)=F } OP(S1, DM) 5 1 (Best) 5 1 (Best)
State S2 
Achv(SGk) S L N F S L N F
Prvn(SGk) N N B N N N B N
MoE Modify Fully & FAchv(SGk) S L -B F S L -B F
UR Accepts New Order TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 0.40 0.20 -0.80 1.00 0.08 0.20 -0.16 1.00
{ Achv(AMoE 2)=F, WP(S2, DM) 0.30 0.10 0.14 0.42
  Achv(AUR 2)=F } OP(S2, DM) 2 4 2 3
State S3 
Achv(SGk) L N S B L N S B
Prvn(SGk) N L N N N L N N
MoE Modify Some & FAchv(SGk) L -L S B L -L S B
UR Accepts New Order TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 0.20 -0.20 0.40 0.80 0.04 -0.20 0.08 0.80
{ Achv(AMoE 3)=F, WP(S3, DM) 0.00 0.60 -0.08 0.44
  Achv(AUR 3)=F } OP(S3, DM) 3 2 4 2
State S4 
Achv(SGk) F F N F F F N F
Prvn(SGk) N N F N N N F N
MoE Lefts Control FAchv(SGk) F F -F F F F -F F
Order TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 1.00 1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.20 1.00 -0.20 1.00
{ Achv(AMoE 4)=F } WP(S4, DM) 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.40
OP(S4, DM) 1 (Best) 5 1 (Best) 4
State S5 
Achv(SGk) N N F N N N F N
Prvn(SGk) B F N Mo B F N Mo
MoE Keeps Order As-Is FAchv(SGk) -B -F F -Mo -B -F F -Mo
& UR Abandons Site TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.80 -1.00 1.00 -0.50 -0.16 -1.00 0.20 -0.50
{ Achv(AMoE 1)=F, WP(S5, DM) -0.90 0.25 -0.58 -0.15
  Achv(AUR 5)=F } OP(S5, DM) 6 (Worst) 3 6 (Worst) 6 (Worst)
(a) for Game 1, with all players’ Strategic Goals set as“Fully’ Important; and for Game2,
with the players prioritize their Strategic Goals to “Fully” and “Partially” Important
Figure 8.3: The Elmira Conflict: Preferences of both Players, Ontario Ministry of
Environment (MoE) and Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. (UR), for all games/configurations
of the conflict
emotional as one could expect from governments with institutional collective ra-
tionality). The analyst can test different rationality and emotional values, and the
implication of such values, by setting up what-if scenario models as variations to
the games/configurations’ base models as part of the sensitivity analysis stage.
From the calculate weighted payoffs of each state, to each of the players, we
calculate the Ordinal Preferences for the players over the conflict’s states. Figure
8.3 shows both the weighted payoffs and the ordinal preferences for each state of
the conflict’s games/configurations, for each player. Figure 8.3 shows that both the
cardinal/weighted preferences and the ordinal ones change for the states from one
336
Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for UR & MoE) Game 1  (with S6 replacing S5) Game 2  (with S6 replacing S5)
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for UR & MoE) UR MoE UR MoE
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGUR SGMoE SGUR SGMoE
SGUR 1 SGUR 2 SGMoE 1 SGMoE 2 SGUR 1 SGUR 2 SGMoE 1 SGMoE 2
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) F F F F L F L F
State S0 
Achv(SGk) N L N M N L N M
Prvn(SGk) S N F N S N F N
Status Quo (1989) MoE FAchv(SGk) -S L -F M -S L -F M
Keeps Order & UR Delay TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.40 0.20 -1.00 0.60 -0.08 0.20 -0.20 0.60
{ Achv(AMoE 0)=F, WP(S0, DM) -0.10 -0.20 0.06 0.20
  Achv(AUR 4)=F } OP(S0, DM) 5 6 (Worst) 4 5
State S1 
Achv(SGk) N N F F N N F F
Prvn(SGk) S F N N S F N N
MoE Keeps Order FAchv(SGk) -S -F F F -S -F F F
As-Is & UR Accepts TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.40 -1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.08 -1.00 0.20 1.00
{ Achv(AMoE 1)=F, WP(S1, DM) -0.70 1.00 -0.54 0.60
  Achv(AUR 1)=F } OP(S1, DM) 6 (Worst) 1 (Best) 6 (Worst) 1 (Best)
State S2 
Achv(SGk) S L N F S L N F
Prvn(SGk) N N B N N N B N
MoE Modify Fully & FAchv(SGk) S L -B F S L -B F
UR Accepts New Order TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 0.40 0.20 -0.80 1.00 0.08 0.20 -0.16 1.00
{ Achv(AMoE 2)=F, WP(S2, DM) 0.30 0.10 0.14 0.42
  Achv(AUR 2)=F } OP(S2, DM) 3 4 3 3
State S3 
Achv(SGk) L N S B L N S B
Prvn(SGk) N L N N N L N N
MoE Modify Some & FAchv(SGk) L -L S B L -L S B
UR Accepts New Order TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 0.20 -0.20 0.40 0.80 0.04 -0.20 0.08 0.80
{ Achv(AMoE 3)=F, WP(S3, DM) 0.00 0.60 -0.08 0.44
  Achv(AUR 3)=F } OP(S3, DM) 4 2 5 2
State S4 
Achv(SGk) F F N F F F N F
Prvn(SGk) N N F N N N F N
MoE Lefts Control FAchv(SGk) F F -F F F F -F F
Order TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 1.00 1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.20 1.00 -0.20 1.00
{ Achv(AMoE 4)=F } WP(S4, DM) 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.40
OP(S4, DM) 1 (Best) 5 1 (Best) 4
State S6 
Achv(SGk) S M F N S M F N
Prvn(SGk) N N N Mo N N N Mo
MoE Keeps Order As-Is FAchv(SGk) S M F -Mo S M F -Mo
& UR Abandons Site TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 0.40 0.60 1.00 -0.50 0.08 0.60 0.20 -0.50
{ Achv(AMoE 1)=F, WP(S6, DM) 0.50 0.25 0.34 -0.15
  Achv(AUR 5)=F } OP(S6, DM) 2 3 2 6 (Worst)
(b) for Game 1 and Game 2, but with UR has a stronger more effective plan to abandon





Figure 8.3: The Elmira Conflict: Preferences of both Players, Ontario Ministry of
Environment (MoE) and Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. (UR), for all games/configurations
of the conflict
game/configuration to another. In other words, prioritizing strategic goals for the
player, as Game 2 do, changes the preferences’ order for both players in comparison
to the all-goals-are-equally-important Game 1. Similarly, replacing s5 with the more
dramatic s6 state in both games, Game 1 and 2, changes the preferences’ order for
the players in both games.
Now, we elicit the preferences’ strengths for each of the players, MoE and UR,
for each of the four games/configurations of the Elmira conflict.
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1) Players’ Preferences for Game 1
The strengths of the players’ preferences of each state over each of the other states
are also calculated from the calculate weighted payoffs using the method discussed
in Section 5.4.2. Table 8.5 shows the MoE and UR’s preferences vectors, and the
preferences strengths of each state over other states in Game 1 configuration of the
conflict.
Table 8.5: The Elmira Conflict - Game 1: Players’ Preferences
UR Preferences (Most to Least Preferred) MoE Preferences (Most to Least Preferred)
UR s4 s2 s3 s0 s1 s5 MoE s1 s3 s5 s2 s4 s0
1.00 0.30 0.00 -0.10 -0.70 -0.90 1.00 0.60 0.25 0.10 0.00 -0.20
UR Preferences’ Strengths MoE Preferences’ Strengths
LPS
UR , t




s1 s3 s5 s2 s4 s0
s4 N S Mo M B F s1 N L S Mo Mo M
s2 -S N L L Mo M s3 -L N L L S S
s3 -Mo -L N N S Mo s5 -S -L N N L L
s
0
-M -L N N S S s
2
-Mo -L N N N L
s
1
-B -Mo -S -S N L s
4
-Mo -S -L N N L
s
5
-F -M -Mo -S -L N s
0
-M -S -L -L -L N
2) Players’ Preferences for Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5)
Table 8.6 shows the MoE and UR’s preferences vectors, and the preferences strengths
of each state over other states in Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5) configuration of the
conflict.
Table 8.6: The Elmira Conflict - Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5 ): Players’ Preferences

























1.00 0.50 0.30 0.00 -0.10 -0.70 1.00 0.60 0.25 0.10 0.00 -0.20































N L S Mo M B s
1
N L S Mo Mo M
s
6
-L N L L S M s
3
-L N L L S S
s
2
-S -L N L L Mo s
6
-S -L N N L L
s3 -Mo -L -L N N S s2 -Mo -L N N N L
s0 -M -S -L N N S s4 -Mo -S -L N N L
s
1
-B -M -Mo -S -S N s
0
-M -S -L -L -L N
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3) Players’ Preferences for Game 2
Table 8.6 shows the MoE and UR’s preferences vectors, and the preferences strengths
of each state over other states in Game 2 configuration of the conflict.
Table 8.7: The Elmira Conflict - Game 2: Players’ Preferences

























0.60 0.14 0.06 -0.08 -0.54 -0.58 0.60 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.20 -0.15































N L L S M M s
1
N N N L L S
s
2
-L N N L S S s
3
N N N N L L
s
0
-L N N N S S s
2
N N N N L L
s
3
-S -L N N L L s
4
-L N N N L L
s1 -M -S -S -L N N s0 -L -L -L -L N L
s5 -M -S -S -L N N s5 -S -L -L -L -L N
4) Players’ Preferences for Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5)
Table 8.6 shows the MoE and UR’s preferences vectors, and the preferences strengths
of each state over other states in Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5) configuration of the
conflict.
Table 8.8: The Elmira Conflict - Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5 ): Players’ Preferences

























0.60 0.34 0.14 0.06 -0.08 -0.54 0.60 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.20 -0.15































N L L L S M s
1
N N N L L S
s
6
-L N L L L S s
3
N N N N L L
s2 -L -L N N L S s2 N N N N L L
s0 -L -L N N N S s4 -L N N N L L
s
3
-S -L -L N N L s
0
-L -L -L -L N L
s
1
-M -S -S -S -L N s
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Figure 8.4: The Elmira Conflict: The players’ UM and CM moves between the
conflict’s states
8.5.5 Players’ Moves over States of the Conflict
At this step, we define the UM moves for each of the players, MoE and UR. These
moves are shown in Figure 8.4. We should note that the states in the figure are
shown with their corresponding numbers. For example state s2 is shown as a circle
with the number 2 at its centre.
The figure also shows the CM moves that none of the players can take on
their own, but they can cooperatively take together. States s2 and s3 cannot be
reached except through cooperative moves, because they represent states in which
the parties agree on some form of a modified control order. But, notice that each of
the players, individually through a UM, can move away from any of these two states,
representing a breakdown in the agreement or the negotiation for the agreement
(this happens quite often in real-life conflicts).
By feeding the players’ UMs and preference structures to Algorithm 8.1, the
Player’s UI and CI moves are defined. Figure 8.5 shows both players individual UIs
and their joint cooperative CIs, for each of the four games/configurations we are



























with S6 replaces S5
UR UR










































UIs and CIs by MoE and UR
Figure 8.5: The Elmira Conflict: The players’ UI and CI moves between the con-
flict’s states, based on their Preferences
8.5.6 Stability Analysis of the Elmira Conflict
In this section, we will analyze the four versions of the Elmira conflict. For each,
we start by conducting stability analysis, followed by equilibrium states analysis.
We will discuss the insight that both analyses provide. We will look at the long-
term equilibrium and resolution states for the conflict, based on each of the four
configurations/versions. Also, we will discuss the short-terms strategies that the
players can take, and how such strategies affect the conflict and its evolution over
time.
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NASH Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex L
GMR N N N N N N L N N
SMR N N N N N N L N N
SEQ N N N N N N N
1) Stability Analysis for Game 1
Table 8.9 presents the stability analysis of the the six states of Game 1, for both
players, under NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ solution concepts. Table 8.10 shows
the equilibrium states for the game under the four solution concepts.
Table 8.9 shows that all the NASH stable states for UR states that UR cannot
reach on its own. For UR, reaching s4 , which is its most preferred state, is under
the control of MoE. UR cannot decide to lift the control order issued by MoE. In
addition, both s2 and s3 are states that can be reached only by both parties, MoE
and UR, cooperate together taking their joint CMs (available only from certain
states). But, if UR reaches s2 , s3 or s4 , then this state will be NASH stable for
it, because it does not have any UI it can take individually, or CI that it can take
cooperatively, out from this state. The NASH stability of these states, to UR, is
shown in the table to be at the Extreme strength level. This is because UR cannot
reach these states on its own. In such case, both Definition 8.4.1 and Algorithm
8.2 put the strength of the states’s NASH stability at the Extreme strength level to
reflect the fact that the player, UR here, cannot reach the state (with a move that
it can benefit from) and cannot leave the state (using a move that it will benefit
from).
On the other hand, Table 8.9 shows that MoE have three states (s2 , s3 and
s1) that are NASH stable and MoE cannot reach them on its own, and one (s4)
which is NASH stable but MoE can move unilaterally to it. As in the case of UR:
both s2 and s3 are states that can be reached only by both parties, MoE and UR,
cooperate together taking their joint CMs (available only from certain states); and
the NASH stability of these states, to MoE, is shown in the table to be at the
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Extreme strength level, because MoE cannot reach these states on its own. And
similar to the case of UR and s4 , for MoE to reach s1 , which is its most preferred
state, is under the control of UR. MoE cannot decide that UR accepts the control
order as-is without all the appeal process (and other delay tactics UR is rightfully
and skillfully applying) .
But in contrast with the Extreme NASH stability of s2 and s3 to MoE, s4 is
shown to be of NASH stability but at Little strength level. This is to reflect the fact
that MoE can move to s4 using a UI it has from the status quo state (s0); and the
gain it will achieve by the this UI, calculated as a difference in preference strength
level, is Little (because s4 
L
MoE ,t
s0). In other words, for MoE, moving from the
status quo to s4 by lifting the control order is of “little” benefit, but nevertheless it
is better than staying at the status quo state (where UR employing delay tactics,
the environmental problems with the effected people demand immediate cleanup
action by the government, and potential investors take notice of the inflexibility of
the government in dealing with the situation).
Table 8.9 provides additional insight on Game 1. It shows that each of the
players has another state that constitutes a longer foresight stability. The status
quo state, s0 , is a GMR and an SMR stable for UR. UR will not take any of the two
joint cooperative CI moves, it has with MoE to reach s2 and s3 , because it fears
that MoE will unilaterally back down, sanction and therefore disimprove UR’s CIs.
Two important aspects of this SM by MoE. First, this SM is a UM move for MoE
and not a UI, i.e. the motive by MoE to take it is just to hurt UR and not to benefit
itself from it. In other words, MoE will act irrationally if it takes this sanction.
This, in fact, why the SM by MoE is not considered an SMI move and why s0 is
not considered SEQ stable for UR. Second, this SM move by MoE puts the game
back at s0 , the state where the CIs started from. This makes the strength of the
GMR and SMR stability of s0 , for UR, to be at the None level, i.e. UR does not
gain any benefit (or close to nothing) by taking the joint CIs out of s0 to s2 or
s3 . Therefore, UR will stay at s0 and considers it stable (based on both GMR and
SMR solution concepts).
The table also shown that MoE has state s5 as GMR and SMR stable. Even
though MoE has a joint CI move, with UR, to state s3 from s5 , MoE will not
take the CI move out of fear that UR will unilaterally back down, sanction and
therefore disimprove MoE’s CI. This SM by UR has also two important aspects to
it. First, this SM is a UM move by UR and not a UI, i.e. the motive by UR in
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taking it is just to hurt MoE and not to benefit itself from it. In other words, UR
will act irrationally if it takes this sanction. This, in fact, why the SM by UR is
not considered an SMI move and why s5 is not considered an SEQ stable for MoE.
Second, this SM move by UR puts the game either back at s5 , the state where
the CI started from, or at the less preferred status quo state s0 . This makes the
strength of the GMR and SMR stability of s5 , for MoE, to be at the Little level,
i.e. MoE will most likely end up at a Little less-preferred state if takes the joint CI
out of s5 to s3 . Therefore, MoE will stay at s5 and considers it stable (based on
both GMR and SMR solution concepts).
Now, moving to the equilibrium analysis of Game 1. Table 8.10 shows the
overall equilibrium states for Game 1 configuration of the Elmira conflict, under
the four solution concepts. As the table shows, Game 1 has three equilibrium states.
State s4 is NASH equilibrium of Little strength level. This is because it is of Little
strength to MoE, even though UR has it as Extremely strong NASH stable state.
Both states s2 and s3 are Extremely NASH stable for both players, and therefore
they are Extremely NASH equilibrium for the game.
Table 8.10 is very telling about the conflict and the way it is expected to progress.
All three equilibrium states for the conflict are not the best states that MoE could
hope for. They all involve some form of concession by MoE, either by lifting the
control order (s4) or loosening it to an agreed-up terms with UR (s2 or s3). The
best equilibrium state for MoE is the most preferred state (from those three states),
and it is state s3 where MoE agrees with UR on some modifications for the current
control order. For sure, such modifications will be better for UR but not for MoE.
On the other hand, the three equilibrium states shown in Table 8.10 are the best
states that UR hopes for.
But the strengths of the three equilibrium states that Table 8.10 shows are
also telling. Out of the three long term equilibrium states, which form possible
resolutions to the conflict, two states (s2 and s3) have high stability strength level.
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Those two states are more likely to form the end/resolution to the conflict, than the
weaker equilibrium state of s4 . Therefore, UR should expect that MoE will have
harder time going to s4 . MoE should expect to give concessions. In addition, MoE
should expect UR to use/abuse the situation as much as possible, because it holds
the power to agree on any modified control order. Otherwise, UR can go back to
the delay tactics, or it can abandon the site.
The equilibrium states analysis provided in Table 8.10 gives us insight on the
long-term resolution states for the conflict. But, what about the short term strate-
gies that the players should take or consider. For this, we go back to Table 8.9.
Two states are shown in the table to play some role on the interim. Those are
states s5 (UR abandons the Elimra site) and s0 (the status quo state where UR
employing all possible delay tactics). Each of which is shown in the table to be
GMR and SMR stable for one player or the other.
The fact that MoE has state s5 , in which UR abandons the Elmira site, as GMR
and SMR stable, tells us a lot about the conflict. If UR made the move to abandon
the Elmira site, or declared its intention to do so, then MoE is set to gain more by
not negotiating a lesser strict control order against UR. This puts pressure on UR
to accept the control order as-is; and this will also has the added benefit of showing
the business community in Ontario how serious the government in dealing with the
environmental problems caused by industry. In addition, the fact that the GMR
and SMR stabilities of s5 , for MoE, is at strength level Little shows that MoE will
scarifies little, at the preference scale, if it decides to negotiate a deal with UR to
loosen the control order. The worst UR can do is bring the game back to s5 , or
to the status quo state s0 . Not to mention that the sanction UR will make in this
case is not a UI for it. And we can be sure that UR, as a mature business entity,
will act rationally and not just for the sake of hurting MoE or Ontario government.
So, UR will most likely stay at s3 which is an equilibrium state for the game as a
whole, with an Extreme NASH strength level.
Additionally, the fact that UR has the status quo state s0 , in which UR employs
delay tactics and does not accept the control order issued by MoE, as GMR and
SMR stable, tells us a lot about the conflict from UR’s perspective. For UR, staying
at s0 is the best strategy for many reasons. First, staying at s0 keeps the pressure
on MoE to either lift its order (s4), or loosen its order and reach an agreement
with UR (s2 or s3). MoE has no other option. This is what historically happen in
the conflict. Second, if UR and MoE reach an agreement on a better-terms-for-UR
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control order, and later MoE backs down on this (because of the pressure that the
city, the people , the media, etc., put on it, or for any other reason), then UR is set
to lose nothing. UR will come back to s0 . Third, if UR runs out of delay tactics
to employ, and it cannot bear the cost of the clean up as required by the control
order, then it can abandon the Elmira site (s5). And, if it can bear the cost, it can
move to s1 by accepting the control order.
Therefore, s0 is the best state to be in, at least for the short to medium range,
and this is why UR immediately moved to s0 after MoE issued its control order;
and why s0 is stable for UR in the foreseeable future. This state’s GMR and SMR
stability, for UR, has higher foresight (one or two steps ahead, as per the discussion
given in Section 7.2), and forms a great proposition to force MoE in either lifting
the order or loosening it on terms that both parties agree on (the NASH stable
states (s4 or s2/s3 , respectively).
2) Stability Analysis for Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5)
Table 8.11 presents the stability analysis of the the six states of Game 1 (with
s6 replacing s5), for both players, under NASh, GMR, SMR and SEQ solution
concepts. Table 8.12 shows the equilibrium states for the game under the four
solution concepts.
Recall that Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5) is a what-if version of the Elmira con-
flict in which UR has a stronger case for abandoning the Elmira site. Hence, state
s6 replacing the weaker abandoning case represented in state s5 of the conflict’s base
model given in Game 1. It does not matter whether UR truly has the capabilities
to allow it shift all/most of the Elmira production capacity to one of its other inter-












































s3 (CI) s3 (CI)
NASH Ex L Ex Ex Ex Ex L
GMR N N N N N N N
SMR N N N N N N N
SEQ N N N N N N N
346
national facilities or it managed somehow (e.g. through media reports) to convince
MoE and Ontario that it has such capabilities (UR is playing a hypergame). The
conflict now, under Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5) configuration and assumptions,
is different than the conflict under Game 1 configuration and assumptions.
Figure 8.3 and Tables 8.5 - 8.6, presented earlier in Section 8.5.4, show clear
differences in the cardinal, and as a result in the ordinal, preferences of UR over
the states of the conflict between the base model in Game 1 and its variation Game
1 (with s6 replacing s5). The figure and tables show that MoE’s preferences stayed
the same. From MoE’s perspective, abandoning the site by UR in s6 is the same as
abandoning it by UR in s5 . But, despite the no change to MoE’s preferences, the
changes in UR’s preferences have significant impact on the stability of the states
for the players and for the conflict as a whole.
The stability analysis of Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5) shown in Table 8.11
is different than the stability analysis of the base Game 1 shown in Table 8.9 in
four aspects. First, whilst the agreement states s2 and s3 in Game 1 are NASH
stable for both MoE and UR, these states in the new Game 1 (with s6 replacing
s5) maintained their NASH stability for MoE but are not stable at all for UR. In
the new modified Game 1, UR is showing itself to be not interested in changing the
control order, fully (s2) or partially(s3). If UR is truly, or tactically shows itself,
capable of abandoning the Elmira site without losing much in operational capacity,
revenue generation and demand satisfaction, then UR will be in avery good position
to get more concisions from MoE in the conflict.
Second, Table 8.11 shows that state s6 , which replaces in this new game state
s5 used in Game 1, is now NASH stable for both UR and MoE. For UR, this is the
essence of showing that it is seriously considering the abandon-Elmira-site option.
It is to show that UR has the capability to move on, and that the state which
represent this option is stable for UR. The table shows the strength of s6 ’s NASH
stability for UR to be at the Little strength level. On the other hand, MoE has no
UM to move to s6 and no UI/CI to move out from it. This makes s6 to be NASH
stable for MoE with Extreme strength level.
Third, The Game 1’s stability analysis given in Table 8.9 shows the status quo
state s0 to be GMR and SMR stable for UR. This state in Game 1 (with s6 replacing
s5) is not GMR or SMR stable to UR, as shown in Table 8.11. Because the status
quo state, where UR employing delay tactics, becomes unstable for UR in this
version of the game, UR ideally should not stay long in this state. UR should
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either take its UI to s6 (by abandoning the Elmira site), or its joint CIs with MoE
to one of the two agreement state (s2 or s3). This has a significant implication to
how the game will progress. This puts more pressure on MoE to modify the control
order and agree with UR to make the game go the s2 or s3 direction, and not the
s6 direction. MoE should move fast to loosen its position, otherwise UR can take
its UI to s6 .
Fourth, state s5 is shown in Table 8.9 to be GMR and SMR stable for MoE in
Game 1, and unstable for UR. In Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5), s6 is becoming
NASH stable for both players as we mentioned above. Recall that s6 is NASH stable
for MoE because it has no UIs to reach the state, not to mention no UMs either
to reach to the state. This makes the state’s NASH stability Extremely strong for
MoE. On the other hand, for UR, the state is NASH stable since UR has no UIs out
of it. But because UR can reach this state from many other states, the strength of
the state’s NASH stability to UR reflect the lesser difference in preference between
the state UR starts from and s6 (the end state of the UI). This makes the strength
of s6 ’s NASH stability to UR is set at the Little strength level. This Little strength
shows that UR is not extremely excited to abandon the Elmira site (s6). But,
absent an agreement with MoE in the making, UR can go to s6 . This, while keeps
the pressure on MoE to change the control order, makes the case for MoE not go
all the way in agreeing to all UR demands.
Table 8.11 also shows that state s4 , as in the case of Game 1, is still NASH
stable for both players for this version of the conflict. For UR, reaching s4 , which
is its most preferred state, is under the control of MoE. UR cannot decide to lift
the control order issued by MoE, making state s4 ’s NASH stability for UR to be at
the Extreme strength level. For MoE, s4 is Nash stable but at the Little strength
level, similar to the situation in Game 1.
Now, moving to the equilibrium analysis of Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5). Table
8.12 shows the overall equilibrium states for this new configuration of the Elmira
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conflict, under the four solution concepts. As the table shows, this game has only
two equilibrium states. Similar to Game 1, Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5) has state
s4 as a NASH equilibrium state of Little strength level. But unlike Game 1, the
new game does not have s2 and s3 as equilibrium states. Instead it has state s6 as
a NASH equilibrium of Little strength level.
Table 8.12 is very telling about the conflict under the Game 1 (with s6 replacing
s5) configuration and the way it is expected to progress. With two equilibrium
states, one that has MoE lift the control order and a second that has UR abandons
the Elmira site, MoE finds itself in a very intense situation. UR shows signs that
it intends to leave the province, and therefore leaves MoE to bear all the fallout of
the environmental disaster it caused. In this game, even compromise agreements,
where MoE loosens its control order, are shown to be not so exciting to UR (as is
the case in Game 1). MoE has to move fast and try to reach an agreement that
will give UR enough incentive to sway it from abandoning the site.
For UR, this configuration of the conflict is much better than Game 1. It
increases the pressure on MoE to lift the control order or drastically change it to
meet UR demands. But, this added value comes at a price. The fact that the status
quo state s0 , where UR is employing delay tactics, is unstable to UR in this game,
UR cannot stay for long in this state. Staying at s0 for a long time could suggest
that UR does not actually have the capability to move production elsewhere, as
suggested by s6 . UR could be seen as a company that is bluffing in an attempt to
deceive MoE, and Ontario at large. This leads to a more damaging public relation
for the company and its current and future business in canada and elsewhere.
3) Stability Analysis for Game 2
Table 8.13 presents the stability analysis of the the six states of Game 2, for both
players, under NASh, GMR, SMR and SEQ solution concepts. Table 8.14 shows
the equilibrium states for the game under the four solution concepts.
In Section 8.5.2, we mentioned that Game 2 what-if version of the Elmira conflict
is similar to Game 1 in the goals and alternatives the players have. Game 2 differs
only in the importance weights the players put into some of their goals. In Game
2, MoE has SImprt(G
MoE 1
) =Little and SImprt(G
MoE 2
) =Full, instead of having
the SImprt for both goals to be Full as in Game 1. Similarly, UR in Game 2
has SImprt(G
UR 1
) =Little and SImprt(G
UR 2
) =Full, again instead of having the
importance value property label for both goals to be Full as in Game 1.
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As a result, the players’ cardinal and ordinal preferences change. Figure 8.3a,
Table 8.5 and Table 8.7, presented earlier in Section 8.5.4, show the differences in
the players’ preferences over the states of the conflict between the base model in
Game 1 and the Game 2 variation. We will show here that these changes in MoE
and UR’s preferences have significant impact on the stability of the states for the
players and as a result for the conflict as a whole.
The stability analysis of Game 2 shown in Table 8.13 is different than the
stability analysis of the base Game 1 shown in Table 8.9 in three aspects. First, in
Game 2, the agreement state s3 , in which MoE modifies the control order to fully
satisfy UR requests and UR accepts to comply with the new order, is no longer a
stable state for UR under any of the four solution concepts. In Game 1, s3 is a
NASH stable state for UR. And while s3 is an Extreme NASH stable state for MoE
in both, the change in the stability status of the state for UR has an impact on
how the conflict could progress as we will discuss when we analyze the equilibrium
states of the conflict under Game 2 versus Game 1.
Second, While Table 8.13 shows that MoE in Game 2 keeps all its NASH stable
states from Game 1 (s1 , s2 , s3 and s4), with the same stability strength levels, there
are changes to its non-NASH stable states. In Game 1, s5 is both a GMR and SMR
stable state for MoE with stabilities’ strength at level Little. In Game 2, s5 is only
a GMR stable state for MoE and with strength level set at the very weak level
None. s5 is no longer SMR stable for MoE, because UR has no ISM for MoE’s UI
to s4 from s5 . Also, the lowering of s5 ’s GMR stability, for MoE, from Little to
None is due to the change in the available sanctions for MoE’s UIs/CIs from s5 ,
and the change in MoE’s preferences’ strengths.
350













NASH EQ. Ex L
GMR EQ. N N N
SMR EQ. N N
SEQ EQ. N N
Third, MoE in Game 2 has a new GMR stable state that is unstable in Game
1. State s0 , the status quo, is GMR stable for MoE in Game 2. This is because UR
can sanction MoE’s UI to s4 from s0 , in an irrational move to s5 motivated by the
need to hurt MoE (based on GMR Definition 8.3.2 but an unrealistic assumption to
adopt). And because s5 
−L
MoE ,t
s0 , and by applying Definition 8.4.2 and Algorithm
8.3 , the strength of s0 ’s GMR stability for MoE is determined to be at the Little,
i.e. at a higher strength than s5 ’s GMR stability for MoE. The fact that the status
quo state s0 is GMR stable for MoE, as it is for UR (as shown in Table 8.13), makes
it a GMR equilibrium state for the conflict; and this will impact how the players
are expected to act in the conflict, as we will discuss shortly.
Table 8.14 shows the overall equilibrium states for Game 2 configuration of the
Elmira conflict, under the four solution concepts. As per the table, Game 2 has
two equilibrium states. State s4 is NASH equilibrium of Little strength level. This
is because it is of Little strength to MoE, even though UR has it as Extremely
strong NASH stable state. State s2 is Extremely NASH stable for both players,
and therefore an Extremely NASH equilibrium for Game2. Both s4 and s2 are
also NASH equilibrium states under Game 1, the base configuration of the Elmira
conflict, as shown in Table 8.10.
The comparison between the equilibrium states analysis for Game 2 (shown
in Table 8.14) and the one for Game 1 (shown in Table 8.10) provides us with
insights on the expected resolution for the Elmira conflict and the way the conflict
is expected to progress. The first thing one should notice is that both games, Game
1 and Game 2, has states s4 and s2 as NASH equilibrium states for the conflict.
Both states involve MoE giving concessions to UR, either by lifting the control order
completely (s4) or by modifing the control order to satisfy all UR requirements. For
sure, such modifications will be better for UR, but not for MoE. In other words,
both of these equilibrium states are not considered happy ending for the conflict,
from MoE’s perspective. On the other hand, the two equilibrium states are the
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best states that UR could hope for (most preferred as shown in Table 8.7).
Recall from the equilibrium analysis of Game 1 (shown in Table 8.10) that s3 , in
which MoE modify the control order partially to fit with some of UR requirements,
is a NASH equilibrium with Extreme strength level. In Game 2, s3 is no longer
an equilibrium state. This definitely adds pressure on MoE. All the foreseeable
equilibrium states for the conflict, under Game 2 configuration, requires MoE to
go further in satisfying UR demands for modifying the control order if MoE wants
the conflict to end. In Game 1, MoE is in a comparatively better position, because
Game 1 has an equilibrium state in which MoE and UR agree on partial modification
to the control order that will satisfy some but not all UR requirements.
Furthermore, Table 8.14 shows that Game 2 has a new equilibrium state that
is not considered an equilibrium under Game 1. State s0 , the status quo in which
MoE insists that UR implement the control order as-is and UR employs all possible
delay tactics, is a GMR equilibrium state in Game 2. This has significant impact
on how the players are expected to act in the conflict, at least in the interim.
In Game 1, s0 is unstable for MoE. This makes MoE must move from s0 to
another stable state. It cannot stay for long in s0 . At the same time, s0 is GMR
and SMR stable for UR, so UR is expected to be not in a rush to leave this stable
state at least for a while (until UR runs out of delay tactics to employ). In Game
2, on the other hand, s0 is a GMR stable state for both MoE and UR and SMR
stable for UR alone. This makes both players relatively stable at s0 and not in
a rush to move out from this state. This is advantageous to MoE, in comparison
to its situation in Game 1, giving it some leverage in the short term. UR will
not be happy with this, because this will remove some of the pressure on MoE, in
comparison to Game 1, to lift/relax the control order it issued against it.
In addition, the strengths of the three equilibrium states that Table 8.14 shows
for Game 2 are also telling. Out of the two long term equilibrium states, which
form possible resolutions to the conflict, one state (s2) has high strength level. The
other equilibrium state (s4) has a weaker strength level. The stronger equilibrium
at s2 will more likely form the end/resolution for the conflict, more so than the
weaker equilibrium state of s4 . Therefore, UR should expect that MoE will have
harder time going to s4 . On the other hand, MoE should expect to give serious
concessions. And, by serious concessions we mean: MoE will modify the control
order to satisfy many if not all UR demands.
But unlike Game 1, in which MoE has no leverage what so ever , Game 2 gives
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MoE some room to stay at the status quo state, the newly established GMR stable
state for it. We said earlier, when we analyzed the equilibriums of Game 1, that
MoE should expect UR to use/abuse the situation as much as possible, because
it holds the power to agree on any modified control order. Otherwise, UR can
go back to the delay tactics, or it can abandon the site. This is still true, to an
extent, but MoE in Game 2 can at least wait at the status quo state s0 for a while
in an effort to put some pressure on UR to moderate its demands. This pressure
will most likely come in the form of public relations pressures (locally and at the
international stage) and/or operational pressure that could affect the short-term
productivity of the Elmira site.
Saying so, one should notice that the equilibrium at state s0 is: 1) an equilibrium
under the GMR solution concept, i.e. MoE is expecting UR to act irrationally in an
effort to hurt MoE even if this means that it will hurt itself, a very unlikely scenario
in the business world with institutional rationality in place; and 2) the strength of
this GMR equilibrium is set to be at the very weak None strength level. For these
reasons, the status quo could not be expected to form a resolution to the conflict,
not even a stable state for more than a short period of time (recall that UR has s0
as GMR stable at the None strength level).
4) Stability Analysis for Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5)
Table 8.15 presents the stability analysis of the the six states of Game 2 (with
s6 replacing s5), for both players, under NASh, GMR, SMR and SEQ solution
concepts. Table 8.16 shows the equilibrium states for the game under the four
solution concepts.
Recall that Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5) is a what-if version of the Elmira con-
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flict in which UR has a stronger case for abandoning the Elmira site, in comparison
to the Game 2 configuration. Hence, state s6 replacing the weaker abandoning case
represented in state s5 of the conflict’s model given in Game 2. As in the case
of Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5), here to it does not matter for Game 2 (with s6
replacing s5) whether UR truly has the capabilities to allow it shift all/most of the
Elmira production capacity to one of its other international facilities or it managed
somehow (e.g. through media reports) to convince MoE and Ontario that it has
such capabilities (UR is playing a hypergame). The conflict now, under Game 2
(with s6 replacing s5) configuration and assumptions, is different than the conflict
under Game 2 configuration and assumptions.
Figure 8.3 and Tables 8.7 - 8.8, presented earlier in Section 8.5.4, show clear
differences in the cardinal, and as a result in the ordinal, preferences of UR over the
states of the conflict between Game 2 and its variation Game 2 (with s6 replacing
s5). The figure and tables show that MoE’s preferences stayed the same. From
MoE’s perspective, abandoning the site by UR in s6 is the same as abandoning it
by UR in s5 . But, despite the no change to MoE’s preferences , the changes in UR’s
preferences have significant impact on the stability of the states for the players and
for the conflict as a whole.
Comparing the stability analysis of Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5), shown in
Table 8.15, to the stability analysis done for Game 2, shown in Table 8.9, one will
notice some differences. But these differences are only for the stability of some
sates to UR. For MoE, the stabilities of the states stay exactly the same, even their
strengths stay the same. This was not the case in the comparison we provided
earlier between the states’ stabilities for Game 1 and the ones for Game 1 (with
s6 replacing s5). There, we have noticed differences for both players. So, what are
these differences that UR have in states’ stabilities between Game 2 and Game 2
(with s6 replacing s5)?
First, state s2 in Game 2 is a NASH stable for both MoE and UR, but this
state maintained its NASH stability for MoE only in the new Game 2 (with s6
replacing s5). State s2 is not stable at all for UR. In the new modified Game 2,
UR is showing itself to be not interested in changing the control order, fully (s2) or
partially(s3). If UR is truly, or tactically shows itself, capable of abandoning the
Elmira site without losing much in operational capacity, revenue generation and
demand satisfaction, then UR will be in avery good position to get more concisions
from MoE in the conflict. This is similar to Game 1 (with s6 replacing s5) where
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MoE find itself in the same situation under the same pressure.
Second, state s6 , which replaces in this new game state s5 used in Game 2, is
shown in Table 8.15 to be NASH stable for UR and GMR stable for MoE. For UR,
this is the essence of showing the it is seriously considering the abandon-Elmira-site
option. It shows that UR has the capability to move on, and that the state which
represent this option is stable for UR. The table shows the strength of s6 ’s NASH
stability for UR to be at the Little strength level. For MoE, the UR-abandoning-
Elmira state s5 stays as a GMR stable even if this state intensifies in the form of
s6 with UR shows itself to be more willing to take the step to abandon the site. In
Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5), the strength of s6 ’s GMR stability for MoE stays at
the same very weak None strength level it has for s5 in Game 2.
Table 8.16 shows the overall equilibrium states for Game 2 configuration of the
Elmira conflict, under the four solution concepts. As per the table, Game 2 (with
s6 replacing s5) has two equilibrium states. State s4 is NASH equilibrium of Little
strength level, as it is in Game 2. The strength level of Little is because s4 ’s NASH
stability for MoE is at the Little strength level, despite the fact that UR has s4
as Extremely strong NASH stable state. The second equilibrium state is state s6
which is shown in the table to be an equilibrium state under the GMR solution
concept with very weak strength set at the None strength level.
The comparison between the equilibrium states analysis for Game 2 (with s6
replacing s5), shown in Table 8.16, and the one for Game 2, shown in Table 8.14,
provides us with insights on the expected resolution for the Elmira conflict and
the way the conflict is expected to progress. The first thing one will notice is that
both games, Game 2 and Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5), has state s4 as NASH
equilibrium states for the conflict. This state involves MoE giving that at most
concession to UR: lift the control order completely. This equilibrium state is not
considered a happy ending for the conflict, from MoE’s perspective. On the other
hand, this states is the best state that UR could hope for in both games (most
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preferred as shown in Table 8.7 and Table 8.8).
The second difference is that s6 an equilibrium state in Game 2 (with s6 replacing
s5) under the GMR solution concept. State s6 is not an equilibrium state in Game
2. The fact that s6 is an equilibrium in this new game shows the UR-abandons-
Elmira state is seriously considered as a resolution for the conflict. But we should
notice that the equilibrium at state s6 is: 1) an equilibrium under the GMR solution
concept, because MoE has this state stable only under GMR , i.e. MoE is expecting
UR to act irrationally in an effort to hurt MoE even if this means that it will hurt
itself, a very unlikely scenario in the business world with institutional rationality
in place; and 2) the strength of this GMR equilibrium is set to be at the very
weak None strength level. For these reasons, s6 could not be expected to form a
resolution to the conflict, except as a theoretical non-practical resolution.
The third difference is that unlike Game 2, Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5) does
not have s2 as a NASH equilibrium states for the conflict. This is very telling
about the conflict. With two equilibrium states, one that has MoE lift the control
order, and a second that has UR abandons the Elmira site, MoE finds itself in a
very intense situation. UR shows signs that it intends to leave the province, and
therefore leave MoE to bear all the fallout of the environmental disaster it caused.
In this game, even compromise agreements, where MoE loosens its control order,
are shown to be not so exciting to UR (as is the case in Game 2). MoE has to move
fast and try to reach an agreement that will give UR enough incentive to sway it
from abandoning the site.
The fact that s0 , the status quo state, is not an equilibrium state in Game 2 (with
s6 replacing s5) as it is in Game 2 forms the forth difference one will notice when
comparing between the stability analysis of both games, given in Table 8.16) and
Table 8.14) respectively. For UR, the Game 2 (with s6 replacing s5) configuration
of the conflict is much better than the Game 2 one. It increases the pressure on
MoE to lift the control order or drastically change it to meet UR demands. But,
this added value comes at a price. The fact that the status quo state s0 , where UR
is employing delay tactics, is not an equilibrium state because it is unstable to UR
in this game, UR cannot stay for long in this state. Staying at s0 for a long time
could suggest that UR does not actually have the capability to move production
elsewhere, as suggested by s6 . UR could be seen as a company that is bluffing in
attempt to deceive MoE. This leads to a more damaging public relation for the
company and its current and future business in canada and elsewhere.
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8.5.7 Results of the Elmira Conflict Analysis
The results of the stability analysis, presented in the previous subsection, provide us
with a significant amount of insight into the Elmira conflict. In this subsection, we
will compare the findings of the stability analysis for the Elmira conflict with what
actually happened in this environmental historical conflict; and with the analysis
and findings of others’ analysis as provided in the literature. We will also compare
the four what-if versions/configurations of the Elmira conflict in terms of how the
conflict is expected to evolve over time based on each; discuss which one of these
four versions better represent what happened historically; and discuss the benefits
of analyzing different what-if models of the conflict.
1) Evolution of The Elmira Conflict Starting from the Status Quo:
Table 8.17 shows the possible scenarios, for each of the four versions/games of the
Elmira conflict. Each of these scenarios shows an evolution path that the Elmira
conflict could take starting from the status quo state s0 . Recall that s0 is the
sate where MoE insists UR implement the control order it issued as-is and the
UR employs delay tactics. Also as a reminder, Table 8.3 shows the differences
between the definitions of the four versions, configurations or what-if games which
we studied individually in the previous subsections.
For each of these versions of the conflict, Table 8.17 shows how the conflict could
progress over time. Starting from the status quo state s0 , and by having the players’
take their individual UIs or cooperative CIs out of s0 until the conflict reach one of
its equilibriums (for the specific version of the conflict). For example, Scenario 2 of
Game 1, presented in Table 8.18a, shows that the game will move from s0 by MoE
taking its UI to s4 . The game then stops, because it reaches an equilibrium state
for the game (under the definition of NASH solution concept). Similarly, Scenario
3 of Game 1, also presented in Table 8.18a, shows that the game will move from
s0 by both players, MoE and UR acting cooperatively, taking their joint CI to s2 .
The game then stops, because it reaches an equilibrium state for the game (also
under the definition of NASH solution concept).
As indicated when analyzed earlier the four what-if versions/games of the Elmira
conflict, the stability analysis for each shows MoE giving major concessions to UR.
In fact, Table 8.17 shows repeatedly that the conflict, under all versions of it, could
end by a move by MoE from s0 to s4 (MoE lifting the control order). If MoE
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Table 8.17: The Elmira Conflict: Evolution Scenarios (starting from status quo s0)
(a) Game 1: Evolution Scenarios
Scenario No.of Conflict Evolution End State
No. Steps 0 1 EQ Stability for UR Stability for MoE
1 0 0 GMR (N ) & SMR (N ) Unstable
2 1 0 4
MoE, UI
NASH (L) NASH (Ex) NASH (L)
3 1 0 2
UR & MoE, CI
NASH (Ex) NASH (Ex) NASH (Ex)
4 1 0 3
UR & MoE, CI
NASH (Ex) NASH (Ex) NASH (Ex)
(b) Game 1 (s6 replacing s5): Evolution Scenarios
Scenario No.of Conflict Evolution End State
No. Steps 0 1 EQ Stability for UR Stability for MoE
1 0 0 Unstable Unstable
2 1 0 4
MoE, UI
NASH (L) NASH (Ex) NASH (L)
3 1 0 6
UR, UI
NASH (L) NASH (L) NASH (Ex)
(c) Game 2: Evolution Scenarios
Scenario No.of Conflict Evolution End State
No. Steps 0 1 EQ Stability for UR Stability for MoE
1 0 0 GMR (N ) GMR (N ) & SMR (N ) GMR (L)
2 1 0 4
MoE, UI
NASH (L) NASH (Ex) NASH (L)
3 1 0 2
UR & MoE, CI
NASH (Ex) NASH (Ex) NASH (Ex)
(d) Game 2 (s6 replacing s5): Evolution Scenarios
Scenario No.of Conflict Evolution End State
No. Steps 0 1 EQ Stability for UR Stability for MoE
1 0 0 Unstable GMR (L)
2 1 0 4
MoE, UI
NASH (L) NASH (Ex) NASH (L)
3 1 0 6
UR, UI
GMR (N ) NASH (L) GMR (N )
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does not lift the control order, then it is either expected to: modify the order to
fully satisfy UR requirements (end state s2 : scenario 3 in Game 1 and scenario 3
in Game 2); modify the order to partially satisfy UR requirements (end state s3 :
scenario 3 in Game 1); or prepare itself to take full control of the clean up effort
and full responsibility of all costs associated with this effort because UR abandoned
the Elmira site (end state s6 : scenario 3 in Game 1 (s6 replacing s5) and scenario
3 in Game 2 (s6 replacing s5)).
The table also points to the fact that none of the expected evolution scenarios of
the Elmira conflict, not in any of the what-if versions of the conflict, has as an end
state UR agreeing to implement the control order as-is and without modifications
that address its requirements (s1). This, in by itself, is a very telling discovery by
the analysis and should have made MoE think twice before issuing the control order
and put its reputation and the integrity of its control orders at stake. All expected
scenarios of how the conflict will progress over time show MoE backing down from
its original demands, and/or taking full responsibility to clean up the site itself.
In addition, some scenarios, or evolution paths, shown in Table 8.17 make the
case that: it is possible for the conflict to end with UR abandoning the Elmira site
(s6). But, one should notice that this possibility is only valid if and only if UR can
abandon the site and move its production elsewhere, satisfying what the Elmira
site used to cover in terms of quantity and quality of material produced. If UR
cannot abandon the Elmira site without suffering great loss, i.e. cannot be in state
s6 , then its only option is to consider s5 (abandon but suffer on the short term
operationally and financially until another site is built and made operational). It is
important to note here that if s5 is the sate considered in the game, then none of the
possible evolution scenarios predict an equilibrium that ends with UR abandoning
the Elmira site. Such ending is only possible if s6 is used in the game, i.e. if UR
can really abandon the site without much loss in the short-term. Recall that s6 is
used only in Game 1 (s6 replacing s5) and in Game 2 (s6 replacing s5)). Game 1
and Game 2 has the not-so-solid-case-to-abandon-Elmira state (s5) instead.
From Table 8.17, one can also observe that the agreement states (s2 in which
MoE modifies the control order to fully satisfy UR demands, and s3 in which MoE
modifies the control order to partially satisfy UR demands) are not equilibrium
states when the strong-abandoning-case-for-UR state s6 is considered in the the
conflict. In other words, the agreement states, s2 and/or s3 , form possible resolution
to the conflict only in Game 1 and Game 2 (Scenarios 3 and 4 in Game 1 and
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Scenario 3 in Game 2). Neither s2 nor s3 can form an equilibrium end state to any
scenario the Elmira conflict could follow over time, if the conflict is Game 1 (s6
replacing s5) or Game 2 (s6 replacing s5).
The status quo state s0 itself is an important state to analyze its stability for the
two players in the conflict. Table 8.17 shows s0 to form an equilibrium only in one
configuration of the conflict. If the conflict follows the what-if version of Game 2, s0
will be an equilibrium under the GMR solution concept. But one should notice that
the strength of this GMR equilibrium is at the very weak None strength level. In
addition, the nature of this state does not allow it to be a long lasting resolution to
the conflict. Recall that s0 represent a state where MoE insist on UR implementing
its control order as-is and UR employing delay tactics. Once UR delay tactics,
mostly done through appeals and legal procedures, come an end, s0 expires and
UR must make a move, unilaterally or cooperatively, to another state.
For these reasons, the status quo could not be expected to form a resolution to
the conflict, not even a stable state for more than a short-to-medium period of time
(recall that UR has s0 as GMR stable at the None strength level). What might
drag the stability of s0 beyond the short-term stability to more of a medium-range
stability is the fact that MoE, under Game 2 configuration, has this state GMR
stable with strength at theLittle level (i.e. a bit more stable for MoE than for UR).
So, MoE is expected to delay the move out from this state to any state under its
control (a UI move by MoE or a CI move that MoE can stop by not cooperating).
But, eventually as we can see from Table 8.17, MoE cannot hold on forever to s0 . If
UR does not run out of delay tactics, MoE cannot stay too long without mobilizing
the clean up efforts, i.e MoE has to move out of s0 . Unfortunately, MoE can only
move unilaterally to s4 , lifting the control order and ending the conflict; or it can
cooperate with UR reaching an agreement that satisfy all UR demands and ending
the conflict at state s2 .
Now, which one of the scenarios presented in Table 8.17 reflect what happened
historically in the Elmira conflict? And, how an analyst will use the stability
analysis and conflict evolution analysis provided above to identify which of the
what-if versions of the conflict accurately represent the conflict before the conflict
reaches its end? By knowing which game the players are playing, the analyst can
better guide and help the player he represents in the conflict. We will discuss all of
this in what follows.
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2) Comparing our Analysis with What Really Happened:
To compare how the conflict actually evolved, historically, to how our analysis
predicts it would, we first need to know the historical time line of this conflict’s
evens. Table 8.18 shows the time line for the Elmira conflict’s events in their
historical order, starting from the time MoE issued the control order against UR
on December 30, 1989. This event is shown in the table as the first event, and
formed the pre-status-quo state. The table provides information about the state
that the conflict is at during each of the conflict’s events, who made the move to
the state (in brackets we show whether the move is a UI/CI move for the mover/s),
the step number (or as it could be read: time t+number of steps/moves by the
players so far), in addition to comments added to the event’s description.
As per Table 8.18, the conflicts enters its status quo state, s0 (the state which
we are analyzing the conflict from), when UR appealed the control order to the
Ontario Environmental Appeal Board on January 12, 1990. By this move, UR
declared that it will use all legal delay tactics it has available to it. The events
that follow, and shown in the table , are based on the documents related to the
conflict in the archive of the Ontario Environmental Appeal Board, and based on
the Uniroyal Chemical / Crompton Company (Elmira, Ontario) Collection (Laurier
Library Archives, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2009).
By looking at Table 8.18, one will notice two important features of the list of
events that historically took place in the Elmira conflict. First, the players stayed at
the status quo state s0 an extended period of time (22 months), signalling a relative
stability for both players at this state. Second, MoE and UR at the end entered
an agreement that satisfies all UR demands. Cameron (1995) lists many concerns
raised by locals and environmentalists alike about the agreement: giving UR close
to 40 years to clean-up; not requiring UR to excavate buried wastes deep enough;
MoE, and Ontario at large, taking big part of the responsibility to do the clean-up
and pay a big share of its costs; and so on. In fact, Cameron (1995) cites sources
stating that MoE appointed a well-known pro-Unirouyal person to supervise the
clean-up efforts, satisfying a demand by UR in order to reach a deal. Clearly, this
agreement, and the new MoE modified control order that resulted from it, satisfied
all UR demands, and not just part of these demands. This signals the conflict
reaching state s2 .
The only scenario, from all those listed in Table 8.17, that satisfies those two
features is Scenario 3 of Game 2. It has the conflict staying at s0 in a relative
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Table 8.18: The Elmira Conflict: Analysis vs.Reality
Step Date Actual Conflict Evolution Move by to/at State
Dec. 30, 1989 Ontario’s Minsitry of Envieronment (MoE) issued a cont- MoE
rol order against Uniroyal Chemical Ltd (UR), after N-
nitroso demethylamine (NDMA) was discovered to con-
taminate the underground aquifer. The control order
came as an Emergency Direction from the Director, Hamil-
ton Regional Office, Ministry of the Environment under s.
32(1) of the Ontario Water Resources Act as amended.
0 Jan. 12, 1990 UR submitted its appeal application to the Ontario Env- UR s0
ironmental Appeal Board. Status Quo
Jan. 18, 1990 MoE added to the control order a Director’s Notice from
the Director, Hamilton Regional Office, Ministry of the
Environment under s. 8 of the Ontario Water Resources
Act as amended.
MoE
Jan. 19, 1990 UR amended its appeal application submitted to Ontario
Environmental Appeal Board in response to the Jan. 18
Director’s Notice by MoE.
UR
Jan. 26, 1990 MoE added to the control order a Director’s Notice from
the Director, Hamilton Regional Office, Ministry of the
Environment under the Ontario Water Resources Ac.
MoE
Feb. 2, 1990 MoE added to the control order a Director’s Order from
the Director, Hamilton Regional Office, Ministry of the
Environment under the Ontario Water Resources Act.
MoE
Feb. 9, 1990 UR submitted a appeal application submitted to Ontario
Environmental Appeal Board in response to the Jan. 26
and Feb. 2 Director’s Notice and Order by MoE, respec-
tively.
UR
Aug. 28, 1990 The Director, West Central Region, MoE issued a new
control against UR replacing the old order dated Dec. 30,
1989. The new control order was more extensive, setting
out procedures for monitoring, sampling and reporting re-
sults for DMNA in wastewater going to the Elmira sewage
treatment plant.
MoE
Sep. 12, 1990 UR submitted a new appeal application to Ontario Envi-
ronmental Appeal Board with respect to the entirety of
MoE’s new control order dated Aug. 28, 1990.
UR
1 October , 1991 The Government of Ontario, as represented by the Min-
ister of the Environment entered into an agreement with
UR. In this agreement, MoE and UR agreed to share the
work and the costs involved in the cleanup efforts. The
agreement also provided for its implementation by the is-
suance of a new control order amending the order of Au-
gust 28,1990. This amended control order was issued in
November 4,1991. Later the same day, in consideration
of the issuance of the amended order, UR withdrew all
outstanding appeals. The withdrawals were followed later
that day by the issuance of a Revocation Order by the
Director, West Central Region, Ministry of the Environ-
ment. This new order revoked the orders of all previous
MoE control orders, directives and notices against UR had
issued before this date.
The clean-up was expected to take decades, conclude in
2028, and costs would be shared between the two parties.
The province would pay one-third of the capital cost and
other one-time costs, along with half the annual operat-
ing costs of the treatment system, and UR would pay the
balance.




stability (equilibrium under GMR(N ): for UR it is GMR(N ) and SMR(N ) stable,
and for MoE it is GMR(L) stable). These strengths of the s0 ’s stabilities to both
players are very telling by themselves. UR has a very weak stability at s0 , while MoE
has s0 stable under a slightly more stability strength. MoE clearly demonstrated
this stability in actions during its stay at s0 , as shown in Table 8.18. Also, Scenario 3
of Game 2 has the conflict reaching state s2 by both players taking their cooperative
improvement move out from s0 .
3) Sensitivity Analysis and What-if Models:
Sensitivity analysis within the context of conflict analysis is achieved by tweaking, or
modifying, the established base model of the conflict, and checking if such tweaks/
modifications lead to different results than the ones produced by the base model
analysis. In the Elmira conflict analysis provided in this chapter, we used what we
called different versions, configurations or what-if games, with Game 1 representing
the base model of the conflict and the rest (Game 1 (s6 replacing s5), Game 2, and
Game 2 (s6 replacing s5)) representing various variations of the base model.
An analyst, whether working for MoE, UR or independently, will not be initially
sure about certain aspects of the players: how they prioritize their goals, whether
certain alternatives are considered real/serious options for their respective players,
and so on. In our case, and as analysts modelling the Elmira conflict, we were not
sure about: 1) whether the economic crisis of the early 90’s will make MoE give
more importance to the goals of the Ontario government dealing with the recession
and the downturn that resulted from it, more so than its own goals, rules and
integrity of its orders; 2) whether the short-terms operational and financial needs
of UR will have more importance to it than its long-term goals; and 3) do UR
has a real option to abandon the Elmira site after the environmental disaster was
uncovered?
To deal with the uncertainties around (1) and (2), we decide to build Game
2 as a second what-if model for the conflict, as opposed to what we considered
the base model of the conflict, Game 1. In Game 1, both UR and MoE treat all
their strategic goals similarly, with all fully important. In Game 2, MoE treats
Ontario government needs as more important than its own, at the same time that
UR treats its short-term goals more important than its long-term ones. For an
illustrative case study, as ours, we think these two variations are sufficient enough.
In reality, an analyst will try at least to check more variations, such as while MoE
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differentiate between its needs and the needs of the government as a whole, UR has
its short-term goals to be as important as the long-term ones.
In addition, to deal with the uncertainty around (3), whether UR has a real
option to abandon the Elmira site, we added a new alternative A
UR 6
for UR to
abandon the site and move its operation somewhere else with less impact on its
bottom line and production needs in the short term. This new alternative A
UR 6




UR is expected to suffer in the short
term because it cannot move the operation elsewhere. If it abandons Elmira, it
needs to build a production facility somewhere, therefore it will suffer financially
and operationally in the short term. Recovery is uncertain and will be very slow,
as opposed to UR taking A
UR 6
, if and only if A
UR 6
actually exist as a real option for





Elmira-site option, as analysts we decided to consider variations for our both Game




. Recall that states of the
conflict are shaped by the alternatives the players have in the conflict. Therefore,
the states that Game 1 and Game 2 have will be different than the ones that the
new variations for them will include. Hence, the names of these two additional
variations for the conflict: Game 1(s6 replacing s5) and Game 2 (s6 replacing s5).
After the analyst establishes his base model and all its what-if variations, then
he will analyze all of these models as we did. But, he cannot stay still waiting for
the conflict to end to know which model variation of the conflict that the conflict
resembles the best in reality. A good practice, by a good analyst, is monitor the
conflict closely as it unfolds for signs to see which model variation the conflict is
going towards, before the conflict ends. At the same time, this monitoring activity
might uncover new options, new players, new goals, new constraints, and so on. In
such case, the analyst must move into action establishing new models, or what-if
variations, to test the implication of the newly uncovered facts about the conflict
by conducting thorough analysis of these new models.
In our case study, and if we were analysts modelling the conflict at the status
quo state, i.e. during January, 1990, then we would analyze the four variation of
the conflict we identified, exactly as we did in the previous subsection. But, as the
conflict unfolds, we would look for the following:
• Signs for A
UR 6
as a areal option to UR: The existence of this option as a
real and possible option that UR is seriously considering will shift the Elmira
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conflict from being either Game 1 or Game 2 conflict, to more of Game 1
(s6 replacing s5) or Game 2 (s6 replacing s5) conflict. It is important to note
here that if UR signals through staged PR campaigns, or by any other means,
that it is considering the A
UR 6
option seriously, but shown signs of relative
stability at s0 and not moving fast to adopt AUR 6 then this puts the conflict
back as Game 1 or Game 2 (Table 8.17 shows clearly that the existence of
A
UR 6
through state s6 is always accompanied by having state s0 to be unstable
for UR).
• Signs of stability exhibited by the players at the status quo state s0: A stability
that the players is showing at s0 beyond the few months range, especially if
accompanied by MoE not showing signs to back down (knowing that it should
in order for the conflict to end), this shows a leaning toward Game 2 or Game
2 (s6 replacing s5) more so than Game 1 and Game 1 (s6 replacing s5), as
shown clearly in Table 8.17.
As analysts modelled and analyzed the four versions of the Elmira conflict during
january 1990, and looking for these signs, we would have notice the following:
• No strong signs for A
UR 6
as a areal option to UR : Although UR threatened
to leave the site during its early communications with MoE official (Cameron,
1995), these threats never materialized. In fact, UR did not show that it is
seriously considering this option. No media reports of UR moving, even par-
tially, some of its production needs to a different plant somewhere else. Not
to mention, the second test of UR behaviour that will lead us to determine
if A
UR 6
really exists: how much stability UR is exhibiting towards s0 . Any
observer monitoring the situation at the time will be amazed by the effort UR
is showing to stay at s0 : employing all available legal means to delay imple-
menting MoE’s control order; questioning test procedures and the acceptable
levels of DMNA; lobbying the locals at the city; lobbying the business bodies;
questioning environmental reports; overloading the appeal procedures with
discussions and requested related to details and procedures; and so on. At
the same time, no serious effort to shift operation elsewhere. This makes the
conflict, based on our analysis, to be a Game 1 or Game 2, eliminating the
possibility of the conflict being a Game 1 with s6 replacing s5 or Game 2 with
s6 replacing s5 .
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• Signs of stability exhibited by the players at the status quo state s0: We talked
above about the stability that UR showed in staying at state s0 . But, MoE
too demonstrated stability staying at s0 . The hesitation of MoE to negotiate
a deal with UR, and instead the demonstrated on-going effort by MoE at the
time to be bogged down with what seemed endless requests to enhance and
clarify its procedures and policies. Not to mention, the lobbying effort MoE
was doing among the locals and environmental groups in an effort to distract
the public from its lack of ability to reach a resolution with UR, start the
clean-up, or take decisions. To be fair to MoE, it was in a very tough situation,
any decision it will take will be heavily criticized. Environmental friendly
policies and decisions are always criticized by economists and businesses, this
is more so at tough economical periods, and vice versa. Nevertheless, MoE, by
feeling stable at s0 and not consider it an unstable state, defined the conflict
as a Game 2 or its variant Game 2 with s6 replacing s5 .
From above, an analyst, with few months passed in the conflict and way before
MoE reached an agreement, could justifiably say that the conflict is going the Game
2 model way. If he is working for MoE, he might prepare his employer that the
conflict has two absolute equilibrium states: s4 and s2 . Both of which are not in
favour of MoE. Therefore, MoE must work to achieve the better of both, i.e. s2 , and
try to use the time in enhancing the the agreement terms and make the clean up
effort start early. If the analyst is working for UR instead, then he might suggest
that UR continue the delay tactics. This is if we put aside the ethical obligations
that UR should feel regarding the environmental disaster they caused. Something
we are personally and completely against, but for the sake of the argument we
assume UR would do (focus rather on purely business side of things) –which in
fact what UR unfortunately demonstrated in reality and historically speaking with
their handling of the conflict–. By continuing the employment of all possible delay
tactics, UR guarantees to put more pressure on MoE to come to an agreement that
will satisfy all UR demands, or lift the control order completely. MoE cannot afford
to delay the clean up effort indefinitely.
The Elmira conflict analysis, we provided in this chapter, clearly shows the
lose-lose position governments, environmentalists and affected local citizens, are
doomed to face when an environmental disaster occurs because of the ill-practices
and irresponsibility committed by an international company operating within their
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territory. Absent any clear international laws to force them do the clean up imme-
diately and be responsible themselves, their holding/owning companies, and their
subsidiaries everywhere in the world for these such disasters, the world will con-
tinue to see case after case of polluters get away with what they cause, either by
getting what they want (favourable terms subsidized by tax-payers money), or by
them leaving the affected place and operating in a new place as if nothing had
happened. Example after example show that this what happens in the absence of
international laws and policies to deal with such matters. From the UR caused
disaster at Elmira Ontario in 1989, to the Union Carbide caused disaster at Bhopal
India in 1984, to the disasters caused by oil companies in Nigeria. Compare this
to what happened recently to the environmental disaster caused by Shell in the
Gulf of Mexico in which the US, motivated by the politics of the time –just before
mid-election time– and by its economical influence around the world, forced Shell
to immediately move into action committing itself to start its clean up efforts and
try everything possible to solve the problem.
4) Comparing our Model and Analysis with Others’ Work:
We will look at how our model and analysis of the Elmira conflict compares to the
models and analysis of Kilgour et al. (2001). Kilgour et al. used the Graph Model
for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), introduced in Fang (1989) and in Fang et al.
(1993), to model and analyze the conflict. GMCR provides normative models that
is based on an ordinal representation of the players’ preferences over the states of
the conflict, not a cardinal one. GMCR is based on solid mathematical grounds and
provides many analytical tools, building on the work of Howard (1971) and the work
of Fraser and Hipel (1984), adding a graphical representation to the players moves,
but suffers from some of the many weaknesses typical game theory methodologies
suffer from (see our discussion in Chapter 2).
First, the work provides no means to model the mapping between the prefer-
ences, and their ordering, and the strategic objectives the players have within the
context of the conflict, or in general. For example, the model of Elmira conflict
presented in Kilgour et al. (2001) does not show or explain why the the players’
preferences are the way given in the model, and what should change, in terms of
players’ goals/priorities or realities on the ground, to make the preferences have
different order. Comparatively, in our models we show the direct link between the
players goals and the conflict realities to how the players’ preferences are modelled,
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or elicited as should be noted. In fact, any change to the players’ goals, priorities,
internal or external constraints/realities will be reflected on how these preferences
get ordered. The analyst can immediately test why a state is more/less preferred
than another for a certain player, and what should be done to reverse this order
or change it. In our models, we showed how changes in the strategic goals of UR
and MoE changed the preferences of both, and leading to a complete set of what-if
games to test.
Second, the ordinal representation of the players’ preferences does not show
any degrees of preference’s strength beside the simple binary relations the ordering
is based on: indifferent ∼ relation and the preferred-to  relation. The work
of Hamouda et al. (2004) tried to rectify this weakness by proposing degrees of
preference added to mainly the the preferred-to  relation, offering relations such as
 to show much-preferred status. Still, all these relations do not show “why” the
degree of preference existed in the first place, and how it will affect the satisfaction
of the player’s strategic goals. The relations presented in Kilgour et al. (2001),
similar to the ones presented by Fraser and Hipel (1984) and the modified ones in
Hamouda et al. (2004), are all based on strict logic: yes or no, applies or does not
apply. On the other hand, our models provide a one complete preferred-to relation
that: 1) has a fuzzy qualifier to show the degree of strength for the preference, in
addition to the preference order; and 2) offers traceability of the preference order
and degree of strength back to the player’s strategic goals and realities, answering
why and how the preference came to be the one elicited. In our models, the analysis
does not take the player word or the analyst word, or more accurately their guesses
as a justification for the preferences order and strength. The justification, and
validation, process is embedded within the way the preferences are elicited and
represented.
For example, in the Elmira conflict’s model presented by Kilgour et al. (2001),
UR is shown to prefer the state in which UR employes delay tactics (state 1 in
their model, and state s0 in our model) more than the MoE-Modify-Order-and-
UR-Accept state (state 4 in their model, and state s2 or s3 in our model, based on
whether the modifications made by MoE to the control oder satisfy UR demanded
modification fully or partially, respectively). A very strange assumption to make.
As typically done in the game theory literature, and similar theories literature,
Kilgour et al. (2001) dos not mention any reasons for this preferences order, nor
any justification for such assumption. In reality, delay tactics are employed for a
reason, are temporarily in nature, and cannot be assumed to form an indefinite
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solution. So, can one assume the preference of the delay state over reaching-a-
modified-control-order state to be a logical one? and if it is logical, under what
context? The model does not answer any. As a second example, the model given by
Kilgour et al. (2001) shows UR preferring the Abandon-Elmira-site state (state 9
in their model, and state s5 or s6 in our model, based on the version of the conflict
and the ability of UR to find an alternative facility elsewhere to carry the burden of
covering for the Elmira production) to the state in which UR accepts MoE original
control order. Same questions apply here: is this logical for a business? under what
context? why? for what reason?
On the other hand, one can immediately answer why UR has the modified-
agreements states (both modified-fully and modified-partially states) to be preferred
to the delay state; and why UR in some version what-if models of the conflict has
the Abandon-Elmira-site state is preferred or less-preferred than accepting MoE’s
original order with no modification. The preferences elicitation tables (shown in
Figure 8.3 for all versions/games of the conflict we analyzed) present how each state
of the conflict contribute to the achievement of each of the players’ strategic goals.
Hence, the preferences are fully justified by: how much each state help the player
achieve his goals. Not only this, our models go further to show the strength of
such preferences, by calculating the weighted preferences, ordinal preferences, and
preferences with linguistic fuzzy qualifiers (as given in Figure 8.3 and Tables 8.5 -
8.8 for all versions of the conflict we studied). So, even the strengths given to the
preferences are justified. Now, the analyst, and the analysis-sponsoring decision
makers, will know exactly why the models, and the analysis based on them, are the
way they are presented. No hidden, unexplained, or unjustified assumptions exist.
Once, the analysts notice any deviation on the behaviour of one player, or more,
from what is given in the models, then he can just build a what-if or a variation
model to test the implications of such deviation on the analysis end results.
Third, because of the way GMCR used by Kilgour et al. (2001) defines the
State concept and the UI move concept, some of the states and UIs presented in
their model of the Elmira conflict are not realistic or feasible. For example, the
model presents and includes in its stability analysis two states in which the MoE
modifies the control order, while UR does not accept the modifications but rather
employs delay tactics. A highly unlikely state of such conflict. What these two
states describe is an extreme form of failure in logic and rationality by MoE, if such
states happen. MoE loses the credibility of its control order for no gains at all from
the other side. In reality, opponents enter a negotiating step. By the end of this
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step, they either have a binding agreement, or they don’t. MoE would not modify
its order and then wait for UR to accept or not.
Forth, Kilgour et al. (2001) fails to recognize the concept of cooperative moves,
which we explained earlier in this chapter. That’s why their model and stability
analysis failed to predict that the agreement between MoE and UR forms an end of
the conflict. In their paper, they proposed an addition to the GMCR framework to
correct this err in prediction. The paper proposed coalition analysis as a solution.
The paper suggested that MoE and UR formed a coalition, allowing them to jump
from one step to another in a multi-step sequence of moves to reach a favourable
state by all parties. The problem with this approach is two folds:
1. the concept of a coalition or an alliance cannot describe in any form or shape a
relationship between a governmental agency, who’s responsibility is to enforce
the laws, and a private enterprise company, who ignored the laws and created
an environmental disaster. The idea that MoE and UR formed a coalition,
against the local governments, will be troubling to rationalize for the players,
the people of Ontario, or even general observers and analysts.
2. the concept of a multi-step moves by a coalition is offered to handle a short-
coming of the GMCR’s framework: the inability to recognize players cooper-
ating in a single move. Cooperative moves are moves that players take jointly
to advance their position in the conflict to a more preferred state for all. A
natural concept that is implemented all the time in real-life conflicts. For
example, the MoE and UR move to negotiate an agreement and reach one is
a joint cooperative move that none of the players can do on their own.
At the heart of this GMCR’s shortcoming is the fact that the framework defines:
states as binary numbers with 1’s and 0s’ representing players selecting or not
selecting, respectively, strategies form the conflict’s set of players’ alternatives; and
player’s moves are individual moves between states with the player’s alternatives-
selection bits are changing from 1’s to 0’s or vice versa. GMCR, as defined by
Fang (1989) and in Fang et al. (1993), still loyal to its origins as a framework build
on the work of Fraser and Hipel (1984), which we mentioned when we compared
their Cuban Crisis model and analysis with ours in Chapter 6. We said then
that Fraser and Hipel (1984), and similarly GMCR, have a problematic UI moves
representation in their models. Such problem is shown in their models because the
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conceptual modelling foundation of the Fraser and Hipel (1984), and GMCR by
extension, is putting mathematical representation in the driving seat. A UI move,
to them, happens when all the bits, of the states’ binary numbers, for one player is
changing from less preferred state to a preferred state, while the bits of the other
player are not changed.
While GMCR tried to add the directed graph representation to solve some
of the problems that the work of Fraser and Hipel (1984) suffered from. Still,
the representation is less concerned with the validity of such move, or the ability
of the player to take it in real-life. So, when it comes to cooperative moves, the
framework was/is not capable of representing such moves unless through coalition’s
multi-step moves, even though the concept of coalition could not describe/explain
the relationship among the involved parties, such as the case of the MoE and UR in
the Elmira conflict. Not to mention, the fact that some of these expressed as multi-
step moves by Kilgour et al. (2001), such as MoE and UR reaching an agreement,
could not realistically be called multi-step moves.
In our conceptual modelling framework, we do not have such problems. The
analyst in our case is in the driving seat. He will, and should, examine the validity of
each move. In our models, and consistent with a realistic view of how things happen
in real-life, a UI move is a real unilateral move the player can take to enhance his
position, and a CI move is a joint cooperative move that a number of players take
at the same time to enhance the position of each one of them in the conflict. A
CI move cannot be reached by the individual players on their own. They must
cooperate to do so. The automated DSS system implementing our framework, as
a knowledge modelling and management framework, demands justification of the
beliefs held by the analyst about the ability of the players to make all types of
moves (UMs, UIs, CMs and CIs). It cannot sacrifice validity in favour of ease of
automation and reliance on binary value flipping as a justification.
Fifth, in the Elmira conflict model provided by Kilgour et al. (2001), the model
shows three players: MoE, UR and the Local Government (LG, a collective player
representing the Township of Woolwich and the Regional Municipality of Waterloo).
By the end of their analysis for the conflict, Kilgour et al. (2001) showed no effect
at all to including LG as a player. In fact, the end result of the conflict historically
showed that the conflict was between MoE and UR and ended with an agreement
between MoE and UR.
This failure in recognizing the real players in the conflict could have been avoided
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by building a GCM model for each of these proposed players. We actually built
GCM model for LG, and immediately realized that all LG can have as goals, or do
as options are wishful thinking. LG’s GCM model could not affect the GCM’s of
neither MoE nor UR. The only interaction that LG’s GCM model has with other
players’ GCMs is to represent: the other players try to get LG’s support for their
positions, for public relations reasons, and nothing more. The conflict between
MoE and UR is: at the provincial level; and it is a legal and policy conflict. So, we
eliminated LG from the conflict model we presented, and our prediction matched
the real historical flow of events happened on the ground. The local governments
did not have any effect on the resolution of the conflict. The analysts could test the
viability of including or excluding any player in a conflict model, through the use
of what-if variant models to the base model. They will be able to identify a real
player in the conflict from the players who have no influence in the conflict and its
outcomes at the GCM modelling phase of the process.
Finally, in our opinion, the Elmira conflict’s GMCR model and analysis pro-
vided by Kilgour et al. (2001) failed to provide any context of the conflict: the fact
that the conflict happened at the late 80s and early 90s where recession and eco-
nomical hardships described the situation for both the government of Ontario and
Ontario’s citizens at the time. The conflict’s model of Kilgour et al. (2001) did not
capture this context, nor it did show the effect of such reality on the players’ prefer-
ences. In addition, when Kilgour et al. (2001) suggested that there was a coalition
forming between MoE and UR as a justification to explain why the GMCR failed
to predict the agreement between both players as an end state to the conflict (and
as a result proposed a coalition analysis add-on), one should stop and wonder: How
can the government of Ontario ally itself with an Environmental-Disaster-Creator
such as UR? And how the proposed conflict’s model could rationalize the fact that
the Ontario Government at the time, and the one who sighed the final agreement
with UR, is an Ontario New Democratic Party (ONDP) Government, the most
environmentally friendly political party that Ontario had at the time and the only
ONDP government Ontario had, so far.
While the models presented by Kilgour et al. (2001) fails to answer these two
questions, our framework, and the Elmira conflict’s models and analysis we pro-
vided, presented the answer: the economical hardship at the time forced the govern-
ment to put saving jobs at the head of its agenda. Keeping businesses in Ontario,
and showing that ONDP is also a business friendly party, was second. An agenda,
in addition to many other reasons, may have contributed to the big failure the party
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faced in gaining the people’s trust and votes in the following election.
In summary, when we compare the work of Kilgour et al. (2001) to our work
presented in this chapter, we used how Kilgour et al. modelled the Elmira conflict
as an example to illustrate the differences. While both works rely on mathemat-
ical and logical modelling and analysis schemes, they differ in many areas. The
work of Kilgour et al. (2001), as most of the game theory methodologies in the
literature, does not model the decision makers’ goals and realities, and therefore do
not provide direct mapping between how the preferences over the conflict’s states
happen to be modelled and how these states satisfy the strategic needs and wants
of the players, or get affected by the realities on the ground. This important fea-
ture is at the heart of what we believe should be the starting point of modelling
strategic conflicts. Dealing with strategic goals’ satisfaction through proxies such
as stated preferences order or deceiving subjective utilities, while makes the math-
ematical presentation looks simpler and nicer, violates the principal of rationality
employed by the normative decision analysis literature: choosing the best option
that satisfies/satisfices the goals of the decision maker.
We also differ in the way how states, players moves, as well as preferences
relations and structures, defined and presented. And in relation to the type of
games this chapter is concerned about, Cooperative Games without Coalitions,
GMCR which Kilgour et al. (2001) uses and adds on, does not accommodate the
concept of cooperative moves made jointly by players who cannot take the moves
on their own without cooperation. A concept, we illustrated in the case study of the
Elmira conflict the usefulness and practicality of it in modelling real-life conflicts.
We also discussed how the models and analysis we provided in this chapter resulted
on more insights about the conflict’s dynamics and better analysis of the players’
options. In addition, how these models represented not only the players, their goals,
their options, but also the context of the conflict at the time whether through the
use of the concept of constraints, or by including the “right” strategic goals the
players have at the time, similar to what we did in the Elmira conflict’s models.
8.6 Summary
The chapter discussed the analysis of cooperative multi-agent games, as per the
Constrained rationality framework. It started by defining the type of moves the
players of cooperative games, without coalitions, are allowed to make. Then, the
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chapter provided definitions for the four different stability and equilibrium solution
concepts, which were defined for the non-cooperative games in Chapter 6, but here
for cooperative games. These concepts guide the stability analysis of each of the
games’ states, for each of the players in these games. The chapter, then, defined
the strength of the stability under such solution concepts, and proposed a set of
algorithms to help identify the strength level of each of these stabilities.
The chapter finished with a case study in which the concepts and methods
proposed in this chapter are applied. In the case study, we analyzed thoroughly the
Elmira Groundwater Contamination Conflict, a 1989 environmental policy conflict
between the provincial government of Ontario and Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. We
started by giving a brief background on the conflict and the players. We, then,
modelled the players goals, constraints and alternatives; analyzed their GCMs;
identified the conflict’s states; elicited the players’ cardinal and ordinal preferences
over these states; and then identified the players unilateral moves among these
states. Next, the stabilities of the conflict’s states were analyzed under the four
stability solution concepts, and the strength of these stabilities were identified.
We looked at the equilibrium states for the conflict; and how the conflict could
have evolved over time under different scenarios. We concluded the case study by
showing how our analysis results compares to what historically happened in the
conflict, and to what others offered as models and analysis to the conflict, after the
fact.
The following chapter takes the same concepts and methods (moves, stabil-
ity solution concepts, strength of stability under these concepts, etc.) defined in
this chapter for cooperative games with no coalitions, redefines these concepts and
methods and extend them to fit with the characteristics of cooperative games with
coalitions and their analysis needs.
374
Chapter 9
Coalitions Analysis and Stability
Solution Concepts for Cooperative
Strategic Conflicts
9.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the analysis of cooperative multi-agent games with coalitions,
i.e. cooperative games in their broadest configuration possible. The decision makers
of this type of games are able to make move types that are not limited to the
unilateral non-cooperative moves and the cooperative one-step moves, which players
of normal cooperative games discussed in Chapter 8 can perform. Decision makers
of cooperative games with coalitions are also allowed to have multi-step coalition
moves. A coalition move can be: a one-step unilateral move by one member of the
coalition, a one-step cooperative move by a subset of the coalition members, or a
number of these unilateral and cooperative moves performed consecutively forming
a multi-step cooperative move.
The decision makers in these games can stay independent players, or join any of
the coalitions available in the game. Therefore, they can act individually and move
unilaterally among the games’ states; or cooperate with other individual and/or
coalitions moving from one state to another, if this one-step move is beneficial for the
cooperating decision makers. They also can join coalitions in which they will have
much flexibility in their moves. Coalitions have aligned objectives and powers, and
therefore can have sophisticated multi-step moves in an effort to advance forward
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the coalition members collectively toward a more preferred states, or to sanction
UIs of others who are not part of the coalition. These multi-step coalition moves
are unique to the games discussed in this chapter: the cooperative games with
coalitions.
We will start by looking at the type of moves the players of the cooperative
games, with coalitions, are allowed to make, and are important to the stability
analysis concepts. Then, we will define, for these games, the same four different
stability and equilibrium solution concepts which we defined for the non-cooperative
games in Chapter 6 and for the cooperative-without-coalitions games in Chapter
8. These concepts will guide the stability analysis of each of the games’ states, for
each of the games’ players. Next, we will define the strength of the stability under
such solution concepts, and propose a set of algorithms to help identify the strength
level of each of these stabilities.
We will finish the chapter with a case study in which we apply the concepts
and methods proposed in this chapter. In the case study, we analyze thoroughly a
strategic business conflict over intellectual property rights. The case will examine
whether it is worth fighting a patent troll. We use the showdown between Research
and Motion, the prosperous wireless email technology and product innovator, and
NTP to help us answer this question. We start by giving a brief background on
the conflict and the players. We, then, model the players goals, constraints and
alternatives; analyze their GCMs; identify the conflict’s states; elicit the players’
cardinal and ordinal preferences over these states; and then identify the players
unilateral moves among these states. We also examine the possible coalitions that
could be formed in the game. The stabilities of the conflict’s states will be analyzed
under the four stability solution concepts, and the strength of these stabilities will
be identified. We will look at the equilibrium states for the conflict; and how the
conflict could have evolved over time under different scenarios. We will analyze the
effect of the coalition formations on the conflict, its stabilities, and its equilibrium
states. We conclude the case study by showing how our analysis results compares
to what historically happened in the conflict.
In terms of the notation used in this chapter it will be the same as the one
used in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8, included here as a reminder. Let the set of
all the game states be given as S = {s1 , s2 , . . . , sm}, where |S| = m the total
number of states in the game, and states are defined as discussed earlier. And
let S a,b,...
D, t
⊆ S where S a,b,...
D, t
represents a subset of S’s states which has common
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characteristics described in the subset’s notation as a, b, . . . as been perceived by
decision maker D and at time t. The set of decision makers in the game is given
as DM = {DM1, DM2, . . . , DMn}, where |DM| = n the total number of decision
makers, the involved agents/players, in the game.
Also as a reminder, we use the terms game and conflict interchangeably to mean
the same thing: a multi-agent strategic conflict. Also, the terms agent, player
and decision maker will be used interchangeably to mean the same thing: an au-
tonomous independent agent, in the strategic conflict, who is capable of perceiving
the world around, holding beliefs, justifying beliefs, holding knowledge, represent-
ing knowledge, extracting new knowledge, reasoning about held knowledge, and
acting independently.
9.2 Coalition and Coalition’s Preferences
As explained in Chapter 8, the decision makers within the context of cooperative
games, without coalitions, are all considered individual players of the games. They
pursue their own individual interests in the games, and look only after themselves.
The only difference between a decision maker within a cooperative games, without
coalitions, and a player of non-cooperative games (discussed in Chapter 6) is that
the former has the ability to cooperate with other players in moving from one state
of the game to another in one step. The motivation for this single-step coopera-
tive moves could be the fact that the moves’ destination state is more preferred
to them than the start state; or that their desire to hurt some other player of the
game is more important to them collectively to the point they are willing to hurt
themselves (move to a less preferred state –for them or for some of them–) to accom-
plish this. Examples of such cooperative moves could include entering negotiation,
signing an agreement, entering war together against an enemy, breaking a signed
agreement, breaking an established partnership, signing an intellectual property
licensing agreement or cancelling one.
In cooperative games, with coalitions, those individual players are still consid-
ered as players here too. They are allowed to take individual unilateral moves, as
well as cooperative moves. Their motivations are also the same in these games
as the ones they have in non-cooperative games and cooperative games, without
coalitions. They could cooperate here too for the purpose of benefit themselves
by advancing to a more preferred state together. Their purpose for cooperation
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in single-step moves could also be to hurt some other player regardless of whether
these moves will benefit them or hurt them.
But, in cooperative games, with coalitions, a new type of decision makers is
considered legitimate. In these games, players could joint together and setup a
coalition or an alliance. This gives the coalition players collectively the power to
coordinate a multi-step moves for the benefit of the coalition and its members, or
to hurt other non-coalition members. We define here what a coalition is, and how
the coalition preferences over the game’s state will be calculated. Before doing so,
and as a reminder, one should note that the Constrained Rationality’s definition
of a coalition and that of the coalition’s preferences are different from that of the
GMCR framework’s ones (proposed by Kilgour et al. (2001) and Inohara and Hipel
(2008b,a)).
9.2.1 What is a Coalition?
Definition 9.2.1 (Coalition): A Group of Decision Makers DMC⊆DM, at time
t of the game, is considered a Coalition iff DMC is an official coalition/alliance,
a known unofficial coalition/alliance among group of decision makers, or a subset
of the game’s decision makers DM who their intent to move from one state of
the game to another or more (could be because this will be benefit all or the ma-
jority of DMC’s members or for other reason may fit DMC collectively) is made
known/declared (by means of an agreement, voting, etc.) or believed to be true
(with justification).
This definition of a coalition considers permanent long time alliance a coalition,
and as well it considers a temporarily established coalition of decision makers a
coalition. It also considers a well known highly publicized alliance to be a coalition.
And at the same time, it considers a believed-to-be-true but-never-been-declared
coalition among some decision makers to be a coalition as long as their is a justi-
fication for this belief by the knowledge holder, the modeller or the focal decision
maker whom the modeller is capturing his viewpoint of the world. This demand for
a justification is to be consistent with how knowledge is defined within ViVD-EKM
(Al-Shawa, 2006b) and to ensure that “why” the viewpoint holder believed this
coalition existed is captured in the knowledge-base.
As we will see in the next section, a coalition of decision makers has the ability
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to commit a multi-step moves which none of the decision makers can do on his own,
or cooperate with others to do if they are not part of a coalition.
9.2.2 Coalition’s Preferences over Game’s States
In Section 5.4.2, of Chapter 5, we discussed how an individual decision maker’s
ordinal and cardinal/weighted preferences over the game’s states is elicited and
modelled. So, how the preferences of a coalition made up of a group of decision
makers, each with his/her own preferences, are calculated? The answer to this
question is: it depends.
Ideally, a coalition is established among a group of decision makers that have
aligned strategic goals in the game. As a result, the preferences should match. But,
we all know that this type of a coalition does not exist in real-life. And even among
close partners, strategic goals never found to be fully aligned or matches. Therefore,
traditionally coalitions, alliances, parties, and similar groups setup mechanisms by
which the “best-alternative-for-all”, or the all-agreed-upon-ranking for all alterna-
tives, is defined within its charters or articles of incorporation. Definitely, as in the
case of individual decision makers, a coalition’s preferences over the game’s states
is decided by how they rank their alternatives. As we saw earlier, a game’s states
are made from the alternatives all the game’s players have.
Mechanisms such voting is very popular within such bodies to choose alterna-
tives, or rank them. But as we know, voting is not by all means the one and only,
or the at-most fair mechanism. The rules used in voting to declare the “best” (such
as the majority rule), or treating different players within the coalition differently
(because of their size, market share, the time they joined the coalition, their in-
vestment in the coalition, etc.) could cause unfairness in the process of choosing
alternatives. For example, in standards alliances within the telecommunication
technologies domain, big players have a bigger say on what the alliance decides to
be “the standard”. Smaller players, or startup companies, are at a disadvantage.
So, the alliance choice is not necessarily “the best” choice for all.
But, regardless of the fairness of the mechanism which the coalition adopts to
decide on what is the “best alternative” for the coalition, or to decide on the ranking
for the alternative that the coalition have collectively, the most important thing for
the coalition members is that: there is a mechanism for the coalition to decide,
collectively, on their choices. And as for modellers and analysts of the coalition in a
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game, they now have a way to know how the alternatives contribute to the coalition
objectives, or how the alternatives been ranked for the coalition. Therefore, the
modellers and analysts have a method for this coalition, and almost every coalition,
to elicit the coalition’s preferences over the game’s state.
In our notation, when we say that s1 
Big
DMi,t
s, we know that this means that
PrefStrength(s1, s,DMi, t) =Big. Similarly, if s1 ∈ S
≥N
DMi,t
(s), then we know that
PrefStrength(s1 , s,DMi, t)≥None. This is easy because DMi is a single decision











(s) could mean that state s1 is preferred over state s, with strength
level greater than or equal to the None strength level, for every decision maker




this is a very simplistic assumption, because we said coalitions tend to have sophis-
ticated mechanisms by which they decide their preferences over alternatives and by
extension over states.
Consider for example an alliance DMA with two classes/groups of members, the
first class DMA1 has the elite big-in-size founding members, and the second class
DMA2 has all other smaller players who joined after the alliance was established. Let
us assume that the elite members have the voting powers and that all must have the
same preference, order and strength level, for any state the alliance is considering











true. What about the fact that DMA2 does not prefer s1 over s? DMA2 has no say.
It is only DMA1 who has the power to decide on the preferences, as per the alliance
setup.
In the absence of having one universal way that coalitions have to decide on




then ∀DMi ∈ DMC s1 ∈ S
≥N
DMi,t




means that ∀DMi ∈ DMC PrefStrength(s1, s,DMi, t) =Big. In other words, all
members of the coalition must agree on the preference, its order, and its strength.
This should not be considered in any way as a restriction on the framework, but
rather a convenient simple way to refer to coalition’s preferences. In reality, the
modeller should take note of how the coalition actually decides on its preferences,
capture it in an algorithm, and then use it in the stability definitions which are
proposed in this chapter.
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For the most part of this chapter, we will use the generic notation S a,b,...
DMC, t
to
represents a subset of S’s states which has common characteristics described in
the subset’s notation as a, b, . . . as been perceived “collectively” by the coalition
DMC and at time t. The modeller/analyst job is to ensure that the “collectively”
part is qualified to be true by applying the algorithm/mechanism/method that the
coalition actually uses to agree on these common characteristics and ensure that it
reflects the coalition’s true state of affairs .
9.3 Types of Decision Makers’ Moves
Decision makers in cooperative games, with coalitions, can have either individual
unilateral moves, cooperative one-step moves, or coalition multi-step complex moves
made of a combination of unilateral and/or one-step cooperative moves. First, we
define the unilateral moves individual players can have. These moves are similar
to the ones individual players use in non-cooperative games. Second, we define
cooperative one-step moves which a group of decision makers can have. These
moves are similar to the ones that group of players can have in cooperative, without
coalitions, games. Then, we define a special type of moves only coalitions can make:
multi-step cooperative moves. Lastly, we define the type of sanction moves that
players (as individuals, groups or coalitions) can make to block certain other players,
or groups/coalitions of players, from benefiting from any unilateral or cooperative
improvement moves they have. Understanding these types of players’ moves is
essential to define the stability solution concepts which will be used to analyze the
stability of cooperative games’ states for the games’ individual players, as well as
its coalitions.
As a reminder, we discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1, and in Chapter 6,
Section 6.2.1, that we followed the steps of Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al.
(1993) in their definitions for UI, UM and SM moves for individual agents. But, we
defined all these type of moves to be within the context, terminology and notation
of the Constrained Rationality framework. These individual agent’s moves are
the same as the ones we defined in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative games, and in
Chapter 8 for cooperative games without coalitions, included here for completeness
and coherence of addressing the needs of modelling and analysis of cooperative
games, with coalitions, in this chapter.
It is also worth including a reminder here that the cooperative moves and coali-
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tion moves, defined in this chapter for cooperative games with coalitions, are dif-
ferent from the cooperative moves defined by Kilgour et al. (2001) and Inohara and
Hipel (2008b,a) for GMCR. We discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1, how these
GMCR’s cooperative moves, or coalition moves as been called in the cited work,
are limited in their scope and in their applications to real-life conflicts. We men-
tioned there how the Constrained Rationality provide broader, more advanced and
practical cooperative moves that reflect the needs of complex real-life multi-agent
conflicts. We also mentioned how the Constrained Rationality cooperative moves
differ from those defined for the GMCR; and how, in Constrained rationality, the
cooperation among agents within a conflict could happen between agents that are
not part of a coalition. Some of the Constrained Rationality’s cooperative moves
were discussed in Chapter 8, namely the single-step cooperative moves, and will be
mentioned in this chapter too. But, the Constrained Rationality’s multi-step group
cooperative moves are discussed in this chapter only. All types of the Constrained
Rationality’s cooperative moves are allowed within the context of cooperative games
with coalitions.
9.3.1 Types of Non-Cooperative Moves by Individual DMs
In this subsection, we define the following important types of movements that an
individual decision maker, alone and non-cooperatively, can make in the game.
Definition 9.3.1 (Unilateral Move (UM)): For Decision Maker DMi∈DM at
time t and state s∈S of the game: a move to state sum∈S is considered a Unilateral
Move (UM) for DMi at time t from state s, denoted as sum∈S
UM
DMi, t
(s), iff DMi can
move unilaterally from state s to state sum in one move, reaching sum at time t+1.
Definition 9.3.2 (Unilateral Improvement (UI)): For Decision Maker DMi∈
DM at time t and state s ∈ S of the game: a move to state sui ∈ S is consid-
























One important step of analyzing a game is to generate the the UIs that DMs will
have from each state of the game. Given a Game-Structure for a cooperative game,
382
with coalitions, that resembles the one proposed for the cooperative games, without
coalitions, and discussed in Chapter 8, we use Algorithm 6.1 to generate the UM
and UI sets for all DMs in the game. Notice that Algorithm 6.1 is the algorithm
proposed previously in Chapter 6 to be used for generating the UM and UI sets for
the players of non-cooperative games. The same algorithm is used for these two
different type of games, non-cooperative and cooperative-with-coalitions, because
UM and UI sets exist for individual players regardless of the players’ abilities to
have cooperative moves.
Now, let each game has a Game Configuration Structure, referred to it as a
Game-Structure in Chapter 6 and in Chapter 8. This data structure provides
essential initial information about the game and its players, all organized and in a
computerized DSS system is written in a file structure. As a reminder, a Game-
Structure will describe the game at a specific point of time t, as perceived and known
by the focal decision maker whom the game is modelled based on his knowledge of
it. Any updates or changes to what is known about the game by the focal decision
maker should initiate a generation of a new Game-Structure to reflect the changes;
and a new analysis of the updated game, treating the structure as a new game.
The Game-Structure for a cooperative game must have the same information
required for non-cooperative games, and listed in Section 6.2.1: the set of the game’s
states, S; the set of the game’s DMs, DM; SUM
DMi,t
(s) for each DM in the game; and
WP (s,DMi, t) for every DMi ∈ DM and for every s ∈ S. We said in Chapter 8 that
the Game-Structures for cooperative games, with no coalitions, differ from the one
for non-cooperative games in one aspect. A Game-Structure for cooperative games,
with coalitions, as the Game-Structure for cooperative games, without coalitions,
has additional information in its structure about the cooperative moves the players
have in such game, as we will see next when we discuss cooperative moves for
players. Something that non-cooperative games’ Game-Structures do not have.
9.3.2 Types of Cooperative Moves by Decision Makers Groups
There are two groups of cooperative moves available for DM groups in a cooperative
game, with coalitions. The first is the group that include all the simple one-step
cooperative moves that DMs, even the ones that do not belong to the same coalition,
can have. These cooperative moves are similar to the ones DMs of cooperative
games, without coalitions, can have. The second is the group that include the
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multi-step cooperative moves that only coalitions can make, and only available
within the context of cooperative games, with coalitions. Coalitions’ cooperative
moves could consist of a series of consecutive unilateral moves and/or one-step
cooperative moves. We will discuss here both groups.
9.3.2.1 Types of One-Step Cooperative Moves
There are two types of one-step movements that a group/coalition of decision mak-
ers, cooperatively, can mae in the game.
Definition 9.3.3 (Cooperative Move (CM)): For a Group of Decision Makers
DMg⊆DM, where |DMg| ≥ 2, at time t and at state s∈S of the game, the move
by DMg from s in one step to state scm∈S is considered a Cooperative Move (CM)
for DMg from s at time t, denoted as scm∈S
CM
DMg,t
(s) iff DMg cannot make the move
unless each and every member of DMg agrees to the move and cooperates by doing
what is necessary to reach the state scm, from the starting state s.
As per the definition, a Cooperative Move is a movement from one state of the
game to another that requires a group of decision makers (more than two) to make
the move. No single decision maker can do the move on his own. Similarly no
subset of a group of decision makers can do the move on their own, every single
decision maker in the group is needed to participate in the move to make it happen.
What differentiates a CM move from the coalition’s group move (C-GM), discussed
shortly, is that a CM move is a one-step move done by all the group members at
once from one state to another, and could not be made of a series of consecutive
moves.
Definition 9.3.4 (Cooperative Improvement (CI)): For a Group Decision
Makers DMg⊆DM at time t and at state s∈S of the game, the move by DMg from
s in one step to state sci∈S is considered a Cooperative Improvement (CI) for DMg
from s at time t, denoted as sci∈SCIDMg,t(s) iff 1) sci ∈ S
CM
DMg,t







>N , i.e. when PrefStrength(s
ci
, s,DMi, t)>None for
every DMi∈DMg.







One important step of analyzing a cooperative game, with coalitions, is to gen-
erate the CIs that DMs will have from each state of the game. The Game-Structure
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for a cooperative game, with coalition (same as cooperative games without coali-
tions), must include information about the CMs that all the DMs have in the game
from each of the game’s states. It must include SCM
DMi,t
(s), for every DMi ∈ DM and
for every s ∈ S, given as a set of graphs describing the CMs that DMs have from
each state the game has (one graph per DM in the game, with the game’s states
represented as the graph’s nodes and the CMs are represented as its arcs (each of
these arcs annotated with the names of the other cooperating players). Given a
Game-Structure, for a cooperative game, with coalitions, that has all this required
information, we use Algorithm 8.1 to generate the CM and CI sets for all DMs in
the game. This is the same algorithm we used in Chapter 8 for cooperative games,
without coalitions, to generate the CIs for their players. This is because groups of
decision makers in cooperative games, with or without coalitions, can have CM and
CI moves regardless of the fact that these groups are part of coalitions or not.
9.3.2.2 Types of Multi-Step Coalition Cooperative Moves
There are two types of multi-step movements that a coalition, or an alliance, of
decision makers cooperatively can make in the game.
Definition 9.3.5 (Coalition Group Movement (C-GM)): For a Group of De-
cision Makers DMG⊆DM, where |DMG| ≥ 2, at time t and at state s∈ S of the
game, the move by DMG from s in one step, or a series of consecutive moves, to
state scgm∈S is considered a Coalition Group Movement (C-GM) for DMG from s
at time t, denoted as scgm∈S
C−GM
DMG,t
(s) iff DMG is an official coalition, a known un-
official coalition among group of decision makers, or a subset of the game’s decision
makers DM who their intent to move from one state of the game to another (because
this will be benefit all or the majority of DMG’s members) is made known/declared
(by means of an agreement, voting, etc.) or believed to be true (with justification),
and:
[(DMG reaches scgm at time t+1) → ((∃ DMi∈DMG : scgm∈S
UM
DMi,t





[(DMG reaches scgmat time t+h) → (∀ stepwise move to state sk ∀ k : ((0 < k ≤










In other words, the move to scgm by DMG is considered a C-GM for the group,
if and only if the group is a legitimate group, or believed to be a legitimate group,
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of the game’s total set of decision makers, and: 1) if DMG reaches scgm in one
step, then there exists at least one of the group members (or a subset of the group
members) has the capacity to move the game unilaterally (or cooperatively, in the
case of a subset) at time t to scgm from the current state s and in one step, reaching
scgm at time t+1; or 2) if DMG reaches scgm in h consecutive steps, then for each
of these steps there exists at least one of the group members (or a subset of the
group members) has the capacity to move the game unilaterally (or cooperatively,
in the case of a subset) to the next step’s state in one step and in one increment
of the time, allowing the group to start from the current state s and ultimately,




Definition 9.3.6 (Coalition Group Improvement (C-GI)): For a Group De-
cision Makers DMG⊆DM at time t and at state s∈S of the game, the move by
DMG from s in one step, or a series of consecutive moves, to state scgi ∈S is con-












The second condition in the definition requires the destination state s
cgi
to be
preferred to the start state s for coalition DMG. Recall that we said judging the
preference over states of the game by a coalition requires knowledge about how the
coalition decides collectively on its preferences, and for simplicity and convenience
reasons we are opting for the use of the ideal case where all the coalition mem-
bers must have agreement on the preferences and their strength. In other words,
the second condition of the definition, and by using the ideal case, should read:






>N , i.e. when PrefStrength(s
cgi
, s,DMk, t)>
None for every DMk∈DMG. Also, we said earlier that, in reality and when using
such preference statements about a coalition, the modeller/analyst must qualify
the truthfulness of such statements by applying the actual method/algorithm the
coalition uses to decide on its collective preferences.







And, this is true for each coalition regardless of how the coalition decides on its
preferences, as long as it is consistent in how it decides on these preferences.
One important step of analyzing a cooperative game, with coalitions, is to gener-
ate the the G-CIs that each coalition of DMs will have from each state of the game.
Given a Game-Structure, for a cooperative game, with coalitions, that has all the
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required information listed earlier, we use Algorithm 9.1, and its additional routine
listed in Algorithm 9.2, to generate the G-CM and G-CI sets for all coalitions of
DMs in the game. The Game-Structure used by this algorithm does not require
any additional information beside what is required for Algorithms 8.1 and 6.1 com-
bined to generate the UMs, UIs, CMs and CIs for all the game’s DMs. Notice that
Algorithms 9.1 and 9.2 uses the ideal case in which the coalition members must
have full agreement of the preferences over the game’s states, and in the strengths
of these preferences.
Algorithm 9.1 Generating the C-GM and C-GI Sets for each Coalition in a Game
1: void Generate Coalition C-GM and C-GI Sets ( Game-Structure)
2: // Game-Structure file starts with empty C-GM and C-GI sets for each DMC Coalition.
3: // S, DM, the UM and UI sets for each DMi ∈ DMC , and the CM and CI sets for each
4: // DMg ⊆ DMC are given as part of the Game-Structure.
5: for all DMC ⊆ DM do
6: // Generate DMC ’s C-GM Sets (one for each of the game’s states), and for each state find
7: // DMC ’s C-GI Set. All these C-GM and C-GI sets will be initially empty. If not, empty
8: // them [not included here]. And, by the end, some of these C-GM/C-GI sets will be
9: // empty sets. Setup C-GM, and C-GI, Paths sets consist of ordered sets of different
10: // lengths, each in the form of (sa, sb, . . . , sn) representing a set of consecutive moves: from
11: // the start state to sa, from (sa to (sb, and so on.
12: for all s ∈ S do




15: path = “”
16: call Add C-GM Paths(s, path, DMC)
17: // Now, we have all DMC ’s C-GM paths, the simple one-step ones and the ones
















22: // moving to scgm from s is also considered a C-GI for DMC





















Algorithm 9.2 The “Add C-GM Paths” Routine used in Algorithm 9.1
1:
2: void Add C-GM Paths(s, List, DMC, DM, S)
3: for all DMi ∈ DMC do









(s) ∪ {(List + “s
um
,′′ )}
6: List1 = List + “sum ,”





10: for all DMg ∈ DMC do









(s) ∪ {(List + “s
cm
,′′ )}
13: List1 = List + “scm ,”





9.3.3 Types of Sanction Moves
We will expand here the definitions provided in Chapter 8, for cooperative games
without coalitions, for a sanction move (SM) and an inescapable sanction move
(ISM), made against a decision maker’s UI, to include sanction moves that are
committed not only by other individual decision makers but also by coalitions of
decision makers. Additionally, we will include in the new definitions sanction moves
that are intended to sanction a group/coalition of decision makers’s CI/C-GI moves,
not just individual’s UI moves.
Definition 9.3.7 (Sanction Move (SM)): 1) For an Individual Decision









is said to have against it a Sanction Move (SM) at time t+1 to state ssm∈S iff





))) : ssm∈ S
≤N
DMi,t


















(s)]; and 2) For a Coalition of Decision





(s), reaching it at time t+h, is said to have against it a Sanction








































(a) A UI by a DM is faced with an
SM/ISM by another individual DM
DMi’s UI























(b) A UI by a DM is faced with an
























“None” Improvement Level from  “s”
Simp
Ssmi
(c) A UI by a DM is faced with an
SM/ISM by a coalition of DMs
Figure 9.1: Type of Sanction Moves available to players of cooperative games, with













Cooperative games, with coalitions, can have two types of players: 1) individ-
uals, not part of any coalition; and 2) coalitions. The SM definition above covers
all types of SMs that both type of players could face. In total there are nine types
of SMs within the context of cooperative games, with coalitions. All are shown in
Figures 9.1 - 9.3. Recall that there are only four types of SMs within the context of
cooperative games, without coalitions. So, adding coalitions to mix of players al-
lowed within cooperative games, increased not only the types of cooperative moves
the players can have (as indicated in the previous subsection) but also expanded
the types of SMs the players can face in these games.
























“None” Improvement Level from  “s”
Simp
Ssmi
(a) A CI by a cooperative group of DMs
























“None” Improvement Level from  “s”
Simp
Ssmi
(b) A CI by a cooperative group of DMs
is faced with an SM/ISM by another
























“None” Improvement Level from  “s”
Simp
Ssmi
(c) A CI by a cooperative group of DMs is
faced with an SM/ISM by a coalition
of DMs
Figure 9.2: Type of Sanction Moves available to players of cooperative games, with
coalitions, in response to a CI by a cooperative group of DMs
in its first part ”for an Individual Decision Maker” as SMs against this individual’s
UI or cooperative CI move from state s to state s
imp
. In Figure 9.1a, DMi’s UI
move to s
imp
is sanctioned by the move of another individual player in the game,
DMj, to state ssm . In Figure 9.1b, the SM against DMi’s UI comes from a group of
decision makers, DMp, who are acting cooperatively but not as a coalition. The SM
against DMi’s UI could also come, as shown in Figure 9.1c, from coalition DMP in
the form of a series of consecutive k moves progressing the game from s
imp
, which
is preferred by DMi to state s, to state ssm which is not only worse than simp but
could be equally or less preferred to the original state s. Similarly, Figures 9.2a
- 9.2c covers the same types of SMs but instead of sanctioning DMi’s UI move to
s
imp
, they sanction DMg’s CI move to simp and where DMi ∈ DMg.
























“None” Improvement Level from  “s”
Scgi
Ssmi
(a) A C-CI by a coalition of DMs is faced




























(b) A C-CI by a coalition of DMs is faced





























(c) A C-CI by a coalition of DMs is faced
with an SM/ISM by another coalition
of DMs
Figure 9.3: Type of Sanction Moves available to players of cooperative games, with
coalitions, in response to a C-CI by a coalition of DMs
are committed against a coalition DMG’s C-GI move from s to a more preferred
state for the coalition, state s
cgi
. These three SM types cover what Definition 9.3.7
describes as SMs against a coalition, not just an individual DM, in its second part
“for a coalition of Decision Makers”. Recall that a C-GI move by the coalition
DMG could be a single move or a series of consecutive moves.
In addition, it is important to notice here that the new expanded definition
of a SM presented above does not assume that the SM to be a UI, a CI or a C-
GI move by the DM/s committing the sanction. The definition assumes that the
motive of the DM/s committing the sanction for their SM is to hurt the individual
DMi, or coalition DMG, even if this SM will put the DM/s committing the sanction
himself/themselves at a less preferred state. To differentiate between an SM by
DM/s which is not required to be a UI, CI or C-GI, as per the SM definition
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above, and an SM which is also a UI, a CI or a C-GI move for the committing
parties, we will call the second SM type as SMI move (read as Sanction Move
and Improvement). As we will see later, this stricter type of SM, or SMI - as we
decided to call it, is required for some stability solution concepts, such as Sequential
Stability (SEQ).
The concept of an SM that is also a UI, CI or C-GI move by the committing
party is illustrated in the subfigures of Figures 9.1 - 9.3, by showing in each the





having the destination be state ssm which cannot be reached by an SM that is also
a UI, a CI or a C-GI). This means that we are expanding here, the concept of a SMI
move to include not only sanction moves by committing parties wether individuals,
groups or coalitions, but also to include sanction moves against the UI of individual
DMs, the CI of cooperating groups of DMs, and the C-GIs by coalitions of DMs.




tioned in the second part, the “for a Coalition of Decision Makers” part, of the
SM definition above, the modeller/analyst should qualify what the preferences




(s)) ≡ (∀DMi ∈ DMG ssm∈S
≤N
DMi,t
(s)). This is assuming that all the
coalition members agree on the preferences and their strength. Otherwise, judging
the preference over the states of the game by a coalition requires knowledge about
how the coalition decides collectively on its preferences. The ideal case of coali-
tion’s preferences is adopted in this chapter only for simplicity and convenience
reasons. In any case, and especially when modelling a real-life cooperative conflict,
with coalitions, the modeller/analyst must qualify the truthfulness of any state-
ment about a coalition’s preferences by applying the actual method/algorithm the
coalition uses to decide on its collective preferences.
Definition 9.3.8 (Inescapable Sanction Move (ISM)): 1) For an Individ-
ual Decision Maker DMi∈DM at time t and at state s∈S of the game, a UI
by DMi to state simp∈S
UI
DMi,t
(s), or a CI by a group DMg : DMi ∈ DMg to state simp∈
SCI
DMg,t
(s), is said to have against it an Inescapable Sanction Move (ISM) at time
t+1 to state s
ism
























































(s)))]; and 2) For
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a Coalition of Decision Makers DMG⊆ DM at time t and at state s ∈ S
of the game, a C-GI by DMG to state scgi∈ S
C−GI
DMG,t
(s), reaching it at time t+h is
said to have against it an Inescapable Sanction Move (ISM) at time t+h to state
s
ism























































The concept of an inescapable sanction move is expanded by this definition to
include not only inescapable sanction moves by committing parties wether individ-
uals or groups, but also to include inescapable sanction moves against UI, CI or
C-GI moves (UI by individuals, CI by cooperating groups of DMs and C-GIs by
coalitions of DMs). Again here, illustrations of the different scenarios covered by
the definition are provided as part of the subfigures of Figures 9.1 - 9.3. From the
figures, it is clear that the concept of inescapable sanction move is building on the
concept of a sanction move and narrowing it down to demand that that the decision
maker/s, whose UI, CI or C-GI is targeted by the sanction move, will not be able
to escape the negative effect of the sanction move (hence the name: inescapable
sanction move (ISM)).








(s))) mentioned in the second part, the “for a Coalition of Deci-
sion Makers” part, of the ISM definition above, the modeller/analyst should qualify
what the preferences for the coalition DMC are, and how they are calculated. We











(s))) ≡ (∀DMi ∈ DMG sesc ∈ S
≤N
DMi,t
(s))). This is assuming that
all the coalition members agree on the preferences and their strength. Otherwise,
judging the preference over the states of the game by a coalition requires knowledge
about how the coalition decides collectively on its preferences. The ideal case of
coalition’s preferences is adopted in this chapter only for simplicity and convenience
reasons. In any case, and especially when modelling a real-life cooperative conflict,
with coalitions, the modeller/analyst must qualify the truthfulness of any state-
ment about a coalition’s preferences by applying the actual method/algorithm the
coalition uses to decide on its collective preferences.
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9.4 Stability Solution Concepts and Equilibriums
for Cooperative Games with Coalitions
The same four stability solution concepts, we discussed in Chapter 6 for non-
cooperative games and in Chapter 8 for cooperative games without coalitions, will
be discussed in this chapter for cooperative games with coalitions. But we will
expand these solution concepts to accommodate the new multi-step cooperative
moves that coalitions of decision makers in cooperative games with coalitions can
have.
We will group these solution concepts into two classes, as we did in Chapter 6
for non-cooperative games: 1) solution concepts that are extremely individualistic,
or coalition-centric, and shortsighted in their definitions, in a way that they do not
consider other players countermoves; and 2) solution concepts that tries to include
other players’ countermoves, therefore these concepts show more foresight.
As a reminder, we said in Chapter 6, Section 6.3, that we followed the steps
of Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Fang et al. (1993) in their definitions for the four
stability solution concepts for non-cooperative games. But, we defined all these so-
lution concepts, for non-cooperative games, to be within the context, terminology
and notation of the Constrained Rationality framework; and using the definitions
of the agents’ non-cooperative unilateral moves and sanction moves introduced in
Chapter 6. In Chapter 8, we extended the definitions of the four stability solu-
tion concepts, presented in Chapter 6, to deal with the Constrained Rationality’s
single-step cooperative moves, added in Chapter 8 for cooperative games without
coalitions; and to deal with the changes happened accordingly to the definitions
of sanction moves in such games. In this section, we expand the definitions of
the four stability solution concepts further. The expanded ones, which will follow,
deal with the Constrained Rationality’s single-step cooperative moves, as well as
multi-step coalition cooperative moves added above; and to deal with the changes
happened accordingly to the definitions of sanction moves in cooperative games
with coalitions (as discussed earlier in this chapter).
It is also worth including here a reminder that the definitions of the stability
solution concepts for cooperative games with coalitions, which will follow, are differ-
ent from the ones presented by Inohara and Hipel (2008b,a) for GMCR and called
coalition stability solution concepts. This is due to the different moves that GMCR
and Constrained Rationality employ. We discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1,
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how the GMCR’s cooperative moves, or coalition moves as been called by Inohara
and Hipel (2008b,a), are limited in their scope and in their applications to real-life
conflicts; and how the Constrained Rationality provide broader, more advanced and
practical collection of cooperative moves that reflect the needs of complex real-life
multi-agent conflicts. We discussed there how the Constrained Rationality’s coop-
erative moves differ from those defined for the GMCR; and how, in Constrained
rationality, the cooperation among agents within a conflict could happen between
agents that are not part of a coalition. And, because each framework employs dif-
ferent cooperation among agents and different definitions of cooperative moves, the
frameworks’ definitions of the stability solution concepts, which are based on the
definitions of the cooperative moves employed, will definitely be different.
9.4.1 Solution Concepts with No Consideration to Others’
Moves
There is one stability solution concept which does not consider in its definition
the moves and countermoves of other players. It is the NASH solution concept.
We expand its definition to include not only NASH stability for individual players
within cooperative games, with coalitions, but also we define NASH stability for a
coalition of players.
Definition 9.4.1 (Nash Stability (NASH)):
1) For an Individual Decision Maker DMi∈DM at time t, state s ∈ S is





(s)=∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMg ⊆ DM : DMi ∈ DMg) SCIDMg,t(s)=∅ ] ∧
[(∀DMG ⊆ DM : DMi ∈ DMG) SC−GIDMG,t(s)=∅ ]; and
2) For a Coalition of Decision Makers DMC⊆DM at time t, state s∈S is





(s)=∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMG ⊆ DM : DMC ⊆ DMG) SC−GIDMG,t(s)=∅ ]
The definition, in its first part, describes what it means for an individual DM
in a cooperative game, with coalitions, to have a state s be a NASH stable state
for him. In the second part, the definitions describe what it takes for a coalition of
DMs to consider a state s a NASH stable state for the coalition.
First, as per the definition, state s is considered NASH stable for an individual
decision maker DMi at time t if and only if s is the best that DMi, individually
or cooperatively (with or without coalitions), can achieve at time t, given the total
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states of the game S. Therefore, states that are not NASH stable are unstable
states since DMi can improve his position from any one of them: unilaterally by
activating one of his UIs out of these states; cooperatively by activating one of
the CIs that he and other individual DMs have from these states; or cooperatively
through the coalition, if DMi is part of one, by activating one of the C-GIs the
coalition have from these states.
Second, as per the definition, state s is considered NASH stable for a coalition of
decision makers DMC at time t if and only if s is the best that DMC collectively can
achieve at time t, given the total states of the game S. Therefore, states that are
not NASH stable are unstable states since coalition DMC can improve its position
from any one of them by activating one of its C-GIs from these states, or the C-GIs
of bigger coalitions that it is part of.
9.4.2 Solution Concepts with Consideration to Others’ Moves
We will discuss here the same three stability solution concepts we discussed in
Chapter 6 for non-cooperative games and in Chapter 8 for cooperative games with-
out coalitions. These solutions concepts are General MetaRationality, Symmetric
MetaRationality and Sequentially Stability. But in this section we will expand the
definitions of these solution concepts to include not only the stability under these
solution concepts for individual players within cooperative games, with coalitions,
but also we define the stability under these solution concepts for a coalition of
players.
Definition 9.4.2 (General MetaRational (GMR) Stability):
1) For an Individual Decision Maker DMi∈DM at time t, a state s∈S is
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2) For a Coalition of Decision Makers DMC⊆DM at time t, state s∈S is
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The previous GMR stability definitions given in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative
games and in Chapter 8 for cooperative games without coalitions, are expanded
in this definition. This new definition explains what it means to have a state be
GMR stable not only for an individual decision maker in a cooperative game, with
coalitions, but also for a coalition of decision makers in such games.
The first part of new GMR definition, Definition 9.4.2, includes now all type
of sanction moves that could be imposed, in a cooperative game with coalitions,
against an individual decision maker DMi’s UIs or CIs from s. These types include:
SMs by other individual decision makers; single-step cooperative SMs by groups of
decision makers cooperating together; and multi-step cooperative SMs by coalitions
of decision makers. These SMs are motivated mainly by the desire of the parties
committing them to hurt DMi and put him at a less preferred state than even the
original state s from which DMi’s UIs/Cis start from. Hence, these SMs are not
required by the definition to be UIs, CIs or C-GIs by the committing parties, but
instead the definition states that they could be UMs, CMs, or C-GMs for them,
respectively.
In addition, the second part of Definition 9.4.2 provides what it means for a
state s, in a cooperative game with coalition, to be considered GMR stable for a
coalition DMC . The definition considers s to be GMR stable for the coalition if and
only if any C-GI move that the coalition has out of s could be faced by one or more
SMs. These SMs could be: single-step SMs by other individual decision makers;
single-step cooperative SMs by groups of decision makers cooperating together; or
multi-step cooperative SMs by other coalitions of decision makers. Again here, and
as per the definition, these SMs are motivated mainly by the desire of the parties
committing them to hurt the focal coalition DMC and put it at a less preferred state
than even the original state s from which DMC ’s C-GIs start from. Hence, these
SMs are not required by the definition to be UIs, CIs or C-GIs by the committing
parties, but instead the definition states that they could be UMs, CMs, or C-GMs
for them, respectively.
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The GMR stability solution concept assumes that decision maker DMi (or coali-
tion DMC) believes that other players surely would apply, unilaterally or cooper-
atively, a sanction against any of his UIs/CIs (the coalition’s C-GIs) out of s.
Therefore, DMi (or DMC) will not move away from s, and s is a GMR stable state
for DMi (DMC) . In addition, in this chapter we continue to use the same notation
to denote the set of all states which are GMR stable for DMi at time t as SGMRDMi,t .
But we add here that the set of all states which are GMR stable for coalition DMC
at time t will be denoted as SGMR
DMC,t
.




mentioned in the second part, the “for a Coalition of Decision Makers” part, of the
GMR definition above, the modeller/analyst should qualify what the preferences




(s)) ≡ (∀DMi ∈ DMC s2∈ S
≤N
DMi,t
(s)). This is assuming that all the
coalition members agree on the preferences and their strength. Otherwise, judging
the preference over the states of the game by a coalition requires knowledge about
how the coalition decides collectively on its preferences. The ideal case of coalition’s
preferences is adopted in this chapter only for simplicity and convenience reasons,
and should not be taken as a restriction. In any case, and especially when modelling
a real-life cooperative conflict, with coalitions, the modeller/analyst must qualify
the truthfulness of any statement about a coalition’s preferences by applying the
actual method/algorithm the coalition uses to decide on its collective preferences.
Definition 9.4.3 (Symmetric MetaRational (SMR) Stability):
1) For an Individual Decision Maker DMi∈DM at time t, a state s∈S is















































[ ∃ ((DMp⊆{DM−DMi}) ∧ (s2∈S
C−GM
DMp,t+1










(s))) ] ; and
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2) For a Coalition of Decision Makers DMC⊆DM at time t, state s∈S















is reached at time t+h )
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The previous SMR stability definitions given in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative
games and in Chapter 8 for cooperative games without coalitions, are expanded
in this definition. This new definition explains what it means to have a state be
SMR stable not only for an individual decision maker in a cooperative game, with
coalitions, but also for a coalition of decision makers in such games.
The first part of new SMR definition, Definition 9.4.3, includes now all type of
ISM moves that could be imposed, in a cooperative game with coalitions, against
an individual decision maker DMi’s UIs or CIs from s. These types include: ISMs
by other individual decision makers; single-step cooperative ISMs by groups of de-
cision makers cooperating together; and multi-step cooperative ISMs by coalitions
of decision makers. In all of which, DMi cannot escape or mitigate the negative
effect of them by moving away from the state produced by them. Again here, as
in the case for GMR stability, these ISMs are motivated mainly by the desire of
the parties committing them to hurt DMi and put him at a less preferred state
than even the original state s from which DMi’s UIs/Cis start from. Hence, these
ISMs are not required by the definition to be UIs, CIs or C-GIs by the committing
parties, but instead the definition states that they could be UMs, CMs, or C-GMs
for them, respectively.
In addition, the second part of Definition 9.4.3 provides what it means for a
state s, in a cooperative game with coalition, to be considered SMR stable for a
coalition DMC . The definition considers s to be SMR stable for the coalition if and
399
only if any C-GI move that coalition has out of s could be faced by one or more
ISMs. These ISMs could be: single-step ISMs by other individual decision makers;
single-step cooperative ISMs by groups of decision makers cooperating together; or
multi-step cooperative ISMs by other coalitions of decision makers. And for all of
these ISM, the coalition DMC cannot escape or mitigate the negative effect of them
by moving away from the state produced by them. Also, as per the definition, these
ISMs are motivated mainly by the desire of the parties committing them to hurt
the focal coalition DMC and put it at a less preferred state than even the original
state s from which DMC ’s C-GIs start from. Hence, these ISMs are not required by
the definition to be UIs, CIs or C-GIs by the committing parties, but instead the
definition states that they could be UMs, CMs, or C-GMs for them, respectively.
The SMR stability solution concept assumes that decision maker DMi (or coali-
tion DMC) believes that other players surely would apply, unilaterally or coopera-
tively, a sanction against any of his UIs/CIs (the coalition’s C-GIs) out of s. And,
DMi (or coalition DMC) cannot escape the negative effect of sanction by moving
away from the state results from the sanction to a more preferred state than s, or
an equally preferred state to s. Therefore, DMi (or DMC) will not move away from
s, and s is a SMR stable state for DMi (DMC) . In addition, in this chapter the set
of all states which are SMR stable for coalition DMC at time t will be denoted as
SSMR
DMC,t
Also here and as a reminder, it is important to mention that wherever s2 ∈
S≤N
DMC,t
(s) is mentioned in the second part, the “for a Coalition of Decision Makers”
part, of the GMR definition above, the modeller/analyst should qualify what the




(s)) ≡ (∀DMi ∈ DMC s2∈S
≤N
DMi,t
(s)). This is assuming that
all the coalition members agree on the preferences and their strength. Otherwise,
judging the preference over the states of the game by a coalition requires knowledge
about how the coalition decides collectively on its preferences.
The ideal case of coalition’s preferences is adopted in this chapter only for sim-
plicity and convenience reasons, and should not be taken as a restriction. In any
case, and especially when modelling a real-life cooperative conflict, with coalitions,
the modeller/analyst must qualify the truthfulness of any statement about a coali-
tion’s preferences by applying the actual method/algorithm the coalition uses to
decide on its collective preferences.
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Definition 9.4.4 (Sequentially Stability (SEQ)):
1) For an Individual Decision Maker DMi∈DM at time t, a state s∈S is







































(s) ] ; and
2) For a Coalition of Decision Makers DMC⊆DM at time t, state s∈S is
considered a Sequentially (SEQ) Stable state, denoted as s∈SSEQ
DMC,t
, iff











is reached at time t+h )





















The previous SEQ stability definitions given in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative
games and in Chapter 8 for cooperative games without coalitions, are expanded
in this definition. This new definition explains what it means to have a state be
SEQ stable not only for an individual decision maker in a cooperative game, with
coalitions, but also for a coalition of decision makers in such games.
The first part of new SEQ definition, Definition 9.4.4, includes now all type of
SMI sanction moves that could be imposed, in a cooperative game with coalitions,
against an individual decision maker DMi’s UIs or CIs from s. These types in-
clude: SMIs by other individual decision makers; single-step cooperative SMIs by
groups of decision makers cooperating together; and multi-step cooperative SMIs
by coalitions of decision makers.
In addition, the second part of Definition 9.4.4 provides what it means for a
state s, in a cooperative game with coalition, to be considered SEQ stable for a
coalition DMC . The definition considers s to be SEQ stable for the coalition if and
only if any C-GI move that coalition has out of s could be faced by one or more
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SMIs. These SMIs could be: single-step SMIs by other individual decision makers;
single-step cooperative SMIs by groups of decision makers cooperating together; or
multi-step cooperative SMIs by other coalitions of decision makers.
Recall that the SEQ solution concept requires that the imposed sanction against
DMi’s UIs/CIs/C-GIs from s to be also a UI, a CI or a G-CI by the party committing
the sanction. In other words, SEQ assumes that all decision makers, individuals
or coalitions, in the game to be rational players and act as such. Unlike the GMR
solution concept, SEQ assumes that no single player or coalition of players will
move in the game, whether individually or cooperatively, for the sake of hurting
others and in the process hurt himself/itself. All players in the game will only
commit themselves to moves that will benefit them.
The SEQ stability solution concept assumes that decision maker DMi (or coali-
tion DMC) believes that other players surely would apply, unilaterally or coopera-
tively, a SMI sanction against any of his UIs/CIs/C-GIs (the coalition’s C-GIs) out
of s. Therefore, DMi (or DMC) will not move away from s, and s is a SEQ stable
state for DMi (DMC) . In addition, in this chapter we continue to use the same
notation to denote the set of all states which are SEQ stable for DMi at time t as
SSEQ
DMi,t
. But we add here that the set of all states which are SEQ stable for coalition
DMC at time t will be denoted as SSEQDMC,t
As it was the case for the GMR stability definition above, and as a reminder,
it is important here to mention that wherever s2∈ S
≤N
DMC,t
(s) is mentioned in the
second part, the “for a Coalition of Decision Makers” part, of the SEQ definition
above, the modeller/analyst should qualify what the preferences for the coalition




(∀DMi ∈ DMC s2∈ S
≤N
DMi,t
(s)). This is assuming that all the coalition members
agree on the preferences and their strength. Otherwise, judging the preference over
the states of the game by a coalition requires knowledge about how the coalition
decides collectively on its preferences.
The ideal case of coalition’s preferences is adopted in this chapter only for sim-
plicity and convenience reasons, and should not be taken as a restriction. In any
case, and especially when modelling a real-life cooperative conflict, with coalitions,
the modeller/analyst must qualify the truthfulness of any statement about a coali-
tion’s preferences by applying the actual method/algorithm the coalition uses to
decide on its collective preferences.
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9.4.3 Equilibrium States in Cooperative Games with
Coalitions
The concept of an Equilibrium states is an important concept in game theory and
conflict analysis. Equilibrium is tied to the concept of Stability Solution Concepts,
and explains ultimate stability states in the game. The previous definitions for an
Equilibrium state, which is provided in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative games and
in Chapter 8 for cooperative games without coalitions, will be expanded here. This
new definition will account for the two types of players that cooperative games with
coalitions have: individual DMs, and coalitions.
Definition 9.4.5 (Equilibrium (EQ.)): A state s∈ S is considered an Equilib-
rium, for a cooperative game with coalitions, at time t, under a specific Solution
Concept SC definition, denoted as s∈SSC EQ.
DM,t
, iff
[ ∀ Coalition DMC⊆DM s∈S
SC
DMC,t








As per the definition, a state s is stable for a cooperative game, with coalitions,
as a whole, i.e. an equilibrium for the game, under a specific solution concept, such
as NASH or GMR, if and only if the state s is stable under this solution concept for
each and every coalition in the game and each and ever individual decision maker in
the game who is not part of a coalition. Notice that this definition is a bit different
from the equilibrium definition given in in Chapter 6 for non-cooperative games
and in Chapter 8 for cooperative games without coalitions. We have to consider
the fact that there are coalitions here; and the assumption that we are making
here is that the decision makers who are part of coalitions have surrendered their
stability needs for the sake of the stability needs of the coalitions that they belong
to. For individual DMs who are not part of any coalition their stability needs must
be accounted for separately. If it happened that individual DMs who are part of
coalitions decided to part from their coalitions and act individually (not considering
the coalition’s stable states to be also stable for them), then the definition is still
valid. Because those parted DMs no longer belong to any coalition in the game,
and are considered therefore as individual DMs, and their stability needs must be
accounted for separately.
As in the other types of games, in any specific cooperative game/conflict with
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coalitions there may be a number of equilibrium states under one or more stability
solution concepts. Equilibrium states represent the most likely outcomes for the
game, and constitutes possible resolutions to the game. Once one of these states
arise, this state is likely persist. But, the strength of this persistence depends on
which solution concept the equilibrium state is under, and what is the strength of
the state’s stability under this solution concept for each of the DMs in the game.
9.5 Stability Strength of Solution Concepts and
Equilibriums for Cooperative Conflicts with
Coalitions
In this section, we will discuss the mechanisms by which one can identify the
strength of the stability, under the four stability solution concept, for any given
state in a cooperative game with coalitions, for any given DM in the game. We
expand here the stability strength definitions and algorithms provided in Chapter 6
for non-cooperative games, and in Chapter 8 for cooperative games without coali-
tions. The new definitions and algorithms will accommodate the new multi-step
coalition cooperative moves that are possible only within the context of cooperative
games with coalitions. Then, we will discuss the strength of an equilibrium under
a specific solution concept for a state in a cooperative conflict, with coalitions.
We will discuss stabilities strengths, and equilibriums’ strengths, for both types of
players in these conflicts: individual decision makers, and coalitions.
9.5.1 Stability Strength of Solution Concepts
The same Stability Concept Strength value property, denoted as StabilityStrength(St-
abilityConcept , s,DMi, t), discussed in Chapter 8 for cooperative games without
coalitions, will continue to be used here for cooperative games with coalitions.
Also, the same fuzzy linguistic value label LSS used for for StabilityStrength will
continue to be used here with the same fuzzy memberships functions given in Figure
4.4-(a). And, the strength expressed by the LSS fuzzy label is meant to represent
the strength of the stability concept type StabilityConcept (where StabilityConcept
∈ {NASH,GMR,SMR,SEQ}) for state s, for decision maker DMi at time t. The
only difference is that we will also be able to take the stability strength for a coali-
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tion DMC at time t for a specific solution concept, as we do for the individual
decision maker DMi.
As a reminder, we said that the StabilityStrength value property before fuzzi-
fication and without normalized has numeric value is in the range [0, 2], there-
fore it will have a fuzzy label LSS ∈ {Extreme, Significant, Strong,Full,Big,Much,
Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null}={Ex, Si, St, F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}. And,
with the understanding that the complete order of these labels is: Ex>Si>St>F>
B>M>Mo>L>N>Null. And, when the StabilityStrength, before fuzzification,
is normalized, i.e. its numeric value is in [0, 1] , then its fuzzy labels will include
the same labels as above with the exception of the three higher labels covering the
range from [1, 2] and those are: Extreme,Significant and Strong.
The LSS fuzzy label assigned to StabilityStrength(StabilityConcept , s,DMi, t), or
StabilityStrength(StabilityConcept , s,DMC , t) for a coalition, will cover the stability
strength satisfaction levels. Where the labels range from representing Extremely
strong stability of s (based on the definition of the solution concept given in Stabil-
ityConcept) to None strength level (to mean very weak stability strength and close
to non-existing strength or close to indifferent). And, with the understanding that
the Null label represents an unknown strength or totaly-non-existing-stability.
We define, now, the stability strength for cooperative games, with coalitions,
for each of the solution concepts we introduced in the previous section. Recall that
within the context of cooperative games, with coalitions, there are two types of
players: 1) the individual players, with their individualistic aims and objectives
in the games, despite the fact that are able occasionally to cooperate with other
player for specific one-step moves; and 2) coalitions, with their collective aims and
objectives in the game and their ability to perform multi-step coalition cooperative
moves. We will define the stabilities’ strengths for both types of players.
Definition 9.5.1 (Strength of NASH Stability):
1) For an Individual Decision Maker DMi∈DM at time t, and for a NASH
stable state s ∈ SNASH
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s NASH stability, to DMi at time t, i.e.































2) For a Coalition of Decision Makers DMC⊆DM at time t, and for a
NASH stable state s∈SNASH
DMC,t
, the strength of s’s NASH stability, to DMC at time





















, s,DMC , t),−Extreme}|)
As per the definition, the strength of s’s NASH stability strength for an indi-
vidual DMi, in a cooperative game with coalitions, is the positive strength equiv-
alent of the negative preference of the state that the worst UI/CI/C-GI move
executed/could-be-executed by DMi, individually, cooperatively, or part of a coali-
tion that he belongs to, at time <t in order to move to s.
Let the NASH’s stability strength of a state s for an individual decision maker
DMi at time t be denoted as NASH (LSS), where StabilityStrength(NASH , s,DMi, t)=
L
SS
. Algorithm 9.3 uses Definition 9.5.1 to calculate the NASH’s stability strength
for individual DMs in a cooperative game, with coalitions, and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
Also as per the definition, for a coalition DMC , the strength of s’s NASH sta-
bility strength is the positive strength equivalent of the negative preference of the
state that the worst C-GI move executed/could-be-executed by DMC , collectively
(including any UI that individual member of the coalition has or any CI that a
group of coalition members -alone or with others outside the coalition- can make),
at time <t in order to move to s.
Let the collective NASH’s stability strength of a state s for a coalition DMC at
time t be denoted as NASH (L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(NASH , s,DMC , t)=LSS .
Algorithm 9.4 uses Definition 9.5.1 to calculate the NASH’s stability strength for a
coalition of DMs in a cooperative game, with coalitions, and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
It is important to note here that Algorithm 9.4, and Definition 9.5.1 which
the algorithm is based on, refer to the collective preference of a coalition without
specifying how this collective-preference will be calculated. Recall that we said
in Section 9.2 that in the absence of having one universal way which coalitions
use to decide on their preferences, we will assume in this chapter the ideal case:
members of the coalition must all agree on the preference, its order and its strength.
Therefore, for the algorithm:
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Algorithm 9.3 Calculating a State’s NASH Stability Strength for an Individual
DM in a Cooperative Game with Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of NASH Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not NASH stable
3: NASH Strength = Null
4: // check if DMi has any UIs/CIs/C-GIs from s at time t
5: if [SUI
DMi,t
(s) = ∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMg ⊆ DM : DMi ∈ DMg) S
CI
DMg,t
(s) = ∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMG ⊆ DM :




6: // s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t; find NASH stability’s strength
7: NASH Strength = Strength of Nash(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
8: end if
9: return NASH Strength
10:
11: strength-value-label Strength of Nash(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
12: // this routine will return the strength of the weakest UI by DMi, or C-GI by a cooperating
13: // group/coalition DMg he belongs to, that yields to reaching s. First, set Nash strength
14: // initially to “Extremely Strong” (the case if s has no UIs/CIs/C-GIs that leads to it).
15: Strength = −Extreme
16: // find s’s NASH strength























20: // return the equivalent positive strength label, if Strength<N
21: if Strength < None then

















And because all the members of the coalition must agree on the preference level,
adopting the ideal case assumes that the safest way to calculate the strength for a
coalition’s preference is to take the minimum of the preference’s strengths across
all the individual members of the coalition. In other words, for Algorithm 9.4:
PrefStrength(s
bfr





Using the ideal case (that all members of the coalition must agree on the prefer-
ence, its order, and its strength) should not be considered in any way as a restriction
on the framework, but rather a convenient simple way to refer to coalition’s prefer-
ences. In reality, the modeller should take note of how the coalition actually decides
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Algorithm 9.4 Calculating a State’s NASH Stability Strength for a Coalition of
DMs in a Cooperative Game with Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of NASH Stability (s, DMC, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not NASH stable
3: NASH Strength = Null
4: // check if DMC has any C-GIs from s at time t
5: if [SC−GI
DMC,t




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMC at t; find NASH stability’s strength
7: NASH Strength = Strength of Nash(s, DMC , Game-Structure)
8: end if
9: return NASH Strength
10:
11: strength-value-label Strength of Nash(s, DMC, Game-Structure)
12: // this routine will return the strength of the weakest C-GI by DMC , or C-GI by a cooperating
13: // group/coalition DMG it belongs to, that yields to reaching s. First, set Nash strength
14: // initially to “Extremely Strong” (the case if s has no C-GIs that leads to it).
15: Strength = −Extreme
16: // find s’s NASH strength













18: Strength = max{Strength, PrefStrength(s
bfr
, s,DMC , t)}
19: end for
20: // return the equivalent positive strength label, if Strength<N
21: if Strength < None then
22: Strength = |Strength|
23: end if
24: return Strength
on its preferences, capture it in an algorithm, and then modify Algorithm 9.4 to fit
with the way the coalition takes decision on its preferences.
The need for the modeller/analyst, especially when modelling a real-life cooper-
ative conflict with coalitions, to qualify the truthfulness of any statement about a
coalition’s preferences is very important. He must apply the actual method/algorithm
the coalition uses to decide on its collective preferences, and should not assume that
all the members of the coalition agree on the preferences, their order, and/or their
strengths. It will be hard to find the ideal case reflects the current affairs of real-life
coalitions. In reality, it is usually the case that the members in the coalition who
who are the biggest in size or market share, the foundering members, the members
who owns the key technologies, or the members with the most political/physical
powers, have more say on the overall coalition’s preferences over a conflict’s states
than smaller or less powerful members of the Coalition.
408
Definition 9.5.2 (Strength of GMR Stability):
1) For an Individual Decision Maker DMi∈DM at time t, and for a GMR
stable state s ∈ SGMR
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s GMR stability, to DMi at time t, i.e.
StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t), is calculated as follows:
((SUI
DMi,t














































































⇒ (StabilityStrength (GMR, s,DMi, t) = None)
2) For a Coalition of Decision Makers DMC⊆DM at time t, and for a
GMR stable state s∈SGMR
DMC,t
, the strength of s’s GMR stability, to DMC at time t,
i.e. StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMC , t), is calculated as follows:
((SC−GI
DMC,t



















s1 is reached at time t+h )
[ [ (∀(DMj ∈{DM−DMC})∀(s2 ∈S
UM
DMj,t+h






































⇒ (StabilityStrength (GMR, s,DMC , t) = None)
As per the definition, the strength of s’s GMR stability strength for an individual
DMi, in a cooperative game with coalitions, is the positive strength equivalent of
the negative strength of the worst sanction, imposed by other decision makers
{DM−DMi}, against DMi’s UIs/CIs/C-GIs from s, individually or cooperatively,
given the fact that DMi will choose the UI/CI/C-GIs which will yield the best
less-preferred end state.
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Let the GMR’s stability strength of a state s for an individual decision maker
DMi at time t be denoted as GMR(LSS), where StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMi, t)=
L
SS
. Algorithm 9.5 uses Definition 9.5.2 to calculate the GMR’s stability strength
for individual DMs in a cooperative game, with coalitions, and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
Also as per the definition, for a coalition DMC , in a cooperative game with coali-
tions, the strength of s’s GMR stability strength is the positive strength equivalent
of the negative strength of the worst sanction, imposed by other decision makers
{DM−DMC}, against DMC ’s C-GIs from s, given the fact that DMC will choose
collectively the C-GIs which will yield the best less-preferred end state.
Let the collective GMR’s stability strength of a state s for a coalition DMC at
time t be denoted as GRM (L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMC , t)=LSS .
Algorithm 9.6 uses Definition 9.5.2 to calculate the GMR’s stability strength for a
coalition of DMs in a cooperative game, with coalitions, and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
It is also important to note here that Algorithm 9.6, and Definition 9.5.2 which
the algorithm is based on, refer to the collective preference of a coalition without
specifying how this collective-preference will be calculated. Recall that we said
in Section 9.2 that in the absence of having one universal way which coalitions
use to decide on their preferences, we will assume in this chapter the ideal case:
members of the coalition must all agree on the preference, its order and its strength.








And because all the members of the coalition must agree on the preference level,
adopting the ideal case assumes that the safest way to calculate the strength for a
coalition’s preference is to take the minimum of the preference’s strengths across
all the individual members of the coalition. In other words, for Algorithm 9.6:
PrefStrength(s
2





As a reminder of what we said earlier, using the ideal case (that all members
of the coalition must agree on the preference, its order, and its strength) should
not be considered in any way as a restriction on the framework, but rather a
convenient simple way to refer to coalition’s preferences. In reality, the modeller
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Algorithm 9.5 Calculating a State’s GMR Stability Strength for an Individual
DM in a Cooperative Game with Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of GMR Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not GMR stable
3: GMR Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMi has any UIs/CIs/C-GIs from s at time t
5: if [SUI
DMi,t
(s) = ∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMg ⊆ DM : DMi ∈ DMg) S
CI
DMg,t
(s) = ∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMG ⊆ DM :




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t
7: GMR Strength = None


















(s)))) [∃ an SM] then
9: // sanction exists against each of DMi’s UIs/CIs/C-GIs ⇒ s is GMR stable; find strength
10: GMR Strength = Strength of Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return GMR Strength
13:
14: strength-value-label Strength of Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
15: // this routine will return the strength of the sanction that yields the worst result for DMi,
16: // given the fact that DMi will choose the UI/CI/C-GI that will minimize his loss
17: // set sanction’s strength initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
18: Strength = −Extreme



















20: SancStrength = None
21: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMi} do











23: SancStrength = min{SancStrength, PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMi, t)}
24: end for
25: end for
26: for all DMp ⊆ {DM−DMi} do











28: SancStrength = min{SancStrength, PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMi, t)}
29: end for
30: end for
31: for all DMP ⊆ {DM−DMi} do
















36: Strength = max{Strength, SancStrength}
37: end for
38: if Strength < None then




Algorithm 9.6 Calculating a State’s GMR Stability Strength for a Coalition of
DMs in a Cooperative Game with Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of GMR Stability (s, DMC, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not GMR stable
3: GMR Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMC has any C-GIs from s at time t
5: if [SC−GI
DMC,t




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMC at t
7: GMR Strength = None











(s)))) [∃ an SM sanction ] then
9: // sanction exists against each of DMC ’s C-GIs ⇒ s is GMR stable; find GMR’s strength
10: GMR Strength = Strength of Sanctions(s, DMC , Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return GMR Strength
13:
14: strength-value-label Strength of Sanctions(s, DMC, Game-Structure)
15: // this routine will return the strength of the sanction that yields the worst result for DMC ,
16: // given the fact that DMC will choose the C-GI that will minimize the coalition loss
17: // set sanction’s strength initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
18: Strength = −Extreme















20: h = the number of steps which DMC/DMG needs to reach state s1 starting from s
21: SancStrength = None
22: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMC} do











24: SancStrength = min{SancStrength, PrefStrength(s
2
, s,DMC , t)}
25: end for
26: end for
27: for all DMp ⊆ {DM−DMC} do











29: SancStrength = min{SancStrength, PrefStrength(s
2
, s,DMC , t)}
30: end for
31: end for
32: for all DMP ⊆ {DM−DMC} do










34: SancStrength = min{SancStrength, PrefStrength(s
2
, s,DMC , t)}
35: end for
36: end for
37: Strength = max{Strength, SancStrength}
38: end for
39: if Strength < None then
40: Strength = |Strength|
41: end if
42: return Strength
should take note of how the coalition actually decides on its preferences, capture it
in an algorithm, and then modify Algorithm 9.6 accordingly.
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Definition 9.5.3 (Strength of SMR Stability):
1) For an Individual Decision Maker DMi∈DM at time t, and for a SMR
stable state s ∈ SSMR
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s SMR stability, to DMi at time t, i.e.
StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t), is calculated as follows:
((SUI
DMi,t




















































































{PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMi, t),
P refStrength(s
3










⇒ (StabilityStrength (SMR, s,DMi, t) = None)
2) For a Coalition of Decision Makers DMC⊆DM at time t, and for a
SMR stable state s∈SSMR
DMC,t
, the strength of s’s SMR stability, to DMC at time t,
i.e. StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMC , t), is calculated as follows:
((SC−GI
DMC,t














































































, s,DMC , t),
P refStrength(s3 , s,DMC , t)}, None},−Extreme} | ) ]And,
((SC−GI
DMC,t




⇒ (StabilityStrength (SMR, s,DMC , t) = None)
As per the definition, the strength of s’s SMR stability strength for an individual
DMi, in a cooperative game with coalitions, is the positive strength equivalent of
the negative strength of the worst ISM sanction, imposed by other decision makers
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{DM−DMi}, against DMi’s UIs/CIs/C-GIs from s, individually or cooperatively,
given the fact that DMi will choose the UI/CI/C-GIs which will yield the best
less-preferred end state.
Let the SMR’s stability strength of a state s for an individual decision maker
DMi at time t be denoted as SMR(LSS), where StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMi, t)=
L
SS
. Algorithm 9.7, and its additional routine listed as Algorithm 9.8, use Definition
9.5.3 to calculate the SMR’s stability strength for individual DMs in a cooperative
game, with coalitions, and assign the strength’s fuzzy linguistic label.
Algorithm 9.7 Calculating a State’s SMR Stability Strength for an Individual
DM in a Cooperative Game with Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of SMR Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not SMR stable
3: SMR Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMi has any UIs/CIs/C-GIs from s at time t
5: if [SUI
DMi,t
(s) = ∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMg ⊆ DM : DMi ∈ DMg) S
CI
DMg,t
(s) = ∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMG ⊆ DM :




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t
7: SMR Strength = None


















(s)))) [∃ an ISM] then
9: // ISM exists against each of DMi’s UIs/CIs/C-GIs ⇒ s is SMR stable; find strength
10: SMR Strength = Strength of Inescapable Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return SMR Strength
Also as per the definition, for a coalition DMC , in a cooperative game with coali-
tions, the strength of s’s SMR stability strength is the positive strength equivalent
of the negative strength of the worst inescapable sanction (ISM), imposed by other
decision makers {DM−DMC}, against DMC ’s C-GIs from s, given the fact that
DMC will choose collectively the C-GIs which will yield the best less-preferred end
state.
Let the collective SMR’s stability strength of a state s for a coalition DMC
at time t be denoted as SRM (L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(SMR, s,DMC , t)=LSS .
Algorithm 9.9, and its additional routine listed as Algorithm 9.10, use Definition
9.5.3 to calculate the SMR’s stability strength for a coalition of DMs in a cooperative
game, with coalitions, and assign the strength’s fuzzy linguistic label.
As a reminders, it is also important to note here that Algorithm 9.9, and its ad-
ditional routine listed as Algorithm 9.10, and Definition 9.5.3 which the algorithms
are based on, refer to the collective preference of a coalition without specifying
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Algorithm 9.8 The “Strength of Inescapable Sanctions” used in Algorithm 9.7
1: strength-value-label Strength of Inescapable Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // this routine will return the strength of the ISM that yields the worst result for DMi, given
3: // the fact that DMi will choose a UI/CI/C-GI and a countermove that will minimize his loss.
4: // Set sanction’s strength (after DMi’s countermove) initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
5: Strength = −Extreme



















7: ISancStrength = None
8: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMi} do





















10: ISancStrength = min{ISancStrength, PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMi, t)}
11: CntrStrength = −Extreme











15: if ISancStrength < CntrStrength then




20: for all DMp ⊆ {DM−DMi} do





















22: ISancStrength = min{ISancStrength, PrefStrength(s
2
, s,DMi, t)}
23: CntrStrength = −Extreme











27: if ISancStrength < CntrStrength then




32: for all DMP ⊆ {DM−DMi} do
33: for all s2 ∈S
C−GM
DMP ,t+1
(s1) : (((s2 ∈S
≤N
DMi,t








34: ISancStrength = min{ISancStrength, PrefStrength(s
2
, s,DMi, t)}
35: CntrStrength = −Extreme








39: if ISancStrength < CntrStrength then




44: Strength = max{Strength, ISancStrength}
45: end for
46: if Strength < None then




Algorithm 9.9 Calculating a State’s SMR Stability Strength for a Coalition of
DMs in a Cooperative Game with Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of SMR Stability (s, DMC, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not SMR stable
3: SMR Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMC has any C-GIs from s at time t
5: if [SC−GI
DMC,t




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMC at t
7: SMR Strength = None
8: else if (∀s1 : ((s1 ∈ S
C−GI
DMC,t








(s)))) [ ∃ an ISM sanction ]
then
9: // ISM exists against each of DMC ’s C-GIs ⇒ s is SMR stable; find SMR’s strength
10: SMR Strength = Strength of Inescapable Sanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return SMR Strength
how this collective-preference will be calculated. Recall that we said in Section 9.2
that in the absence of having one universal way which coalitions use to decide on
their preferences, we will assume in this chapter the ideal case: members of the
coalition must all agree on the preference, its order and its strength. Therefore, for









And because all the members of the coalition must agree on the preference level,
adopting the ideal case assumes that the safest way to calculate the strength for a
coalition’s preference is to take the minimum of the preference’s strengths across









As a reminder of what we said earlier, using the ideal case (that all members
of the coalition must agree on the preference, its order, and its strength) should
not be considered in any way as a restriction on the framework, but rather a
convenient simple way to refer to coalition’s preferences. In reality, the modeller
should take note of how the coalition actually decides on its preferences, capture it
in an algorithm, and then modify Algorithm 9.9, and its additional routine listed as
Algorithm 9.10, to fit with the way the coalition takes decision on its preferences.
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Algorithm 9.10 The “Strength of Inescapable Sanctions” used in Algorithm 9.9
1: strength-value-label Strength of Inescapable Sanctions(s, DMc, Game-Structure)
2: // this routine will return the strength of the ISM that yields the worst result for DMC , given
3: // the fact that DMC will choose a C-GI and a countermove that will minimize DMC ’s loss.
4: // Set sanction’s strength (after DMC ’s countermove) initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
5: Strength = −Extreme















7: h = the number of steps which DMC/DMG needs to reach state s1 starting from s
8: ISancStrength = None
9: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMC} do
10: for all s2 ∈S
UM
DMj,t+h










11: ISancStrength = min{ISancStrength, PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMC , t)}
12: CntrStrength = −Extreme







14: CntrStrength = max{CntrStrength, PrefStrength(s3 , s,DMC , t)}
15: end for
16: if ISancStrength < CntrStrength then




21: for all DMp ⊆ {DM−DMC} do
22: for all s2 ∈S
CM
DMp,t+h










23: ISancStrength = min{ISancStrength, PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMC , t)}
24: CntrStrength = −Extreme







26: CntrStrength = max{CntrStrength, PrefStrength(s3 , s,DMC , t)}
27: end for
28: if ISancStrength < CntrStrength then




33: for all DMP ⊆ {DM−DMC} do























35: ISancStrength = min{ISancStrength, PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMC , t)}
36: CntrStrength = −Extreme







38: CntrStrength = max{CntrStrength, PrefStrength(s3 , s,DMC , t)}
39: end for
40: if ISancStrength < CntrStrength then




45: Strength = max{Strength, ISancStrength}
46: end for
47: if Strength < None then




Definition 9.5.4 (Strength of SEQ Stability):
1) For an Individual Decision Maker DMi∈DM at time t, and for a SEQ
stable state s ∈ SSEQ
DMi,t
, the strength of s’s SEQ stability, to DMi at time t, i.e.
StabilityStrength(SEQ, s,DMi, t), is calculated as follows:
((SUI
DMi,t











































































⇒ (StabilityStrength (SEQ, s,DMi, t) = None)
2) For a Coalition of Decision Makers DMC⊆DM at time t, and for
a SEQ stable state s∈SSEQ
DMC,t
, the strength of s’s SEQ stability, to DMC at time t,
i.e. StabilityStrength(GMR, s,DMC , t), is calculated as follows:
((SC−GI
DMC,t





















is reached at time t+h )





































{PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMC , t), None},−Extreme} | ) ]And,
((SC−GI
DMC,t




⇒ (StabilityStrength (SEQ, s,DMC , t) = None)
As per the definition, the strength of s’s SEQ stability strength for an individual
DMi, in a cooperative game with coalitions, is the positive strength equivalent of
the negative strength of the worst sanction, imposed by other decision makers
{DM−DMi}, against DMi’s UIs/CIs/C-GIs from s, individually or cooperatively,
given the fact that DMi will choose the UI/CI/C-GIs which will yield the best less-
preferred end state. But recall here that as per Definition 9.4.4, for SEQ stability to
be established the sanctions imposed by other players on DMi’s UIs/CIs/C-GIs out
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Algorithm 9.11 Calculating a State’s SEQ Stability Strength for an Individual
DM in a Cooperative Game with Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of SEQ Stability (s, DMi, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not SEQ stable
3: SEQ Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMi has any UIs/CIs/C-GIs from s at time t
5: if [SUI
DMi,t
(s) = ∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMg ⊆ DM : DMi ∈ DMg) S
CI
DMg,t
(s) = ∅ ] ∧ [(∀DMG ⊆ DM :




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMi at t
7: SEQ Strength = None


















(s)))) [∃ an SMI] then
9: // SMI exists against each of DMi’s UIs/CIs/C-GIs ⇒ s is SEQ stable; find strength
10: SEQ Strength = Strength of SMISanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return SEQ Strength
13:
14: strength-value-label Strength of SMISanctions(s, DMi, Game-Structure)
15: // this routine will return the strength of the sanction that yields the worst result for DMi,
16: // given the facts that: 1) the sanction move must be a UI/CI/C-GI (for the provider); and
17: // 2) DMi will choose the UI/CI/C-GI that will minimize his loss.
18: // set sanction’s strength initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
19: Strength = −Extreme



















21: SMISancStrength = None
22: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMi} do











24: SMISancStrength = min{SMISancStrength, PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMi, t)}
25: end for
26: end for
27: for all DMp ⊆ {DM−DMi} do











29: SMISancStrength = min{SMISancStrength, PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMi, t)}
30: end for
31: end for
32: for all DMP ⊆ {DM−DMi} do
















37: Strength = max{Strength, SMISancStrength}
38: end for
39: if Strength < None then




of s must be UI/CI/C-GI moves by those players who are committing the sanctions.
In other word, they must act “rationally”. They will not hurt themselves in order
to sanction DMi’s UIs/Cis/C-GIs. And this is at the heart of the difference between
GMR stability and SEQ stability.
Let the SEQ’s stability strength of a state s for an individual decision makerDMi
at time t be denoted as SEQ(L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMi, t)=LSS .
Algorithm 9.11 uses Definition 9.5.4 to calculate the SEQ’s stability strength for
individual DMs in a cooperative game, with coalitions, and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
Also as per the definition, for a coalition DMC , in a cooperative game with coali-
tions, the strength of s’s SEQ stability strength is the positive strength equivalent
of the negative strength of the worst sanction, imposed by other decision makers
{DM−DMC}, against DMC ’s C-GIs from s, given the fact that DMC will choose
collectively the C-GIs which will yield the best less-preferred end state. Again here,
for SEQ stability to be established the sanctions imposed by other players on coali-
tion DMC ’s C-GIs out of s must be UI/CI/C-GI moves by those players who are
committing the sanctions.
Let the collective SEQ’s stability strength of a state s for a coalition DMC
at time t be denoted as SEQ(L
SS
), where StabilityStrength(SEQ , s,DMC , t)=LSS .
Algorithm 9.12 uses Definition 9.5.4 to calculate the SEQ’s stability strength for a
coalition of DMs in a cooperative game, with coalitions, and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
Again, it is important to note here that Algorithm 9.12, and Definition 9.5.4
which the algorithm is based on, refer to the collective preference of a coalition
without specifying how this collective-preference will be calculated. Recall that we
said in Section 9.2 that in the absence of having one universal way which coalitions
use to decide on their preferences, we will assume in this chapter the ideal case:
members of the coalition must all agree on the preference, its order and its strength.








And because all the members of the coalition must agree on the preference level,
adopting the ideal case assumes that the safest way to calculate the strength for a
coalition’s preference is to take the minimum of the preference’s strengths across
all the individual members of the coalition. In other words, for Algorithm 9.12:
PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMC , t)= min
DMi∈DMC
{PrefStrength(s2 , s,DMi, t)}
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Algorithm 9.12 Calculating a State’s SEQ Stability Strength for a Coalition of
DMs in a Cooperative Game with Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of SEQ Stability (s, DMC, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not SEQ stable
3: SEQ Strength = NULL
4: // check if DMC has any C-GIs from s at time t
5: if [SC−GI
DMC,t




6: //s is NASH Stable State for DMC at t
7: SEQStrength = None
8: else if (∀s1 : ((s1 ∈S
C−GI
DMC,t







(s)))) [∃ an SMI ] then
9: // SMI exists against each of DMC ’s C-GIs ⇒ s is SEQ stable; find SEQ’s strength
10: SEQ Strength = Strength of SMISanctions(s, DMC , Game-Structure)
11: end if
12: return SEQ Strength
13:
14: strength-value-label Strength of SMISanctions(s, DMC, Game-Structure)
15: // this routine will return the strength of the sanction that yields the worst result for DMC ,
16: // given the facts that: 1) the sanction move must be a UI/CI/C-GI (for the provider); and
17: // 2) DMC will choose the C-GI that will minimize the coalition loss.
18: // set sanction’s strength initially to “Extremely Less Preferred”
19: Strength = −Extreme















21: h = the number of steps which DMC/DMG needs to reach state s1 starting from s
22: SMISancStrength = None
23: for all DMj ∈ {DM−DMC} do











25: SMISancStrength = min{SMISancStrength, PrefStrength(s
2
, s,DMC , t)}
26: end for
27: end for
28: for all DMp ⊆ {DM−DMC} do











30: SMISancStrength = min{SMISancStrength, PrefStrength(s
2
, s,DMC , t)}
31: end for
32: end for
33: for all DMP ⊆ {DM−DMC} do










35: SMISancStrength = min{SMISancStrength, PrefStrength(s
2
, s,DMC , t)}
36: end for
37: end for
38: Strength = max{Strength, SMISancStrength}
39: end for
40: if Strength < None then




As a reminder of what we said earlier, using the ideal case (that all members
of the coalition must agree on the preference, its order, and its strength) should
not be considered in any way as a restriction on the framework, but rather a
convenient simple way to refer to coalition’s preferences. In reality, the modeller
should take note of how the coalition actually decides on its preferences, capture it
in an algorithm, and then modify Algorithm 9.12 to fit with the way the coalition
takes decision on its preferences.
9.5.2 Equilibrium Strength
The same Equilibrium Strength value property of a game at time t, denoted as
EquilibriumStrength(StabilityConcept , s, t), discussed in Chapter 8 for cooperative
games without coalitions, will continue to be used here for cooperative games with
coalitions. Also, the same fuzzy linguistic value label LSS used for for Equilibri-
umStrength will continue to be used here with the same fuzzy memberships func-
tions. And, the strength expressed by the LSS fuzzy label is meant to represent the
strength of the equilibrium under the specific stability concept type StabilityCon-
cept (where StabilityConcept ∈{NASH,GMR,SMR,SEQ}) for state s, for decision
maker DMi at time t. The only difference between the Equilibrium Strength value
property for a cooperative game without coalition, and another for a cooperative
game with coalition, is that the latter will consider two types of players, individual
players and coalitions, while the former considers only individual players.
As indicated in the equilibrium definition given earlier (Definition 9.4.5), the
equilibrium concept must be defined under a specific stability solution concept. An
equilibrium state under a specific stability solution concept is a state that is stable
for all the decision makers, whether coalitions or non-coalition individual players,
in the game under the same stability solution concept. For example, if a state
is an equilibrium under SEQ, then this means that the state is SEQ stable from
every coalition and non-coalition player in the game. As a result, the strength
of the equilibrium for a specific state s under a specific solution concept SC is
tightly coupled with the strength of the SC stabilities of s for each coalition and
non-coalition individual player player in the game.
As a reminder, we said that the StabilityStrength value property before fuzzi-
fication and without normalized has numeric value is in the range [0, 2], there-
fore it will have a fuzzy label LSS ∈ {Extreme, Significant, Strong,Full,Big,Much,
Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null}={Ex, Si, St, F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}. And,
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with the understanding that the complete order of these labels is: Ex>Si>St>F>
B>M>Mo>L>N>Null. And, when the StabilityStrength, before fuzzification,
is normalized, i.e. its numeric value is in [0, 1] , then its fuzzy labels will include
the same labels as above with the exception of the three higher labels covering the
range from [1, 2] and those are: Extreme,Significant and Strong.
As for the StabilityStrength value property, and because of the dependancy, the
Equilibrium Strength fuzzy label LSS∈{Extreme, Significant, Strong,Full,Big,Much,
Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null}={Ex, Si, St, F,B,M,Mo, S, L,N,Null}. And,
with the complete order of Ex>Si>St>F>B>M>Mo>L>N>Null, where the
labels range from representing Extremely strong equilibrium stability (based on the
definition of the solution concept given in StabilityConcept) of s to None strength
level (meaning very weak equilibrium strength and close to non-existing strength)
for s.
The LSS fuzzy label assigned to EquilibriumStrength(StabilityConcept , s, t) will
cover the equilibrium stability strength satisfaction levels, with the understand-
ing that the Null label represents an unknown equilibrium stability strength or
totaly-non-existing-equilibrium. The fuzzy membership functions defining these
stability/equilibrium strength’s linguistic value labels are given in Figure 6.1. The
figure shows the membership functions for each label’s fuzzy set to be trapezoidal
in shape, for simplicity only (not as a restriction) as indicated in Al-Shawa and
Basir (2010). In practice, the number of fuzzy sets and their membership functions
should be defined based on the user needs and requirements, as we indicated in
Al-Shawa and Basir (2009, 2010).
We define, now, the equilibrium strength for cooperative games, with coalitions,
under each of the solution concepts we introduced earlier in the chapter. Recall
that within the context of cooperative games, with coalitions, there are two types
of players: 1) the individual players, with their individualistic aims and objectives
in the games, despite the fact that are able occasionally to cooperate with other
player for specific one-step moves; and 2) coalitions, with their collective aims and
objectives in the game and their ability to perform multi-step coalition cooperative
moves. So, as per Definition 9.4.5, we have to consider the fact that there are
coalitions here, and the assumption that we are making here is that the decision
makers who are part of coalitions have surrendered their stability needs for sake
of the stability of the coalitions that they belong to. For individual DMs who are
not part of any coalition their stability needs must be accounted for separately. If
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it happened that individual DMs who are part of coalitions decided to part from
their coalitions and act individually (not considering the coalition’s stable states
also stable to them), then the definition is still valid. Because those parted DMs
no longer belong to any coalition in the game, and are considered therefore as in-
dividual DMs, and their stability needs must be accounted for separately.
Definition 9.5.5 (Strength of an Equilibrium ): For DM, all decision makers
in a specific cooperative game, with coalitions, at time t, and for state s which is
an Equilibrium for the game under a specific Solution Concept SC, i.e. s∈SSC EQ.
DM,t
,
the strength of s’s Equilibrium stability, to DM at time t, is calculated as follows:
[(∃ (CoalitionDMC⊆DM) s /∈S
SC EQ.
DMC,t



























Algorithm 9.13 Calculating a State’s Equilibrium Strength, under a specific So-
lution Concept SC, in a Cooperative Game with Coalitions
1: strength-value-label Strength of Equilibrium (s, SC, Game-Structure)
2: // start with the assumption that s is not an Equilibrium under SC
3: SC EQ Strength = NULL
4: // check if s is stable for all DMs in the game under Solution Concept SC












6: // s is an Equilibrium for the game under Solution Concept SC; find EQ’s strength
7: // set equilibrium’s strength initially to “Extremely Strong”
8: SC EQ Strength = Extreme
9: // find s’s equilibrium strength
10: for all CoalitionDMC⊆DM do
11: SC EQ Strength = min{SC EQ Strength, StabilityStrength(SC,s,DMC ,t)}
12: end for





14: SC EQ Strength = min{SC EQ Strength, StabilityStrength(SC,s,DMi,t)}
15: end for
16: end if
17: return SC EQ Strength
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As per the definition above, if a state s is stable under a Solution Concept SC,
then the state form an equilibrium for the game (Definition 9.4.5. The strength of
the Equilibrium at s is the minimum strength level of all strengths of s’s stability
under SC for each coalition and non-coalition individual decision maker in the
game.
Let the Equilibrium’s stability strength of state s of the game at time t be
denoted as SC EQ(L
SS
), where EquilibriumStrength(SC, s, t)=L
SS
. Algorithm 9.13
uses Definition 9.5.5 to calculate the equilibrium’s strength and assign the strength’s
fuzzy linguistic label.
9.6 Case Study: Is it Worth Fighting a Patent
Troll? The Showdown between RIM and NTP,
as an example
9.6.1 Background
In late 2001, Research in Motion Ltd. (RIM) of Waterloo, Ontario, the company fa-
mous of its game-changer BlackBerry R© wireless email device had found itself in the
middle of what looks like a normal patent infringement lawsuit. NTP, Inc. (NTP)
a Virginia-based patent holding company, founded in 1992 by inventor Thomas J.
Campana Jr. and Lawyer Donald E. Stout, had filed a lawsuit in the US District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming that over forty system and
method claims from its several patents-in-suit had been knowingly infringed upon
by various configurations of the BlackBerry R© system (Court of Appeals, 2005).
This seemed to many observers at the time as a normal intellectual property legal
case that is brought against RIM by a patent troll. Therefore, the case did not
get any serious media attention at the time. But four and a half years later, RIM
found itself mysteriously embroiled in a battle for its own survival.
The conflict between RIM and NTP holds many features of the classical legal
cases/conflicts between patent trolls and real product innovators. Although, NTP is
not a patent troll per se, it holds one of the key features of a patent troll: it does not
own a product that it actively markets, only patents on papers. In the intellectual
property law parlance, a “patent troll” is an individual or a company that owns
vague or overly broad patents, but does not commercialize them, and waits for an
operating company to infringe them (Melnitzer, 2006). NTP doesn’t exactly fit
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this definition. It was co-founded by Thomas J. Campana Jr., an engineer who
in 1990 created a system to send e-mails between computers and wireless devices.
His wireless e-mail innovations were shown at the Comdex computer show in Las
Vegas. Mr. Campana was working for his own company, but his primary customer,
a wireless carrier called Telefind, was unraveling. To protect his work, he formed
NTP along with a northern Virginia attorney, Don Stout (Associated Press, 2005;
McKenna et al., 2006). In other words, Mr. Campana and his company, NTP, have
products that used his patents, but they were at the early stage of development
when the funding was cut. So when we use NTP as an example for a patent troll,
by no means we say that NTP is actually a patent troll or in any form undermine
the work, the intellectual abilities, and/or the ethical practices of Mr. Campana,
an engineer who has more than 30 years in the wireless communication industry.
The fact that NTP does not have a wireless email device, such as the BlackBerry R©,
that it is actively marketing in the marketplace, it has only patents on papers, and
that it went after the number one player in the wireless email space, RIM, for in-
fringing on NTP’s patents, made the case looks like a patent troll going after a real
product company. The other key feature of patent troll cases that fit the RIM v.
NTP case is: NTP has nothing to lose, except licensing fees, but RIM has much
more than money to lose. Patent trolls, in general, understand this very well. In
fact, if a patent troll does not find the product-company has the financial capacity
to pay “good” licensing fees, he can go after the product-company’s customers, if
they are much bigger and wealthier. For example, see the typical patent troll case,
reported by (Varchaver, 2001), of Jerome Lemelson, or “The Patent King”, going
after the customers who use barcode scanners instead of going after the manufac-
turer of the barcode scanners.
Most of the time, and once the patents found to be valid in courts of law, the
patent trolls get their wishes and the defendants sign licensing agreements, pay and
settle. What separates the RIM v. NTP case from almost all patent troll cases,
and similar cases to the RIM v. NTP case came before and after it, is the fact
that RIM did not pay and settle. RIM fought back hard to the point that experts,
both within the legal domain and the business domain, called RIM’s moves and
actions as: gamble, risky, bold, arrogant, ill-advised, and so on (e.g. Green (2005);
McKenna et al. (2006)).
So, was RIM right in fighting and not settling the case with NTP? and was
RIM right in continuing its fight against NTP even after the courts, in all its levels,
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sided with NTP and against RIM’s position? Looking back, the answer is easy.
RIM paid more than ten times what it was supposed to pay if it settled at the time
the lower federal court issued its decision favouring NTP’s position. Also, if RIM
had settled at that time, it would not find itself fighting for survival four and half
years later, threatened to be shutdown from its biggest market, and losing current
and potential market share to its rivals who allied themselves with NTP. We will
look, at the end of this section, at how the conflict evolved over time, and compare
the actual path the conflict took with the findings and predictions of our analysis.
For decision makers, looking back and judging whether a decision was a good
or a bad one is easy. The difficulty arises when decision makers are required to
choose one strategy versus another on real time. This is when conflict analysis and
decision support methods are supposed to come to play, offering decision makers
methodological methods to test scenarios, weigh options, predict opponents’ next
moves, and offer a look at possible equilibrium end points to the conflict in hand.
In this case study, we look at the RIM v. NTP conflict, model it and analyze it
using the concepts and methods introduced earlier in this chapter. What makes
this conflict an interesting case study to end this chapter with is the fact that it
is not just a conflict that fits the definition of a cooperative game but also it has
coalitions (between NTP and RIM’s rivals) that could be formed, and as a result
affect the main conflict between RIM and NTP.
9.6.2 Structure of the the RIM v. NTP Conflict
Figure 9.4 shows the structure of the RIM v. NTP conflict. Following a conflict
structure that is imposed by the legal system, the conflict moves from stage to
another as it goes from one court to a higher level one through the appeal process.
In the case of RIM v. NTP, and after NTP had filed a federal lawsuit against RIM
accusing it of knowingly infringing upon NTP’s patented technologies, the lower
federal court (the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia) can take
a decision either: 1) against RIM, finding that RIM in fact did and still infringe
upon NTP patents; or 2) against NTP, finding that RIM did not infringe on NTP
patents and therefore the lawsuit is baseless. Once the lower federal court takes its
decision, then the losing party can file an appeal to the higher court, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This higher court also has to take a decision




RIM x NTP Conflict    -     Phase 1
( Before the Lower Court Decision on RIM x NTP Case )




RIM x NTP Conflict    -     Phase 2A
( the Lower Court Decision is against RIM )




RIM x NTP Conflict    -     Phase 2B
( the Lower Court Decision is against NTP )




RIM x NTP Conflict    -     Phase 3A
( the Higher Court Decision is against RIM )




RIM x NTP Conflict    -     Phase 3B
( the Higher Court Decision is against NTP )
NTP x RIM’s Competitors
Side Game
(Not Important to RIM x NTP)
Lower Court Decision on RIM x NTP Case
Higher Court Decision on RIM x NTP Case
Figure 9.4: The RIM v. NTP Conflict: Phases/Iterations of the conflict, and in
each phase there is a main game, between RIM and NTP, and a side game that NTP
plays with RIM compatitors (we use Nokia as an example because it is the biggest
in terms of market share).
Within each of these stages, we call them phases, that the lawsuit goes through,
there are two games played: the main game between RIM and NTP; and a side
game between NTP and RIM’s rivals in the marketplace. In the side game, of
these phases, we intend to test whether RIM’s rivals will find it more stable to sign
license agreements with NTP, or not. Essentially, we will test whether a coalition
between NTP and RIM’s rivals is likely to happen, or not. And, if this coalition is
likely to happen, then will NTP be able to capitalize on this coalition to affect the
main game between it and RIM, puting the main game at a more favourable state
to NTP and a less favourable state to RIM.
Figure 9.4 shows the conflict goes from Phase 1, before the lower federal court
issue its decision on the case, to either: Phase 2A, if the lower court decision comes
in favour of NTP; or Phase 2B, if the lower court decision comes in favour of RIM.
Then either Phase 2A or Phase 2B, the conflict will move to either: Phase 3A, if
the higher court decision comes in favour of NTP; or Phase 3B, if the lower court
decision comes in favour of RIM. In each of these phases, we will analyze both
the main game and the side game, with the exception of Phase 3B where we will
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analyze only the phase’s main game (we found no value to the side game at that
stage –but one can follow the same analysis methods and add it if found some value
for it–).
9.6.3 Players’ Strategic Goals and Alternatives
In this case, we will use a simplified flat modelling of the players’ GCMs. In other
words, we will not model the players’ full goals-tree/s, we will just list the main
strategic goals each of the players have. We, then, let each of the alternatives/option
that the players have contribute to the strategic goals that the players have through
lateral goal (the start intention node representing the alternative/option) to goal
(the end goal is the strategic goal of the player) relationships.
Table 9.1 shows the strategic goals that each of RIM and NTP has in this
conflict. Recall that RIM and NTP are playing in the main game of each phase of
the conflict. Both, RIM and NTP are expected to maintain these goals throughout
all the phases. On the other hand, NTP and RIM’s competitors (we are using
Nokia –the biggest of them– as an example) are playing a side game within each of
the conflict phases.
Table 9.2 shows the strategic goals that each of NTP and Nokia (and other
competitors of RIM) have in these side games. We treat NTP strategic goals in the
main game as different than its goals in the side game, because theoretically they
can be different, even though in this case we assumed that NTP will maintain its
strategic goals in both games, the main and the side game, in each of the conflict’s





Keep the Financial Cost as low as possible and the Finical Gain as high as possible
G
RIM 2
Protect RIM Technologies (especially the key mobile email ones)
G
RIM 3
Protect Current Customer Base and Market Share
G
RIM 4




Increase the (Potential) Financial Licensing Rewards from RIM as much as possible
G
NTP 2




Protect the ownership of the key technologies to the mobile email devices
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Table 9.2: RIM v. NTP Conflict: Strategic Goals for the Side Game Players, NTP
and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia –the biggest of them– as an example)
Nokia Strategic Goals : (these will be the same goals that other RIM’s competitors will have)
G
NOK 1
Keep the Financial Cost as low as possible and the Finical Gain as high as possible
G
NOK 2
Capitalize on RIM Problems and Attract its Customers/Markets
G
NOK 3
Protect Current Customer Base and Market Share
G
NOK 4




Increase the (Potential) Financial Licensing Rewards from RIM as much as possible
G
NTP 2




Protect the ownership of the key technologies to the mobile email devices
phases. This is done because we believe NTP demonstrated a consistent behaviour
of a patent troll, despite the fact that NTP is not by any stretch of an imagination
a typical patent troll as we said earlier. NTP showed that it is motivated by
maximizing the financial rewards of using its patent portfolio and protecting these
patents.
Table 9.3 shows the alternatives that each of RIM and NTP has in the conflict
These are expected to be consistent across all the phases, but limited to the main
games (between RIM and NTP) of these phases. On the other hand, Table 9.4 shows
the alternatives that NTP and RIM’s competitors (Nokia is used here as example
because it is the biggest of them) have in the conflict. Again the alternatives that
NTP and Nokia (and others) have in the conflict are expected to stay the same
across the side games of the different phases of the conflict.
As per Table 9.3, RIM have the option to: continue to fight NTP demands
legally (A
RIM 0
), by all means available to it (such as defending itself in courts,
appealing to higher courts, filing to invalidate NTP patents, and so on); continue
to fight NTP demands and at the same time find a technical workaround (A
RIM 3
),
allowing RIM to run its BlackBerry R© service and network without using NTP’s
technology; reach an agreement with NTP to either license NTP’s technology for
future usage of it and pay for previous usage (A
RIM 1
) or just pay for previous
usage (A
RIM 2
); or finally, withdraw from the US market and stop any operations
there, including stop providing the BlackBerry R© service to current customers there
(A
RIM 4
). Definitely, some of these alternatives are more preferred to RIM than
others but such preferences depend also on the state that the conflict is in, in terms
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Table 9.3: RIM v. NTP Conflict: RIM and NTP’s Alternatives/Options





Fight, in courts, NTP’s demands to license their technology, and pay
for the claimed RIM’s usage of their Technology so far.
A
RIM 1
Reach a Full Agreement satisfying all NTP’s demands to licence the
technology and pay for previous usage.
A
RIM 2
Reach a Part Agreement satisfying some of NTP’s demands, namely
paying for RIM’s previous usage of NTP technology.
A
RIM 3
Fight all of NTP’s demands, but Find a Workaround to what NTP
claims to be their technology.
A
RIM 4
Stop US Sales and Operations.





Fight RIM, in courts, asking it to pay for previous usage of NTP’s
technology, and have it sign a licensing agreement for future usage.
A
NTP 1
Reach with RIM a Full Agreement satisfying all NTP’s demands
to licence the technology and pay for previous usage.
A
NTP 2
Reach with RIM a Part Agreement satisfying some of NTP’s demands,
namely having RIM pay for previous usage of NTP’s technology.
A
NTP 3
Ally and sign Full Licence Agreements with RIM’s Competitors.
A
NTP 4
Give Up and stop the fight, i.e. no longer want to enforce NTP patents.
of what phase the conflict is in and what NTP chooses as a strategy.
NTP, on the other hand, has the following options within the context of the
main game of the conflict, as shown in Table 9.3: continue to fight RIM (A
NTP 0
) by
all legal means available to it in an effort to force RIM to license NTP’s technology
and pay for using it; continue to fight RIM and sign full licensing agreements with
RIM’s competitors (A
NTP 3
) in an effort to add more pressure on RIM and show the
judge and jury that RIM’s competitors are licensing NTP technology (validating
NTP’s case in front of the legal system); reach an agreement with RIM to either
license NTP’s technology for RIM’s future usage of it and pay for previous usage
(A
NTP 1
) or just pay for previous usage (A
NTP 2
); or finally, stop the fight with RIM
over their usage of NTP’s patented technology. It is obvious here too that some
of these alternatives are more preferred to NTP than others but such preferences
depend also on the state that the conflict is in, in terms of what phase the conflict
is in and what RIM chooses as a strategy.
In the side game of the conflict, Table 9.4 shows that NTP and RIM’s com-
petitors (we continue to use Nokia –the biggest of them– as an example) have the
following options to: NTP to wait for its fight with RIM to finish and settle (A
NTP a
)
before it goes after RIM’s competitors; Nokia to wait for NTP to challenge it legally
(A
NOK a
) before it enters in any talks with NTP; NTP to fight Nokia over its usage
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Table 9.4: RIM v. NTP Conflict: Alternatives of NTP and RIM’s Competitors
(Nokia —the biggest of them– as an example)





Wait for the legal fight with RIM to finish before challenging other
companies (e.g. Nokia) to licence-and-pay or go-to-court.
A
NTP b
Fight, in courts, these companies (e.g. Nokia) asking them to licence NTP’s
technology and pay for previous usage.
A
NTP c
Ally and Reach with these companies (e.g. Nokia) Full Agreements satisfying
all NTP’s demands, to license the technology and pay for previous usage.
A
NTP d
Reach with these companies (e.g. Nokia) Part Agreements satisfying some
of NTP’s demands, namely paying for previous usage of NTP technology.





Wait for NTP to challenge/fight Nokia legally.
A
NOK b




Ally with NTP and Reach a Full Agreement satisfying All NTP’s demands
to licence the technology and pay for previous usage.
A
NOK d
Reach a Part Agreement satisfying only some of NTP’s demands, namely
paying for previous usage of NTP technology.
of NTP’ technology in courts and use all legal means to force them into entering in
a full licensing agreement (A
NTP b
); and Nokia to defend itself in courts and use all
legal means available to it to fight back (A
NOK b
).
Alternatively, Table 9.4 shows, both companies, NTP and Nokia (and possibly
other competitors of RIM), can ally and join forces by entering into a full licensing
agreement through which Nokia will use NTP’s technology and NTP collect roy-
alties (Nokia’s A
NOK c
alternative and NTP’s A
NTP c
alternative). This alternative
will benefit both NTP and Nokia (and other RIM’s rivals) by allowing NTP to add
more pressure of RIM as well as validate its case in front of the legal system, and
allowing Nokia (and others) to capitalize on RIM problems by targeting its current
and future customers. Finally, NTP and Nokia (and others) have the equivalent of
the last alternative but instead of reaching a full licensing agreement the parties
reach a partial agreement that covers Nokia (and other RIM’s competitors) pay-
ing for previous usage of NTP’s technology but not licensing NTP’s technology for
future usage (Nokia’s A
NOK d
alternative and NTP’s A
NTP d
alternative).
We will see, when studying the players’ preferences over the conflict’s states, that
both NTP and Nokia (and others) have different preferences over these alternatives
that depend on the stage the conflict is in and on the strategies chosen by the
opponent.
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Table 9.5: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 1: Defining the Conflict’s States
The Set of All States S for the RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 1:
States of RIM v. NTP Game States of NTP x Nokia/Others Game
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In this subsection, we will define the states for the RIM v. NTP conflict. This
includes all the states for each phase of the conflict, and for both games of the
phase, when applicable: the main between RIM and NTP, and the side game
between NTP and RIM’s competitors.
1) Conflict’s States for Phase 1 of the RIM v. NTP conflict
In Phase 1 of the RIM v. NTP conflict, both players have all their alternatives
available for them to choose from. But, it is unlikely that RIM will consider stopping
its operations and BlackBerry R© service at this stage (A
RIM 4
) and before the courts
forces RIM to do so. Similarly, NTP is not expected to stop the fight against
RIM and enforce its patents (A
NTP 4
). The final list of possible states at Phase 1 of
the conflict, and within the main game between RIM and NTP, is shown in Table
9.5. Each state is defined in the table as a set of alternatives that will be chosen
by the players in order to allow the conflict to enter the state. The table also
shows the states for Phase 1’s side game between NTP and RIM’s competitors. In
the side game, both NTP and Nokia (and other RIM’s competitors) have all their
alternatives available for them to choose from.
2) Conflict’s States for Phase 2 (A and B) of the RIM v. NTP conflict
In Phase 2 of the conflict, and similar to Phase 1, both players have all their
alternatives available for them to choose from. Again here, it is unlikely that RIM
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Table 9.6: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2: Defining the Conflict’s States
The Set of All States S for the RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2:
covering states for both Phase 2 cases (A and B, or NTP Wins and RIM Wins)
States of RIM v. NTP Game States of NTP x Nokia/Others Game
State RIM Options NTP Options State NTP Options Nokia Options





























































will consider stopping its operations and BlackBerry R© service at this stage (A
RIM 4
)
and before the courts forces RIM to do so. Similarly, NTP is not expected to stop
the fight against RIM and enforce its patents (A
NTP 4
). And these exceptions will
apply to both players regardless of what the lower court decision was, in favour of
RIM or in favour of NTP, because both players are motivated to not lose at this
stage while they both have options to escalate the fight, and possibly reverse the
lower court’s decision by the higher court .
The final list of possible states at Phase 2 of the conflict, and within the main
game between RIM and NTP, is shown in Table 9.6. Each state is defined in the
table as a set of alternatives that will be chosen by the players in order to allow
the conflict to enter the state. The table shows the states for Phase 2 under: Phase
2A, which applies just after the lower court’s decision was found to be in favour
of NTP and against RIM; and Phase 2B, which applies just after the lower court’s
decision was found to be in favour of RIM and against NTP. States of Phase 2A
are shown in the left side of the “States” column and states of Phase 2B are shown
in the right side of the column. The table also shows the states for Phase 2’s side
game between NTP and RIM’s competitors, again for both Phase 2A and Phase
2B. In the side game, both NTP and Nokia (and other RIM’s competitors) have all
their alternatives available for them to choose from.
3) Conflict’s States for Phase 3 (A and B) of the RIM v. NTP conflict
In Phase 3 of the conflict, and unlike Phase 1 and 2, it is possible that RIM will




be forced to do so, if the higher court orders it to seize any operation in the US until
it satisfies its obligation towards NTP’s rights. Similarly, NTP could decide to stop
the fight against RIM and therefore stop enforcing its patents (A
NTP 4
), especially
if the higher court rejects its claims towards RIM and found its case baseless. But




, in which chooses to have a work around NTP technology
while it is continuing to fight NTP, is useless to RIM at this stage of the conflict
because this will not change the fact that the case has been decided on by the
higher court. If the higher court decides against RIM, RIM must stop its operation
or satisfy NTP demands, as decided by the court, whether RIM finds a workaround
to its usage of NTP’s technology or not. And, if the court decision comes against
NTP, RIM does not need to look for a workaround.
In addition, Alternative A
NTP 3
for NTP has an effect on the conflict and how it
will progress or end., only if the higher court decided against RIM. If this is the case,
allying with RIM’s rivals will give some assurance to the court, and current RIM
customers, that the service will not be completely lost. Companies allied with NTP
will ensure a valid alternative (at RIM’s expense). This definitely will put additional
pressure on RIM to settle, otherwise RIM will be forced to seize any operation in
its biggest market, the US. On the other hand, if the higher court decides against
NTP wishes, then the alliance with RIM’s rivals, and any agreements NTP signs
with them, will not benefit NTP at this stage (this is also the reason that the side
game between NTP and RIM’s rivals does not matter at Phase 3B). NTP can only
take the fight higher to the supreme court or end the fight.
Beside these exceptions both players will have all their other alternatives avail-
able to them regardless of what the higher court decision come to be, in favour of
RIM or in favour of NTP. Both NTP or RIM can take the fight to the supreme
court if they are motivated to not lose at this stage, but RIM options in this regard
seem much limited especially if the courts ordered it to seize any operations in the
US until the supreme court makes its decision (a most likely outcome if both lower
levels of the legal system decided against RIM). RIM can still fight through the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to invalidate NTP’s patents
and/or claims in these patents, but RIM must comply with the higher court or-
der if it gives/confirms a seize-operation ruling. On the other hand, NTP fighting
options seem open, ranging from appeals to multiple cases to appeals through the
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USPTO. Not to mention that NTP has nothing to lose and everything to win if it
continues the fight, especially when RIM starts feeling the heat in the marketplace
with customers leaving because of the uncertainty and its share price suffers.
The final list of possible states at Phase 3 of the conflict, and within the main
game between RIM and NTP, is shown in Table 9.6. Each state is defined in the
table as a set of alternatives that will be chosen by the players in order to allow the
conflict to enter the state. The table shows the states for Phase 3 under: Phase 3A,
which applies just after the higher court decision was found to be in favour of NTP
and against RIM; and Phase 3B, which applies just after the higher court decision
was found to be in favour of RIM and against NTP. States of Phase 3A are shown
in the left side of the “States” column and states of Phase 3B are shown in the
right side of the column. The table shows the states for a side game between NTP
and RIM’s competitors only within Phase 3A of the conflict. As we said above, the
side game is not relevant to the conflict between RIM and NTP at Phase 3B and
will not affect how the conflict progress or end.
9.6.5 Players’ Preferences over States of the Conflict
To calculate the preferences of the players over the conflict’s states, for each phase
and for each game of the state, we calculate how much each state (with all its play-
Table 9.7: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3: Defining the Conflict’s States
The Set of All States S for the RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3:
covering states for both Phase 3 cases (A and B, or NTP Wins and RIM Wins)
States of RIM v. NTP Game States of NTP x Nokia/Others Game
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ers’ alternatives selected as shown in Tables 9.5 - 9.7) contributes to the achievement
of the players’ strategic goals. The sets of strategic goals for the players were defined





























}. All the strategic goals are explained indi-
vidually above in Tables 9.1 - 9.2. The sets of the conflict’s states, for each of the
phases and for each of the games within the phases, are defined in Tables 9.5 - 9.7.
For each game within each of the 3 phases the RIM v. NTP conflict has, we
calculate the Weighted Payoff value for each state for each player using the method
presented in Section 5.4.2. As we will see, the strategic importance of the different
strategic goals, the players have, changes based on the phase the conflict is in
and the game they are in. But, for all the games, in all the phases, we set the
Rationality and Emotionality Factors for the players to Full and None, or 1.0 and
0.0, respectively. In other words, all players are assumed to be fully rational and not
emotional, as one could expect from business entities with institutional collective
rationality. Saying so, the analyst can still test different values for the rationality
and emotional factors, and the implication of such values, by setting up what-
if scenario models as variations to the games’ base models during the sensitivity
analysis stage. This might be important especially if the analyst suspects that some
of the players start acting emotionally, or showing signs of such.
1) Players’ Preferences for Phase 1 of the RIM v. NTP conflict (before
the lower court’s decision)
From the calculated Weighted Payoffs, for each state to each of the players, we
calculate the Ordinal Preferences for the players over the conflict’s states in Phase
1. Figure 9.5 shows the weighted payoffs and the ordinal preferences for each state
of Phase 1’s games, for each player. Figure 9.5a shows the preferences of RIM
and NTP in the main game of the phase. And, Figure 9.5b shows the preferences
of NTP and Nokia (as an example of RIM’s competitors) in the side game of the
phase.
In the main game of Phase 1, as we are showing in Figure 9.5 , NTP is con-
sidering all its strategic goals of Full importance. This is because both financial
and technology-ownership related goals are all important to NTP at this stage of
the conflict, and will continue to be so through out the conflict. RIM, on the other
hand, has its market-share and technology-ownership related strategic goals to be
of Full importance to it. But, because at the time when NTP started to fight RIM
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Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM x NTP Conflict:  Phase # 1
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM NTP
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGRIM SGNTP
SGRIM 1 SGRIM  2 SGRIM 3 SGURIM 4 SGNTP 1 SGNTP  2 SGNTP 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) M F F F F F F
State S0 
Achv(SGk) N B F F B B B
Prvn(SGk) L N N N N N N
Status Quo (2003) FAchv(SGk) -L B F F B B B
NTP insists & RIM fights TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80
{ Achv(ARIM 0)=F, WP(S0, DM) 0.67 0.80
  Achv(ANTP 0)=F } OP(S0, DM) 1 (Best) 3
State S1 
Achv(SGk) N L B M F F F
Prvn(SGk) B N N N F N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -B L B M N F F
 use +  signs Lic. future use TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.48 0.20 0.80 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00
{ Achv(ARIM 1)=F, WP(S1, DM) 0.28 1.00
  Achv(ANTP 1)=F } OP(S1, DM) 4 1 (Best)
State S2 
Achv(SGk) N L B M Mo Mo M
Prvn(SGk) M N N N F N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -M L B M Mo Mo M
Only TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.36 0.20 0.80 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.60
{ Achv(ARIM 2)=F, WP(S2, DM) 0.31 0.53
  Achv(ANTP 2)=F } OP(S2, DM) 3 4
State S3 
Achv(SGk) N M B M L L B
Prvn(SGk) S N N N S N N
NTP insists & RIM fights FAchv(SGk) -S M B M L S B
+RIM develops Workaround TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.24 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.20 0.20 0.80
{ Achv(ARIM 3)=F, WP(S3, DM) 0.44 0.40
  Achv(ANTP 0)=F } OP(S3, DM) 2 5 (Worst)
State S4 
Achv(SGk) N L M S F F B
Prvn(SGk) L N N N F N N
NTP insists & RIM fights FAchv(SGk) -L L M S N F B
+NTP signs Lic Agr. w Others TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.20 0.60 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.80
{ Achv(ARIM 0)=F, WP(S4, DM) 0.27 0.93
  Achv(ANTP 3)=F } OP(S4, DM) 5 (Worst) 2
(a) Preferences for RIM and NTP in Phase 1 of the conflict’s main game.
Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for RIM & NTP) Nokia x NTP Conflict:  Phase # 1
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for RIM & NTP) Nokia NTP
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGNokia SGNTP
SGNokia 1 SGNokia 2 SGNokia 3 SGUNokia 4 SGNTP 1 SGNTP  2 SGNTP 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) M F F F F F F
State Sa 
Achv(SGk) N L F F B B B
Prvn(SGk) N N N N N N N
Status Quo (2003) FAchv(SGk) N L F F B B B
NTP Waits & Nokia Waits TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 0.00 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80
{ Achv(ANTP a)=F, WP(Sa, DM) 0.55 0.80
  Achv(ANOK a)=F } OP(Sa, DM) 1 (Best) 2
State Sb 
Achv(SGk) N N F F M B B
Prvn(SGk) L N N N N N N
NTP Fights & Nokia Fights FAchv(SGk) -L N F F M B B
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.80 0.80
{ Achv(ANTP b)=F, WP(Sb, DM) 0.47 0.73
  Achv(ANOK b)=F } OP(Sb, DM) 2 3
State Sc 
Achv(SGk) N S B Mo F F F
Prvn(SGk) B N N N N N N
Nokia agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -B S B Mo F F F
 use +  signs Lic. future use TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.48 0.40 0.80 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00
{ Achv(ANTP c)=F, WP(Sc, DM) 0.33 1.00
  Achv(ANOK c)=F } OP(Sc, DM) 4 (Worst) 1 (Best)
State Sd 
Achv(SGk) N S B M L L B
Prvn(SGk) M N N N N N N
Nokia  agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -M S B M L L B
(Partial Agreement with NTP) TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.36 0.40 0.80 1.00 0.20 0.20 0.80
{ Achv(ANTP d)=F, WP(Sd, DM) 0.46 0.40
  Achv(ANOK d)=F } OP(Sd, DM) 3 4 (Worst)
(b) Preferences for NTP and Nokia (the biggest competitor to RIM) in Phase
1 of the conflict’s side game between NTP and RIM Competitors.
Figure 9.5: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 1 (before lower court order is issued):
Preferences of RIM, NTP and RIM Competitors (Nokia as an example).
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Table 9.8: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 1: Players’ Preferences in the main game
(RIM v. NTP)
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Table 9.9: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 1: Players’ Preferences in the side game
(NTP x RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example))
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for license rights over the technology used by RIM, as it claims, RIM was prosper-
ing and enjoying huge success in the market, RIM has its financial related strategic
goal a bit less important than the other. The figure shows RIM has its financial
goal, G
RIM 1
, set at the Much importance level, while all other technology-ownership
and market related goals set at the Full importance level.
The strengths of each of the players’ preferences, within each game of the phase,
are then elicited from the weighted preferences shown in Figures 9.5a and 9.5b.
Table 9.8 shows the preferences’ strengths for NTP and RIM in the main game of
Phase 1. And, Table 9.9 shows the preferences’ strengths for NTP and Nokia (as
an example of RIM’s competitors) in the side game of Phase 1. Both tables also
show the preferences vector for each player in each one of these two games.
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2) Players’ Preferences for Phase 2A of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after
the lower court decides against RIM’s position)
From the calculated Weighted Payoffs, for each state to each of the players, we
calculate the Ordinal Preferences for the players over the conflict’s states in Phase
2A. Figure 9.6 shows the weighted payoffs and the ordinal preferences for each state
of Phase 2A’s games, for each player. Figure 9.6a shows the preferences of RIM
and NTP in the main game of the phase. And, Figure 9.6b shows the preferences
of NTP and Nokia (as an example of RIM’s rivals) in the side game of the phase.
In our analysis of the RIM v. NTP conflict, and what happened in it, historically
speaking, we have noticed that RIM puts a lot more importance on its financial
strategic goal, within the context of this conflict, than it should. We will elaborate
later, when we discuss the stability analysis of the conflict and its results, on this
observation and the implication of this on the conflict as it actually unfolded in
real-life. In this section, and for the sake of following the same presentation style
of modelling and analyzing conflicts as used so far in this document, we will show
two preferences models for RIM at Phase 2A of the conflict. First, the Should-Be
RIM’s preferences model based on RIM placing “Little” importance level of its
financial strategic goal, G
RIM 1
. This reflects the fact that RIM, once been handed
a court decision against it at the lower federal court, should have seen the clock
should start ticking and should feel that all its future now is at stake (its current
customers and market in the US). Therefore, RIM places Little importance on how
much resolving this conflict will cost it, but still keeps placing Full importance on
all its market and technology-ownership goals. Recall that this is similar to the
importance levels placed by RIM, as per the Phase 1 preference model for RIM,
shown in Figure 9.5a, with the exception that G
RIM 1
in that model is given a Much
importance level compared to the Little importance level this goal is been given in
the Should-Be RIM’s preferences model for Phase 2A, as shown in Figure 9.6a.
The second preferences model for RIM at Phase 2A is the one which RIM
actually demonstrated historically in the conflict as the conflict was unfolding in
real-life. In this second model, which we will call hereafter as the the Observed
RIM’s preferences model for this phase, RIM keeps the same importance levels it
placed to all its strategic goals in Phase 1 of the conflict (shown in Figure 9.5a).
RIM keeps the financial goal G
RIM 1
set at the Much importance level while all other
goals are set to the Full importance level. In other words, RIM still thinks that
settling the conflict with NTP is not worth paying for, and if it should, then the
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Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM x NTP Conflict:  Phase # 2A (Lower Court Order AGAINST RIM)
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM (SHOULD BE) NTP
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGRIM SGNTP
SGRIM 1 SGRIM  2 SGRIM 3 SGURIM 4 SGNTP 1 SGNTP  2 SGNTP 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) L F F F F F F
State S5 Achv(SGk) N S Mo S B B BPrvn(SGk) L N N N N N N
FAchv(SGk) -L S Mo S B B B
NTP insists & RIM fights TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.04 0.40 0.50 0.40 0.80 0.80 0.80
{ Achv(ARIM 0)=F, WP(S5, DM) 0.32 0.80
  Achv(ANTP 0)=F } OP(S5, DM) 4 3
State S6 
Achv(SGk) N L B M F F F
Prvn(SGk) B N N N F N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -B L B M N F F
 use +  signs Lic. future use TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.16 0.20 0.80 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00
{ Achv(ARIM 1)=F, WP(S6, DM) 0.36 1.00
  Achv(ANTP 1)=F } OP(S6, DM) 2 1 (Best)
State S7 
Achv(SGk) N L B M Mo Mo M
Prvn(SGk) M N N N F N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -M L B M Mo Mo M
Only TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.20 0.80 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.60
{ Achv(ARIM 2)=F, WP(S7, DM) 0.37 0.53
  Achv(ANTP 2)=F } OP(S7, DM) 1 (Best) 5 (Worst)
State S8 
Achv(SGk) N S M S M Mo B
Prvn(SGk) S N N N S N N
NTP insists & RIM fights FAchv(SGk) -S S M S M Mo B
+RIM develops Workaround TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.08 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.80
{ Achv(ARIM 3)=F, WP(S8, DM) 0.33 0.63
  Achv(ANTP 0)=F } OP(S8, DM) 3 4
State S9 
Achv(SGk) N L Mo L F F B
Prvn(SGk) L N N N F N N
NTP insists & RIM fights FAchv(SGk) -L L Mo L N F B
+NTP signs Lic Agr. w Others TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.04 0.20 0.50 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.80
{ Achv(ARIM 0)=F, WP(S9, DM) 0.22 0.93
  Achv(ANTP 3)=F } OP(S9, DM) 5 (Worst) 2
(a) Preferences for RIM and NTP in Phase 2A of the conflict’s main game.
RIM’s Preferences shown here are the ones that should-be RIM’s prefer-
ences.
Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for RIM & NTP) Nokia x NTP Conflict:  Phase # 2A
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for RIM & NTP) Nokia NTP
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGNokia SGNTP
SGNokia 1 SGNokia 2 SGNokia 3 SGUNokia 4 SGNTP 1 SGNTP  2 SGNTP 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) S F F F F F F
State Se
Achv(SGk) N L B Mo B B B
Prvn(SGk) N N N N N N N
FAchv(SGk) N L B Mo B B B
NTP Waits & Nokia Waits TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.80
{ Achv(ANTP a)=F, WP(Se, DM) 0.40 0.80
  Achv(ANOK a)=F } OP(Se, DM) 3 2
State Sf 
Achv(SGk) N N M Mo M B B
Prvn(SGk) M N N N N N N
NTP Fights & Nokia Fights FAchv(SGk) -M N M Mo M B B
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.36 0.00 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.80 0.80
{ Achv(ANTP b)=F, WP(Sf, DM) 0.19 0.73
  Achv(ANOK b)=F } OP(Sf, DM) 4 (Worst) 3
State Sg 
Achv(SGk) N B B B F F F
Prvn(SGk) Mo N N N N N N
Nokia agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -Mo B B B F F F
 use +  signs Lic. future use TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.30 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00
{ Achv(ANTP c)=F, WP(Sg, DM) 0.53 1.00
  Achv(ANOK c)=F } OP(Sg, DM) 2 1 (Best)
State Sh 
Achv(SGk) N B B B L L B
Prvn(SGk) S N N N N N N
Nokia  agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -S B B B L L B
(Partial Agreement with NTP) TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.24 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.20 0.20 0.80
{ Achv(ANTP d)=F, WP(Sh, DM) 0.54 0.40
  Achv(ANOK d)=F } OP(Sh, DM) 1 (Best) 4 (Worst)
(b) Preferences for NTP and Nokia (the biggest competitor to RIM) in Phase
2A of the conflict’s side game between NTP and RIM Competitors.
Figure 9.6: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A (after the lower court order
comes against RIM): Preferences of RIM, NTP and RIM Competitors (Nokia as an
example).
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Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM x NTP Conflict:  Phase # 2A (Lower Court Order AGAINST RIM)
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM (OBSERVED) NTP
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGRIM SGNTP
SGRIM 1 SGRIM  2 SGRIM 3 SGURIM 4 SGNTP 1 SGNTP  2 SGNTP 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) M F F F F F F
State S5 Achv(SGk) N S Mo S B B BPrvn(SGk) L N N N N N N
FAchv(SGk) -L S Mo S B B B
NTP insists & RIM fights TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.40 0.50 0.40 0.80 0.80 0.80
{ Achv(ARIM 0)=F, WP(S5, DM) 0.30 0.80
  Achv(ANTP 0)=F } OP(S5, DM) 2 3
State S6 
Achv(SGk) N L B M F F F
Prvn(SGk) B N N N F N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -B L B M N F F
 use +  signs Lic. future use TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.48 0.20 0.80 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00
{ Achv(ARIM 1)=F, WP(S6, DM) 0.28 1.00
  Achv(ANTP 1)=F } OP(S6, DM) 4 1 (Best)
State S7 
Achv(SGk) N L B M Mo Mo M
Prvn(SGk) M N N N F N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -M L B M Mo Mo M
Only TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.36 0.20 0.80 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.60
{ Achv(ARIM 2)=F, WP(S7, DM) 0.31 0.53
  Achv(ANTP 2)=F } OP(S7, DM) 1 (Best) 5 (Worst)
State S8 
Achv(SGk) N S M S M Mo B
Prvn(SGk) S N N N S N N
NTP insists & RIM fights FAchv(SGk) -S S M S M Mo B
+RIM develops Workaround TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.24 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.80
{ Achv(ARIM 3)=F, WP(S8, DM) 0.29 0.63
  Achv(ANTP 0)=F } OP(S8, DM) 3 4
State S9 
Achv(SGk) N L Mo S F F B
Prvn(SGk) L N N N F N N
NTP insists & RIM fights FAchv(SGk) -L L Mo S N F B
+NTP signs Lic Agr. w Others TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.20 0.50 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.80
{ Achv(ARIM 0)=F, WP(S9, DM) 0.25 0.93
  Achv(ANTP 3)=F } OP(S9, DM) 5 (Worst) 2
(c) Preferences for RIM and NTP in Phase 2A of the conflict’s main game.
RIM’s Preferences shown here are the ones demonstrated by RIM’s be-
haviour at the time.
Figure 9.6: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A (after the lower court order
comes against RIM): Preferences of RIM, NTP and RIM Competitors (Nokia as an
example).
cost should not be that much.
Because of the fact that we are considering two models of RIM’s preferences at
Phase 2A, we have two figures showing the preferences of Phase 2A’s main game.
First, Figure 9.6a shows the preferences of RIM and NTP in the main game of
Phase 2A, with RIM’s preferences are shown as they Should-Be the preferences for
RIM. Second, Figure 9.6c shows the preferences of RIM and NTP in the main game
of Phase 2A, with RIM’s preferences are shown as they were Observed historically
and as demonstrated by RIM at the time. In both figure, NTP’s preferences does
not change. NTP still considers all its strategic goals Fully important. It is not
under pressure to reconsider such thinking.
The strengths of each of the players’ preferences, within each game of the phase,
are then elicited from the weighted preferences shown in Figures 9.6a, 9.6c and
9.6b. Table 9.10 shows the preferences’ strengths for NTP and RIM (based on
RIM’s Should-Be preferences as shown in Figure 9.6a) in the main game of Phase
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Table 9.10: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A: Players’ Preferences in the main
game (RIM v. NTP) - RIM’s Preferences shown here are the Should-be ones (not
observed in reality)
RIM Preferences (Most to Least Preferred) NTP Preferences (Most to Least Preferred)
RIM s7 s6 s8 s5 s9 NTP s6 s9 s5 s8 s7
0.37 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.22 1.00 0.93 0.80 0.63 0.53
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Table 9.11: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A: Players’ Preferences in the main game
(RIM v. NTP) - RIM’s Preferences shown here are the ones actually-demonstrated
by RIM at the time
RIM Preferences (Most to Least Preferred) NTP Preferences (Most to Least Preferred)
RIM s7 s5 s8 s6 s9 NTP s6 s9 s5 s8 s7
0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.25 1.00 0.93 0.80 0.63 0.53
RIM Preferences’ Strengths NTP Preferences’ Strengths
LPS
RIM , t
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Table 9.12: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A: Players’ Preferences in the side game
(NTP x RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example))

















1.00 0.80 0.73 0.40 0.54 0.53 0.40 0.19
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2A. Table 9.11 shows the preferences’ strengths for NTP and RIM (based on RIM’s
Observed preferences as shown in Figure 9.6c) in the main game of Phase 2A. And,
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Table 9.12 shows the preferences’ strengths for NTP and Nokia (as an example of
RIM’s competitors) in the side game of Phase 2A.
3) Players’ Preferences for Phase 2B of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after
the lower court decides in favour of RIM’s position)
From the calculated Weighted Payoffs, for each state to each of the players, we
calculate the Ordinal Preferences for the players over the conflict’s states in Phase
2B. Figure 9.7 shows the weighted payoffs and the ordinal preferences for each state
of Phase 2B’s games, for each player. Figure 9.7a shows the preferences of RIM
and NTP in the main game of the phase. And, Figure 9.7b shows the preferences
of NTP and Nokia (as an example of RIM’s rivals) in the side game of the phase.
In the main game of Phase 2B, as we are showing in Figure 9.7, NTP is con-
sidering all its strategic goals of Full importance. This is because both financial
and technology-ownership related goals are all important to NTP also at this stage
of the conflict, and will continue to be so through out the conflict. For RIM, and
unlike the situation imposed on it in Phase 2A (by the lower federal court been
against it), this phase puts it in a very good position and provides it with an op-
portunity to maintain the importance level it assigned to its strategic goals at the
same levels of Phase 1.
In this phase RIM’s current US customers and potential US market are not
threatened to be lost, if RIM decides to continue the fight and not settle the conflict
with NTP. A situation, that RIM will find itself in if the court’s decision is against
it and in favour of NTP’s position. In fact, in Phase 2B, the lower court just
handed RIM a ruling that enforced its position against NTP. Therefore, RIM should
not lower the importance of the not-paying-much strategic goal, G
RIM 1
, to end the
conflict. Instead, RIM will keep G
RIM 1
at the the Much importance level, and will
keep its market-share and technology-ownership related strategic goals set at the
Full importance levels, as shown in Figure 9.7.
The strengths of each of the players’ preferences, within each game of the phase,
are then elicited from the weighted preferences shown in Figures 9.7a and 9.7b. Ta-
ble 9.13 shows the preferences’ strengths for NTP and RIM in the main game of
Phase 2B. And, Table 9.14 shows the preferences’ strengths for NTP and Nokia (as
an example of RIM’s competitors) in the side game of Phase 2B. Both tables also
show the preferences vector for each player in each one of these two games.
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Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM x NTP Conflict:  Phase # 2B (Lower Court Order AGAINST NTP)
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM NTP
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGRIM SGNTP
SGRIM 1 SGRIM  2 SGRIM 3 SGURIM 4 SGNTP 1 SGNTP  2 SGNTP 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) M F F F F F F
State S10 Achv(SGk) N B F B L L MoPrvn(SGk) L N N N N N N
FAchv(SGk) -L B F B L L Mo
NTP insists & RIM fights TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.20 0.20 0.50
{ Achv(ARIM 0)=F, WP(S10, DM) 0.62 0.30
  Achv(ANTP 0)=F } OP(S10, DM) 2 2
State S11
Achv(SGk) N L F L L L L
Prvn(SGk) B N N N N N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -B L F L L L L
 use +  signs Lic. future use TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.48 0.20 1.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
{ Achv(ARIM 1)=F, WP(S11, DM) 0.23 0.20
  Achv(ANTP 1)=F } OP(S11, DM) 5 (Worst) 4
State S12 
Achv(SGk) N L F L N N L
Prvn(SGk) M N N N N N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -M L F L N N L
Only TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.36 0.20 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20
{ Achv(ARIM 2)=F, WP(S12, DM) 0.26 0.07
  Achv(ANTP 2)=F } OP(S12, DM) 4 5 (Worst)
State S13 
Achv(SGk) N B F F L L S
Prvn(SGk) S N N N N N N
NTP insists & RIM fights FAchv(SGk) -S B F F L L S
+RIM develops Workaround
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.24 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.20 0.40
{ Achv(ARIM 3)=F, WP(S13, DM) 0.64 0.27
  Achv(ANTP 0)=F } OP(S13, DM) 1 (Best) 3
State S14
Achv(SGk) N M F B L S Mo
Prvn(SGk) L N N N N N N
NTP insists & RIM fights FAchv(SGk) -L M F B L S Mo
+NTP signs Lic Agr. w Others TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.60 1.00 0.80 0.20 0.40 0.50
{ Achv(ARIM 0)=F, WP(S14, DM) 0.57 0.37
  Achv(ANTP 3)=F } OP(S14, DM) 3 1 (Best)
(a) Preferences for RIM and NTP in Phase 2B of the conflict’s main game.
Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for RIM & NTP) Nokia x NTP Conflict:  Phase # 2B
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for RIM & NTP) Nokia NTP
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGNokia SGNTP
SGNokia 1 SGNokia 2 SGNokia 3 SGUNokia 4 SGNTP 1 SGNTP  2 SGNTP 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) M F F F F F F
State Si 
Achv(SGk) N L M S L L Mo
Prvn(SGk) N N N N N N N
FAchv(SGk) N L M S L L Mo
NTP Waits & Nokia Waits TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 0.00 0.20 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.50
{ Achv(ANTP a)=F, WP(Si, DM) 0.30 0.30
  Achv(ANOK a)=F } OP(Si, DM) 1 (Best) 2
State Sj 
Achv(SGk) N N B S L L S
Prvn(SGk) L N N N N N N
NTP Fights & Nokia Fights FAchv(SGk) -L N B S L L S
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.00 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.40
{ Achv(ANTP b)=F, WP(Sj, DM) 0.27 0.27
  Achv(ANOK b)=F } OP(Sj, DM) 2 3
State Sk 
Achv(SGk) N L B S L S Mo
Prvn(SGk) B N N N N N N
Nokia agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -B L B S L S Mo
 use +  signs Lic. future use TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.48 0.20 0.80 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.50
{ Achv(ANTP c)=F, WP(Sk, DM) 0.23 0.37
  Achv(ANOK c)=F } OP(Sk, DM) 4 (Worst) 1 (Best)
State Sl 
Achv(SGk) N L B S N N L
Prvn(SGk) M N N N N N N
Nokia  agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -M L B S N N L
(Partial Agreement with NTP)
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.36 0.20 0.80 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.20
{ Achv(ANTP d)=F, WP(Sl, DM) 0.26 0.07
  Achv(ANOK d)=F } OP(Sl, DM) 3 4 (Worst)
(b) Preferences for NTP and Nokia (the biggest competitor to RIM) in Phase
2B of the conflict’s side game between NTP and RIM Competitors.
Figure 9.7: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2B (after the lower court order
comes against NTP): Preferences of RIM, NTP and RIM Competitors (Nokia as an
example).
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Table 9.13: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2B: Players’ Preferences in the main
game (RIM v. NTP)
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Table 9.14: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2B: Players’ Preferences in the side game
(NTP x RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example))
NTP Preferences (Most to Least) Nokia Preferences (Most to Least)
NTP s
k
si sj sl NOK si sj sl sk
0.37 0.30 0.27 0.07 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.23
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N N N N
4) Players’ Preferences for Phase 3A of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after
the higher court decides against RIM’s position)
The Ordinal Preferences for the players over the conflict’s states in Phase 3A are
calculated from the calculate Weighted Payoffs of each state to each of the players.
Figure 9.8 shows the weighted payoffs and the ordinal preferences for each state of
Phase 3A’s game, for each player. Figure 9.8a shows the preferences of RIM and
NTP in the main game. And, Figure 9.8b shows the preferences of NTP and Nokia
(as an example of RIM’s rivals) in the side game of this phase.
In Phase 3A, and as shown in Figure 9.8a, NTP continue to consider all its
strategic goals of Full importance as before. RIM, on the other hand, has the sit-
uation worsened for it. If Phase 2A, in which the lower court agrees with NTP
claims, is a bad phase for RIM, Phase 3A is even worse. In this phase, the higher
federal court agrees with NTP demands, empowering NTP’s position and anteing
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Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM x NTP Conflict:  Phase # 3A (Higher Court Order AGAINST RIM)
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM NTP
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGRIM SGNTP
SGRIM 1 SGRIM  2 SGRIM 3 SGURIM 4 SGNTP 1 SGNTP  2 SGNTP 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) L S F F F F F
State S15 Achv(SGk) N S S L Mo B FPrvn(SGk) L N N N N N N
FAchv(SGk) -L S S L Mo B F
NTP insists & RIM fights TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.04 0.16 0.40 0.20 0.50 0.80 1.00
{ Achv(ARIM 0)=F, WP(S15, DM) 0.18 0.77
  Achv(ANTP 0)=F } OP(S15, DM) 3 3
State S16 Achv(SGk) N L M M F F FPrvn(SGk) B N N N N N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -B L M M N F F
 use +  signs Lic. future use TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.16 0.08 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00
{ Achv(ARIM 1)=F, WP(S16, DM) 0.28 1.00
  Achv(ANTP 1)=F } OP(S16, DM) 2 1 (Best)
State S17 Achv(SGk) N L M M M M FPrvn(SGk) M N N N N N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -M L M M M M F
Only TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.08 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 1.00
{ Achv(ARIM 2)=F, WP(S17, DM) 0.29 0.73
  Achv(ANTP 2)=F } OP(S17, DM) 1 (Best) 4
State S18 Achv(SGk) N L N N N F FPrvn(SGk) F N N N N N N
RIM stops sales & FAchv(SGk) -F L N N N F F
operation in US TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.20 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
{ Achv(ARIM 4)=F } WP(S18, DM) -0.03 0.67
OP(S18, DM) 5 (Worst) 5 (Worst)
State S19 Achv(SGk) N L L N Mo F FPrvn(SGk) M N N N N N N
NTP insists & RIM fights FAchv(SGk) -M L L N Mo F F
+NTP signs Lic Agr. w Others TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.12 0.08 0.20 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00
{ Achv(ARIM 4)=F } WP(S18, DM) 0.04 0.83
OP(S18, DM) 4 2
(a) Preferences for RIM and NTP in Phase 3A of the conflict’s main game.
Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for RIM & NTP) Nokia x NTP Conflict:  Phase # 3A
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for RIM & NTP) Nokia NTP
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGNokia SGNTP
SGNokia 1 SGNokia 2 SGNokia 3 SGUNokia 4 SGNTP 1 SGNTP  2 SGNTP 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) S F F F F F F
State Sm
Achv(SGk) N L B Mo B B B
Prvn(SGk) N N N N N N N
FAchv(SGk) N L B Mo B B B
NTP Waits & Nokia Waits TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.80
{ Achv(ANTP a)=F, WP(Se, DM) 0.40 0.80
  Achv(ANOK a)=F } OP(Se, DM) 3 2
State Sn 
Achv(SGk) N N M Mo M B B
Prvn(SGk) M N N N N N N
NTP Fights & Nokia Fights FAchv(SGk) -M N M Mo M B B
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.36 0.00 0.60 0.50 0.60 0.80 0.80
{ Achv(ANTP b)=F, WP(Sf, DM) 0.19 0.73
  Achv(ANOK b)=F } OP(Sf, DM) 4 (Worst) 3
State So 
Achv(SGk) N B B B F F F
Prvn(SGk) Mo N N N N N N
Nokia agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -Mo B B B F F F
 use +  signs Lic. future use TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.30 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00
{ Achv(ANTP c)=F, WP(Sg, DM) 0.53 1.00
  Achv(ANOK c)=F } OP(Sg, DM) 2 1 (Best)
State Sp 
Achv(SGk) N B B B L L B
Prvn(SGk) S N N N N N N
Nokia  agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -S B B B L L B
(Partial Agreement with NTP) TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.24 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.20 0.20 0.80
{ Achv(ANTP d)=F, WP(Sh, DM) 0.54 0.40
  Achv(ANOK d)=F } OP(Sh, DM) 1 (Best) 4 (Worst)
(b) Preferences for NTP and Nokia (the biggest competitor to RIM) in Phase
3A of the conflict’s side game between NTP and RIM Competitors.
Figure 9.8: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3A (after the higher court order
comes against RIM): Preferences of RIM, NTP and RIM’s competitors (Nokia as an
example).
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up the price for RIM to settle the conflict with NTP. Therefore, RIM at this stage
gives little importance to the financial cost of resolving the conflict, i.e. sets the
importance level for its G
RIM 1
to the Little level. As well, the technology-ownership
goal now is taking a Some importance level, because it is clear that RIM is more
and more losing this battle based on the courts’ decision. RIM now shifts it focus
to keep its customers-base from leaving to other more stable services, as it appears
more and more to the base that RIM is losing control of the situation, and also
protect as much as possible the future potential that it could harness in the US




, respectively, giving each of these two goals
a Full importance level.
Table 9.15: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3A: Players’ Preferences in the main
game (RIM v. NTP)
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Table 9.16: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3A: Players’ Preferences in the side game
(NTP x RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example))
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The strengths of each of the players’ preferences, within each game of the phase,
are then elicited from the weighted preferences shown in Figures 9.8a and 9.8b.
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Table 9.15 shows the preferences’ strengths for NTP and RIM in the main game
of Phase 3A. And, Table 9.16 shows the preferences’ strengths for NTP and Nokia
(as an example of RIM’s rivals) in the side game of Phase 3A.
5) Players’ Preferences for Phase 3B of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after
the higher court decides in favour of RIM’s position)
For Phase 3B, the Ordinal Preferences for the players over the conflict’s states are
calculated from the calculate Weighted Payoffs of each state to each of the players.
Figure 9.9 shows the weighted payoffs and the ordinal preferences for each state of
Phase 3B’s game, for each player. Figure 9.8a shows the preferences of RIM and
NTP in the main game and only game of the phase. Recall that we said earlier the
side game between NTP and RIM’s competitors is not important in Phase 3B. The
side game could have an effect on the main conflict between RIM and NTP only
before the higher court takes a decision on the case, or if the higher court takes a
decision that is against RIM’s position. After the higher court decision, and if the
court’s decision is against NTP’s position, the side game, and any outcome of it,
will not have an effect on the main game.
Figure 9.9 shows that NTP continues in Phase 3B to consider all its strategic
Rationality Factor = 1.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM x NTP Conflict:  Phase # 3B (Higher Court Order AGAINST NTP)
Emotionality Factor  = 0.0 (for RIM & NTP) RIM NTP
Strategic Goals of DMs    SGs: SGRIM SGNTP
SGRIM 1 SGRIM  2 SGRIM 3 SGURIM 4 SGNTP 1 SGNTP  2 SGNTP 3
Strategic Importance SImprt(SGk) L S F F F F F
State S19 Achv(SGk) N S M S L L SPrvn(SGk) B N N N N N N
FAchv(SGk) -B S M S L L S
NTP insists & RIM fights TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.04 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.20 0.40
{ Achv(ARIM 0)=F, WP(S19, DM) 0.34 0.27
  Achv(ANTP 0)=F } OP(S19, DM) 3 3
State S20 Achv(SGk) N L M L S Mo MPrvn(SGk) Mo N N N N N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -Mo L M L S Mo M
 use +  signs Lic. future use TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.10 0.08 0.60 0.20 0.40 0.50 0.60
{ Achv(ARIM 1)=F, WP(S20, DM) 0.20 0.50
  Achv(ANTP 1)=F } OP(S20, DM) 4 (Worst) 1 (Best)
State S21 Achv(SGk) N S M Mo L S MoPrvn(SGk) S N N N N N N
RIM agrees to Pay for old FAchv(SGk) -S S M Mo L S Mo
Only TWFAchv(SGk,DM) -0.08 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.20 0.40 0.50
{ Achv(ARIM 2)=F, WP(S21, DM) 0.36 0.37
  Achv(ANTP 2)=F } OP(S21, DM) 2 2
State S22 Achv(SGk) B F B B N N NPrvn(SGk) N N N N N N N
NTP Stops the fight FAchv(SGk) B F B B N N N
TWFAchv(SGk,DM) 0.16 0.40 0.80 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
WP(S22, DM) 0.54 0.00
  { Achv(ANTP 4)=F } OP(S22, DM) 1 (Best) 4 (Worst)
Figure 9.9: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3B (after the higher court order
comes against NTP): Preferences of RIM and NTP the conflict’s main game. The
side game between NTP and RIM’s competitors does not matter at this stage of the
conflict.
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Table 9.17: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3B: Players’ Preferences in the main
game (RIM v. NTP)
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goals of Full importance, as before. RIM, on the other hand, has the situation
much better than if it is in Phase 3A (where the higher court order is against
RIM), but still the situation is not good. Despite the fact that the higher court
here supports RIM against NTP demands, NTP can still go to the supreme court
or restart all over with new law suits. This means that NTP will continue to drag
RIM into continuos sources of distractions to its operations and market, making
RIM’s problems continue and grow.
Therefore, RIM at this stage too, much like its situation in Phase 3A, gives little
importance to the financial cost of resolving the conflict, i.e. sets the importance
level for its G
RIM 1
to the Little level. As well, the technology-ownership goal now
is taking a Some importance level, because it is clear that RIM is gaining some
support based on the court’s decision but this support is not enough to let the
cloud hanging over RIM’s operations and market go away. This is at the heart of
the patent troll cases, the patent troll has nothing to lose, and their opponents have
much more to lose. In fact the opponents’ best case scenarios are the ones that cut
short the loss and the distraction as early as possible.
But, as in Phase 3A, RIM puts more emphasis into the importance of keeping
its customers-base from leaving to other more stable services, as it appears more
and more to the base that RIM has a lot of problems to resolve, and also protect





, respectively, giving each of these two goals a Full
importance level.
The strengths of each of the players’ preferences, within the game of this phase,
are then elicited from the weighted preferences shown in Figure 9.9. Table 9.17
shows the preferences’ strengths for NTP and RIM in the game of Phase 3B. The
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table also shows the preferences vector for each player in the game.
9.6.6 Players’ Moves over States of the Conflict
At this step, we define the UM moves for each of the players, RIM, NTP and Nokia
(as an example of RIM’s competitors). These moves will be shown in this subsection
for each phase of the conflict and for each game within the phases. We should note
that the states in the figures shown in this subsection are all represented with circles
surrounding their corresponding numbers. For example state s2 will be shown as
a circle with the number 2 at its centre. The figures will also show the CM moves
that none of the players can take on their own, but they can cooperatively, but not
as a coalition, take together.
From these UM and CM moves, and by using the players’ preferences, we will
be able to elicit the players’ individual UIs, cooperative CIs and the coalitions’
C-GIs. We will use for this purpose Algorithm 6.1 to generate each of the players’
list of UIs, Algorithm 8.1 to generate the cooperative CI moves for the players, and
Algorithm 9.1 to generate the coalitions’ C-GIs.
In this section, we will also check if NTP and RIM’s competitors can have a
fruitful coalition in which they all will benefit from some C-GI moves the coalition
have against their common enemy here, RIM. The list of states that the conflict
phases have, in their main game between NTP and RIM, include states in which
NTP reaches an agreement with RIM’s competitors putting additional pressure
on RIM (giving RIM’s current and potential customers a safe exist from RIM’s
service to a stable will-not-be-shut-down licensed service) and giving NTP’s claims
additional legitimacy in the eyes of the courts, the jury, and the market.
But these states, cannot be reached by NTP alone (using some UMs it have),
nor it can reach them cooperatively in one steps. NTP must use multiple-step
group moves, or C-GMs to reach such states, and these moves require a trusted
coalition relation among NTP and RIM’s competitors. But such coalition will not
form, or more accurately the involved parties will not have an incentive to form the
coalition, unless these moves are not only C-GM moves but C-GI moves, by which
the coalition will reach ultimately states that will benefit all, NTP and the involved
RIM’s competitors. Therefore, we will be looking for the existence of C-GIs by the
possible coalition of NTP and RIM’s competitors. Once these moves are identified,
then the analysis should suggest the likelihood of having the coalition formed and
take such C-GIs.
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1) Players’ Moves in Phase 1 of the RIM v. NTP conflict (before the
lower court’s decision)
Figure 9.10a shows the players’ UMs in both the main game (between NTP and
RIM) and the side game (between NTP and RIM’s competitors) of the conflict at
this phase (before the lower federal court rules in the RIM v. NTP case). The figure
also shows the one-step CM moves that the players, in each game of the phase, have
and can act upon jointly. Recall that these moves are identified as possible moves
that the players can have, either individually in the case of UMs or cooperatively
in the case of CMs, but may not lead to improvements in the players’ positions in
the conflict. Only a subset of these moves, the UI and CI moves, that can lead to
such improvements.
Figure 9.10a also shows moves in dotted lines signifying the existence of UM
moves that NTP has between states in different games, the main game and the side
game, of the conflict. As indicated earlier, we will analyze each game in each of
the phases separately, but the fact that one of the players is participating in both
games and may choose to use gains from one game to elevate his position in the
other, makes it more likely that this player will move between the games at certain
points/states. In our case, NTP is a player in the main game between RIM and
NTP, and also a player in the side game between NTP and RIM’s competitors. NTP
will be looking, if it is in its benefit –and ultimately also in the benefit of RIM’s
competitors–, to sign licensing agreements with these companies, i.e. reach state s4 ,
allowing them to capitalize on RIM’s uncertain future within the US market and at
the same time add a layer of legitimacy to NTP claims for technology ownership.
But for NTP to reach s4 , it must: 1) move from the current status quo s0 at the
main game to the current status quo at the side game sa (the dotted line between
s0 and sa); 2) check for a coalition C-GI move that could allow it to reach s4 ; and 3)
if this C-GI move is available, then NTP will follow all the one-step UIs and CIs it
has in the side game until it reaches the signing-license-deal-with-RIM-rivals state
sc , and then move from sc to s4 through a UM it has (the dotted line between sc
and s4); or 4) if this C-GI does not exist, then NTP will take a UM back from the
status quo state sa of the side game to the status quo state s0 of the main game,
i.e. go back to the main game (the dotted line between s0 and sa). Such scenarios
demand these UM moves, denoted graphically as dotted lines in Figure 9.10a.
By feeding the players’ UMs and CMs and preference structures separately to
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NTP x RIM’s Competitors    Side Game
RIM x NTP Conflict    -     Phase 1
(a) Unilateral Moves (UMs) and Cooperative Moves (CMs) by RIM, NTP and
RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example) in both games, the main game
and the side game, of the conflict at Phase 1
RIM x NTP    Main Game
RIM x NTP Conflict    -     Phase 1
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(b) Unilateral Improvements (UIs) and Cooperative Improvements (CIs) by
RIM, NTP and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example) in both games
of the conflict at Phase 1
Figure 9.10: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 1 (before the lower federal court
decision is issued): Moves by RIM, and NTP in the conflict’s main game, and moves
by NTP and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example) in the conflict’s side game.
defined. Figure 9.10b shows the resultant set of UI and CI moves that the players of
both games, the main game and the side game, have in the conflict at this phase. It
is important to note here that by feeding the players’ UMs and CMs and preference
structures to Algorithm 9.1, assuming a coalition among NTP and Nokia (and
other competitors of RIM) is formed, the coalition will not have C-GIs that could
lead to s4 in the main game, the state that the coalition’s members can all benefit
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from. The coalition will be stuck at state sa of the side game, because none of the
coalition’s members have a unilateral UI or cooperative CI out from it. In other
words, the coalition between NTP and RIM’s competitors is not likely to form.
We will elaborate more on this, once the stabilities of the different states to the
different players, individually and collectively, are analyzed in the next subsection.
But, for now, there are no C-GIs of any value to the possible coalition to show.
2) Players’ Moves in Phase 2A of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after the
lower court decides against RIM’s position)
Figure 9.11a shows the players’ UMs in both the main game (between NTP and
RIM) and the side game (between NTP and RIM’s competitors) of the conflict’s
Phase 2A (after the lower federal court rules against RIM and in favour of NTP
in the RIM v. NTP case). The figure also shows the one-step CM moves that the
players, in each game of the phase, have and can act upon jointly. These moves are
similar to the ones that we identified above as possible moves that the players can
have, either individually in the case of UMs or cooperatively in the case of CMs,
in Phase 1 of the conflict. This is because the states that make up Phase 2A are
similar, in their definitions, to the states make up Phase 1. They differ only on the
timing of when the states occur (before or after the lower federal court ruling).
By feeding the players’ UMs and CMs and preference structures separately to
Algorithm 6.1 and then to Algorithm 8.1, the player’s UI and then CI moves for
Phase 2A will be defined. But because of the fact that we have studied two pref-
erences structures for RIM, the should-have-been preferences and the preferences
actually demonstrated by RIM at the time, then we sure will have two sets of UIs
and CIs especially for the main game of Phase 2A in which RIM is a key player.
Both Figure 9.11b and Figure 9.12a show the UI and CI moves that the players
of both games, the main game and the side game, have in the conflict’s Phase 2A.
But, the former figure shows the UIs and CIs for the players, RIM and NTP, in the
main game based on the should-be preferences for RIM, whilst the latter shows the
UIs and CIs for RIM and NTP based on the preferences RIM demonstrated at the
time.
In both versions of the UIs and CIs for the conflict’s players at Phase 2A, shown
in Figure 9.11b and Figure 9.12a, the UIs and CIs for the players in the side game
of the phase do not change. Looking at both figures, one will notice that the UI
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(a) UMs and CMs by RIM, NTP and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an exam-
ple) in both games of the conflict’s Phase 2A.
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(b) UIs and CIs by RIM, NTP and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example)
in both games of the conflict’s Phase 2A. RIM’s UIs and CIs shown here
reflects the preferences that RIM should have had.
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(c) Coalition Group Improvement (C-GI) multi-step moves by the NTP-Nokia-
Others Coalition in both games of the conflict’s Phase 2A.
Figure 9.11: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A (after the lower court decision
comes against RIM): Moves by RIM, and NTP in the conflict’s main game, and
moves by NTP and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example) in the conflict’s side
game, including their possible coalition’s multi-step C-GI moves. [all based on RIM’s
Should-Be Preferences]
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(a) UIs and CIs by RIM, NTP and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example)
in both games of the conflict’s Phase 2A. RIM’s UIs and CIs shown here
reflects the preferences that RIM actually demonstrated at the time.
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RIM x NTP Conflict    -     Phase 2A
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(b) Coalition Group Improvement (C-GI) multi-step moves by the NTP-Nokia-
Others Coalition in both games of the conflict’s Phase 2A.
Figure 9.12: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A (after the lower court decision
comes against RIM): Improvement Moves by RIM, and NTP in the conflict’s main
game, and Improvement Moves by NTP and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an exam-
ple) in the conflict’s side game, including their possible coalition’s multi-step C-GI
moves. [all based on RIM’s Observed Preferences]
example) stay the same, and this is because these moves are not affected by RIM’s
preferences. Only NTP’s cooperative CI moves with RIM in the main game of the
phase are affected.
It is important to note here that by feeding the players’ UMs and CMs and
preference structures to Algorithm 9.1, assuming a coalition among NTP and Nokia
(and other competitors of RIM) is formed, the coalition will have C-GIs that could
lead to s4 in the main game, the state that the coalition’s members can all benefit
from. Figure 9.11c shows the G-CIs for the coalition formed by NTP and Nokia
(and other RIM’s competitors who would like to join). The figure shows G-CIs,
through which the coalition can, at different starting states in the main game or the
side game, end up at state s4 of the main game. These C-GI multi-step moves are
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made possible because the coalition members prefer the licensing-agreement state
sg more than the wait-wait state se .
Figure 9.11c shows the NTP-Nokia-and-Others coalition’s C-GIs on a graph that
shows also the UIs and CIs of the players in Phase 2A, with RIM’s preferences are
the ones that should-have-been RIM’s preferences. Figure 9.12b shows the same
C-GIs for the coalition, but on a graph that also shows the UIs and CIs of the
players in the phase, but with RIM’s preferences are the ones that RIM actually
demonstrated at the time. It is important to note here that the coalition’s C-GIs
in both figures, under the two contexts, are the same. The reason is quite obvious.
As we have said above, the UIs and CIs of NTP and RIM’s competitors in the side
game do not depend on RIM’s preferences. Therefore the coalition’s multi-steps,
which are made of a sequence of UM, UI, CM, and/or CI moves by the member
players of the coalition, as a result will not be affected by RIM’s preferences (and
any UIs/CIs depend on these preferences).
3) Players’ Moves in Phase 2B of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after the
lower court decides in favour of RIM’s position)
Figure 9.13a shows the players’ UMs in both the main game (between NTP and
RIM) and the side game (between NTP and RIM’s competitors) of the conflict’s
Phase 2B (after the lower federal court rules in favour of RIM’s position and against
NTP). The figure also shows the one-step CM moves that the players, in each game
of the phase, have and can act upon jointly.
These moves are similar to the ones that we identified above as possible moves
that the players can have, either individually in the case of UMs or cooperatively in
the case of CMs, in Phase 1 as well as in Phase 2A of the conflict. This is because
the states that make up Phase 2B are similar, in their definitions, to the states
make up Phase 1 and Phase 2A. They differ only in the timing of when the states
occur (before or after the lower federal court’s ruling), and or in the context (the
lower court’s ruling is in favour of RIM or NTP).
By feeding the players’ UMs and CMs and preference structures separately to
Algorithm 6.1 and then to Algorithm 8.1, the player’s UI and then CI moves will be
defined for this phase. Figure 9.13b shows the resultant set of UI and CI moves that
the players of both games, the main game and the side game, have in the conflict at
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(b) Unilateral Improvements (UIs) and Cooperative Improvements (CIs) by
RIM, NTP and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example) in the conflict’s
both games: the main game and the side game.
Figure 9.13: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2B (after the lower court decision
comes against NTP): Moves by RIM, and NTP in the conflict’s main game, and
moves by NTP and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example) in the conflict’s side
game.
and preference structures to Algorithm 9.1, and agin as before assuming a coalition
among NTP and Nokia (and other competitors of RIM) is formed, the coalition will
not have C-GIs that could lead to s4 in the main game, the state that the coalition’s
members can all benefit from. The coalition will be stuck at state s
i
of the side
game, because none of the coalition’s members have a unilateral UI or cooperative
CI out from it. In other words, the coalition between NTP and RIM’s competitors
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is not likely to form. We will elaborate more on this, once the stabilities of the
different states to the different players, individually and collectively, are analyzed
in the next subsection. But, for now, there are no C-GIs of any value to the possible
coalition to show.
4) Players’ Moves in Phase 3A of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after the
higher court decides against RIM’s position)
Figure 9.14a shows the players’ UMs in both the main game (between NTP and
RIM) and the side game (between NTP and RIM’s competitors) of the conflict’s
Phase 3A (after the higher federal court rules against RIM’s position and in favour
of NTP). The figure also shows the one-step CM moves that the players, in each
game of the phase, have and can act upon jointly.
These moves are similar to the ones that we identified above as possible moves
that the players can have, either individually in the case of UMs or cooperatively
in the case of CMs, in Phase 1 as well as in Phase 2A and 2B of the conflict. But
there are some differences. Most notably, in this phase, RIM has a state replaces
the workaround state that it used to have before (states s3 , s8 and s13 in Phase 1,
2A and 2B, respectively) with state s18 . s18 represents RIM leaving the US market
and seizing any operations there. These changes in the states landscape caused
some differences in the moves allowed for the players at this phase of the conflict.
By feeding the players’ UMs and CMs and preference structures separately to
Algorithm 6.1 and then to Algorithm 8.1, the player’s UI and then CI moves will
be defined for this phase. Figure 9.14b shows the resultant set of UIs and CIs that
the players of the main game, and the side game, have in the conflict at this phase.
It is important to note here that by feeding the players’ UMs and CMs and
preference structures to Algorithm 9.1, assuming a coalition among NTP and Nokia
(and other competitors of RIM) is formed, the coalition will have C-GIs that could
lead to s19 in the main game, the state that the coalition’s members can all benefit
from. Figure 9.14c shows the G-CIs for the coalition formed by NTP and Nokia
(and other RIM’s rivals who would like to join). The figure shows G-CIs, through
which the coalition can, by starting at some states in the main game or the side
game, end up at state s19 of the main game. These C-GI multi-step moves are made
possible because the coalition members prefer the licensing-agreement state so over
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(b) Unilateral Improvements (UIs) and Cooperative Improvements (CIs) by
RIM and NTP in the conflict’s main game.
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(c) Coalition Group Improvement (C-GI) multi-step moves by the NTP-Nokia-
Others Coalition in both games of the conflict’s Phase 3A.
Figure 9.14: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3A (after the higher court decision
comes against RIM): Moves by RIM and NTP in the conflict’s main game, and moves
by NTP and RIM’s Competitors (Nokia as an example) in the conflict’s side game,
including their possible coalition’s multi-step C-GI moves.
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5) Players’ Moves in Phase 3B of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after the
higher court decides in favour of RIM’s position)
Figure 9.15a shows the players’ UMs in both the main game (between NTP and
RIM) and the side game (between NTP and RIM’s competitors) of the conflict’s
Phase 3B (after the higher federal court rules in favour of RIM’s position and
against NTP in the RIM v. NTP case). The figure also shows the one-step CM
moves that the players have in the main game, and the only game that this phase
has.
In this phase there is no state equivalent to the state represented, in the previous
phases, NTP reaching a licensing agreement with RIM’s competitors (states s4 , s9
and s14 in Phase 1, 2A and 2B, respectively). This is because such an agreement,
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(a) Unilateral Moves (UMs) and Cooperative Moves (CMs) by RIM and NTP
in the conflict’s main game.
RIM x NTP    Main Game
RIM x NTP Conflict    -     Phase 3B
202221
23  NTP UI
 RIM UI
CI
(b) Unilateral Improvements (UIs) and Cooperative Improvements (CIs) by
RIM and NTP in the conflict’s main game.
Figure 9.15: The RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3B (after the higher court decision
comes against NTP): Moves by RIM and NTP in the conflict’s main game. The
conflict’s side game between NTP and RIM’s Competitors in not important to the
main game in this phase.
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not need to study the side game at this phase of the conflict). Also, RIM has no
state representing the workaround state that it used to have before (states s3 , s8
and s13 in Phase 1, 2A and 2B, respectively), or a state representing RIM leaving
the US market and seizing any operations there (state s18 in Phase 3A). In addition,
because of the higher federal court ruling against NTP in this phase, NTP has a
new state that represents giving up the fight with RIM (state s23). These changes
in the states landscape caused some limitations to the moves the players can have
at this phase of the conflict.
By feeding the players’ UMs and CMs and preference structures separately to
Algorithm 6.1 and then to Algorithm 8.1, the player’s UI and then CI moves will
be defined for this phase. Figure 9.15b shows the resultant set of UI and CI moves
that the players of the main game, and the only game we have in the conflict at
this phase. It is important to note here that, similar to the situation in Phase 3A
of the conflict, there is no coalition’s moves here since the side game is no longer
important to the conflict between RIM and NTP. The conflict is now just between
RIM and NTP, and is guided by whatever UIs they have individually or CIs they
have cooperatively at this phase. Therefore, there is no coalition at this phase too,
and there are no C-GIs to show as a result.
9.6.7 Stability Analysis of the RIM v. NTP Conflict
In this section, we will analyze the three phases of the RIM v. NTP conflict, each
with the games it has. For each, we start by conducting stability analysis, fol-
lowed by equilibrium states analysis. We will discuss the insight that both analyses
provide.
1) Stability Analysis for Phase 1 of the RIM v. NTP conflict (before the
lower court’s decision)
Table 9.18 presents the stability analysis of the the five states of Phase 1’s main
game, for both RIM and NTP, under NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ solution con-
cepts. Table 9.19 shows the equilibrium states for the main game under the four
solution concepts.
As Table 9.18 shows, RIM’s only stable state, under any solution concept, is
the status quo state s0 . This is because the worst that NTP can do to RIM in this
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game, at this phase, is to take RIM to state s0 . which is the most preferred state
to RIM in the game. Therefore, NTP cannot do any disimprovement to RIM, if
RIM takes a UI to s0 from any of the game’s states. As a result, none of the games
states is stable to RIM with the exception of s0 .
And, because RIM has no UI/CI out of s0 to any other state, then this state
is a NASH stable state for RIM. Also, because RIM can reach this state through
many UI moves it has from other states in the main game, the strength of the
NASH stability of this state to RIM equals the least preference strength it has
with these other states (NASH stability strength for individual player within a
cooperative conflict with coalitions is given in Definition 9.5.1 and calculated by
applying Algorithm 9.3). Referring back to RIM’s preferences in the main game
of Phase 1 shown in Table 9.8, we see that out of all the states that can lead to
s0 through a UI, coming from s3 provides RIM with the least preference gain, of
Little gain. This makes the strength of s0 ’s NASH stability to RIM set at the Little
strength level.
NTP, on the other hand, has all states of Phase 1’s main game stable to it under
one or more of the solution concepts. NTP has a UI from each of s3 and s2 to the
status quo state s0 . RIM can disimprove any of these two NTP’s UIs by sanctioning
them and moving the game to s3 , leaving NTP with GMR stability for s3 and for
s2 . The GMR stability strength for each of s3 and s2 matches the disimprovement
that could happen to NTP because of RIM’s sanctions. Notice that both s3 and s2
are not SMR stable for NTP because NTP can recover from such disimprovement
by moving back to s0 . Also, both states are not SEQ stable for NTP, because these
RIM’s sanctions are not UI moves to RIM. This means that RIM, if it takes any
of these two sanctions, it will be acting in an irrational way against its preferences
structure, motivated by the urge to hurt NTP even if this means that it will hurt
itself in the process.
In addition, NTP has state s4 as a GMR, SMR and SEQ stable state for it in
this game. This is because the cooperative CI move that NTP can have jointly with
RIM might get sanctioned by RIM afterwords by RIM taking one of two UIs it has
from s4 to either state s0 (a Little less preferred state for NTP than s4) or to state
s3 (a Moderately less preferred state for NTP than s4). This makes s4 GMR as well
as SEQ stale for NTP, with strength set at the Moderate level. And, because NTP
has no countermove to the first sanction and a countermove to the sanctions that
leaves the game at state s0 , state s4 is also an SMR stable with strength set at the
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Furthermore, NTP has states s1 and s0 as NASH stable states for it at strengths
Extreme and Little levels, respectively. This is because NTP has no UIs, CIs, or
C-GIs out of these two states. It also cannot reach s4 without a coalition that is
unlikely to form because NTP and RIM’s competitors has no incentive, or C-GI
leading them to s4 , to form such coalition (see the stability analysis for the side
game of this phase which will be presented shortly). Hence, the Extreme NASH
stability of s4 for NTP. At the same time, the status quo state s0 can be reached,
by way of an NTP’s UIs, from states s3 and s2 . By applying Algorithm 9.3, s0 ’s
NASH stability for NTP is found to be at the Little strength level.
The overall stability of the states in Phase 1’s main game is shown in Table
9.19. The only stable state for all players within this game, i.e. equilibrium state
for the game, is the status quo state s0 . This means that all the other states in the
game are unstable for at least one player. In this case, RIM has all other stables
as unstable to it. And, for this reason the main game between RIM and NTP is
likely to be stuck at the status quo s0 state, where both fighting each other in the
court system. This is because s0 is the only equilibrium state for the conflict at
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Table 9.20: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 1: Stability Analysis for the side game
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Table 9.21: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 1: Equilibrium States for the side game













this phase, before the lower federal court decides on the RIM v. NTP case, as per
the analysis presented. Historically, this is exactly what happened.
We have said above that a coalition between NTP and RIM’s competitors is not
likely to form at Phase 1 of the RIM v. NTP conflict. The reason behind this will
be more obvious, once we present the stability and equilibrium analysis of the side
game of Phase 1. Table 9.20 presents the stability analysis of the the four states of
Phase 1’s side game, for both NTP and Nokia (the biggest of RIM’s competitors
used here as an example), under NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ solution concepts.
Table 9.21 shows the equilibrium states for the side game under the four solution
concepts.
From able 9.20, we can see that Nokia (and other RIM’s competitors) will
not likely settle, or sign any agreement, with NTP (states sc or sd). Nokia will
likely use the UIs it has from these states to the fight-NTP-legally state s
b
. All
other RIM’s competitors will do the same thing, based on their preferences, and
logically speaking since all want to see if NTP has a strong case against RIM. In
addition, RIM is not yet suffering in the marketplace because of this case, and
RIM’s customers are not likely at this stage to look for alternatives because of fear
of disruption or cut in the services. These things can happen only when RIM start
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losing legally to NTP and/or the cloud of uncertainty start thickening around its
service and future in the US market. NTP cannot sanction the UIs that Nokia, and
others, will take out of states sc or sd to state sb , a NASH stable for them but a very
weak one (at strength level set at the None level). If NTP does take the move it has
from s
b
to the status quo sa , which is a UI move from NTP, then Nokia and other
RIM’s competitors will be at the best state for them, preference-wise. Therefore,
sa is a NASH stable for Nokia, and others, with strength set at the Extreme level,
whilst sc and sd are not stable for them.





because it has UIs out from them to state sa or to states sa and sb (respectively),
and Nokia/Others cannot sanction such UIs. But, as the table shows, sc is a NASH
stable state to NTP because NTP does not have a UI out of it, and with strength
set at the Extreme level because it cannot reach this state on its own.
The only state in Phase 1’s side game that is stable for all players, NTP and
Nokia (and others), is the status quo state sa , which represents all players wait for
the results of the lower federal court ruling on RIM v. NTP case. sa is NASH for all
players, because none of the side game players has a UI, CI or C-GI out of sa . And,
the strength for sa ’s NASH stability for Nokia (and others) is set at the Extreme
level, because they cannot reach this state on their own, and their stay there is at
the mercy of NTP’s decision to challenge them legally for what it claims its rights.
Also, the strength of sa ’s NASH stability for NTP is calculated applying Algorithm
9.3 to be set at the very-weak None level. This is because NTP can reach state sa
by using UIs it has from state s
b
(where NTP and Nokia–and others– are fighting
in the courts) and from state sc (where NTP and Nokia–and others– reach a partial
agreement that does not include a licensing component). The least preference gain
from these UIs is the one accomplished by moving from the s
b
to sa with NTP
gaining almost nothing in such move. Hence, the very weak None strength of sa ’s
NASH stability for NTP.
This makes sa a NASH equilibrium for Phase 1’s side game with strength set
at None level. In other words, the side game in Phase 1 of the conflict has the
weakest strength level. NASH, by definition is a weak stability; and NASH at
strength None brings down the stability of this state. This is understandable for
many reasons. For all players in the side game, NTP and RIM’s competitors, it
is a wait and see game. NTP can challenge those players legally but will gain
nothing in the process. If NTP waits until the courts agree with its case with RIM,
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it will be in a better position. It will be able to sign those companies for more
licensing fees, and can use such agreements to add another layer of legitimacy to
its claims. Not to mention, the additional pressure RIM will face if it decides not
to settle. For RIM’s competitors, it is also wait and see. They do not like the idea
to license NTP’s technology and pay for it, but this may change if RIM is dragged,
willingly or forcefully, into a long battle with NTP. Then, there may be a chance
for a coalition between NTP and all other against RIM (the market leader). This
coalition, then, will benefit all of the players except RIM, their common enemy.
So far, and based on the analysis of Phase 1’s side game, the coalition is not
likely because none will benefit from it. A good indication that no member of this
NTP-Nokia-Others coalition will benefit from such coalition is the fact that there
is no C-GIs that could materialize for this coalition and affect the dynamics within
the main game between NTP and RIM. The side game in this phase has no C-GIs
that could change the main game from one state to another. Therefore, based on
this analysis of the side game, the side game is more likely to stay put at its current
status quo sa because this state is the only equilibrium to the side game at this
phase. And, even though this equilibrium is of weak strength, it is stable for all
the players, nevertheless.
2) Stability Analysis for Phase 2A of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after the
lower court decides against RIM’s position)
Phase 2A represent the stage of the conflict where the lower federal court decides
against RIM. Table 9.22 presents the stability analysis of the the five states of
Phase 2A’s main game, for both RIM and NTP, under NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ
solution concepts. Table 9.23 shows the equilibrium states for the main game under
the four solution concepts. Recall that we have two versions of RIM’s preferences
structure for Phase 2A of the conflict: 1) the should-be RIM’s preferences; and 2)
the observed preferences that historically RIM demonstrated at the time. Table 9.22
and Table 9.23 show the stability analysis and the equilibrium analysis, respectively,
of Phase 2A’s main game using RIM’s should-be preferences. The stability analysis
and equilibrium analysis of Phase 2A’s main game using the preferences that RIM
actually demonstrated at the time are presented later, after the should-be analysis
tables, in Table 9.24 and Table 9.25, respectively.
As the stability analysis of Phase 2A’s main game based on the should-be RIM’s
preferences provided in Table 9.18 shows, RIM has all the phase’s states stable under
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Table 9.22: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A: Stability Analysis for the main game
(RIM v. NTP) - based on the Should-be RIM’s Preferences not the ones observed in
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one or more of the solution concepts, and at different stabilities’ strength levels.
Both states s7 and s6 , in which RIM reaches an agreement with NTP (partial
agreement that covers old usage for state s7 and full licensing agreement for state
s6), are NASH stable states for RIM because RIM has no UIs or CIs out of them,
and with stabilities’ strength set at the Extreme level for both because RIM cannot
reach these states on its own through any of its UIs.
State s8 , in which RIM comes out with a workaround to NTP’s wireless email
technology, is GMR stable for RIM because if RIM decides to cooperate with NTP
in reaching an agreement putting the conflict at state s6 , NTP might decide to
cut the agreement talks short, sanction it and go back to fighting RIM. Of course,
this is not a rational sanction by NTP, if NTP decides to take it. Hence, the fact
that s8 is not SEQ stable for RIM. But, because RIM has a countermove from this
sanction to state s5 , lowering the bad effect of the sanction from Little (the GMR
strength level) to None, s8 is considered SMT stable for RIM at stability strength
level of None.
In addition, the both-parties-fighting state s5 is GMR stable for RIM because if
RIM tries to enhance its position by going to state s8 , in which it will keep fighting
but at the same time prepare a workaround NTP’s technology for its service, or by
going to state s6 , in which it cooperates with NTP to reach a full scale licensing
agreement, NTP might just sanction any of these UI moves by RIM using a multi-
step move NTP has with its coalition (a coalition formed by NTP and RIM’s
competitors). This coalition’s sanction is a C-GI move if it starts from s8 , but just
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a C-GM move if it starts from s6 (because of this, s5 is not SEQ stable for RIM),
and will put the game at state s9 . This sanction will put RIM at a worse place in
the game because now NTP, partnering with RIM’s competitors in the marketplace,
manages to legitimize its claims for the technology in front of the court and in front
current/potential customers of RIM. RIM will end up at state s9 , which is Little
less-preferred than s5 , therefore the strength of s5 ’s GMR stability for RIM is set
at the Little level.
Also, notice that s5 is not SMR stable for RIM, because RIM can ignore the
facts on the ground created by s9 and go to sate s8 , which is more preferred to it
than s5 which it started from. But in reality, RIM cannot just ignore the facts on
the ground created by NTP and its new coalition moving the game to state s9 . If
RIM decides to take any of its individual UIs or cooperative CIs from s9 (shown
in Table 9.22 under RIM’s s9), the coalition will use a multi-step sanction move,
it has from any of these UIs/CIs end states, bringing the game back to s9 . Yes,
the coalition will gain nothing. Hence, the fact that s9 is GMR stable for RIM
at strength level of None. And, if the coalition sanction started from s6 , then this
sanction is not rational for the coalition, namely NTP –its main player–. Hence, the
fact that s9 is not SEQ stable for RIM. In addition, RIM can still persist fighting,
and, or even better, fight but find a workaround solution, i.e. RIM can enhance its
position from s9 , as a countermove to the coalition sanction. This makes s9 not an
SMR stable state for RIM in this game.
For NTP, this phase of the conflict is a good phase. The lower federal court have
just agreed with its claims, putting pressure on RIM to cave in to NTP demands.
In terms of stability of the conflict’s states for RIM, the picture is not bad either,
as can be seen from Table 9.22. Understandably, State s6 is NASH stable for NTP
because NTP has no UI or CI out of it, and with strength set at the Extreme level
because NTP cannot reach this state on its own, it must cooperate with RIM to do
so. State s9 is GMR stable for NTP because NTP fears RIM moving away from an
initial cooperative CI joint move by NTP and RIM to reach a licensing agreement
(s6). This sanction by RIM is not a rational one for RIM, based on the should-be
RIM’s preferences structure. Hence, state s9 is SEQ stable for NTP. And, NTP has
a countermove for this sanction, bringing the game back to the facts in the ground
created by its coalition’s licensing-agreement move. This countermove makes the
strength of s6 ’s SMR stability for NTP set at the None level, easing the state’s
GMR stability of Small strength level (equal to the loss at the preference scale that
NTP will have with RIM’s sanction been the one that takes the game to s8).
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Table 9.23: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A: Equilibrium States for the main game
(RIM v. NTP) - based on the Should-be RIM’s Preferences not the ones observed in
reality at the time
s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
NASH EQ. Ex
GMR EQ. L N N N
SMR EQ. N
SEQ EQ. N
Both states s5 and s8 are GMR stable for NTP, making NTP not wanting to
take any of its UI, CI and or C-GIs of these two states. NTP will be afraid that
RIM will sanction its improvement moves by either moving to state s5 or s8 . This
puts the strengths of s5 ’s GRM stability for NTP at Little level, and s8 at the
None GMR strength level. Definitely, NTP can fight back by putting the game at
state s9 which is much preferred to it, making in the process both s5 and s8 not
SMR stable to it. And, because some of RIM’s sanction moves, especially the ones
in response to NTP’s CI move to s6 , are not rational moves for RIM (under the
should-be RIM’s preferences model), both s5 and s8 cannot be SEQ stable state for
NTP.
The overall stability of the states in Phase 2A’s main game, with RIM’s should-
be preferences considered, is shown in Table 9.23. As the table shows, state s6 ,
in which RIM reaches a licensing agreement with NTP, forms a NASH equilibrium
because neither RIM nor NTP has a UI out of this state. The strength of the state’s
NASH is set at the Extreme level because neither can reach this state on its own.
They have to cooperate jointly to make it to s6 .
Table 9.23 shows another important fact about the equilibrium states, and po-
tential resolution points for the RIM v. NTP conflict at Phase 2A of the conflict.
It shows that s6 is the only equilibrium for the conflict at this stage, assuming that
both players, NTP and RIM, act rationally. The table shows that the conflict has
three other equilibriums at this stage, at states: s5 , s8 and s9 . But all these equi-
librium states are equilibriums under the GMR solution concepts. In other words,
each of the players at these states will fear the other player act for the purpose of
hurting the opponent, even if it means that the opponent will hurt himself in the
process. An unlikely scenario, given the collective rationality established at the in-
stitutional level within the business world. Therefore, s6 is a more likely resolution
to the conflict at Phase 2A, if and only if the conflict ends at this phase, given
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Table 9.24: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A: Stability Analysis for the main game
(RIM v. NTP) - based on RIM’s Preferences that were actually-demonstrated by
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the rationality of both players in the conflict. Saying so, one should notice that s5
is slightly more stable as a GMR equilibrium, strength-wise, than the other GMR
equilibriums. Again, showing that if both players act rationally, they will fear the
escalation of the fight. The escalator will soon see his opponent escalates the fight
from his side too.
But, how will Phase 2A’s stability and equilibrium analysis, provided above,
change, if we consider the preferences structure that RIM actually demonstrated
historically at the time, instead of using RIM’s should-be preferences structure?
The question could be easily answered by comparing the analysis tables for Phase
2A given RIM’s should-be preferences, Tables 9.22 and 9.23, with the phase’s stabil-
ity and equilibriums analysis tables given RIM’s preferences observed at the time,
Tables 9.24 and 9.25.
First, by comparing RIM’s should be preferences shown in Table 9.10 to the
actual preferences demonstrated by RIM at the time shown in Table 9.11, one will













based on the actually demonstrated ones; and 2) while RIM’s weighted preferences
show very weak preferences across all the states, in both cases –the should-be and
the demonstrated preferences–, with each state is preferred or less-preferred to the
other states by a strength degree of None, the should-be preferences structure show
a stronger less-preference of state s9 to all other states by a strength degree of Little.
At the heart of the reasons behind these changes is the fact that RIM still valued
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what it considered a fair finical value of NTP settlement more than the actual
settlement of the case, and moving on to focus on its core business of stabilizing
its position in the market and growing its customer base (see Figures 9.6a and 9.6c
for the strategic importance RIM assigned to its goals based on both cases). Thus,
RIM underestimated the impact of continue its fight with NTP and the fact that
its competitors in the market will capitalize on its distraction, and what seemed
RIM’s obsession to win the legal case it has with NTP, to win over RIM’s customer
and gain market share.
The changes in RIM’s preferences, between the should-be and the actual struc-
tures, resulted on a change in RIM’s UIs and the cooperative CIs it has in the main
game of Phase 2A, as can be seen by comparing Figure 9.11b with Figure 9.12a.
This lead to the changes we see in the stability analysis of the different states based
on the two different structures. Comparing Table 9.22 with Table 9.24, we can
notice the following:
1. RIM maintained the NASH stability it has for state s7 , but replaced what
should have been a very strong Extreme NASH stability at the full-licensing-
settlement state s6 (based on the should-be preferences model) by a very weak
NASH stability at the fight-fight state s5 with strength set at the None level;
2. while state s8 is GMR stable for RIM based on both models (with a bit more
strength in the model based on RIM’s demonstrated preferences), s8 is shown
to be SEQ stable for RIM only based on the demonstrated preferences model,
i.e. the sanction against RIM’s UI out of s8 committed by the NTP-Nokia-
Others coalition is considered in this case a rational move by the coalition;
3. state s8 lost its SMR stability for RIM, in the model which is based on
demonstrated-preference, because RIM thinks now that its countermove to
the coalition sanction bringing the game back to the fight-fight s5 state, and
ignoring the facts created on the ground by the coalition sanction, is a pre-
ferred state (regardless of the fact that it is a very superficial belief because
in reality RIM cannot just ignore the facts on the ground created by the
coalition sanction –at least, the market will take notice and will not ignore–);
4. state s6 is a GMR and SEQ stable for RIM, based on the demonstrated-
preferences model, with strength for both stabilities set at the very weak
None level, for the same reasons that state s8 is GMR and SEQ stable for
RIM based on this model; and
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Table 9.25: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A: Equilibrium States for the main
game (RIM v. NTP) - based on RIM’s Preferences that were actually-demonstrated
by RIM at the time
s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
NASH EQ.
GMR EQ. N N N N
SMR EQ.
SEQ EQ. N N
5. The stabilities of the different states of the game for NTP, based on RIM’s
demonstrated preferences model, did not change from the ones NTP has based
on the the should-be RIM’s preferences model except in a minor way: both
state s9 and state s5 are SEQ stable for NTP based on RIM’s demonstrated
preferences model because now RIM’s sanctions are “rational” (for sure this
is based on RIM’s thinking and how it perceives its goals and therefore its
preferences at this stage of the game –i.e. regardless whether the rationality
of these beliefs is justified by the outside observers or not–).
The changes in Phase 2A’s individual state’s stabilities based on the two differ-
ent preferences structures for RIM, the should-be and the actually-demonstrated-
at-the-time, impact also the overall stability of these states for the conflict at this
phase. This is illustrated by comparing the equilibrium states analysis of Phase
2A based on the should-be RIM’s preferences, shown in Table 9.23, and the same
analysis based on the demonstrated RIM’s preferences, shown in Table 9.25. One
will immediately notice the following:
1. there is no equilibrium states for Phase 2A, under the NASH stability solution
concept, if and when RIM’s demonstrated preferences at the time is considered
in the analysis;
2. state s6 , in not a NASH equilibrium in the analysis based on RIM’s demon-
strated preferences, as it is the case if RIM’s preferences were the should-be
ones;
3. state s6 , nevertheless, maintained in both cases a GMR and SEQ stability for
both players with strength set at the very weak None level;
4. the fight-fight s5 state is not only GMR stable for both players, for the con-
flict at its Phase 2A based on RIM’s demonstrated preferences as it is the
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case based on the should-be RIM’s preferences, but also SEQ stable for both
players; and
5. states s8 and s9 maintained their very weak equilibrium status under the
GMR solution concept.
This list gives us great insight on why the RIM v. NTP conflict’s Phase 2A
progressed historically in real-life the way it did, as we will elaborate later when
we discuss the results of our overall stability analysis of the conflict. But, we can
at least point at some interesting results elicited from the list above:
1. the only two states that could form an equilibrium for the conflict at Phase
2A, assuming the players of the conflict act rationally, i.e. according to their
preferences structures, are: the full-licensing-agreement s6 state and the fight-
fight s5 state;
2. if state s5 persisted as an equilibrium to the conflict at the Phase 2A stage of
it, then the conflcit will continue to the next phase of the conflict: Phase 3,
and whether the conflict is going the Phase 3A way or Phase 3B way depends
completely on what the higher federal court decides; making state s6 to be
the true possible rational resolution to the conflict at Phase 2A of it;
3. the partial-agreement state, s7 , is not a candidate as a resolution to the
conflict at this state; and
4. each of the players will not be escalating the conflict individually, because the
other player will respond by escalating the conflict to a less-preferred state
(suggested by the GMR stability of both s8 and s9).
Now, we analyze the stability of each of Phase 2A side game’s states, with the
purpose of checking whether a coalition between NTP and RIM’s competitors is
possible at this stage of the conflict. And, to check whether the members of this
possible coalition will all expect to benefit from some C-GI moves that could affect
the main game of the phase and put their common “enemy” at a worse position.
First, we introduce the stability tables of the side game of Phase 2A, and then we
will discuss the contents of these tables. Table 9.26 presents the stability analysis of
the the four states of Phase 2A’s side game, for both NTP and Nokia (the biggest
of RIM’s competitors used here as an example), under NASH, GMR, SMR and
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Table 9.26: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A: Stability Analysis for the side game
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Table 9.27: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2A: Equilibrium States for the side game
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SEQ solution concepts. Table 9.27 shows the equilibrium states for the side game
under the four solution concepts.
From Table 9.26, we can see that Nokia (and other RIM’s competitors) will
likely sign a full licensing agreement with NTP (states sg). The full-agreement
sg state is NASH stable for NTP and Nokia (and others) with Extreme strength
level because none can reach sg on their own, they all must cooperate to be able
to do so. On the other hand, the partial agreement s
h
state, even though it is a
NASH stable state for Nokia (and other RIM’s competitors) with Extreme strength
because Nokia cannot get to it without cooperating with NTP, it is unstable to NTP
because NTP can take one of its UIs out of s
h
to either se or sf .
The table shows also that the fight-fight s
f
state is unstable for NTP because
it will always be able to use its UI to wait se or cooperate with RIM’s competitors
and go to state sg . For Nokia, and others, the fight state is GMR and SMR
stable because NTP can sanction them after they all start putting together the full
agreement by bringing the side game back to the fight-fight state s
f
. Hence, the
stability strength of s
f
’s GMR and SMR for Nokia, and others, is set at the very
weak None level. In addition, the wait-wait se state is GMR and SMR stable for
both NTP and Nokia (and others) because while both can move cooperatively to
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reach sg , each will fear a sanction move that the other has bringing the side game
back to the fight-fight s
f
state. The strength of se ’s GMR and SMT for each of
NTP and Nokia (and others) differ based on how less-preferred s
f
is to state se for
each.
Table 9.26 shows also that neither se nor sf form an SEQ stable state for any
of the players, giving us an indication that this fear, that the other party will
sanction the CI the players take cooperatively to reach to sg from any of these two
states, is not justified because none of the players will act irrationally against their
preferences just to hurt the other. This is especially true in a business environment
with institutional collective rationality.
The stability analysis results of Phase 2A’s individual states are the input needed
to definite the overall equilibrium states for the side game at this phase. Table
9.27 shows that this side game has two equilibrium states. As expected, the full-
agreement sg state is a NASH equilibrium, with strength set at the Extreme level
because none of the players in this game will be able to reach this state on their
own. They all have to cooperate to do so. The second equilibrium state is state se ,
the wait-wait state, which found to be an equilibrium under both the GMR and the
SMR stability solution concepts. But, this equilibrium has a very weak strength
set at the None level. Not to mention, that se is also a weak equilibrium, because it
is based on fear the individual players has that the opponent/s will act irrationally
–against their preferences– just to hurt them (an additional indication of this is
the fact that this state is not SEQ stable to any of the players in the side game).
An unjustified fear, knowing that within the context of the business environment
all entities have collective institutional rationality, eliminating the possibility of
emotional reactions and irrational behaviour.
The results of the side game’s analysis suggest that the coalition between NTP
and RIM’s competitors is very likely because all will benefit from it. A good
indication of this strong possibility is the formation of a number C-GI moves that
the coalition can have to affect the main game between NTP and RIM, putting
it at a state that is preferred to all members of the coalition. These multi-step
C-GI moves, the coalition can have, are shown above in Figure 9.11c. It is also
worth noting here that the stabilities, equilibriums and these C-GIs will not change
whether RIM adopted the should-be preferences structure or the one that RIM
actually demonstrated at the time. This is because these stabilities, equilibriums
and C-GIs are based on the preferences of NTP and RIM’s competitors (Nokia and
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others).
From Figure 9.11c, we can see that the resultant coalition’s C-GIs will put the
main game at state s9 . A state that is preferred to NTP in its fight with RIM,
especially if the main game was stuck at one of the states that is less preferred
to NTP: the fight-fight s5 state, the RIM-fights-and-have-a-workaround-solution s8
state, or the partial-agreement s7 state. In addition, putting the main game between
NTP and RIM at state s9 is better for all RIM’s competitors, despite the fact that
they are not direct players in the main game. But, putting their common rival at a
much worse state in the conflict, and as a result in the marketplace, will definitely
help them capitalize on RIM’s problems and uncertain future in order to take
away current customer of RIM and increase their market share. Let us not forget
that RIM was the biggest player in the wireless/mobile email devices market (later
started to be known as smart phones market) with the biggest market share and
the most advanced devices. So, slowing down RIM’s growth and bogging it down
with legal problems is considered a very positive outcome for RIM’s competitors.
Especially, if this also comes packaged with legitimizing these companies devices,
offering RIM’s customers a stable alternative away from the uncertainties produced
by RIM’s no-sign-of-settling strategy and the possibility that RIM will end up forced
to stop operating in the US as a result.
3) Stability Analysis for Phase 2B of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after the
lower court decides in favour of RIM’s position)
Phase 2B represent the stage of the RIM v. NTP conflict where the lower federal
court decides against NTP and in favour of RIM’s position. Table 9.28 shows the
stability analysis of the the five states of Phase 2B’s main game, for both RIM and
NTP, under NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ solution concepts. Table 9.29 shows the
equilibrium states for the main game under the four solution concepts.
Table 9.28 shows RIM having two states stable for this phase of the conflict.
State s13 is now a NASH stable for RIM, because RIM has no UI out of it. And,
the strength of s13 ’s NASH stability for RIM is set at the None level, because RIM
has many UIs leading to this state and the strength of its NASH stability is set
based on the lows gain in preference that RIM will earn by taking any of these UIs
to s13 . Recall that s13 is the state in which RIM develops a workaround to NTP’s
claimed-technology, despite the fact that the lower federal court has just ruled in
favour of RIM’s position, as it also continues the fight NTP in the courts. The
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Table 9.29: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2B: Equilibrium States for the main
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move to s13 is a rational move to RIM, act as an insurance policy that strengths its
position in the marketplaces and through out the fight with NTP (just in case the
higher court rule against RIM and in favour of NTP).
In addition, RIM has the fight-fight s10 state as a GMR and SEQ stable state in
this phase. This is because RIM will not activate its UI from s10 to s13 fearing that
NTP will sanction this UI by bring the game back to state s10 . Three things we
should notice here: 1) this sanction by NTP is a UI for it, hence the SEQ stability
of this state to RIM; 2) the strength of s10 ’s GMR and SEQ for RIM is set at the
very weak None level, making RIM’s loss to be minimal if in fact it ignored this
stability and activated a UI to s13 ; and 3) this state is not SMR stable to RIM,
because RIM can bring the game to state s13 restating the facts on the ground that
it has moved on to a new technology that does not depend on what NTP claims to
be its own.
NTP, on the other hand, appears to be at a disadvantage in this phase, because
the lower federal court ruled against its claims and demands. But, this appears
to be the case only on the surface. In reality, NTP plays the time game too.
Continue the fight with RIM (s10) and/or escalate the market pressure on RIM by
partnering with RIM’s competitors (s14) seem to be the best strategies for NTP
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going forward. Table 9.28 shows this clearly. State s14 is NASH stable for NTP
because NTP has no UIs out of it. The strength of s14 ’s NASH stability for NTP is
set at the Extreme level because NTP cannot reach this state on its own, it must
ally with RIM’s competitors to do so. This coalition is not likely to materialize
during this phase, as we will see later, making this state in effect unreachable to
NTP. In addition, state s10 is NASH stable for NTP, with no UIs out from it too.
The strength of this Nash stability is set at the very weak None level because NTP
can reach this state by using any of its UIs from other states with at least one of
these UIs providing None level preference gain.
NTP, also, has state s13 as a GMR and SEQ stable state in this phase. This is
because NTP will not activate its UI from s13 to s10 fearing that RIM will sanction
this UI by bringing the game back to state s13 reminding all with the facts on the
ground (that RIM now is using a new technology that is not what NTP claims to
be its own). Again here too, we should notice: 1) this sanction by RIM is a UI for
it, hence the SEQ stability of this state to NTP; 2) the strength of s13 ’s GMR and
SEQ for NTP is set at the very weak None level, making NTP’s loss to be minimal
if in fact it ignored this stability and activated a UI to s10 ; and 3) this state is not
SMR stable to NTP, because NTP can bring the game to state s10 reminding RIM,
RIM’s customers and RIM’s shareholders that it can hurt them by keep fighting
till the end, generating in the process uncertainty around RIM services, operations
and future.
Table 9.29 shows the overall stability of the states in Phase 2B’s main game.
Two states are shown in the table to form equilibrium states for the conflict at this
phase. Both states s10 and s13 are found to form equilibrium states under the GMR
and the SEQ stability solution concepts. And, because these two states are stable
for the players not only under GMR but also under SEQ, the hesitation the players
will experience, when trying to move out from these two states to more preferred
states fearing sanction moves, is justified as these sanctions are also rational UI
moves to the players committing them.
But, the table also shows that s10 and s13 stabilities have strength levels that
are set at the very weak None level. With the meaning that these equilibriums are
weak and if any of the players ignores them, taking a UI out of any, that player
will only suffer minimally. Saying so, if one will check Table 9.28 again, he will find
that RIM has one UI only out from s10 , a UI that will put the main game at s13 ;
and NTP has one UI only out of s13 , a UI that will put the main game back at s10 .
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Table 9.30: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2B: Stability Analysis for the side game
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Table 9.31: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 2B: Equilibrium States for the side game













This will ensure a loop that signifies one important fact of Phase 2B, if and only
if Phase 2B materialize by the lower federal court ruling against NTP and in favour
of RIM, and that is: the fight will continue and NTP will not declare defeat. This
means bad news for RIM, RIM’s customers and shareholders. If they are hoping
for NTP to give up the fight after the court agree with RIM’s position, they are
sure heading for a big disappointment. What the analysis of Phase 2 is suggesting
here is not only understandable but also logical. By NTP keeping the fight on, it
cannot lose: 1) it might get the higher courts to agree on its claims and demands,
reversing the lower court’s decision; and 2) the pressure on RIM will increase over
time, internally and externally. The distraction this continuous fight will cause to
RIM’s operations, and the uncertainty it will cause to RIM’s products and future,
will surely increase with time.
We have said above that a coalition between NTP and RIM’s competitors is not
likely to form at Phase 2B of the RIM v. NTP conflict. The reason behind this will
be more obvious, once we present the stability and equilibrium analysis of the side
game of Phase 2B. Table 9.30 presents the stability analysis of the the four states of
Phase 2B’s side game, for both NTP and Nokia (the biggest of RIM’s competitors
used here as an example), under NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ solution concepts.
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Table 9.31 shows the equilibrium states for the side game under the four solution
concepts.
From able 9.30, we can see that Nokia (and other RIM’s competitors) will not




). Nokia will likely
use the UIs it has from these states to the fight-NTP-legally state s
j
. All other
RIM’s competitors will do the same thing, based on their preferences, and logically
speaking since all want to see if NTP can prevail at the end in its case against RIM.
In addition, RIM will not likely to suffer that much in the marketplace because the
lower court has just handed RIM a rule in its favour and against NTP. RIM’s
customers will also not likely at this stage to look for alternatives because of fear
of disruption or cut in the services. These things can happen only when RIM start
losing legally to NTP and/or the cloud of uncertainty start thickening around its
service and future in the US market. NTP cannot sanction the UIs that Nokia,






, a NASH stable for them but
a very weak one (at strength level set at the None level). If NTP does take the




, which is a UI move by NTP, then Nokia and other
RIM’s competitors will be at the best state for them, preference-wise. Therefore,
s
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are not stable for them.





because it has UIs out from them to state s
i





and Nokia/Others cannot sanction such UIs. But, as the table shows, s
k
is a NASH
stable state to NTP because NTP does not have a UI out of it, and with strength
set at the Extreme level because it cannot reach this state on its own.
The only state in Phase 2B’s side game that is stable for all players, NTP and
Nokia (and others), is state s
i
, which represents all players wait for the results of
the higher federal court ruling on RIM v. NTP case. s
i
is NASH for all players,





’s NASH stability for Nokia (and others) is set at the Extreme level,
because they cannot reach this state on their own, and their stay there is at the
mercy of NTP’s decision to challenge them legally for what it claims its rights.
Also, the strength of s
i
’s NASH stability for NTP is calculated applying Algorithm
9.3 to be set at the very-weak None level. This is because NTP can reach state s
i
by using UIs it has from state s
j
(where NTP and Nokia–and others– are fighting
in the courts) and from state s
l
(where NTP and Nokia–and others– reach a partial
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agreement that does not include a licensing component). The least preference gain





gaining almost nothing in such move. Hence, the very weak None strength of sa ’s
NASH stability for NTP.
This makes s
i
a NASH equilibrium for Phase 2B’s side game with strength set
at None level. In other words, the side game in Phase 2B of the conflict has the
weakest strength level. NASH, by definition is a weak stability; and NASH at
strength None brings down the stability of this state. This is understandable for
many reasons. For all players in the side game, NTP and RIM’s competitors, it is
a wait and see game. NTP can challenge those players legally but will gain nothing
in the process. If NTP waits until the higher courts agree with its case with RIM,
it will be in a better position. It will be able to sign those companies for more
licensing fees. For RIM’s competitors, it is also wait and see. They do not like
the idea to license NTP’s technology and pay for it, but this may change if NTP
managed to gain the support of the higher federal court in its fight with RIM.
Based on the analysis of Phase 2A’s side game, the coalition is not likely to
form because none will benefit from it. A good indication that no member of this
NTP-Nokia-Others coalition will benefit from such coalition is the fact that there
is no C-GIs that could materialize for this coalition and affect the dynamics within
the main game between NTP and RIM. The side game in this phase has no C-GIs
that could change the main game from one state to another. Therefore, based on
this analysis of the side game, the side game is more likely to stay put at its starting
state, s
i
, because this state is the only equilibrium to the side game at this phase.
And, even though this equilibrium is of weak strength, it is stable for all the players,
nevertheless.
4) Stability Analysis for Phase 3A of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after the
higher court decides against RIM’s position)
At Phase 3A of the conflict, the higher federal court decides against RIM and in
favour of NTP’s claims and demands. Table 9.32 shows the stability analysis of
the the five states of Phase 3A’s main game, for both RIM and NTP, under NASH,
GMR, SMR and SEQ solution concepts. We also present here Table 9.33 which
shows the equilibrium states for the main game under the four solution concepts.
Table 9.32 provides us with insight on the expected dynamics between RIM and
NT at this phase of the conflict. At the first glance, the table shows state s16 , which
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* All C-GIs here are C-GI moves by the
Coalition of NTP and Nokia (and other
RIM’s competitors).
Table 9.33: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3A: Equilibrium States for the main
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represents RIM and NTP reaching a full settlement agreement, is NASH stable for
RIM and for NTP. None of the players has a UI out of s16 . In addition, the strength
of s16 ’s NASH stability, for both players, is as expected set at the Extreme level
because none of the players can reach this state alone. They both have to cooperate
to do so.
On the other hand, state s17 , which represents RIM and NTP reaching a partial
settlement agreements, is NASH stable for RIM only, and GMR stable for NTP.
RIM does not have a UI out of s17 , and cannot reach s17 on its own, as it must
cooperate to do so. This makes s17 NASH stable for RIM, with strength set at the
Extreme level. NTP, and because it has a UI (to s15) and C-GI (to s19 as part of
the moves that its coalition with RIM’s rivals have), state s17 is not NASH stable
for it at this phase of the conflict. But, NTP could decide not to take the UI or
the C-GI it has from s17 out of fear that RIM will sanction such moves. RIM has
non-UI SMs to state s18 , making s17 GMR stable for NTP at strength set at the
None level. And, because NTP has a countermove to s19 , a much better state than
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s17 , then s17 is not SMR stable for NTP. Also, because RIM sanctions are not UI
moves by RIM, s17 is not SEQ stable to NTP.
Therefore, state s17 , or reaching a partial agreement with RIM, is a weak stable
state for NTP (based on GMR stability –a weak stability by definition– and the
strength of this GMR stability is set at the very weak None level). NTP can enhance
on it by either add more pressure on RIM by partnering with its rivals in the
marketplace, or keep fighting RIM especially after the higher court decision siding
with NTP. NTP fears that RIM will sanction its unilateral UI move or coalition
C-GI move is based on the weak assumption that RIM is ready to act against its
own preferences structure just to hurt NTP. An unlikely assumption, given the fact
that both parties are businesses with collective institutional rationality.
States s16 and s17 also form equilibrium states of the conflict at this phase, as
shown in Table 9.33. But, as expected, State s16 form an Extreme NASH equilib-
rium state, because it is NASH stable for both RIM and NTP at the same level
of strength. And, state s17 is an equilibrium to the conflict at this state under the
GMR stability definition, with strength that matches the lowest strength of s17 ’s
GMR stability that the players have: None strength level.
Table 9.32 also shows the fight-fight s15 to be stable for both NTP and RIM
under the GMR. This means that RIM will fear to take its CI out of s15 , to s16
entering agreement talks with NTP, because NTP might walk away from the agree-
ment sanctioning the CI move by putting the game back at the fight-fight s15 state,
or worse partner with RIM’s rivals ( s19). And, NTP will fear to take its CI out of
s15 , to s16 entering agreement talks with RIM, or its C-GI coalition multi-step move
out of s15 , to s19 partnering with RIM’s competitors, because RIM might sanction
such moves by putting the game back at the fight-fight s15 state, or worse at s18
leaving its US operations all together (an irrational and unlikely move - hence the
state is GMR stable not SEQ stable for NTP).
The GMR and SMR stability of s15 for RIM, especially when we see that the
strengths of these stabilities are set at the weak levels( Little for GMR, and None
for SMR), and the fact that s15 is not SEQ stable for RIM, suggest: 1) this fear
is based on NTP taking an irrational sanction against NTP’s own preferences, an
unlikely move considering that the players are business entities (with collective
institutional rationality) operating in a professional business environment; 2) RIM
cannot recover from NTP’s sanction, but the maximum harm that NTP can do to
RIM is to bring the game back to the fight-fight s15 state (hence the None strength
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level for the SMR stability); 3) because this is a weak stability, if RIM decides to
ignore it and therefore take its CI out of s15 , the expected loss for RIM is close
to None even if NTP act irrationally and sanction the CI move, therefore it is
better for RIM to try to get out of this state than act based on fear of an irrational
NTP; and 4) because the weak stability of continuing the fight with NTP, if RIM
is looking for a better strong stability position in this conflict, in order to get back
to its core business, then RIM needs to reach an agreement with NTP (through a
serious move to state s16 meeting NTP demands).
In addition, the GMR stability of state s15 , for NTP at this phase, with strength
set at the Little level, and the fact that the table shows s15 not SEQ stable for
NTP, suggest the following: 1) the fear NTP has, which this GMR stability is
based on, is justified by RIM taking an irrational sanction to stop operating in
the US or continue the fighting course, against RIM’s own preferences, an unlikely
move considering that the players are business entities (with collective institutional
rationality) operating in a professional business environment; 2) NTP can recover
from RIM’s sanction by partnering with RIM’s rivals in the marketplace, bringing
the game to state s19 putting more pressure on RIM to settle and meet NTP
demands and comply with the court’s ruling (s19 is more preferred to NTP than
s15 , hence s15 is not SMR stable for NTP in this phase); and 3) the weak stability
of continuing the fight with RIM, and if NTP is looking for a better strong stability
position in this conflict, in order for NTP to maximize its income from licensing
of its technologies, then NTP need to reach an agreement with RIM (through a
serious move to state s16 with reasonable demands which RIM can accommodate
and meet).
As we can see, the GMR stability of s15 for both RIM and NTP at this phase
could be a source of the contentious moving in and out of settlement talks between
RIM and NTP at this phase of the conflict, as demonstrated by the players histor-
ically at the time. For the observers at the time, it seemed that neither RIM nor
NTP would like to move on beyond this fight-fight s15 state, despite the fact that
reaching an agreement even if it is an unfair one is better for both (especially for
RIM because it has the most to lose with this ongoing uncertainty this is causing
to its customers and market).
One could easily explain this phenomena, or predict it a head of the time, by
just looking at Tables 9.32 and 9.33. Table 9.33 shows state s15 as an equilibrium
state for the conflict at this phase, under the GMR solution concept. The table
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shows this equilibrium as: 1) weak, but not very weak, with strength set at the
Little level, with the meaning that it is not a lasting equilibrium especially with
the existence of a better rational NASH equilibrium state that both players can
reach (at state s16); and 2) based on fear of the other player acting irrationally
just to hurt the other, a weak assumption knowing that both players are business
entities acting in a highly rational (profit maximization and loss minimization) type
of environment.
Tables 9.32 also shows that state s18 , which represent RIM leaving the US
market and stop its operation there, is unstable for RIM because RIM has UI and
CIs out of such state/thinking. The table also shows state s18 with very weak
GMR stability for NTP with strength set at the None level. This weak stability
is understandable given the fact that NTP will gain nothing by staying in it, and
it is better for NTP to escalate the fight with RIM within the US and elsewhere,
or even better cooperate with RIM in reaching a long lasting agreement. This
stability is also based on a weak assumption of RIM acting irrationally, against its
preferences, and decides to stop operating in the US. An unlikely course of events
and unjustified assumption given the business environment the players working in,
and the collective institutional rationality they have.
The analysis table shows also state s19 , which represent NTP partnering with
RIM’s competitors in the market space (such as Nokia, Good Technology, Visto,
and any RIM rival who did not yet join NTP coalition–if formed in Phase 2A–), is
unstable for RIM because RIM has a UI and a CI out of it. But, the table show
state s19 with GMR stability for NTP with strength set at the Little level, and
SMR stability for NTP with strength set at the None level. This stability though
is based on a weak assumption of RIM acting irrationally, against its preferences,
and decides to stop operating in the US or prefer to go back to the fight-fight
situation. It is unlikely that RIM will act that way, given the business environment
the players working in, and the collective institutional rationality RIM and NTP
have.
Finally, because both s18 and s19 are unstable for one player or the another,
both are not shown in Table 9.33 as equilibrium states, under any solution concept,
for the main game at this phase of the conflict. This should indicate two things to
the strategists in NTP’s camp:
1. RIM is not likely to leave the US market or accept the rules order to stop its
operations in the US, understandably, as this outcome is the least preferred
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outcome to RIM and RIM has a UI to continue the fight with NTP, in addition
to a CI move to the equilibrium state s16 reaching an agreement with NTP
(no matter how unfair this agreement will be it will still better than leaving
its biggest market, the US); and
2. Partnering with RIM’s rivals should be considered as means to put more
pressure on RIM, and cannot be used as means to end the conflict with RIM
replacing RIM in the marketplace, because RIM is not likely to leave the US
market.
Similarly, the fact that s18 and s19 are unstable for one player or the another,
and therefore do not form equilibrium states, under any solution concept, should
indicate to RIM’s strategists that:
1. NTP is not likely to put up the fight even if RIM stops its operations in
the US, but still work through third party partners or some other technical
workarounds, because NTP has two strategies/moves to deal with this: a)
partner with RIM’s rivals in the marketplace forming a coalition (s19) that in
effect gives more stable alternative to RIM’s BlackBerry R© services and prod-
ucts (shortly we will see that the analysis show that this coalition formation
is likely to happen, or expand if it started in Phase 2A); and b) if the courts
do not shut RIM’s operations completely in the US market, NTP can still go
legally after the Telcos that RM is providing its services and products through
them and/or all its big enterprise customers (see for example the classical US
case of Jerome Lemelson, or “The Patent King” as he was nicknamed by the
media, going after the barcode scanner customers not the smaller company
sold the scanners to those customers, discussed in (Varchaver, 2001)).
2. fighting NTP is a temporarily strategy, and a bad one if RIM continue adopt-
ing it in the long run (we will elaborate more on this later when we discuss
the overall results of the analysis), and RIM is better off moving to the long-
lasting equilibrium state s16 with serious intention to meet NTP demands and
end the conflict.
Before we end the stability analysis of Phase 3A, we would like to discuss the
stability of the Phase 3A side game’s states, with the purpose of checking whether
a coalition between NTP and RIM’s competitors is possible at this stage of the
conflict. And, to check whether the members of this possible coalition will all
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Table 9.34: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase3A: Stability Analysis for the side game
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Table 9.35: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3A: Equilibrium States for the side game










GMR EQ. N N
SMR EQ. N N
SEQ EQ. N
expected to benefit from some C-GI moves that could affect the main game of the
phase putting their common “enemy” at a worse position.
Table 9.34 presents the stability analysis of the the four states of Phase 3A’s
side game, for both NTP and Nokia (and/or any other rival of RIM who did not
join NTP in its coalition at Phase 2A of the conflcit), under NASH, GMR, SMR
and SEQ solution concepts. Table 9.35 shows the equilibrium states for the side
game under the four solution concepts.
As one can see, Phase 3A’s side game stability analysis Table 9.34 and equi-
librium analysis Table 9.35 are exact copies of the respective tables for the side
game of Phase 2A. Notice that the states used in the side games of both phases,
2A and 3A, are similar but with different names: states se ,sf , sg and sh in the side
game of Phase 2A are replaced with sm , sn , so and sp in the side game of Phase
3A, respectively. Keeping the name differences in mind, the discussion of Phase 2A
side game’s stability and equilibrium analysis tables will apply here for Phase 3A
side game tables.
And as in the equilibrium states analysis of Phase 2A, Table 9.35 of Phase 3A’s
side game shows two equilibrium states. The full-agreement so state is a NASH
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equilibrium, with strength set at the Extreme level because none of the players
in the side game will be able to reach this state on their own. They all have to
cooperate to do so. The second equilibrium state is state sm , the wait-wait state,
which is found to be an equilibrium under both the GMR and the SMR stability
solution concepts. But, this equilibrium has a very weak strength set at the None
level. Not to mention, that sm is also a weak equilibrium because it is based on fear
the individual players have that the opponent/s will act irrationally –against their
preferences– just to hurt them (an additional indication of this is the fact that this
state is not SEQ stable to any of the players in the side game). An unjustified fear,
knowing that within the context of the business environment where all entities have
collective institutional rationality, eliminating the possibility of emotional reactions
and irrational behaviour.
The results of the side game’s analysis at this phase suggest that the coalition
between NTP and RIM’s competitors is very likely to happen, because all will
benefit from it. A good indication of this strong possibility is the formation of a
number C-GI moves the coalition can have to affect the main game between NTP
and RIM putting it at a state that is preferred to all members of the coalition.
These multi-step C-GI moves, the coalition can have, are shown above in Figure
9.14c. Recall that the results of analyzing the side game of Phase 2A indicated a
similar likely hood for the coalition to form. So, if the coalition between NTP and
RIM’s rivals did not form in Phase 2A then it is more likely to form here at this
stage; and if the coalition was formed during Phase 2A but some of RIM’s rivals
did not join at the time, then they are most likely to join at this phase. In fact, the
historical events of the conflict show that this what had happened. We will discuss
this further when we compare what had happened historically in the conflict to
what our analysis of the conflict suggested and predicted.
From Figure 9.14c, we can see that the resultant coalition’s C-GIs will put the
main game at state s19 . A state that is preferred to NTP in its fight with RIM,
especially if the main game was stuck at one of the states that is less preferred to
NTP: the fight-fight s15 state, the RIM-stopes-its-operation-in-the-US s18 state, or
the partial-agreement s17 state. In addition, putting the main game between NTP
and RIM at state s19 is better for all RIM’s competitors, despite the fact that they
are not direct players in the main game. But, putting their common rival at a
much worse state in the conflict, and as a result in the marketplace, will definitely
help them capitalize on RIM’s problems and uncertain future in order to take
away current customer of RIM and increase their market share. Let us not forget
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that RIM was the biggest player in the wireless/mobile email devices market (later
started to be known as smart phones market) with the biggest market share and
the most advanced devices. So, slowing down RIM’s growth and bogging it down
with legal problems is considered a very positive outcome for RIM’s competitors.
Especially, if this also comes packaged with legitimizing these companies devices,
offering RIM’s customers a stable alternative away from the uncertainties produced
by RIM’s no-sign-of-settling strategy and the possibility that RIM will end up forced
to stop operating in the US as a result. This situation is similar to the situation
that the conflict has during Phase 2A of it, as we discussed above.
5) Stability Analysis for Phase 3B of the RIM v. NTP conflict (after the
higher court decides in favour of RIM’s position)
At Phase 3B of the conflict, the higher federal court decides against NTP and in
favour of RIM’s position. Table 9.36 shows the stability analysis of the the four
states of Phase 3B’s main game, for both RIM and NTP, under NASH, GMR, SMR
and SEQ solution concepts. We have said earlier that, for Phase 3B of the conflict
and similar to Phase 3A, we will not study the side game between NTP and RIM’s
competitors (Nokia and others) because the side game cannot influence/affect the
main game and its states, moves, stabilities and so on, which is the main focus of our
case study. Hence, a state which represents NTP signing licensing agreements with
RIM’s competitors is not part of Phase 3B’s states, while similar states were part
of each phase we studied before this phase. We also present here Table 9.37 which
shows the equilibrium states for the main game under the four solution concepts.
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Table 9.37: RIM v. NTP Conflict - Phase 3B: Equilibrium States for the main










GMR EQ. N N
SMR EQ. N N
SEQ EQ. N
Table 9.36 provides us with insight on the expected dynamics between RIM and
NTP at this phase of the conflict. The table shows that NTP will not give up the
fight with RIM (s23), even after the higher court decided in favour of RIM. NTP
will most likely escalate the case to the supreme court, and additionally use any
other legal and political means it has. Having state s23 as unstable state for NTP in
the game, will not help RIM and its NASH stability for this state (with strength set
at the Extreme level because RIM cannot reach this state itself). Therefore, RIM
should be aware that its problems will not end by the higher court agreeing with
its position. The court’s decision will weaken NTP’s resolve, but will not break
it. NTP, most likely, will keep dragging RIM into the distraction and uncertainties
this continuos legal fight brings.
Similarly, NTP’s hopes of RIM agreeing to sign a full licensing agreement with
it (s21), is no longer justified. Yes, NTP has this state NASH stable with strength
level set at the Extreme level (because NTP cannot reach this state/agreement on
its own). But, NTP must remember that state s21 is unstable for RIM. RIM will
most likely take its UI to the fight-fight s20 state, armed with the higher federal
court ruling supporting its position.
State s22 , which represent both RIM and NTP reach a partial settlement agree-
ment, is shown in Table 9.36 to be NASH stable for RIM and for NTP. None of the
players has a UI out of s22 . In addition, the strength of this state’s NASH stability
is, as expected, set at the Extreme level because none of the players can reach it
alone. They both have to cooperate to do so. This makes s22 to be an Extreme
NASH equilibrium state for the conflict at this phase, as Table 9.37 shows. As a
result, s22 forms the most expected resolution to the conflict at this phase.
Table 9.36 also shows the fight-fight s20 to be stable for both NTP and RIM
under the GMR and the SMR solution concepts. This means that RIM will fear
to take one of its CIs out of s20 , in order to enter agreement talks with NTP, and
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then NTP walks away from the agreement sanctioning the CI move by putting
the game back at the fight-fight s20 state. The GMR and SMR stability of s20
for RIM, especially when we see that the strengths of these stabilities are set at
the very weak None level and s20 is not SEQ stable for RIM, suggest: 1) this
fear is based on NTP taking an irrational sanction against NTP’s own preferences,
an unlikely move considering that the players are business entities (with collective
institutional rationality) operating in a professional business environment; 2) RIM
cannot recover from NTP’s sanction, but the maximum harm that NTP can do to
RIM is to bring the game back to the fight-fight s20 state (hence the None strength
level for the stabilities); and 3) because of the weak stability of continuing the fight
with NTP, if RIM is looking for a better strong stability position in this conflict,
in orderer for RIM to get back to its core business, then RIM need to reach an
agreement with NTP (through a serious move to state s22 meeting some of NTP
demands).
In addition, the GMR and SMR stabilities of state s20 , for NTP at this phase,
with strengths set at the None levels, and the fact that the table shows s20 not
SEQ stable for NTP, suggest the following: 1) the fear NTP has, which these
stabilities are based on, is justified by RIM taking an irrational sanction against
RIM’s own preferences, an unlikely move considering that the players are business
entities (with collective institutional rationality) operating in a professional business
environment; 2) NTP cannot recover from RIM’s sanction to bring the game back
to the fight-fight s20 state (hence the None strength level for the SMR stability);
and 3) because of the weak stability of continuing the fight with RIM, if NTP is
looking for a better strong stability position in this conflict, in order for NTP to
start earning income from licensing/capitalization of its technologies, then NTP
need to reach an agreement with RIM (through a serious move to state s20 with
reasonable demands which RIM can accommodate and meet). NTP must remember
that the court’s ruling is not in its favour.
As we can see here too, the GMR and SMR stabilities of s20 for both RIM
and NTP at this phase could be a source of the contentious moving in and out
of settlement talks between RIM and NTP at this phase of the conflict. It will
seem, for an observer, that neither RIM nor NTP would like to move on beyond
the fight-fight s20 state, despite the fact that reaching an agreement even if it not
a fair one is better for both (especially for RIM –here too– because it has the
most to lose with this ongoing battle). One could easily explain this phenomena,
or predict it a head of the time, by just looking at Tables 9.36 and 9.37. Table
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9.37 shows state s20 as an equilibrium state for the conflict at this phase, under
both GMR and SMR solution concepts. The table shows this equilibriums as: 1)
very weak with strength set at the None level, under both solution concepts, with
the meaning that it is not a lasting equilibrium especially with the existence of a
better NASH equilibrium states that both players can reach; and 2) based on fear
of the other player acting irrationally just to hurt the opponent, a weak assumption
knowing that both players are business entities acting in a highly rational (profit
maximization and loss minimization) type of environment.
9.6.8 Results of the RIM v. NTP Conflict Analysis
The stability analysis for the RIM v. NTP conflict, presented in the previous sub-
section, provides us with a significant insight into the conflict, the players motives,
the options they can choose from, and the implications of such choices. In this
subsection, we will compare the findings of the stability analysis for the RIM v.
NTP conflict with what actually happened in this landmark historical intellectual
property conflict. We will try to see why did the conflict go through the lengthy
painful roller-coaster-style path it took? and whether there are some generalized
conclusions that can be elicited from this case, namely, on how smiler cases will
evolve over time and eventually end?
Also, we will shed some light on the coalition analysis aspect of the overall
conflict stability analysis, especially the possibility of coalition formation and how
the coalition could benefit the coalition members. Finally, we will discuss additional
interesting aspects of modelling and analyzing the RIM v. NTP conflict, such as:
the multi-stage nature of the conflict, the effect of side games on the main conflicts,
the effect of the courts system (as an example of non-involved player/s in the conflict
who certainly can control some parts of the conflict’s flow and dynamics), and lastly
the need for sensitivity/what-if analysis in conflicts such as this one.
1) Comparing our Analysis with What Really Happened:
In other conflicts, we discussed in earlier chapters, we presented for each an analysis
of the different evolution paths the conflict will take, as predicted by the stability
analysis conducted for the conflict, and then compared such evolution paths with
what happened historically, or expected to happen logically, in the conflict. In
the case of RIM v. NTP conflict, and because of the size of the case and the
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fact that we discussed before how such evolution analysis is done for any conflict,
we will skip this step. We have enough insight from the stability and equilibrium
analysis, we conducted for this conflict, to move directly to the comparison between
the predicted path the conflict will take and the path the conflict actually took
historically.
It is worth mentioning here that the task of putting together a table to show
the major events of the conflict, in order to trace the evolution of the conflict as it
happened, was not an easy task. The legal battle between NTP and RIM lasted for
about 4.5 years with the majority of the events reported by the sensational media
(in all its flavours: biased, unbiased, analytical, informative and dis-informative)
and companies’ press releases (mostly represented messages that the companies
would like to get out through their public relation campaigns/propaganda). Despite
the hardship of sorting facts from fiction, and pure reporting from passion wishful
thinking, we managed to put together a table that show the real events took place
during the conflict period. We compared any of the news reports, or articles, to
court documents, or looked for multiple sources to ensure the events in the table,
and the description given to each, represent the reality on the ground at the time,
as much as possible.
The result is shown in Table 9.38. The table is broken to three parts, each
reflect one of the phases that the conflict went through. Recall that we decided at
the beginning of the modelling exercise of this conflict to break the conflict into
a number of phases or frames, based on the level of the court taking the decision
on the case between RIM and NTP, and whether the decision, the court makes,
agrees with RIM’s position or against it. The table also, for each of the events
listed, indicates the player responsible for the event (took the move), the type of
the payer’s move (UI, CI, or C-GI), and the end state which this event/move keeps,
or leaves, the game at.
Figure 9.16 shows visually the conflict’s moves, explained in Table 9.38. The
figure shows all the players’ UI, CI and C-GI moves for all phases of the conflict
(moves that are shown in Section 9.6.6 for each phase separately), with an overlay
indicating the actual moves the players took actually at the time. These actual
moves are shown in the figure as a consecutive series of arrows, with each arrow
representing a step explained in detail in Table 9.38. Recall that we studied two
versions of Phase 2A of the conflict (one using the should-be RIM’s preferences and
the other using the actual preferences RIM demonstrated at the time). Because of
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Table 9.38: RIM v. NTP Conflict: Analysis vs.Reality
Phase 1
Step Date Actual Conflict Evolution Move by to/at State
0 Nov. 13, 2001 NTP filed a lawsuit in the US District Court for the East- NTP s0
ern District of Virginia, claiming that over forty sys-
tem and method claims from its several patents-in-
suit had been infringed by various configurations of the
BlackBerry R© system (Court of Appeals, 2005).
Phase 1
Phase 2A
Step Date Actual Conflict Evolution Move by to/at State
• Nov. 21, 2002 After a 13 day jury trial commenced on Nov. 4, 2002, the Lower Court s5
jury found direct, induced, and contributory infringement
by RIM on all 14 asserted claims of the patents that were
submitted to the jury trial. The jury also found that the
infringement was willful. It rejected every defence pro-
posed by RIM and awarded to NTP damages of approxi-
mately $23M, representing a royalty rate of 5.7% of RIM’s
US BlackBerry R© sales up to this point in time.Following
the jury verdict, RIM filed with the District Court a peti-
tion for judgments as a matter of law or, in the alternative,
for a new trial. (District Court, 2003b; Court of Appeals,
2005; Teska, 2006).
Phase 2A
Feb. 28, 2003 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
orders RIM and NTP to begin mediation. As part of the
ruling, RIM is ordered to account for sales and services
through Feb. 28, 2003 for the purposes of determining po-
tential damages (Peacock, 2005).
May 23, 2003 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia denied RIM’s motion f for judgments as a matter
of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which RIM
filed with the District Court following the jury verdict on
Nov. 21, 2002 (District Court, 2003b). The court also crit-
icized RIM’s “questionable litigation tactics throughout”,
specifically that “RIM attempted to confuse and mislead
the jury by conducting a demonstration of the TekNow!
system which RIM asserted as prior art, by using updated
software that did not exist at the time the system was
used” (District Court, 2003b; McKenna et al., 2006) .
Aug. 5, 2003 Justice James Spencer from the Virginia District Court
entered final judgment, in favour of NTP, awarding it mon-
etary damages totalling $53.7M. In his final order, he also
issued a permanent injunction order against RIM, enjoin-
ing it from further manufacture, use, importation, and/or
sale of all accused BlackBerry R© systems, software, and
handhelds. The injunction was stayed pending RIMs ap-
peal (District Court, 2003a).
0 Aug. 29, 2003 RIM appealed the District Courts decision (District Court,
2005).
RIM
1 Jun. 14, 2004 Nokia Corporation entered into a patent licensing agree- Coalition of s9
ment with NTP that includes the five patents currently NTP-Nokia-Others
under litigation between RIM and NTP. Nokia took the
step to go forward with US sales of a version of its 6820
phone that can connect to RIM’s popular BlackBerry R©
e-mail server, as Nokia officials said. “We’ve gone ahead
and licensed the NTP patents, and this gives us the oppor-
tunity to get these things out on the market,” said Keith
Nowak, a Nokia spokesman (Nobel, 2004). Months later,
the other RIM-rivals, but smaller rivals, signed an agree-
ment with NTP: Good Technology (Mar. 11, 2005) and
Visto (Dec. 14, 2005) (Green, 2005)
(C-GI)
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Table 9.38: RIM v. NTP Conflict: Analysis vs.Reality (Continued)
Phase 2A (Continued..)
Step Date Actual Conflict Evolution Move by to/at State
Mar. 11, 2005 Good Technology entered into a patent licensing agree- Coalition of
ment with NTP that includes the five patents currently NTP-Nokia-Others
under litigation between RIM and NTP (Green, 2005).
Good Technology is a smaller rival to RIM, but never-
theless poses a serious threat to RIM because the com-
pany’s markets its products and services to the corporate-
enterprise market, RIM’s main market.
(C-GI)
2 Mar. 16, 2005 RIM announced that it agreed to pay $450M to settle the RIM & NTP (CI∗) s∗
6
dispute, sending its stock soaring more than 17 per cent
(Teska, 2006). The announced settlement–one of the
largest settlements in history–to fully rest all claims to
date against RIM, as well as provide for a perpetual, fully
paid license for NTPs patented technologies going forward
(RIM, 2005; Peacock, 2005).
* most likely this was an attempt to reach s6 , not a serious
one though, given the fact next event happened.
3 Jun. 9, 2005 RIM and NTP fail to finalize a settlement, and RIM says s∗∗,∗∗∗
5
it will ask a judge to enforce the terms of the March deal
(Peacock, 2005).
RIM claims that it is acting in good faith on the terms of
the settlement while NTP is refusing to finalize the docu-
ments needed to complete the settlement.
NTP (SM∗∗)
— or —
NTP, however, accuses RIM of stalling in the face of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Offices re-examination of the
patents (Peacock, 2005).
RIM (UI∗∗∗)
** if RIM is right in its claim, then this is a sanction move
by NTP to hurt RIM and put more pressure on RIM
to settle for more [and the move follows the Should-be
RIM’s Preferences model]; but
*** if RIM actually the ones delaying finalizing the deal,
as NTP claims, a move which is more consistent with
the facts on the ground where RIM seems to the obser-
vers more playing the delay game in hopes that it will
get the USPTO to re-examine and invalidate NTP’s
patents before it run out of legal options, then this
is a UI move by RIM [and the move follows the Demo
nstrated-By RIM’s Preferences model].
4 Jun. 16, 2005 RIM announces it has developed and tested workarounds RIM (UI) s∗∗∗∗
8
that would eliminate its reliance on any of NTPs patented
technology. It claims that the new workaround will work
with all BlackBerry R© models and on all networks. Unfor-
tunately for RIM, the next day a widespread BlackBerry R©
outages occurred across the United States. Networks are
down for periods anywhere between two minutes to two
hours, depending on the network and location. An undis-
closed hardware failure is blamed. Speculation abounds
that RIM was secretly testing its new workaround, which
apparently failed. And on Jun. 22, 2005, i.e. in less
than a week, another BlackBerry R© disruption occurred.
Again, the disruption is blamed on a hardware failure,
with RIM claiming it to be completely unrelated to the
first. Again, speculation arises that the BlackBerry R©
workarounds were being tested publicly and once again
failed. (Peacock, 2005).
**** this is mostly perceived as just an attempt by RIM to
reach, or appear to reach, state s8 in an effort to enhance
its position in the game, given the fact that these repeated
BlackBerry R© service outages happened within few days
after the announcement, making the actual UI move by
RIM is to state s5 instead.
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Table 9.38: RIM v. NTP Conflict: Analysis vs.Reality (Continued)
Phase 3A
Step Date Actual Conflict Evolution Move by to/at State
• Aug. 2, 2005 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued Higher Court s15
its final decision.The court upholds most of the claims that
RIM infringed on NTP’s patents.The court also says part
of the lower court had erred in some claims’ infringement,
specifically related to the lower courts misconstruction of
the originating processor term, and orders the lower court
to take another look at the case, and consider what ef-
fect, if any,thismight have had on the jurys assessment of
damages and on the scope of the injunction. And, on the
matter of RIM’s claim that the United States Patent Act
states that patent rights are restricted to the U.S.. the ap-
peals court held that since the control and beneficial use
of the infringing system was in the U.S., RIM could be
subject to penalties and injunctions for the infringement
(Court of Appeals, 2005).
0 Oct. 7, 2005 Responding to a motion by RIM, the U.S. Appeals Court RIM
refuses to reconsider its earlier ruling on the case. RIM
announces it will appeal the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court (Singer, 2005).
Oct. 26, 2005 U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts rejects
RIM’s motion to stay case while the high court decides
whether to hear an appea l(Levine, 2005).
Nov. 30, 2005 The case returns to Richmond, where a judge refuses
to force NTP to accept the proposed $450M settlement
with RIM back on March 2005. The judge also decided not
to delay the case, pending a review of NTP’s patents by
the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, as per RM’s request
(District Court, 2005; Teska, 2006).
1 Dec. 14, 2005 Visto entered into a patent licensing agreement with NTP Coalition of s19
that includes the five patents currently under litigation NTP-Nokia-Others
between RIM and NTP (Krazit, 2005). NTP said it took
a stake in Visto to strengthen its legal position in asking
for the injunction against RIM. Rather than simply being
a patent holding company that doesn’t sell any products
or services, it now has stakes in two companies that are in
the mobile e-mail business. “If there is an argument about
whether an injunction is appropriate, we aren’t in the
same set of circumstances,” says Don Stout, co-founder
of NTP (Green, 2005). With uncertainty and concern ris-
ing about the outcome of the RIM-NTP suit, RIM’s com-
petitors have been fielding a growing number of calls from
BlackBerry R© customers, according to executives at Good
Technology, Visto, and Microsoft (Green, 2005).
(C-GI)
2 Dec. 19, 2005 RIM submitted a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ RIM (UI) s15
of certiorari, requesting the court to issue a writ of
certiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued on Aug.
2, 2005 (Fenster et al., 2005). On Jan. 23, 2006, the
Supreme Court denied RIM’s petition for certiorari to re-
view the Appeals Court’s decision issued on Aug. 2, 2005
(Supreme Court, 2006; Teska, 2006).
Feb. 24, 2006 NTP asked for an immediate injunction that would NTP
have shut down BlackBerry R© after 30 days, as well $126M
in damages in addition to royalty payments. As a result,
the district court judge James Spencer declined to issue
an injunction that would have immediately shut down
BlackBerry R© service to US customers. In his ruling, the
judge said it was clear that RIM had infringed on NTP
patents, and he would decide on damages and whether to
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Table 9.38: RIM v. NTP Conflict: Analysis vs.Reality (Continued)
Phase 3A (Continued..)
Step Date Actual Conflict Evolution Move by to/at State
eventually issue an injunction as soon as reasonably pos-
sible. Observers reported that the judge appeared upset
that the two parties had not resolved the dispute on their
own. The judge is reported saying to RIM and NTP rep-
resentatives: “I must say I am surprised, absolutely sur-
prised, that you have left this incredibly important and
significant decision to the court. I’ve always thought that
this, in the end, was really a business decision. And yet
you have left the decision in the legal arena, and that’s
what you’re going to get, a legal decision” (Broache and
Krazit, 2006; Krazit, 2006).
Mar. 3, 2006 RIM and NTP announced that they have signed a defini- RIM & NTP (CI) s16
tive licensing and settlement agreement. All terms of the
agreement have been finalized and the litigation against
RIM has been dismissed today by a court order. The
agreement eliminates the need for any further court pro-
ceedings or decisions relating to damages or injunctive
relief. As part of the agreement, RIM has paid NTP
$612.5M in full for final settlement of all claims against
RIM, as well as for a perpetual, fully-paid up license go-
ing forward (Krazit and Broache, 2006; ?).
this, we have Figure 9.16 uses the should-be RIM’s preferences in Phase 2A of it
and Figure 9.17 uses the demonstrated preferences model.
So, how does the flow of the conflict as it happened at the time compare to the
flow predicted by the stability analysis we provided for the conflict in the previous
subsection? Let us take the conflict phase by phase:
Phase 1 (before the lower court decision on the RIM v. NTP case):
Main Game - Analysis: As per the equilibrium states analysis for the
main game of this phase, given in Table 9.19, there is only one equilib-
rium state: the fight-fight s0 state. And, this equilibrium is under the
NASH solution concept, with the meaning that neither RIM nor NTP
has a UI or a CI out of this state. The stability analysis Table 9.18 shows
that the strength of s0 ’s NASH stability to both parties is set at the Little
level, showing the parties have states which are Little less-preferred to
s0 . A margin of preference strength that, if ignored by any of the parties
acting irrationally against his preference vector, might make that player
choose a state that show some signs of a little bit of escalation (such as
going to state s3 for RIM acknowledging some truth to NTP claims by
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with RIM). But, if both players act rationally, as we expect them to do,
they will stay put at the fight-fight s0 state.
Main Game - Reality : After NTP filed its lawsuit against RIM on Nov.
13, 2001, both players were engaged in the legal battle to convey their
respective positions to the court. No signs of talks between the parties
to negotiate a settlement to end the dispute. In other words, the con-
flict at this phase was deadlocked at the fight-fight state s0, as
predicted by the analysis.
Side Game - Analysis: Table 9.21 shows that the wait-wait sa state is
the only equilibrium for the game between NTP and RIM’s rivals at this
phase of the conflict. This equilibrium is also under the NASH solution
concept. In other words, neither NTP nor any of RIM’s rivals has a UI
or a CI out of this state. But, the very weak strength of this equilibrium
(set at the None level) suggest that at least one of the players (NTP
in this game) has a slightly less-preferred state to sa that NTP have a
UI from it to sa . This state is the fight-fight sb state. This means that
the equilibrium at state sa is pretty much under the control of NTP. If
NTP decides to compromise on rationality a bit, though not expected,
it could act against its preferences vector and go to the slightly less-
preferred state of fighting RIM’s rivals in courts (state s
b
). In addition,
the fact that both sides will prefer the wait-wait sa is the reason that a
coalition among them is not expected to form at this phase.
Side Game - Reality : During this phase, neither NTP nor any of RIM’s
competitors in the marketplace show signs of negotiating or reaching
a licensing deal. Both sides preferred the wait-wait sa, as sug-
gested by the analysis. In addition, notably and as a result, the
coalition/alliance did not form at this stage of the game, as
also predicted by the analysis.
Phase 2A (after the lower court decision came against RIM’s position):
During this phase, observing analysts (as well as NTP analysts) have/should-
have noticed that RIM was acting based on the expected Should-Be RIM’s
preferences model. When this starts to be obvious, the analysts should try
to build what-if preferences model/s for RIM, to understand the behaviours
it is demonstrating at the time, and the motives behind such preferences. In
the stability analysis for Phase 2A, discussed in the previous sub-sections,
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we showed a preferences-model for RIM that explains its behaviour at the
time, and the motives behind such behaviour (the strategic importance RIM
placed at the time for its strategic goals), and we referred to this model as the
Demonstrated-By or Observed RIM’s Preferences model. We also discussed
the implication of this what-if model on the players moves and states’ stabil-
ities for each player. Here, we will show the Main-Game - Analysis part for
both models, and then compare the results with what really happened at the
time.
Main Game - Analysis:
Based on the Should-Be RIM’s Preferences:
Table 9.23 shows that the main game between NTP and RIM at this
phase has one and only one rational equilibrium, and it is at state
s6 where both parties reach a full licensing agreement that will end
the conflict. The equilibrium at s6 is under NASH solution concept,
and its strength is set at the Extreme level, showing that none of the
players has a UI/CI out of it and none of the players can reach it on
their own. The table also shows GMR based equilibriums at: the
fight-fight s5 state, the RIM-finds-a-workaround-but-continue-the-
fight s8 state, and the NTP-ally-with-RIM-rivals-and-sign-licensing-
agreements-with-them s9 state. But, these GMR based equilibriums
are based on the players no improving their position in the game
fearing that their opponents will act irrationally against their own
preferences vectors hurting themselves and others in the process. An
unreasonable assumption given the business environment that con-
flict is in, and the collective institutional rationality that each player
embodies. Nevertheless, these GMR equilibriums suggest temporar-
ily stable states at different points of time within this phase. The
stability strength for each of these states, to the individual players,
will suggest how the players will move and what state they prefer
to stay put at. Table 9.22 shows that NTP has higher GMR and
SMR stability at state s9 , while RIM has higher GMR and SMR
stability at state s8 . But, because each has a UI out from the more
GMR and SMR stable state of his opponent to the fight-fight state
s5 or its own more stable GMR and SMR state, we will expect to
see movements back and forth among those states. We can expect
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movements by NTP to s9 (if coalition with RIM’s rivals is possible),
followed by RIM taking the game back to s5 or s8 ; and movements
by RIM to s8 (if it can build a workaround to NTP’s technology),
followed by NTP taking the game back to s5 or s9 . The fight-fight s5
state has higher shared GMR equilibrium strength than s8 and s9 ,
making the game more likely to stay at it than the other two state.
This is if and only if the players do not move cooperatively to the
only rational equilibrium of this phase, to state s6 , reaching a full
lasting agreement and ending the conflict. Based on this analysis,
it expected that rational players will try to move to s6 with serious
well-intentioned plans to end the conflict.
Based on the Demonstrated-By RIM’s Preferences:
The equilibrium states analysis, for this phase but based on the pref-
erences RIM demonstrated at the time, given in Table 9.25, shows
that the very weak GMR based equilibriums at states s8 and s9
stayed the same, with the same strength level, as the equilibriums
shown at these states based on the should-be model. This suggests
that the players will show signs of moving back and forth between
the three states, s8 , s9 and s5 , as suggested by the analysis based
on the should-be RIM’s preferences model. No change here. But,
for states s5 and s6 , we see a big difference. First, the fight-fight s6
state does not form an equilibrium under NASH solution concept
for this phase, showing that at least one of the players (RIM in this
case) has a UI/CI out of this state to other more preferred states.
Second, s6 is now an equilibrium under GMR and SEQ, with the
meaning that each of the two players will stay put at this state once
reached and not take any UI/CI out of it fearing the other player
will sanction (with a rational SMI sanction) his move. But the lack
of SMR equilibrium suggests that at least one of the players can get
out of the bad effect of this sanction. Third, s5 is now, not only an
equilibrium state under the GMR solution concept, but also under
the SEQ solution concept. This makes the fear, the players have to
get out of s5 , to be well grounded in rationality, i.e. a justified fear
since the sanctions the players will face are SMI sanctions (SM + UI
moves). These three differences are quite insightful and telling on
how the conflict is expected to evolve over the period of this phase.
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Here, state s6 is no longer a state that no player has a UI out of it.
So, if state s6 is reached, or the players showing signs of attempting
to reach the state by negotiating a full agreement to end the conflict,
soon one of the players (RIM in this case) will break away from this
state to a better state, in a completely justifiable rational move (at
least in his mind). Therefore, any stay at state s6 will be short lived.
The same, to an extent, could be said about the equilibrium at the
fight-fight s5 state. State s5 has stability that is backed by rational
behaviour of all player involved, but the fact that it is a very weak
equilibrium, that players can mitigate sanctions imposed on them,
and that the players have moves to other GMR equilibriums (at s8
and s9), we should see more in and out movements to s5 than to
s6 . Recall that moves to s6 demands cooperation, while moves in
and out of s5 can be done unilaterally. Based on this analysis, it
is expected that the conflict will not reach its end by the players
arriving at state s6 . But rather, we will see a cycle of moving in
and out from the three states, s5 , s8 and s9 , showing the players
continuously fighting each other and putting pressure on each other.
Any move to negotiate a final full settlement, will be short lived.
Main Game - Reality : Immediately after the lower federal District Court
showed signs that it was agreeing with NTP’s position, that RIM in-
fringed on the patents, especially after the jury found the infringement
to be wilful, RIM entered into a tireless fight with the courts employing
all the tactics it has legally to change the ruling, reverse or at least delay
any injunction order against RIM, the court was expected to issue, shut-
ting its sales and operations in the US. Table 9.38 lists a number of these
actions that RIM took against NTP, including filing for a reexamination
of NTP patents by the US Patents and Trademarks Office (USPTO)
–not listed in the table but will be discussed later in this subsection–.
Once the lower court issued its final decision, as anticipated, against
RIM, RIM appealed the decision to the higher federal court. In effect,
enforcing the game stay at state s5 in this phase, which the court order
put the conflict at. Interestingly, shortly after the court final decision,
NTP entered into a licensing agreement with Nokia, RIM’s biggest ri-
val in the marketplace, and then with the second in-line competitor to
RIM’s mobile email technology, Good Technology. These agreements
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marked the establishment of a coalition, or a soft alliance, forming be-
tween NTP and RIM’s rivals in the marketplace, moving the game to
state s9 , where NTP puts pressure on RIM to settle, and RIM’s rivals
capitalize on RIM’s problems and signs of uncertainty that start show-
ing for the continuation of its service in the marketplace. In less than
a week, after NTP signed a licensing agreement with Good Technology,
RIM announced that it is negotiating a final licensing settlement with
NTP. In other words, an attempt to reach state s6 . But as expected
by the analysis (based on the preferences demonstrated by RIM at the
time), the settlement talks broke down, and RIM took a UI out of this
state to the fight-fight s5 state. Shortly after that, in fact after exactly
a week passed as Table 9.38 shows, RIM tried to enhance its position
in the game by moving the game to state s8 announcing a workaround
NTP’s technology that will ensure continuos service to its customers no
matter what the courts decide. But as we stated in the table, the outage
in RIM services that happened in the following day and days, made the
move by RIM to be perceived by the market and the industry more as an
attempt to move the game from s5 to s8 , instead of an actual solid move
to s8 . This left the game ending the phase at state s5 , or at state s8 if
one believes RIM and discredit the reposts that the outage was caused
by RIM testing its workarounds. In other words, the players behaved
as predicted by the analysis. The conflict moved between the
variations of continue-the-fight states, s5, s8 and s9. And, when
an attempt to reach s6 was made, the attempt was short lived
by RIM taking a UI out of s6 to the fight-fight s5 state.
Side Game - Analysis: Table 9.27 shows state sg , in which NTP will
reach full licensing agreements with RIM’s rivals (all or some of them),
is the only rational equilibrium for the side game at this phase of the
conflict. This equilibrium is under the NASH solution concept, with
strength set at the Extreme level, with the meaning that NTP and any
of RIM’s rivals decide to join in has a UI or a CI out of this state, and the
joining partners cannot reach this state on their own. The table shows
anther equilibrium at the wait-wait se state. But this equilibrium is un-
der the GMR and SMR solution concepts, with the meaning that the
players will decide to stay se for fear that the other player will retaliate
by sanctioning any improvement move the player will try to make. But,
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because state se is not an equilibrium under the SEQ solution concept,
then the sanction moves are not UI/CI for the players committing them,
i.e. the equilibrium at se is based on irrational sanctioning players who
are willing to hurt themselves (work against their preferences) just to
hurt others. This is an unjustified assumption especially in the business
environment where players embody institutional collective rationality.
In addition, the GMR and SMR based equilibrium at se has very weak
strength level of None. This makes the equilibrium at sg the only ratio-
nal equilibrium for completely rational players in the side game. In other
words, the analysis suggest that NTP and RIM’s rivals will join forces,
establish a coalition or a soft alliance, and sign full licensing agreements,
i.e. reach se in the side game, and allow NTP (through the coalition) to
reach s9 in the main game. This will benefit all parties. NTP will put
more pressure at RIM to join in, settle the case, and sign a full licensing
agreement. And, RIM’s rivals (Nokia –the biggest–, Good Technolo-
gies –the second in wireless email technology–, and others) will benefit
by offering an alternative, to RIM’s services and devices, to frightened
current customers of RIM (afraid to lose their services and investment
in such devices) and potential customers (who are looking for a stable
services with certainty).
Side Game - Reality : On Jun. 14, 2004, while the RIM v. NTP case was
in its mid way through the federal appeal court, NTP and Nokia an-
nounced a full licensing agreement that will allow Nokia to sell wireless
email devices and service, comparable to RIM’s devices and services,
within the US. In a smiler move, in what seemed a move to consolidate
the establishment of a soft alliance between NTP and RIM’s rivals, NTP
and Good Technology announced on Mar. 11, 2005 a full licensing agree-
ment that will allow Good Technology to sell its wireless email services
and devices in the US market. In other words, a coalition between
NTP and the two major rivals of RIM had formed as predicted
by the analysis. This allowed RIM’s rivals to sign full licensing
agreements with NTP, i.e. reach state sg in the side game, and
allowed NTP to reach state s9 in the main game of the conflict
at this phase, also as predicted by the analysis.
Phase 3A (after the higher court decision came against RIM’s position):
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Main Game - Analysis: Table 9.33 shows three equilibriums states for
the main game at this stage of the conflict. The first is an equilibrium
state under the NASH solution concept, and it is at state s16 , in which
NTP and RIM reach a full licensing agreement and settle the conflict.
This is the only rational equilibrium (assumes that all players are ratio-
nal player who will not disimprove their positions just to hurt others)
that this game has. Its NASH stability to the players, and its Extreme
strength level, suggest that the players do not have UI/CI/C-GIs out of
it, and none of the players can reach this state on their own. They have
all to cooperate to reach it. The other two equilibrium states, shown
in Table 9.33 , are the the equilibriums at the fight-fight s15 state and
at the reaching-a-partial-settlement-agreement s17 state. Both equilibri-
ums are under the GMR solution concept, and not equilibriums under
the SEQ solution concept This means that both are based on unjusti-
fied fear of opponents cting irrationally against their own preferences
vector just to hurt other players. An assumption that is not likely to
be true, especially within the context of a business environment where
all/most players embody collective institutional rationality. In addition,
both states are not equilibriums under the SMR solution concept, i.e.
players can improve their positions out of the sanctions that the GMR
stability is based on. The strengths of these two GMR-based equilibri-
ums also show that the fight-fight s15 state is more stable to the players,
than the partial-agreement state s16 state. The stability analysis for this
phase, Table 9.32, shows that state s19 is GMR and SMR stable for NTP,
but unstable for RIM. This means that NTP will keep its coalition with
RIM’s rivals (if this coalition was established at phase 2A of the conflict),
setup one (if not established at phase 2A), and add new members to it.
This move by NTP is expected, only if the side game could show that a
coalition formation is possible, and is beneficial to all parties involved.
But, NTP should know that RIM is expected to sanction any such move
by bringing the main game back to the fight-fight s15 state. In summary,
the analysis predicts that the end state of the conflict at this phase is
state s16 , in which RIM and NTP reach a full agreement to settle the
conflict. It is also expected that any stability at the fight-fight s15 state,
or state s17 (where the parties seemed negotiating a partial agreement)
will be a short lived stability that will not persist. In addition, NTP
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will try to move the game, if the analysis of the side game shows that
a coalition is possible, to the NTP-Coalition-Licensing-Deals s19 state.
NTP will try to consolidate, maintain, and add new members to its soft
alliance against RIM, in an effort to amount additional pressure on RIM
to settle the conflict by signing a full licensing agreement. But, it is
expected that any such move by NTP will be faced by a swift sanction
by RIM bringing the conflict to the fight-fight state, most likely with
escalation of the fight in a form of a new motion or an announcement
to show that it is determined to fight the case (in other words, declare
a back-to-s15 move).
Main Game - Reality : Table 9.38 shows the conflict moved to state s15
as the higher Appeals Court decided against RIM’s position, with RIM
shortly after that enforcing the games state to be s15 by filing motions
asking the Appeals Court to reconsider its ruling. NTP, then, cut a
deal with the third ranking rival to RIM in the wireless email space,
Visto (an innovative company that owns many patents of its own in
this space). The licensing deal with Visto, gave NTP also a share of
the company. This bold move by NTP, enforced the view that NTP
built a strong alliance against RIM in the marketplace, with NTP as
not just a licensor to the technology but also as a company that has
services and products of its own. This marked a move for the game
from state s15 to state s19 , putting RIM under real pressure, with its
current and potential customers having real more certain alternatives
to its services and products. In just five days, RIM filed a petition
to the Supreme Court, despite the fact that the supreme court turns
down most patent cases, putting the game back at state s15 . But, by
now RIM started to face the heat in the marketplace, from the stock
market, from its customers and partners, and the courts alike. RIM
and NTP announced, on Mar. 3, 2006, a final deal that gave RIM full
license to NTP’s technologies and compensated NTP for all legal costs,
ending the main game of phase 3A and the conflict at state s16 . In
summary, the conflict ended, as predicted by the analysis, at
the equilibrium state s16. Before that, also as predicted, the
coalition of NTP and RIM’s rivals made a move to state s19,
with RIM responding shortly after that with a move bringing
the conflict back to state s15 .
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Side Game - Analysis: The side game of Phase 3A was shown in the anal-
ysis provided in the previous subsection to follow the same pattern of
stabilities and equilibriums as the side game of Phase 2A. The equilib-
rium at state so , where the coalition of NTP and RIM’s rivals (whomever
did not join the coalition by now) reaching full licensing agreement, is
shown to be the only rational equilibrium for completely rational players
in the side game at this phase. In other words, the analysis suggest that
NTP and RIM’s rivals will join forces, establishing a coalition or a soft
alliance, if not formed yet, or enforcing the alliance, if already existed
by adding new members, and sign full licensing agreements, i.e. reach so
in the side game, and allow NTP (through the coalition) to reach s19 in
the main game.
Side Game - Reality : On Dec. 14, 2005, NTP and Visto (the third, in
market share size and importance, competitor to RIM) announced Visto
getting a full licensing agreement and NTP getting a share in Visto. This
move marked NTP strengthening its coalition with RIM’s rivals, adding
new ones, and taking part in the services and devices delivery, put the
side game at state so . The type of arrangements announced by the deal
show the benefits that both sides are getting. NTP bringing additional
pressure on RIM to settle, and on the courts which agreed to not delay
the case any longer (but hesitated to shut down a telecommunication
service that may affect the work of governmental agencies who uses it).
RIM’s rivals, now having a field day with all reporting increase in sales
especially to people who were with RIM or were thinking of RIM but
opted for a more certain service offered by RIM’s competitors. In other
words, a coalition between NTP and the third major RIM rival
had formed as predicted by the analysis. This allowed RIM’s
rivals to sign full licensing agreements with NTP, i.e. reach
state so in the side game, and allowed NTP to reach state s19 in
the main game of the conflict at this phase, also as predicted
by the analysis.
2) Notes on the RIM v. NTP Conflict’s Analysis vs. Reality:
So, the Constrained Rationality analysis we conducted for the RIM v. NTP conflict
predicted the flow and the outcome of each of the conflict’s phases. But, surely there
are many issues and questions we intentionally left out addressing or answering, in
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order to not clutter the analysis with matters we thought has no implication on
the conflict and how it will evolve over time. Some of these issues are at the heart
of the conflict (such as: Who actually refused to finalize the $450M settlement
announced early on March 2005? Is it RIM or NTP?), or add-on questions that we
believe are not part of the conflict but nevertheless interesting to know because of
its proximity to the conflict (such as the question: Was RIM justified on its belief
that playing the delay game will be better off for it?). In this subsection, we will
address these questions and issues which we thought are better addressed after the
analysis is completed and the hysterical events of the conflict are discussed.
Who Refused to Finalize the $450M Settlement Deal on Jun 9, 2005?
The announcement RIM made on March 16, 2005 that it had agreed to pay NTP
$450M to settle and end the conflict (RIM, 2005), was received very positively by
the market and RIM’s customers alike. In fact, the marker rewarded RIM with a
jump in RIM’s stock price. But, shortly after that, more specifically on Jun. 9, 2005,
a breakdown on finalizing the agreement between RIM and NTP was announced
(shown in Table 9.38 as Step No. 3 in Phase 2A), with the parties blaming each
other for this breakdown. RIM claims that it is acting in good faith on the terms of
the settlement while NTP is refusing to finalize the documents needed to complete
the settlement. NTP, however, accuses RIM of stalling in the face of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Offices re-examination of the patents (Peacock, 2005).
So, who is really to be blamed? It is hard to tell, unless one have full knowledge
of the negotiation happening at the time. But, we can take both sides argument
and match them to the moves in the Constrained Rationality models we have for
Phase 2A of the conflict (the stage of the conflict after the lower federal court
decided against RIM in its ruling and before the Appeal Court decided on it). In
Table 9.38, we listed the claims of NTP and RIM, and how such claims could be
interpreted in terms of players moves from state s6 to state s5 :
1. If RIM was right in its claim that there was a complete settlement agreement,
i.e. both players were at state s6 , but NTP refused to finalize it and moved
the game to the fight-fight s5 state, then this could be read as one of two:
(a) if both parties were actually and truly at state s6 , then NTP’s move to
s5 can only be considered as a sanction move to hurt RIM, put more
pressure on it, and hurt itself in the process. Let us not forget that the
USPTO office started by then re-examining NTP’s patents (based on a
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request by RIM made on Jan. 14, 2003), and in fact on Apr. 6, 2005
rejected one of the patents (Peacock, 2005). So, NTP surly made a risky
move by taking such sanction move that could hurt its chance of getting
a full licensing agreement with RIM. And, with its patents getting struck
down one at time by the USPTO then it might lose the court’s support
that it managed to harness so far. Could it be really that NTP is an
irrational player, who decided to hurt itself and its chances in order to
hurt RIM and punish it?
(b) alternatively, both parties were actually not at state s6 , and the nego-
tiation was not serious and never materialized as a final agreement on
the details of the settlement, as RIM announced in its press release at
the time (RIM, 2005). In other words, the conflict was still at state s9 ,
the state where the NTP-Nokia-GoodTechnology coalition left the game
at after the Mar. 11, 2005 announcement. There is some arguments to
support this. The biggest and ultimately the most important of them
came after RIM asked the Federal Circuit to stay the appeal and to have
Judge Spencer, of the District Court, decide this latest dispute of final-
izing a settlement claimed to be a done-deal. In a briefing on that issue,
NTP asserted that RIM, once again, was simply attempting to avoid
the consequences of infringement. The Federal Circuit refused RIM’s re-
quest. Ultimately, on Nov. 30, 2005, Judge Spencer ruled there had been
no settlement (District Court, 2005). Recall that RIM had a jump in its
stock price, after its announcement of the settlement, and that RIM’s
announcement came just 5 days after NTP announced its alliance with
Good Technology, the number two Competitor of RIM in the wireless
email mart space. The fact the court rejected the claim that there was a
done-deal between RIM and NTP, and the fact that RIM had benefited
from such announcement, made some analysts question the “bold” move
RIM made by this announcement (e.g. Teska (2006)).
2. If NTP was right in its claim that RIM stalled the talks regarding a complete
final settle agreement in the face of the USPTO re-examining NTP’s patents
(responding to RIM’s request submitted to the office on Jan. 14, 2003), and
the office rejecting one of NTP’s patents on Apr. 6, 2005 (Peacock, 2005),
then the main game at Phase 2A of the conflict moved from s6 to state s5 by
RIM deciding that the fight-fight state is better for it. After all the USPTO
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could reject all NTP’s patents, and therefore, there will be no basis for the
NTP infringement case against RIM. This move by RIM could be read as one
of two:
(a) if both parties were actually and truly at state s6 , then RIM’s move to
s5 can only be considered as:
i. an SM by RIM to hurt NTP and hurt itself, if we use the Should-be
RIM’s Preferences model. A move that surely RIM will be hurt in,
even more than NTP, given the ruling that the lower court took
against RIM’s position (District Court, 2003a), and the direction
the Appeal Courts was taking by its initial and non-final decision of
Court of Appeals (2004) (agreeing mostly with the lower court’s rul-
ing of District Court (2003a)). This move does not even explain the
harm that RIM could suffer from. So, it is an illogical explanation
at best.
ii. a UI by RIM to enhance its position from state s6 to state s5 , based
on the Demonstrated-By RIM’s preferences model. A move, and
an explanation, that has many arguments to support. Despite the
fact that most observers and analysts questioned the rationality be-
hind the move (e.g. Green (2005); McKenna et al. (2006)), because
they all were thinking based on the Should-Be RIM’s preferences
model and that settling-the-conflict-at-any-price and ending the un-
certainty is better for RIM and its future, RIM was completely ra-
tional (in its collective mind) to stall-the-deal and continue-the-fight
based on the Demonstrated-By RIM performance model. In RIM’s
mind, it attempt to invalidate NTP’s patents at the USPTO office,
started to pay off. Three weeks after RIM rationally moved to cut a
final settlement with NTP (on Mar. 16, 2005), the USPTO on Apr.
6, 2005 (Peacock, 2005) rejected the first of NTP’s patents-in-suit.
So, playing the delay game with NTP and the courts by bringing
the conflict at this phase to the fight-fight s5 state is quite rational
and logical. This is only if one believes that RIM had at the time
the Demonstrated-By RIM’s preferences model. RIM was in effect
believing that the cost of the settlement does not justify ending the
conflict and ending the uncertainty it causes to RIM’s future in the
marketplace (Recall that RIM has the strategic importance lower for
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the finical cost in its Should-Be-RIM’s preferences model that the
Demonstrated-By-RIM one). A belief that is not shared by many in
the industry, the market, and the courts at the time (we will discuss
shortly the justification of this delay strategy of RIM).
(b) alternatively, both parties were actually not at state s6 and the negotia-
tion was not serious and never materialized as a final agreement on the
details of the settlement, as RIM announced in its press release at the
time (RIM, 2005). In other words, the conflict was still at state s9 , the
state where the NTP-Nokia-GoodTechnology coalition left the game at,
after the Mar. 11, 2005 announcement. This certainly could be the case,
as stated above, given the District Court’s decision on Nov. 30, 2005
that there had been no settlement (District Court, 2005).
So, who killed the most-hoped-to-be-be-finalized $450M settlement of March,
2005? Firstly, whatever scenario, out of all possible scenarios discussed above, that
you think happened, and whether one believes RIM’s story or NTP’s one, this
scenario is shown to be mapped to the Constrained Rationality model and stability
analysis of the conflict. The analyst will not only understand how the players
behaved and predict their next moves, but also understand the rationality behind
any of the taken and/or to-be-taken moves. Secondly, looking at the scenarios
above, and assuming that all players in this conflict are rational actors (a safe and
logical assumption in a business environment where the players are not emotional
individuals but institutions with collective rationality), then there are only two
scenarios that can explain what happened at the time: the UI-by-RIM scenario
(scenario No. 2.a.ii) based on the Demonstrated-By RIM Preferences model; and
the alternative scenario that the game was never at s6 state in the first place, i.e.
there was no serious negotiation to end the conflict going on between the parties
(at least one of the players was not serious, if not both, in negotiating the final
settlement).
Was RIM justified in its belief that the delay game will be better for it?
This question could be put differently: Why RIM showed no rush to end the con-
flict? There are many reasons that could be given. Some will argue that RIM was
outspoken about these reasons in words and deeds. Here is a list of the most cited
reasons:
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• the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) will invalidate all
NTP patterns: It is no secret that RIM tried hard to invalidate NTP’s
patents-in-suit, as a strategy to invalidate the bases for the infringement law-
suit that NTP filed against RIM. Two months after a federal jury determined
that RIM knowingly infringed upon eight patents held by NTP (Peacock,
2005), more specifically on Jan. 14, 2003 RIM filed a request with the USPTO
to re-examine five of the eight patents-in-suit owned by NTP. In Apr. 6, 2005,
just three weeks after RIM announced that it will pay a $450M to settle the
case with NTP, USPTO after re-examination rejected one of the five patents-
in-suit. This as indicated above is/could-be one “the reason”, or one of the
reasons, that led to the breakdown of the settlement talks with NTP. In Jun.
22, 2005, two more patents are rejected by USPTO after been re-examined.
Apparently, RIM find the strategy working and decided to file for many mo-
tions at different court levels to stay, i.e. delay, pending the USPTOs reexami-
nation of several of the patents-in-suit. There is one serious problem with this
strategy though. The re-examination process for any entities’ patents is not
a one-step process finished and completed at the USPTO. For most analysts
and observers, who cared about RIM and its services and products, the strat-
egy was troubling because it shows that RIM was indeed ill-advised, despite
the fact that RIM at the time was already a big company with many resources
and no longer the little small start-up company based on Waterloo-Ontario.
For many experts familiar with the patents laws and procedures, striking down
the patents is only the first step in what would be an extremely long legal pro-
cess (Peacock, 2005; Teska, 2006). Surely, NTP will more than likely appeal
the decision by the patent office, which would be sent to a patent board and
then ultimately to the US. Circuit Court of Appeals, which is the same court
that decided in favour of NTP in both its rulings (Court of Appeals, 2004,
2005). In his ruling, denying RIMs Motion for Stay of Proceedings Pending
Reexamination of NTP (District Court, 2005), Judge Spencer explained the
flaw in the line of thinking, that RIM will soon get off the hock if the USPTO
struck down all the patents-in-suit under examination:
“Over the course of this litigation, at both the trial and appellate
levels, RIM has moved on four separate occasions to stay the pro-
ceedings based at least in part on the ongoing reexamination of the
patents-in-suit by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
514
(the “PTO”). RIM’s first three attempts were unsuccessful. . . .
The Court is not persuaded that the PTO will issue final actions in
RIMs favor “within the next few months,” as RIM asserts. RIM’s
Mem. Supp. 6. The PTO has not even finished issuing all of its
first actions. Furthermore, NTP will have the opportunity and has
already indicated its intention to respond to the first actions. The
PTO, after considering NTP’s responses, will then issue another
office action which may or may not be “final.” Even in the unlikely
event that all final office actions were taken in the next few months,
NTP, if not satisfied, could appeal the PTO’s findings.
Reality and past experience dictate that several years might very
well pass from the time when a final office action is issued by the
PTO to when the claims are finally and officially “confirmed” af-
ter appeals. See, e.g., In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming the claim construction of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in a case where, after
numerous rehearing requests and appeals, the PTO’s findings were
not confirmed until ten years after a reexamination was first re-
quested).” [source: District Court (2005), underlines are from the source]
Therefore, and because of the fact that a strategy of delaying the case, and
any settlement of it until a re-examination of NTP’s patents-in-suit is com-
pleted, is flawed, we did not see the need to include this strategy as an op-
tion/alternative for RIM in the conflict. We included such “delay” tactics
within the fight-fight states that each of the conflict phases in the model has.
• the US Government will not allow RIM services to be shut down in
the US: It is fair to assume that RIM would not settle the case, as it finally
did on March 2006, if there had been no injunction against it that threatened
to shut down RIM’s services and operation in the US (court order of Dis-
trict Court (2003a), a stay on it until the Appeal Courts finalize its decision
is removed after Court of Appeals (2005) and a new request by RIM to stay
it further is denied by District Court (2005)). Therefore, immediately after
the lower court decision of District Court (2003a), RIM hired political lob-
byists and public relations specialists in Washington in order to: 1) to speed
up the invalidation of NTP’s patents-in-suit re-examination at the USPTO,
a process which typically very slow, and picked up speed at the USPTO un-
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fairly according to NTP (2006) and most observers (Teska, 2006; McKenna
et al., 2006) (but still the legal process itself after the USPTO decision is still
along one, as we said above); and 2) stop the court from implementing the
injunction against RIM, at least until the USPTO finalized its decision.
RIM’s heavy weight lobbyists managed to get the USPTO speed up its typically-
slow internal re-examination process, not to mention undisclosed meetings
with RIM (NTP, 2006), but could not change the pace of the legal process fol-
lowed by the courts, or the nature of the decisions the courts took (McKenna
et al., 2006). Saying so, RIM managed to get the US’s Department of Justice
(DOJ), on behalf of many US governmental departments and agencies, to file
briefs on Nov. 2005 and later on Feb. 2006 asking the federal court to allow
RIM to stay and continue because of the large number of BlackBerry R© users
in the US Federal Government (Noguchi, 2005; Wong, 2006).
But all these efforts succeeded to delay the courts and the process for a while,
but it will not be likely that the court will wait for a long time. In addition, the
move by NTP and its coalition (Nokia, Visto, Good Technology) to offer safe
and equivalent alternatives, and NTP suggesting that only US governmental
staff to be exempted from the shutdown of RIM’s BlackBerry R© services, the
court has no other choice but to seriously threaten RIM that the court is
running out of patience. This exactly what the court did on Feb. 24, 2006
(Broache and Krazit, 2006; Krazit, 2006).
Based on all of the above, it is safe to say that lobbing-the-govenment served,
and in most cases can only serve, as a “delay tactic”. And similar to the
re-examination of NTP’s patents-in-suit, we did not see the need to include
this as an option/alternative for RIM in the conflict. We included such “de-
lay” tactics within the fight-fight states that each of the conflict phases in the
model has.
• the customers will stay with RIM no matter what: This was probably
was RIM’s worst assumption. And, even if RIM did not assume that its
customers will stay with it and not move on, it sure acted as if it did hold
such belief. The delay tactics employed by RIM put many of RIM’s US
valuable customers, the enterprise business, at risk of losing what become to
be “the communication device” used by them and the investment in setting
up their systems around it.
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Some called RIM’s delay strategy a “’Legal Gamble’ (Green, 2005), because
of its effect on RIM’s current and potential customers base. Green (2005)
explains why it is a gamble: “With uncertainty and concern rising about the
outcome of the RIM-NTP suit, RIM’s competitors have been fielding a grow-
ing number of calls from BlackBerry R© customers, according to executives at
Good Technology, Visto, and Microsoft. Licensing agreements with NTP give
individuals and companies an added reason to check out these alternatives,
analysts say. “It’s a huge opportunity to try to steal some market share
while RIM is in limbo,” says Gene Signorini, an analyst at researcher Yankee
Group”. The consulting company Gartner advised its clients, on Dec. 2005,
to stop or delay crucial BlackBerry R© rollouts, pending the outcome of the
case. “I would say that every 2 out of 10 companies are starting to investi-
gate something else, but are still hoping it goes away before they have to do
anything,” said Ken Dulaney, a Gartner analyst (Green, 2005; Perez, 2005).
In other words, while RIM was busy delaying a settlement deal, its competi-
tors in the marketplace (through the coalition of NTP, Nokia, Good Technol-
ogy, Visto) moved aggressively not only to acquire new customers who are
looking for a stable-sure-to-stay wireless email services and devices, but also
start taking some of RIM’s customers at the time. One do not need more
proof than RIM itself admitting in the same day it announced the final set-
tlement with NTP, Mar. 3, 2006, but in a separate press release (RIM, 2006)
that the number of new subscribers to its BlackBerry R© service will fall short
of expectations by as much as 120,000 subscribers in the fourth quarter of that
year. The uncertainty caused by the dispute with NTP was evidently causing
many potential customers to either put off their BlackBerry R© purchases or
choose a competing wireless product (RIM, 2006).
Not to mention that while RIM was busy with its battle with NTP, other
new comers to the market ware preparing new devices and services. Apple
announced on Jan. 2007, few months after RIM settled the case, its game-
changer smartphone, the iPhone R©. Apple at the time said it was working
on the phone for about two years (Honan, 2007). So, Apple was building the
“next big thing” during the second half of the 4.5 years legal battle of RIM vs.
NTP. This is the time in which RIM was not only tied down and distracted
by the case, but also working hard employing delay tactics to extend the time
for the legal battle further.
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• the financial cost of a final settlement is too high: This seems to be
the most logical reason that RIM can rationalize to itself and others. But,
RIM forgot that the cost of letting the case continue for so long has also
finical implications. Some were really harsh on RIM, but nevertheless stated
the consequences of its delay tactics and actions rightly so, such as McKenna
et al. (2006): “Through . . . and bad advice, RIM’s potential bill had shot up
from a few million dollars before the trial to roughly $20-million when its case
headed south at trial, to now hundreds of millions of dollars.”
2) So, Is It Worth Fighting a Patent Troll?
From a purely technical point of view, we used the case of RIM v. NTP mainly
to show how a complicated intellectual property business (and legal) multi-stage
cooperative conflict, with coalitions involved, can be modelled and analyzed using
our Constrained Rationality framework; and to illustrate the use of the conflict
analysis concepts and methods, introduced earlier in this chapter, in a real-life
conflict. But, surely one can stop and ask the question: Can we generalize this RIM
v. NTP case to the point that we can state with confidence “that’s why one should
not fight a patent troll”? The answer, with confidence, is: No. Generalization,
especially when it comes to real-life cases, is very dangerous. Context is very
important in any real-life conflict, and it will be hard to find two cases with the
same context.
Nevertheless, there are some general lessons to be taken from this case. After
all, this case is one of the the few cases that a defendant challenged a patent troll
plaintiff (or a plaintiff that holds the key characteristics of a patent troll –specifically
that he does not have a product, only patents on paper, and the fact the he has
nothing to lose and everything to gain from these legal cases–) in courts, at all
levels, for as long as RIM challenged NTP. Not only RIM challenged NTP in courts
for a long time, but also vigorously employed and tried to employ all delay tactics
possible to extend the case as much as possible (hoping to invalidate the patent-
troll’s patents and claims). Most companies settle the cases with patent trolls, and
do not let it go for long, as RIM did, threatening its business, its customers, and
market. We will list here some of the general technical lessons, or patterns, elicited
from the stability analysis we provided for the RIM v. NTP conflict, and most likely
will show in the majority of patent troll cases:
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Phase 1 - Before the Lower Court Decides on the Case:
• No settlement in phase 1. Phase 1 will serve to validate the
patent troll case and claims. In analyzing the RIM v. NTP case,
one could not but notice that the only equilibrium Phase 1 has was the
fight-fight s0 state (Table 9.19). This is understandable, given that the
defendant in this case, and all other similar cases, would like to validate
the patent troll case and claims in courts of law. Especially, when the
defendant is not sure, or does not believe, that the patent-troll’s patents-
in-suit are valid or apply to his case. So, it is safe to wait for the court
to decide on the validity. But, if the defendant knows that the patents-
in-suit and claims are valid, waiting for the court decision will only serve
to raise the cost of settling the case.
• No coalition between the patent troll and the defendant’s rivals
in the marketplace is likely to form in phase 1. The waiting
game for the main parties involved in the infringement case between the
plaintiff (the patent-troll) and the defendant, is likely to extend to the
plaintiff and any other smaller companies (the defendant’s rivals in the
marketplace) who also infringe on the plaintiff’s patents. As the stability
analysis of the side game of Phase 1 of the RIM v. NTP conflict shows,
in Table 9.21, that the wait-wait sa state is the only equilibrium for
this game at this stage of the conflict. This leaves the main defendant
(usually the biggest player in the market –that’s why the patent troll
went after him first) safe to assume that a coalition is not likely to
happen between the patent troll and its own rivals. Not before the courts
validate, or in its way to validate, the patent troll claims, and not before
the defendant’s products and services start suffering from uncertainty in
the marketplace.
Phase 2A - After the Court Decision Comes in Favour of the Plaintiff:
• The only rational equilibrium at this stage is a full and final
settlement. This is expected to last, i.e. beyond Phase 2A to Phase
3A, as long as the courts at the higher levels support the lower court’s
decision in favour of the plaintiff (the patent troll). The equilibrium
analysis tables for the main game of both Phases 2A and 3A, Tables
9.23 and 9.33, show that all other equilibriums are not rational (assumes
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some of the players will act irrationally against their preferences vectors
just to hurt their opponents). In addition, the defendant should expect
the total cost for a final settlement to increase as time passes and as the
courts amount more support in favour of the plaintiff.
• A coalition between the patent troll and the defendant’s rivals
in the marketplace is more likely to form in phase 2A, last
and add new members in Phase 3A as long as the courts keep
agreeing with the plaintiff’s position. As the equilibrium analysis of
the side game for Phase 2A and 3A of the RIM v. NTP conflict shows, in
Tables 9.27 and 9.35, that the rivals-sign-full-licensing-agreements state
is the only equilibrium for this game at these stages of the conflict. In
other words, the defendant should expect that his rivals will most likely
form a coalition, or a soft alliance, with the plaintiff allowing both sides
to benefit. The defendant will be increasingly under pressure as time
passes to either settle or keep losing financially and market-share-wise.
Phase 2B - After the Lower Decision Comes in Favour of the Defendant:
• The patent troll is expected to continue the fight. This is ex-
pected to last, i.e. beyond Phase 2B to Phase 3B, as long as the courts
at the higher levels support the lower court’s decision in favour of the de-
fendants. The defendant should not expect that the patent troll to stop
the fight. After all, the patent troll has nothing to lose, and everything
to gain, if he continues the fight. On the other hand, the defendant will
continue to live with the noise and distraction caused by the plaintiff’s
case. The equilibrium analysis tables for the main game of both Phases
2B and 3B, Tables 9.29 and 9.37, show that all rational equilibrium
states (under solution concepts that assumes all players to be rational
players at all times) at these stages of the conflict have the patent troll
chooses “fighting” as his strategy (alternative of choice).
• No coalition between the patent troll and the defendant’s rivals
in the marketplace is likely to form in phase 2B, and as long as
the courts decisions continue to be in favour of the defendant’s
position. As the equilibrium analysis of the side game for Phase 2B of
the RIM v. NTP conflict shows, in Table 9.31, that the wait-wait state
is the only equilibrium for this game at this stage of the conflict.
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In summary, as for the classical cases of a patent troll (who has no products but
patents on paper) going after a prosperous company with products and services, the
analysis shows that the patent troll has nothing to lose by fighting for the alleged
rights, while the prosperous company has everything to lose from having this fight
extend beyond the point the courts found that the patent troll claims are valid.
Any delay in settling the case beyond this point, will only play into the patent
troll game, and will result with more loss at many fronts: customers-base, market
potential, stock market reaction, competitors eagerly seizing the opportunity, and
so on. It was unfortunate to see RIM fall into this trap, upping the ante, the
pressure on itself and the odds of it getting out of this legal battle without paying.
RIM should have paid-and-settled as early as possible, once it was clear that the
system decided the case in favour of NTP.
3) Final Notes on Coalition Analysis and Sensitivity Analysis:
Two final notes before we end this case study. One on coalition analysis and another
on sensitivity analysis. First, it is worth reminding the reader that there are many
coalition formations and types. Some are legally binding while others are voluntarily
based. Some are strictly defined as coherent bodies, while others softly defined as
groups of members with common objectives even though they are free agents. The
coalition between NTP and RIM’s rivals could be defined as individually-legally-
binding between NTP and each of the members, but soft in its structure that all the
members are free agents who share one objective: put RIM at a worse position and
capitalize on this. Saying so, one could not but notice that close to the end of 2005,
NTP started to be not only signing licensing agreements with these companies but
taking shares in them, namely in Visto and Good Technology, moving the coalition
from the soft structure it had to be more coherent and solid in nature.
Analysts, when analyzing coalitions in cooperative conflicts, must understand
the nature of these coalitions, how the members benefit from it, and how deci-
sions/moves are taken (all should benefit, the big original founders must benefit
but the rest is not as important, and so on). As we discussed at the beginning of
this chapter when we defined the concept of a coalition, the analyst must be able to
answer these questions clearly, before starting the analysis. We said, for example,
that defining C-GI moves and separating them from the mere C-GM moves depends
on such answers.
The second note relates to conducting sensitivity analysis for complex conflicts
such as the RIM v. NTP conflict we studied. We said earlier that, generally speak-
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ing, an analyst will build a base model, that fits most of the known facts, and safely
assumed, about the conflict and its players. In the RIM v. NTP case study, the
base model for the conflict is the one which includes the conflict’s Phase 2A model
which is based on the Should-Be RIM’s Preferences. The analyst will then conducts
sensitivity analysis by building variant models, called what-if or scenario models in
this research work. Analyze these models separately and compare results. Sensitiv-
ity analysis, by building what-if models, can be done: up front when the conflict is
in the horizon or at its initial stage, motivated by testing some uncertain aspects of
the conflict or the players (such as alternatives that they may or may not have or
can afford, or goals they may have or not have); while the conflict progressing over
time, motivated by new discoveries about the conflict, new players surfaced, new
players’ options uncovered, or some players exhibiting unusual behaviour, deviating
from the base model assumptions, such as the case of RIM’s behaviour in Phase
2A of the RIM v. NTP conflict; or after the conflict had ended, to study lessons
learned, opportunities missed, and so on.
Good practices in conflict analysis, based on our experience, shows that the care
that the analyst puts in structuring the conflict, will eventually pay off. This is
true in any problem solving situation, but it is more so and especially important
when conducting sensitivity analysis as part of a bigger conflict analysis assignment.
While theoretically speaking, the analyst can build complete new models each time
he wants to test a small minor change to the base model he originally built, it is a
matter of common sense to assume that re-building new models is not only a time
consuming practice, but also wastes the analyst valuable time and resources. Better
planning and model structuring, saves the analyst time and energy, and allows for
the much needed comparative analysis based on a base model. For example, in the
RIM v. NTP conflict, which we have analyzed above, and because we structured
the conflict model based on the legal process phases that such conflicts follow, we
were able to build a whole new what-if model for the conflict with only Phase 2A’s
main game model slightly changed to reflect what RIM demonstrated at the time as
preferences. The rest of the conflict phases stayed as is, including Phase 2A’s side
game stayed unchanged. This allowed for comparative analysis of both scenarios.
9.7 Summary
This chapter discussed the analysis of cooperative multi-agent games with coali-
tions. It started by defining the type of moves the players of the cooperative
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games, with coalitions, are allowed to make. Then, the chapter provided defini-
tions for the four different stability and equilibrium solution concepts which were
defined for the non-cooperative games in Chapter 6 and for the cooperative-without-
coalitions games in Chapter 8. These concepts guide the stability analysis of each
of the games’ states, for each of the games’ players. The chapter, then, defined
the strength of the stability under such solution concepts, and proposed a set of
algorithms to help identify the strength level of each of these stabilities.
The chapter finished with a case study in which the concepts and methods
proposed in this chapter were applied. In the case study, we analyzed thoroughly
a strategic business conflict over intellectual property rights. The case examined
whether it is worth fighting a patent troll, and used the showdown between Research
and Motion and NTP to help us answer this question. We started by giving a brief
background on the conflict and the players. We, then, modelled the players goals,
constraints and alternatives; analyzed their GCMs; identified the conflict’s states;
elicited the players’ cardinal and ordinal preferences over these states; and then
identified the players unilateral moves among these states. We also examined the
possible coalitions that could be formed in the game. Next, the stabilities of the
conflict’s states were analyzed under the four stability solution concepts, and the
strength of these stabilities were identified. We looked at the equilibrium states
for the conflict; and how the conflict could have evolved over time under different
scenarios. We analyzed the effect of the coalition formations on the conflict, its
stabilities, and its equilibrium states. We concluded the case study by showing




Contributions and Future Work
10.1 Summary of Contributions
We started the thesis document, in Chapter 1, by stating our research objective:
to propose a qualitative formal goals and constraints/context conceptual modelling
and reasoning framework, for decision-making agent/s (also called players or de-
cision makers) within single and multi-agent systems and environments, to use
in order to effectively help the agent(s) systematically analyze his (their) strate-
gic decisions and conflict situations. The novel formal Constrained Rationality
framework, which deliver on this research objective is the main contribution of our
research work. The framework forms a new paradigm for modelling and analyzing
single and multi-agent decision making situations by bringing the decision support
problem back to its roots: reasoning about options, and alternatives, to satisfy
the strategic and conflicting goals each agent has, given the internal and external
complex and conflicting realities (limitations and opportunities) each has. Each of
its components and methods represent a contribution to the field of decision mak-
ing modelling and analysis, both in one-agent and in multi-agent decision support
environments. This section summarizes the contributions that this framework and
its components provide.
The foundational concepts and methods of the Constrained Rationality con-
ceptual modelling and reasoning framework were introduced in Chapters 3 and
4. In Chapter 3, we showed how the Constrained Rationality framework extends
the conceptual modelling mechanisms of the Viewpoint-based Value Driven - En-
terprise Knowledge Management framework (ViVD-EKM), proposed by Al-Shawa
(2006b,a), to model the goals, realities/constraints and plans/alternatives which
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the agents (or the involved decision makers in the decision making situation) have
and reason about. Specifically, Chapter 3 introduced:
• The Goals & Constraints Model (GCM) for each of the involved agents, a
model that includes the agent’s goals and constraints as interacting nodes,
affecting each other.
• Goal-to-Goal (G-G) reduction relationships allowing the goals of the agent
to form a hierarchal tree-like structures, where the goals at the top of the
goal-trees are the agent’s strategic goals (needs and wants), and the goals at
the bottom represent the reduced-to operational goals.
• Goal-to-Goal (G-G) lateral relationships, a special set of relationships to
model the support, hinder and conflict-with relations that exist among goals.
• Constraint-to-Goals (C-G) lateral relations, to model the affect that con-
straints have on the individual goal nodes within the GCM model.
• A set of value properties for goal nodes, given fuzzified qualitative linguistic
value labels, based on fuzzy membership functions, to represent: the amount
of operationalization and achievement goal nodes harness through the net-
work of relationships connecting them to other goals and constraints, and the
amount of prevention goal nodes receive through these relationships.
• A set of fully axiomatized propagation rules for these fuzzy linguistic value
labels propagation through the different G-G and C-G relationships; and how
the final value labels, for each value property, for each individual goal node in
the GCM model, are calculated at any single point of time (axiomatization
of the relationships is given in Appendix A).
• A goals’ qualitative value labels forward propagation algorithm, in Section
3.6; and we proved in the section that the algorithm terminates in polyno-
mial time, and proved the correctness and completeness of the algorithm in
Appendix B. In addition, we showed in the chapter that the algorithm sup-
ports finalizing the value labels of goals part of multiple goal-trees within the
agent’s GCM.
• How the reasoning framework deals with the dynamic changes happening to
the agents’ GCM models over the time (such as the addition of new goals
or constraints, the removal of some of these goals or constraints, and/or the
changes that could happen to the current goals and constraints, including
changes to the value labels of their value properties or to their interrelation-
ships).
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• The extendability and flexibility of the framework’s modelling mechanisms, by
showing possible extensions, such as: changing the qualitative fuzzy linguistic
value labels or increasing/decreasing their number; and changing or adding
new lateral relationships (G-G or C-G) to satisfy the specific needs of the
decision making modelling initiative.
In Chapter 4, we showed how the Constrained Rationality framework captures
the agents’ priorities, emotions and attitudes within the agents’ decision making
models, and showed how the agents’ preferences over their alternatives are gener-
ated. More specifically, the chapter introduced:
• How the agent’s strategic goals are identified and separated from the rest of
the goals he has; and how the agent’s alternatives are represented within the
agent’s GCM as intention goal nodes (lower refined operational goal nodes),
each node representing an intention by the agent to adopt a specific alterna-
tive.
• How the agent’s priorities are modelled as strategic importance value proper-
ties attached to the agent’s strategic goals, and how these properties are given
fuzzy qualitative linguistic value labels based on fuzzy membership functions.
• How the agent’s emotion/feeling towards working to achieve a specific strate-
gic goal is modelled as an emotional-valence value property attached to that
strategic goal, and how this property is given a fuzzy qualitative linguistic
value label based on fuzzy membership functions (representing a range of
emotions from extremely-like to extremely-dislike).
• How the framework allows for personality wide attitudes, such as attitudes to-
wards acting rationally or emotionally (whether or not the importance and/or
emotional valences exist), to be modelled; and how this modelling mechanism
allows for a wide range of personalities to be captured, modelled and used in
the reasoning mechanisms.
• How the agent’s cardinal and ordinal preferences over his alternatives are
calculated based on how much each alternative contribute to the achievement
of the agent’s strategic goals, given: the constraints affecting these goals, the
importance the agent assigned to his strategic goals, the emotional valences
assigned to these goals, and the attitudes the agent is demonstrating towards
acting rationally or emotionally in this situation.
• How the strengths of the agent’s preferences, over his alternatives, are calcu-
lated, and assigned a fuzzy qualitative linguistic value label based on fuzzy
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membership functions. These value labels represent the preferences’ strengths,
with strength labels that range from Extremely-Less-Preferred to Extremely-
Preferred, including the Indifferent preference strength label). Note that
these preferences’ strengths are calculated, i.e. not predetermined. In other
words, one can trace back (verify and validate) how and why each preference’s
strength is at the level it is given, and not less or more.
• A novel, unique and complete calculated-and-verifiable preference relationship
of LPS
DMi,t
, where LPS is the fuzzy linguistic value label representing the prefer-
ence’s strength, to represent any preference a decision maker DMi, at time t,


















Aa to be extremely-preferred to DMi than Ab. This modelling mechanism
of preferences, and their strengths, is a major contribution and advancement
over the way current methods provide. For example, the GMCR provides two
relations, one for preference “” and another for indifference “∼” (Fang et al.,
1993). Some of GMCR extensions provide additional relationships: Hamouda
et al. (2004) added “>>” to represent a strong preface and “>” a weak pref-
erence; and Xu (2009) went further to the extent of offering “>> · · · >” to
represent a preference with strength that matches the number of “>” in the
relation . One should remember that all these preferences are pre-determined
set upfront, i.e. unlike the Constrained Rationality preferences, these prefer-
ences are not calculated, and could not be verified nor validated.
Chapter 3 and 4 focused on the modelling and analysis of one-agent decision
making situations (and multi-agent decision making situations where the agents
act in an individualistic manner with no regard to others’ choices and decisions),
for simplicity, and in order to maintain the main focus of the two chapters on the
Constraints Rationality’s foundational concepts and methods. Chapter 5, on the
other hand, introduced the framework’s modelling and analysis process for multi-
agent decision making situations. Specifically, Chapter 5 introduced:
• The identification of two distinct types/modes of multi-agent decision making
situations: collaborative situations, and adversarial competitive situations
(the lateral called games in game theory literature or conflicts in the broader
management science and conflict analysis literature).
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• Two different processes for the modelling and analysis of the two different
multi-agent decision making situations.
• How the different concepts and methods of the Constrained Rationality mod-
elling and reasoning framework, introduced in Chapter 3 and 4, are modified
and extended to deal with the modelling and analysis of multi-agent decision
making situations.
• How agents’ cardinal and ordinal preferences, and their preferences’ strengths,
are calculated and modelled in collaborative decision making situations, and
in conflicts.
• How states of conflicts are defined, how complex conflicts structures (with
iterations and multiple phases) are modelled, and how the different types
of moves agents have among the conflict states help defining three types of
conflicts: non-cooperative conflicts, cooperative conflicts with no coalitions,
and cooperative conflicts with alliances and coalitions allowed and competing
in the conflicts.
• The relationships among the three conflict types, more specifically how co-
operative games with coalitions form the most general and broad type of
multi-agent conflicts, where cooperative game without coalitions form a sub-
set of the set of cooperative conflicts with coalitions, and non-cooperative
conflicts form a subset of the set of cooperative conflicts without coalitions.
Each of Chapters 6, 8 and 9 provided a detailed look at the specific modelling
and analysis needs of the three conflict types: non-cooperative, cooperative with-
out coalitions, and cooperative with coalitions, respectively. These chapters defined
formally the analysis process, moves, stability solution concepts, equilibrium con-
cepts, for each of the three conflict types. More specifically, Chapters 6, 8 and 9
defined formally for each of non-cooperative conflicts, cooperative conflicts without
coalitions, and cooperative conflicts with coalitions, respectively, the following:
• The different types of non-cooperative unilateral moves, and sanction moves,
that individual agents are allowed to make in all conflict types.
• The different types of cooperative single-step moves, and sanction moves,
that agents are allowed to make in cooperative games (with and without
coalitions).
• The multi-step cooperative moves, and sanction moves, that groups/coalitions
are allowed to make in cooperative games with coalitions.
529
• Four stability solution concepts, for all conflict types: Nash stability, Gen-
eral MetaRational (GMR) stability, Symmetric MetaRational (SMR) stabil-
ity, and Sequentially Stability (SEQ).
• Equilibrium states under these stability solution concepts.
• A unique and novel definition of the strength of a stability/equilibrium, under
each of the four solution concepts, with the strength of a stability/equilibrium
is assigned a fuzzy qualitative linguistic value label based on fuzzy member-
ship functions. This unique strength of a stability solution concept is based on
the novel complete calculated-and-verifiable preference relationship indicated
earlier. It provides a calculated and verifiable stability strength. For exam-
ple, traditional stability solution concepts definitions provided for GMCR by
(Fang et al., 1993) decides only whether a conflict’s state is stable or not-stable
under a certain stability concept, i.e. no strength of stability is provided. But,
these GMCR definitions were later extended by Hamouda et al. (2004), and
others such as Xu (2009), adding two/more level strength levels for a state’s
stability under a certain solution concept. But all these GMCR stability-
strength extended definitions are based on given pre-determined agents’ or-
dinal preferences that are set upfront, i.e. unlike the Constrained Rationality
preferences, these preferences are not calculated, and could not be verified nor
validated. Therefore, the stabilities’ strengths that Constrained Rationality
define can easily be calculated, verified, validated, and tied to the players’
motives and constraints. Changes in any of the contextual information about
the conflict and its players, will be reflected on the stability strength of the
conflict’s states for the agents.
• A set of formal robust algorithms to calculate the strength of stabilities and
equilibriums under each of the four solution concepts, and assign the right
strength value label for each state’s stability and/or equilibrium.
In Chapter 7, we provided a detailed discussion about the characteristics of
the four stability solution concepts (NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ); the theoretical
interrelationships among these solution concepts, generally; and the theoretical
interrelationships among these solution concepts’ strength sets. More specifically,
Chapter 7 defined formally the following (within the context of non-cooperative
games –for simplicity only–):
• a detail comparative look at the characteristics of the NASH, GMR, SMR
and SEQ stabilities.
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• a set of theorems and proofs describing formally the interrelationships among
the general sets of (stable states under each of) NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ.
• a novel and unique robust set of theorems and proofs describing formally the
interrelationships among the sets (of states stable under) different stability
strengths of NASH, GMR, SMR and SEQ.
The Constrained Rationality framework is build from the ground up as a set of
modelling and analysis modules connected through a coherent and complete sys-
tematic and methodological process. This gives its users the flexibility to use it
from start to finish as a complete framework and process to model and analyze
their decision making situation/conflict, or use only some modules of it in conjunc-
tion with other frameworks. For example, a user of a game theoretic approach, or
a user of a graph model for conflict resolution approach, whose structure uses or
mandates the use of such an approach, or a tool that embodies the use of such a
procedure, can continue using their approach for conflict modelling and analysis.
At the same time, they can use the Constrained Rationality’s goals and constrained
modelling module, the players’ priorities and emotions modelling module and the
preferences generation module for the purpose of validating the players’ preferences
in the conflicts they are studying. Constrained Rationality, in such case, is used
to test the validity of what is usually given as-is pre-determined (without justifi-
cation) preferences, ensuring the alignment of the players’ preferences with their
respective objectives and realities within the context of the conflict. Saying so, we
still recommend using Constrained Rationality as a complete framework and pro-
cess, even for people who are familiar with, or mandated to use, other approaches.
Using Constrained Rationality framework, in its totality with all its modelling and
analysis modules and process, will give these users a validation not only to the
players’ preferences, but also to the conflict analysis results generated using other
approaches.
Through out the thesis documents, we used illustrative and exploratory case
studies (as defined by Yin (2003), and as used by other comparative thesis and
research works – discussed in Section 2.6–) to show the effectiveness and benefits of
using the Constrained Rationality approach, in modelling and analyzing strategic
decision making situations and conflicts, in comparison to what current dominant
approaches provide. In selecting the illustrative and exploratory cases studies, and
application examples, to use, model and analyze in our thesis work, we tried to
cover:
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• Classical conflicts which are extensively used and modelled in the literature
(using the traditional and new-comer approaches alike). This allowed us to
compare our approach and models to what is provided in the literature.
• Historical conflicts which are extensively studied, modelled and analyzed in
the literature (such as the case of the Cuban Missile Crises). Using such con-
flict cases allows for objective comparison of the models and analysis produced
by our approach to what others provided.
• Cases and examples that spanned across the different types of problem and
application domains (listed in Chapter 1 under research objective as our re-
search’s application domains): from one agent (decision-maker) to multi-agent
cases; from political conflicts to business conflicts; from organizational (group)
conflicts to personal dilemmas; from historical conflicts to conflicts of current
interest; from strategic business/managerial conflicts to technology design
conflicts; and so on.
• Cases and application examples that allowed us to illustrate the full extent of
all the claimed benefits of our approach. For example, we used the Howard’s
Dilemma case (a hypothetical case used in the literature) to demonstrate
the modelling and analysis of a conflict where high emotions and personal
interests/attitudes exist.
• Cases that allowed us to illustrate the claimed “better than” benefits of our
approach (over other approaches), listed in Chapter 1 under research argu-
ments and propositions. For example, in order to show how our approach
compares-to, enhances and complements other approaches, namely here the
Conflict Analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), and the Graph Model of Conflict
Resolution (Fang, 1989; Fang et al., 1993) and the traditional Game-Theory’s
Rational Actor Model (Allison and Zelikow, 1999), we chose to model and
analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis (a political historical conflict), a noncooper-
ative conflict, and the Elmira Groundwater Contamination Conflict (a histor-
ical governmental and environmental policy conflict), a cooperative without
coalitions conflict.
The following case studies, and application examples, were used in this thesis
work. Each of these case studies/examples, its models and analysis using the Con-
strained Rationality framework (including the comparison with how others’ mod-
elled and analyzed the case) is a contribution to the research domain of decision
making modelling and analysis. The case studies/ examples used in this research
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work include:
1. One-Agent Decision Making Cases:
(a) Howard’s Personal Dilemma (hypothetical case from literature, with a
mix of high degrees of emotions and rationality) [Chapter 3 and 4]
(b) Car Manufacture’s Strategic Business Decision (hypothetical case study,
but based on a current real-life case simplified to fit the scope of our
research context) [Chapter 3]
2. Multi-Agent Decision Making Cases:
(a) Collaborative Multi-Agent Decision Making Situations:
i. System Requirements Engineering (hypothetical case study, but based
on a real-life industrial case simplified to fit the scope of our research
context) [Chapter 5]
(b) Competitive Adversarial Multi-Agent Decision Making Situations (also
called Conflicts or Games):
i. The Cuban Missile Crisis (non-cooperative historical political con-
flict - from literature) [Chapter 6]
ii. The Elmira Groundwater Contamination Conflict (a cooperative,
without coalitions, historical governmental and environmental policy
conflict, with possible hypergames - from literature) [Chapter 8]
iii. Is it Worth Fighting a Patent Troll? The Showdown between RIM
and NTP, as an example (a cooperative multi-phase, with coalitions,
historical intellectual property strategic business conflict) [Chapter
9]
3. Paradoxes of Rationality Cases:
(a) Classical Prisoner’s Dilemma (non-cooperative conflict - from literature)
[Chapter 7]
(b) Iterative Prisoners Dilemma, Classical and Tit-For-Tat (non-cooperative
conflict - from literature) [Chapter 7]
(c) Game of Chicken (non-cooperative conflict - from literature) [Chapter 7]
In these case studies, we demonstrated that our research central argument,
given in Chapter 1 under research objective, is true. In other words, using these
case studies, and application examples, we proved that:
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By structuring and conceptually modelling the strategic decision making problem
(within single or multi agent decision making environment and whether the
the decision-maker/agent is an individual, an organization, a robot, or a coali-
tion) by bringing the problem back to its roots: reasoning about options, and
alternatives, to satisfy the strategic and conflicting goals each agent has, given
the internal and external complex and conflicting realities (limitations and op-
portunities) each has.
Then more realistic modelling, insight and analysis of the strategic decision making
situations, or the real-life conflicts, could be reached, allowing for:
• better understanding of the full extent of the players’ options (current
and potential alternatives)
• better decision making, and sensitivity analysis
• better stability analysis and outcome prediction
• better dynamic modelling and simulation of evolving and changing decision-
making/conflicts
• better representation and testing of players’ different patterns of be-
haviour (based on priorities, needs, wants and emotional states)
Compared to what alternative-focused (as called by Keeney (1992)) decision the-
ory and game theory can provide. Not to mention that the proposed method-
ology, and the models it produces, can be used in fact to provide and/or verify
as well as explain the proxy cardinal and/or ordinal preferences these theories
use and need to order decision makers’ options.
Especially when applied to strategic decision making and conflicts and prob-
lems where: options of players are not clear or unknown, preferences could
not be defined or unclear, utility functions are hard to establish, and so on.
In all these case studies, and where there are models and analysis for them in
the literature using other frameworks, we showed how the Constrained Rational-
ity framework: performed better in addressing many of the limitations of current
frameworks (discussed in Chapter 2); provided better modelling and analysis facili-
ties; captured more contextual knowledge about the cases and the decision maker’s
motives and constraints; and provided more and better insight, learning and pre-
dictions. And, where there are no formal models and analysis exist in the decision
and game theoretic literature for a conflict, such as the case of RIM v. NTP –
an important business conflict with far reaching implications on patent laws and
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business practices–, we showed how the Constrained Rationality framework not
only provided models and analysis for this multi-stage multi-game complex real-life
strategic conflict, but also produced accurate predictions of how the conflict would
evolve.
10.2 Future Work
This research work proposed foundational concepts and methods, for the Con-
strained Rationality framework, that could be extended in many directions and
applied to many application domains. We see the follow-up future work, based
on this research, as a full scale research program with many research areas. The
following is a list of these areas, with some of the work items we intend to deliver,
within each area, in the near future:
Extensions to the Constrained Rationality Framework:
• Build risk analysis methods and tools for the framework.
• Add methods and tools to assist in modelling and reasoning strategic
decision making under uncertainties or unknowns (we have started work
on this item, based on our experience, using the framework in a product-
development industrial study which we have just finished).
• Add a set of more systemic and formal methods and tools to help auto-
mate the process of status quo analysis.
• Propose additional stability solution concepts under the different conflict
types/patterns, and redefine some of the useful existing ones (available
in the literature beyond what we have included –NASH, GMR, SMR
and SEQ– ).
• Add goal prioritization (and emotional valences) for all goals, not just the
strategic goals; and offer modelling and reasoning facilities to propagate
and consolidate these priorities (and emotional valences) under different
decision making situations and patterns.
• Offer modelling and reasoning facilities to handle additional attitudes,
beside the overall-acting Rational and Emotional ones the framework has
currently, such as: attitudes towards specific agents, types of agents, and
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types of decision making situations. In addition, offer modelling and rea-
soning facilities to handle more attitudes types, such as: aggressiveness,
easy-going, etc.
• Add Constraint-to-Constraint lateral relationships to capture the effect
that constraints have on each other; and Goal-to-Constraint lateral re-
lationships to capture the effect that goals’ achievement have on some
constraints.
• Expand on the use of Constraints and Alternatives within the frame-
work to match the rich and detailed definitions of both concepts given
in the ViVD-EKM conceptual modelling framework which Constrained
Rationality is based on.
• Add modelling facilities within the framework to make use of sophisti-
cated known creative thinking tools, in order to help the decision makers
generate alternatives/options creatively.
• Identify patterns of conflicts, and provide additional customized mod-
elling and analysis facilities for them.
• Offer additional formal modelling and analysis facilities specifically for
multi-level hypergames.
• Provide modelling and analysis facilities to capture and reason-about
different aspects of multi-agent conflicts, such as the organizational and
behavioural aspects Allison and Zelikow (1999) discussed for the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
Applications and Case Studies: Model and analyze real-life industrial decision
making situations and conflicts in the following areas, and report on the
findings and learnings:
• New Product Development
• Product Line Strategies
• Intellectual Property Strategies
• Business Acquisitions Strategies
• Research and Development Business Strategies
• Consumer Adoption and Marketing Strategies
• Systems Requirements Engineering
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• User Centric Designs and Usability Analysis
• Governmental Environmental and Infrastructure Policies
• Governmental Research and Development Funding Strategies
• Enhancing the Learning Environment and the Students Learning Expe-
rience in Higher Education
Experimental Studies and Comparative Analysis:
• Test the effectiveness of Constrained Rationality, in comparison to tradi-
tional decision support methods, in controlled strategic decision making
experiments
• Test the effectiveness of Constrained Rationality in capturing the ef-
fect of emotions and attitudes, in controlled strategic decision making
experiments
• Conduct comparative analysis studies: the Constrained Rationality frame-
work, its concepts and methods, versus other frameworks.
• Provide case studies to show how the Constrained Rationality frame-
work compliment other decision and conflict modelling frameworks, such
as game theory and the graph model for conflict resolution, and test
the effectiveness of Constrained Rationality in doing so, especially when
it comes to offering these framework mechanisms to validate the pre-
determined given-as-is options and preferences that they rely on, and to
connect them to the decision makers goals and constraints.
Decision Support System (DSS) and Tools:
• Integrate many of the Constrained Rationality’s DSS modules and tools,
which we built during this research work, into one DSS.
• Build model management facilities, specifically to deal with usability
and presentation issues due to the size of models (specially for real-life
full scale industrial decision making models).
• Complete the simulation engine, and integrate it into the DSS system.
• Add animation and visualization capabilities to the DSS system, spe-
cially for dynamic changes under simulation.
• Add an enhanced reporting facility to the DSS.
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• Add new pre-built modelling templates and components, for each specific
application area and conflict pattern, to aid the analysts and decision
makers through the modelling and analysis processes.
• Enhance the DSS and its components based on the learnings from the






Axiomatization of Goal-Goal and
Constraint-Goal Relationships
In this appendix, we will provide a complete set of ground relation axioms for all
the goal-to-goal and goal-to-constraint relationships, discussed in Chapter 3.
For this appendix, and for space and presentation reasons, we will assume that
the fuzzy value labels set L, which is introduced in Section 3.3 and has its elements
match in number and names the fuzzy sets chosen to divide the satisfaction levels
domain of the operationalization, achievement, and prevention value properties, to
be L={Full, Some,None,Null}={F, S,N,Null}, reflecting the fuzzy sets definition
as shown in Figure A.1, and with the order F>S>N>Null. This reduced set used
here replaces the full L={Full,Big,Much,Moderate, Some,Little,None,Null} with
the order Full>Big>Much>Moderate>Some>Little>None>Null, introduced in
Section 3.3 and reflected the sets definition as shown in Figure 3.3; and with the un-
derstanding that this is done for space and presentation concerns only and because
of the fact that the fuzzy set “Some” and its representative value label could be bro-
ken down, or extended using the same logic presented in this appendix, to form the
full list of fuzzy sets/labels between Full and None to: Big,Much,Moderate, Some,
and Little; or any other fuzzy sets/labels division of the value properties’ domains
that the framework’s user/application see fit.
For each value property, we introduce a set of predicates over goals and con-
straints, where Fachv(Gi) represents Achv(Gi) = Full, and Sachv(Gi) represents
Achv(Gi) = Some, Nachv(Gi) represents Achv(Gi) = None and Nullachv(Gi) rep-
resents Achv(Gi)=Null. We then introduce a total order where ∀G∈G :Fachv(G)≥
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Figure A.1: Smaller set of the Fuzzy Sets introduced earlier to divide the sat-
isfaction levels domain of the different Goals’ Value Properties (operationalization,
achievement, and prevention)
Sachv(G)≥Nachv(G)≥Nullachv(G). The same order exists for Opr and Prvn pred-
icates over goals, and for Achv and Prvn predicates over constraints. Then, the
following is the axiomatization of all the goal-to-goal relations (reduction and lat-
eral relations introduced in Section 3.4 of the paper), and all the constraint-to-goal
lateral relations (introduced in Section 3.5):
Axioms for the AND Reduction Relationship
(G1, G2)
and−→ G :
(Fopr(G1) ∧ Fopr(G2))→ Fopr(G) (A.1)
(Sopr(G1) ∧ Sopr(G2))→ Sopr(G) (A.2)
(Fopr(G1) ∧ Sopr(G2))→ Sopr(G) (A.3)
(Sopr(G1) ∧ Fopr(G2))→ Sopr(G) (A.4)
(Nopr(G1) ∧Nopr(G2))→ Nopr(G) (A.5)
(Nopr(G1) ∧ (Fopr(G2) ∨ Sopr(G2)))→ Nopr(G) (A.6)
((Fopr(G1) ∨ Sopr(G1)) ∧Nopr(G2))→ Nopr(G) (A.7)
(Nullopr(G1) ∨Nullopr(G2))→ Nullopr(G) (A.8)
(Fachv(G1) ∧ Fachv(G2))→ Fachv(G) (A.9)
(Sachv(G1) ∧ Sachv(G2))→ Sachv(G) (A.10)
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(Fachv(G1) ∧ Sachv(G2))→ Sachv(G) (A.11)
(Sachv(G1) ∧ Fachv(G2))→ Sachv(G) (A.12)
(Nachv(G1) ∧Nachv(G2))→ Nachv(G) (A.13)
(Nachv(G1) ∧ (Farch(G2) ∨ Sarch(G2)))→ Nachv(G) (A.14)
((Farch(G1) ∨ Sarch(G1)) ∧Nachv(G2))→ Nachv(G) (A.15)
(Nullarch(G1) ∨Nullarch(G2))→ Nullarch(G) (A.16)
(Fprvn(G1) ∨ Fprvn(G2))→ Fprvn(G) (A.17)
(Sprvn(G1) ∧ Sprvn(G2))→ Sprvn(G) (A.18)
(Sprvn(G1) ∧ (Nprvn(G2) ∨Nullprvn(G2)))→ Sprvn(G) (A.19)
((Nprvn(G1) ∨Nullprvn(G1)) ∧ Sprvn(G2))→ Sprvn(G) (A.20)
(Nprvn(G1) ∧Nprvn(G2))→ Nprvn(G) (A.21)
(Nprvn(G1) ∧Nullprvn(G2))→ Nprvn(G) (A.22)
(Nullprvn(G1) ∧Nprvn(G2))→ Nprvn(G) (A.23)
(Nullprvn(G1) ∧Nullprvn(G2))→ Nullprvn(G) (A.24)
Axioms for the OR Reduction Relationship
(G1, G2)
or−→ G :
(Fopr(G1) ∨ Fopr(G2)) −→ Fopr(G) (A.25)
(Sopr(G1) ∧ Sopr(G2)) −→ Sopr(G) (A.26)
(Sopr(G1) ∧ (Nopr(G2) ∨Nullopr(G2))) −→ Sopr(G) (A.27)
((Nopr(G1) ∨Nullopr(G1)) ∧ Sopr(G2)) −→ Sopr(G) (A.28)
(Nopr(G1) ∧Nopr(G2))→ Nopr(G) (A.29)
(Nopr(G1) ∧Nullopr(G2))→ Nopr(G) (A.30)
(Nullopr(G1) ∧Nopr(G2))→ Nopr(G) (A.31)
(Nullopr(G1) ∧Nullopr(G2))→ Nullopr(G) (A.32)
(Fachv(G1) ∨ Fachv(G2)) −→ Fachv(G) (A.33)
(Sachv(G1) ∧ Sachv(G2)) −→ Sachv(G) (A.34)
(Sachv(G1) ∧ (Nachv(G2) ∨Nullachv(G2))) −→ Sachv(G) (A.35)
((Nachv(G2) ∨Nullachv(G2)) ∧ Sachv(G2)) −→ Sachv(G) (A.36)
(Nachv(G1) ∧Nachv(G2))→ Nachv(G) (A.37)
(Nachv(G1) ∧Nullachv(G2))→ Nachv(G) (A.38)
(Nullachv(G1) ∧Nachv(G2))→ Nachv(G) (A.39)
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(Nullachv(G1) ∧Nullachv(G2))→ Nullachv(G) (A.40)
(Fprvn(G1) ∧ Fprvn(G2)) −→ Fprvn(G) (A.41)
(Sprvn(G1) ∧ Sprvn(G2)) −→ Sprvn(G) (A.42)
(Fprvn(G1) ∧ Sprvn(G2)) −→ Sprvn(G) (A.43)
(Sprvn(G1) ∧ Fprvn(G2)) −→ Sprvn(G) (A.44)
(Nprvn(G1) ∧Nprvn(G2))→ Nprvn(G) (A.45)
(Nprvn(G1) ∧ (Fprvn(G2) ∨ Sprvn(G2)))→ Nprvn(G) (A.46)
((Fprvn(G1) ∨ Pprvn(G1)) ∧Nprvn(G2))→ Nprvn(G) (A.47)
(Nullprvn(G1) ∨Nullprvn(G2))→ Nullprvn(G) (A.48)
Axioms for the Asymmetric Consistent G-G Lateral Relationships
G1
++−→ G :
Fopr(G1) −→ Fopr(G) (A.49)
Sopr(G1) −→ Sopr(G) (A.50)
Nopr(G1) −→ Nopr(G) (A.51)
Nullopr(G1) −→ Nullopr(G) (A.52)
Fachv(G1) −→ Fachv(G) (A.53)
Sachv(G1) −→ Sachv(G) (A.54)
Nachv(G1) −→ Nachv(G) (A.55)
Nullachv(G1) −→ Nullachv(G) (A.56)
G1
+(M+)−→ G :
if M = Full, then [G1
+(Full+)−→ G] ≡ [G1 ++−→ G] (A.57)
i.e. follow axioms: A.49 - A.56
if M = Some, then G1
+(Some+)−→ G :
(Fopr(G1) ∨ Sopr(G1)) −→ Sopr(G) (A.58)
Nopr(G1) −→ Nopr(G) (A.59)
Nullopr(G1) −→ Nullopr(G) (A.60)
(Fachv(G1) ∨ Sachv(G1)) −→ Sachv(G) (A.61)
Nachv(G1) −→ Nachv(G) (A.62)
Nullachv(G1) −→ Nullachv(G) (A.63)
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if M = None, then G1
+(None+)−→ G :
(Fopr(G1)∨Sopr(G1)∨Nopr(G1)) −→ Nopr(G) (A.64)
Nullopr(G1) −→ Nullopr(G) (A.65)
(Fachv(G1)∨Sachv(G1)∨Nachv(G1))−→Nachv(G) (A.66)
Nullachv(G1) −→ Nullachv(G) (A.67)






Fprvn(G1) −→ Fprvn(G) (A.70)
Sprvn(G1) −→ Sprvn(G) (A.71)
Nprvn(G1) −→ Nprvn(G) (A.72)
Nullprvn(G1) −→ Nullprvn(G) (A.73)
G1
−(M−)−→ G :
if M = Full, then [G1
−(Full−)−→ G] ≡ [G1 −−−→ G] (A.74)
i.e. follow axioms: A.70 - A.73
if M = Some, then G1
−(Some−)−→ G :
(Fprvn(G1) ∨ Sprvn(G1)) −→ Sprvn(G) (A.75)
Nprvn(G1) −→ Nprvn(G) (A.76)
Nullprvn(G1) −→ Nullprvn(G) (A.77)
if M = None, then; G1
−(None−)−→ G :
(Fprvn(G1)∨Sprvn(G1)∨Nprvn(G1))−→Nprvn(G) (A.78)
Nullprvn(G1) −→ Nullprvn(G) (A.79)
if M = Null, then G1
−(Null−)−→ G :
Nullprvn(G) (A.80)
Axioms for the Asymmetric Conflict G-G Lateral Relationships
G1
+−−→ G :
Fachv(G1) −→ Fprvn(G) (A.81)
Sachv(G1) −→ Sprvn(G) (A.82)
Narch(G1) −→ Nprvn(G) (A.83)




if M = Full, then [G1
+(Full−)−→ G] ≡ [G1 +−−→ G] (A.85)
i.e. follow axioms: A.81 - A.84
if M = Some, then G1
+(Some−)−→ G :
(Fachv(G1) ∨ Sachv(G1)) −→ Sprvn(G) (A.86)
Nachv(G1) −→ Nprvn(G) (A.87)
Nullachv(G1) −→ Nullprvn(G) (A.88)
if M = None, then G1
+(None−)−→ G :
(Fachv(G1)∨Sachv(G1)∨Nachv(G1))−→Nprvn(G) (A.89)
Nullachv(G1) −→ Nullprvn(G) (A.90)





Fprvn(G1) −→ Fachv(G) (A.92)
Sprvn(G1) −→ Sachv(G) (A.93)
Nprvn(G1) −→ Nachv(G) (A.94)
Nullprvn(G1) −→ Nullachv(G) (A.95)
G1
−(M+)−→ G :
if M = Full, then [G1
−(Full+)−→ G] ≡ [G1 −+−→ G] (A.96)
i.e. follow axioms: A.92 - A.95
if M = Some, then G1
−(Some+)−→ G :
(Fprvn(G1) ∨ Sprvn(G1)) −→ Sachv(G) (A.97)
Nprvn(G1) −→ Nachv(G) (A.98)
Nullprvn(G1) −→ Nullachv(G) (A.99)
if M = None, then G1
−(None+)−→ G :
(Fprvn(G1)∨Sprvn(G1)∨Nprvn(G1))−→Nachv(G) (A.100)
Nullprvn(G1) −→ Nullachv(G) (A.101)




Axioms for the Symmetric Consistent G-G Lateral Relationships
G1
=−→ G ≡ [G1 ++−→ G] ∪ [G1 −−−→ G] (A.103)
i.e. follow axioms: A.49 - A.56 and A.70 - A.73
G1
(M=)−→ G ≡ [G1
+(M+)−→ G] ∪ [G1
−(M−)−→ G] (A.104)
i.e. follow axioms: A.57 - A.69 and A.74 - A.80
Axioms for the Symmetric Conflict G-G Lateral Relationships
G1
×−→ G ≡ [G1 +−−→ G] ∪ [G1 −+−→ G] (A.105)
i.e. follow axioms: A.81 - A.84 and A.92 - A.95
G1
(M×)−→ G ≡ [G1
+(M−)−→ G] ∪ [G1
−(M+)−→ G] (A.106)
i.e. follow axioms: A.85 - A.91 and A.96 - A.102
Axioms for the Asymmetric Consistent C-G Lateral Relations
C
++−→ G :
Fachv(C) −→ Fachvup−lim(G) (A.107)
Sachv(C) −→ Sachvup−lim(G) (A.108)
Nachv(C) −→ Nachvup−lim(G) (A.109)
Nullachv(C) −→ Nullachvup−lim(G) (A.110)
C
+(M+)−→ G :
if M = Full, then [C
+(Full+)−→ G] ≡ [C ++−→ G] (A.111)
i.e. follow axioms: A.107 - A.110
if M = Some, then C
+(Some+)−→ G :
(Fachv(C)∨Sachv(C)) −→ Sachvup−lim(G) (A.112)
Nachv(C) −→ Nachvup−lim(G) (A.113)
Nullachv(C) −→ Nullachvup−lim(G) (A.114)
if M = None, then C
+(None+)−→ G :
(Fachv(C)∨Sachv(C)∨Nachv(C))−→Nachvup−lim(G) (A.115)
Nullachv(C) −→ Nullachvup−lim(G) (A.116)
547





Fprvn(C) −→ Fprvnlo−lim(G) (A.118)
Sprvn(C) −→ Sprvnlo−lim(G) (A.119)
Nprvn(C) −→ Nprvnlo−lim(G) (A.120)
Nullprvn(C) −→ Nullprvnlo−lim(G) (A.121)
C
−(M−)−→ G :
if M = Full, then [C
−(Full−)−→ G] ≡ [C −−−→ G] (A.122)
i.e. follow axioms: A.118 - A.121
if M = Some, then C
−(Some−)−→ G :
(Fprvn(C)∨Sprvn(C)) −→ Sprvnlo−lim(G) (A.123)
Nprvn(C) −→ Nprvnlo−lim(G) (A.124)
Nullprvn(C) −→ Nullprvnlo−lim(G) (A.125)
if M = None, then C
−(None−)−→ G :
(Fprvn(C)∨Sprvn(C)∨Nprvn(C))−→Nprvnlo−lim(G) (A.126)
Nullprvn(C) −→ Nullprvnlo−lim(G) (A.127)
if M = Null, then C
−(Null−)−→ G :
Nullprvnlo−lim(G) (A.128)
Axioms for the Asymmetric Conflict C-G Lateral Relations
C
+−−→ G :
Fachv(C) −→ Fprvnlo−lim(G) (A.129)
Sachv(C) −→ Sprvnlo−lim(G) (A.130)
Nachv(C) −→ Nprvnlo−lim(G) (A.131)
Nullachv(C) −→ Nullprvnlo−lim(G) (A.132)
C
+(M−)−→ G :
if M = Full, then [C
+(Full−)−→ G] ≡ [C +−−→ G] (A.133)
i.e. follow axioms: A.129 - A.132
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if M = Some, then C
+(Some−)−→ G :
(Fachv(C)∨Sachv(C)) −→ Sprvnlo−lim(G) (A.134)
Nachv(C) −→ Nprvnlo−lim(G) (A.135)
Nullachv(C) −→ Nullprvnlo−lim(G) (A.136)
if M = None, then C
+(None−)−→ G :
(Fachv(C)∨Sachv(C)∨Nachv(C))−→Nprvnlo−lim(G) (A.137)
Nullachv(C) −→ Nullprvnlo−lim(G) (A.138)





Fprvn(C) −→ Fachvup−lim(G) (A.140)
Sprvn(C) −→ Sachvup−lim(G) (A.141)
Nprvn(C) −→ Nachvup−lim(G) (A.142)
Nullprvn(C) −→ Nullachvup−lim(G) (A.143)
C
−(M+)−→ G :
if M = Full, then [C
−(Full+)−→ G] ≡ [C −+−→ G] (A.144)
i.e. follow axioms: A.140 - A.143
if M = Some, then C
−(Some+)−→ G :
(Fprvn(C)∨Sprvn(C)) −→ Sachvup−lim(G) (A.145)
Nprvn(C) −→ Nachvup−lim(G) (A.146)
Nullprvn(C) −→ Nullachvup−lim(G) (A.147)
if M = None, then C
−(None+)−→ G :
(Fprvn(C)∨Sprvn(C)∨Nprvn(C))−→Nachvup−lim(G) (A.148)
Nullprvn(C) −→ Nullachvup−lim(G) (A.149)
if M = Null, then C
−(Null+)−→ G :
Nullachvup−lim(G) (A.150)
Axioms for the Symmetric Consistent C-G Lateral Relations
C
=−→ G ≡ [C ++−→ G] ∪ [C −−−→ G] (A.151)
i.e. follow axioms: A.107 - A.110 and A.118 - A.121
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C
(=)−→ G ≡ [C +(M+)−→ G] ∪ [C −(M−)−→ G] (A.152)
i.e. follow axioms: A.111 - A.117 and A.122 - A.128
Axioms for the Symmetric Conflict C-G Lateral Relations
C
×−→ G ≡ [C +−−→ G] ∪ [C −+−→ G] (A.153)
i.e. follow axioms: A.129 - A.132 and A.140 - A.143
C
(×)−→ G ≡ [C +(M−)−→ G] ∪ [C −(M+)−→ G] (A.154)
i.e. follow axioms: A.133 - A.139 and A.144 - A.150
We, now, introduce the axioms for concluding the effect of multiple goal-to-
goal (reduction or lateral) and constraint-to-goal (lateral) relations on a single goal
node Gi. But first, let the achievement value predicate over the goal Gi be called
Lachv(Gi) where Lachv(Gi)∈{Fachv(Gi),Sachv(Gi),Nachv(Gi),Nullachv(Gi)}. Similarly,
let the operationalization value predicate over Gi be Lopr(Gi) ∈ {Fopr(Gi), Sopr(Gi),
Nopr(Gi), Nullopr(Gi)}, and the prevention value predicate over Gi be Lprvn(Gi)∈
{Fprvn(Gi),Sprvn(Gi),Nprvn(Gi),Nullprvn(Gi)}. For each relation r, and where r ∈
RG−Gi if r is a reduction or a G-G lateral relation that targets/ends-with Gi, or
r ∈ RC−Gi if r is a C-G lateral relation that targets/ends-with Gi, let the achieve-
ment, operationalization and prevention value predicates over Gi which results from
the relation r be represented as Lachvr (Gi), Loprr (Gi) and Lprvnr (Gi), respectively.
Finally, let the initial values’ predicates over G before the effect of the relation
is applied be noted as Lachv0 (Gi), Lopr0 (Gi) and Lprvn0 (Gi); and the final values’








Axioms for concluding the effect of multiple Relations on a goal Gi
If RG−Gi = RC−Gi = ∅


















(Gi) [then as per axiom A.103] (A.157)
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(Gi) [then as per axioms A.41-A.48] (A.160)















Soundness and Completeness of
the Goals’ Value-Labels Forward
Propagation Algorithm
In this appendix, we prove the correctness and completeness for the goals’ value-
label forward propagation algorithm, Label GCM Goals, provided in Chapter 3 as
Algorithm 3.1.
Let each of goalGi’s Achv(Gi), Opr(Gi) and Prvn(Gi) be represented generically
as a value function V (Gi). And similar to what has been said earlier in the paper,
that a value label assignment statement to the achievement value property of a
goal Gi, for example, represented as Achv(Gi) =Lachv where Lachv ∈ L, a generic
value label assignment statement for V (Gi) will be represented here as V (Gi)=L.
L ∈ L, and L is the universal set of actual value labels which could be assigned
to any of the value properties/functions of any goal, and given earlier as L =
{Full, Some,None,Null}, where Full > Sume > None > Null. It is important
to remember that the value label assignment statements for the different value
properties of goal nodes are also represented as predicates over goals. In addition,
the value label assignment statements of value properties of constraint nodes are
represented as predicates over constraints. Each of the V(Gi)=L and V(Ci)=L
statements has a predicate that is equivalent to it.
Let V (G) = L is said to be deduced from (V (G1) = Lg1), (V (G2) = Lg2),
. . . (V (Gn) =Lgn) and (V (C1) =Lc1), (V (C2) =Lc2), . . . (V (Cm) =Lcm) by means
of a Relation Axiom, one of the axioms listed in this appendix (A.1 - A.162),
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that leads to this deduction. For example, (Achv(G) = Full) can be deduced from
(Achv(G1) = Full) and (Achv(G2) = Full) by means of the Relation Axiom (A.9),
if and when ((G1, G2)
and−→ G) relation exists among G, G1 and G2.
On the other hand, let V (G) = L is said to be derives from (V (G1) = Lg1),
(V (G2) =Lg2), . . . (V (Gn) =Lgn) and (V (C1) =Lc1), (V (C2) =Lc2), . . . (V (Ccm) =
Lm) by means of a relation’s Propagation Rule, one of the propagation rules
listed earlier in the paper (3.1 - 3.45), that leads to this derivation. For exam-
ple, (Prvn(G)=Some) derives from (Achv(G1)=Full) by means of the propagation
rule (3.24), if and when (G1
+(Some−)−→ G) relation exists among G and G1.
The following Lemma states that the propagation rules listed in the paper are
nothing but a translation, or more precisely an aggregation/generalization, of the
axioms listed in this appendix.
Lemma B.0.1: V (G)=L derives from (V (G1)=Lg1), (V (G2)=Lg2), . . . (V (Gn)=
Lgn) and/or (V (C1) = Lc1), (V (C2) = Lc2), . . . (V (Cm) = Lcm) by means of the
Propagation Rules (3.1 - 3.45), if and only if V (G) = L can be deduced from
(V (G1) =Lg1), (V (G2) =Lg2), . . . (V (Gn) =Lgn) and/or (V (C1) =Lc1), (V (C2) =
Lc2), . . . (V (Cm)=Lcm) by applying one of the Relation Axioms (A.1 - A.162).
Proof. This Lemma states that propagation relation rules (3.1 - 3.45) are straight-
forward translation of the the relation axioms (A.1 - A.162). To prove the Lemma,
we will give the proof for only two of these propagation rules, and the rest can be
proved easily following the same logic.
Firstly, for the Propagation Rule (3.2), which states that “(G1, G2)
and−→G :Achv(G) =
min{Achv(G1), Achv(G2)}” :
From before, we said that any goal Gj will have, at any single point of time, an
achievement value property statement of (Achv(Gj)=Lachv), where Lachv ∈ L and
L={F, S,N,Null}. So, only one of these statements will be true for Gj at any single
point of time: (Achv(Gj)=F), (Achv(Gj)=S), (Achv(Gj)=N), or (Achv(Gj)=Null).
if. With two achievement value statements for two different goals, G1 andG2, at the
left side of the rule, and each has 4 possible labels assigned to them, then there
are 24, or 16, possibilities for the combination of Achv(G1) and Achv(G2). For
each combination, we shall show that a value for Achv(G) derives by applying
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the rule, matches one-to-one the value for it that is deduced by applying one
axiom (among the ones listed earlier: A.1 - A.162).
If (Achv(G1)=F) and (Achv(G2)=F) then (Achv(G)=F) is derived, using the
propagation rule (3.2), since min{F,F}=F. This matches one-to-one the fact
that from (Achv(G1)=F) and (Achv(G2)=F) axiom (A.9) is applied so that
(Achv(G)=F) is deduced. Similarly, if (Achv(G1)=S) and (Achv(G2)=S)
then (Achv(G)=S) is derived, and this matches one-to-one the fact that from
(Achv(G1)=S) and (Achv(G2)=S) axiom (A.10) is applied so that (Achv(G) =
S) is deduced; and if (Achv(G1)=N) and (Achv(G2)=N) then (Achv(G)=N)
is derived, then this matches one-to-one the fact that from (Achv(G1)=N)
and (Achv(G2)=N) axiom (A.13) is applied so that (Achv(G)=N) is deduced.
But, if (Achv(G1)=F) while (Achv(G2)=S), or vice versa, then (Achv(G)=S)
is derived since min{F, S}=S. This matches one-to-one the fact that from
(Achv(G1)=F) and (Achv(G2)=S) axiom (A.11), or axiom (A.12) if vice versa,
is applied so that (Achv(G)=S) is deduced. Similarly, if (Achv(G1)=N) while
((Achv(G2)=F) or (Achv(G2)=S)), or the opposite (i.e.(Achv(G2)=N) while
((Achv(G1)=F) or (Achv(G1)=S))), then (Achv(G)=N) is derived because
min{F, S,N}=N. This matches one-to-one the fact that from (Achv(G1)=N)
and ((Achv(G2)=F) or (Achv(G2)=P)) axiom (A.14), or axiom (A.15) if the
opposite, is applied so that (Achv(G)=N) is deduced.
Finally, we covered so far nine possibilities. The other remaining seven pos-
sibilities, which we still need to cover, are the ones where either (Achv(G1)=
Null) or (Achv(G2)=Null), or both. In such cases, (Achv(G)=Null) is derived,
because it represent the minimum in the order of all value labels exist in L,
and this matches one-to-one the fact that, in all these cases, axiom (A.16) is
applied so that (Achv(G)=Null) is deduced.
only if. The value of Achv(G) deduced by applying one of the axioms (A.1 - A.16)
matches one-to-one the value derives by means of propagation rule (3.2).
Secondly, for the Propagation Rule (3.24), which states that
“G1
+(M−)−→ G : Prvn(G) = min{Achv(G1),M}” :
if. Since the relation’s Modifier labelM ∈ L = {Full, Some,None,Null} = {F, S,N,Null},
then this rule covers four forms of the “+(M−)” relation. One form for each
possible value of M . We also know from before that, at any single point
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of time, the prevention value property statement of any goal Gj is given
as (Prvn(Gj) = Lprvn), where Lprvn ∈ L and L={F, S,N,Null}. So, only
one of these statements will be true for Gj at any single point of time:
(Prvn(Gj) = F), (Prvn(Gj) = S), (Prvn(Gj) = N), or (Prvn(Gj) = Null).
Similarly, at any single point of time, the achievement value property state-
ment of any goal Gj is given as (Achv(Gj) = Lachv), where Lachv ∈ L and
L={F, S,N,Null}. Therefore, only one of these statements will be true for Gj
at any single point of time: (Achv(Gj)=F), (Achv(Gj)=S), (Achv(Gj)=N), or
(Achv(Gj)=Null). This means that for each of the four forms of the “+(M−)”
relation, based on the M value, there are four possible values of Achv(G1) to
cover, to deduce a value for Prvn(G) by means of the rule.
First, when M=Full, then the relationship is G1
+(Full−)−→ G , or G1 +−−→G by the
equivalence stated in axiom (A.85): Now, if (Achv(G1)=F), then (Prvn(G)=
F) is derived by means of rule (3.24), since min{F,F}= F. This matches
one-to-one the fact that from (Achv(G1) = F) axiom (A.81) is applied so
that (Prvn(G) = F) is deduced. If (Achv(G1) = S), then (Prvn(G) = S) is
derived, since min{S,F}= S. This matches one-to-one the fact that from
(Achv(G1)=S) axiom (A.82) is applied so that (Prvn(G)=S) is deduced. And
if (Achv(G1)=N) [(Achv(G1)=Null)], then (Prvn(G)=N) [(Prvn(G)=Null)]
is derived, since min{N,F}=N [min{Null,F}=Null]. This matches one-to-one
the fact that from (Achv(G1)=N) [(Achv(G1)=Null)] axiom (A.83) [axiom
(A.84)] is applied so that (Prvn(G)=N) [(Prvn(G)=Null)] is deduced.
Second, whenM=Some, the relationship is “G1
+(Some−)−→ G : Here, if (Achv(G1)=
F), or if (Achv(G1)=S), then (Prvn(G)=S) is derived by means of rule (3.24),
since min{F, S}=S and min{S, S}=S. This matches one-to-one the fact that
from (Achv(G1) = F), or from (Achv(G1) = S), axiom (A.86) is applied so
that (Prvn(G)=S) is deduced. And if (Achv(G1)=N) [(Achv(G1)=Null)],
then (Prvn(G) = N) [(Prvn(G) = Null)] is derived, because min{N, S}= N
[min{Null, S}=Null]. This matches one-to-one the fact that from (Achv(G1)=
N) [(Achv(G1)=Null)] axiom (A.87) [axiom (A.88)] is applied so that (Prvn(G)=
N) [(Prvn(G)=Null)] is deduced.
Third, when M = None, the relationship is “G1
+(None−)−→ G : If (Achv(G1)=F),
(Achv(G1)=S), or (Achv(G1)=N), then (Prvn(G)=N) is derived by means of
rule (3.24), since min{F,N} = min{S,N} = min{N,N} = N. This matches
one-to-one the fact that from (Achv(G1)=F), (Achv(G1)=S), or (Achv(G1)=
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N), axiom (A.89) is applied so that (Prvn(G) = N) is deduced. And if
(Achv(G1)=Null), then (Prvn(G)=Null) is derived, because min{Null,N}=
Null. This matches one-to-one the fact that from (Achv(G1)=Null) axiom
(A.90) is applied so that (Prvn(G)=Null) is deduced.
Finally, when M = Null, the relationship is “G1
+(Null−)−→ G : If (Achv(G1)=
F), (Achv(G1)=S), (Achv(G1)=N), or (Achv(G1)=Null) then (Prvn(G)=
Null) is derived by means of rule (3.24), since min{F,Null}=min{S,Null} =
min{N,Null}=min{Null,Null}=Null. This matches one-to-one the fact that
from (Achv(G1)=F), (Achv(G1)=S), (Achv(G1)=N), or (Achv(G1)=Null),
axiom (A.91) is applied so that (Prvn(G)=Null) is deduced.
only if. The value of Prvn(G) deduced by applying one of the axioms (A.81
- A.91) matches one-to-one the value derives by means of propagation rule
(3.24).
Now, we state the correctness and completeness theorem for the goals’ value-
label forward propagation algorithm, Label GCM Goals, provided in Chapter 3 as
Algorithm 3.1.
Theorem B.0.2: Let Final G be the returned value-label-array by the algorithm
Label GCM Goals (GCM Graph 〈G, C,R〉, c-value-label-array Initial C, value-label-
array Initial G). The value statement (V (Gi)=Li) is true in Final G if and only if
the statement (V (Gi)=Li) can be deduced from Initial G and Initial C by applying
the relation axioms (A.1 - A.162).
Proof. Let the “deduced from Initial G and Initial C in k steps” be defined
inductively: (1) a value-label assignment statement/assertion in Initial G can
be deduced from Initial G in 0 steps; and (2) a value-label assignment state-
ment/assertion can be deduced from Initial G and Initial C in up to k + 1 steps
if either it can be deduced from Initial G and Initial C in up to k steps or it can
be deduced by applying a relation axiom to some assertions, all of which deduced
from Initial G and Initial C in up to k steps.
Let Current G
k
be the value label assignments statements of Current G after
k repeat-until loops (of the algorithm). We show that the value label assignment
statement (V (Gi) = Li) is true in Current Gk if and only if (V (Gi) = Li) can be
deduced from Initial G and Initial C in up to k steps.
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The thesis follows from the fact that Final G = Current G
k
for some k. We
then reason by induction on k: (1) the base case, in which k = 0, is obvious as
Current G0 = Initial G; and (2) by inductive hypothesis, we assume the thesis for
k and we prove it for k + 1.
If. If the value assignment statement (V (Gi)=Li) is deduced from Initial G and
Initial C in up to k + 1 steps, then (V (Gi) = Li) is deduced by applying
one of the relation axioms (A.1 - A.162) to some value assignment asser-
tions (V (G1) = Lg1), (V (G2) = Lg2), . . . (V (Gn) = Lgn), and/or (V (C1) =
Lc1), (V (C2) =Lc2), . . . (V (Cm) =Lcm), all of which could be deduced from
Initial G and Initial C in up to k steps. By inductive hypothesis, (V (G1)=
Lg1), (V (G2) = Lg2), . . . (V (Gn) = Ln) and (V (C1) = Lc1), (V (C2) = Lc2),
. . . (V (Cm) =Lcm) occur in Current Gk . By Lemma B.0.1, (V (Gi) =Li) de-
rives from (V (G1)=Lg1), (V (G2)=Lg2), . . . (V (Gn)=Lgn), and/or (V (C1)=
Lc1), (V (C2)=Lc2), . . . (V (Cm)=Lcm), by means of the propagation rules (3.1
- 3.45). Thus, if V (Gi) is one of Opr(Gi), Arch(Gi) or Prvn(Gi) , then Li is a
value label assigned to V (Gi) in Current Gk+1 through one of the statements
in lines 15, 16 or 17 [or lines 15, 25 or 26 if the goal is affected by constraints]
of the Label GCM Goals algorithm, respectively. These algorithm lines, as
directly stated in the algorithm, uses the propagation rules (3.1 - 3.45) to
conclude such value assignment. Thus, the value label assignment statement
(V (Gi)=Li) is true in Current Gk+1 .
Only if. Let statement (V (Gi) = Li) be true in Current Gk+1 . If (V (Gi) = Li)
is also true in Current G
k
, then, by inductive hypothesis, (V (Gi) =Li) can
be deduced from Initial G and Initial C in up to k steps, and therefore in
k+1 steps. Otherwise, if (V (G1)=Lg1), (V (G2)=Lg2), . . . (V (Gn)=Lgn) and
(V (C1)=Lc1), (V (C2)=Lc2), . . . (V (Cm)=Lcm) value assignment statements
are true in Current G
k
, and from which the value statement (V (Gi) = Li)
is derived by applying one of the propagation rules (3.1 - 3.45). Then,
by inductive hypothesis, (V (G1) = Lg1), (V (G2) = Lg2), . . . (V (Gn) = Lgn)
and (V (C1) = Lc1), (V (C2) = Lc2), . . . (V (Cm) = Lcm) can be deduced from
Initial G and Initial C in up to k steps. And by Lemma B.0.1, (V (Gi) ≥ Li)
can be deduced from (V (G1) = Lg1), (V (G2) = Lg2), . . . (V (Gn) = Lgn) and
(V (C1)=Lc1), (V (C2)=Lc2), . . . (V (Cm)=Lcm) by the application of one the
relation axioms (A.1 - A.162). Thus, the value label assignment statement
(V (Gi) = Li) can be deduced from Initial G and Initial C in up to k + 1
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steps.
By Theorem B.0.2, the value label assignments for all the goals’ value properties
(achievement, operationalization and prevention) which are returned by the La-
bel GCM Goals (GCM Graph 〈G, C,R〉, c-value-label-array Initial C, value-label-
array Initial G) algorithm, Algorithm 3.1, are the correct, complete and final value
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